Monroe & War January-May in 1814
Monroe & War August-September in 1814
Monroe & War November-December 1814
Secretary of State Monroe in 1815
Secretary of State Monroe in 1816
On 30 December 1813 President James Madison received a letter from
British Lord Castlereagh offering to negotiate a treaty without mediation by the Russians.
Madison was not sure how the Russians would react to that, and Secretary of State
James Monroe persuaded the President that the
Russians would be happy if they really wanted peace.
Monroe had explained that issue in his “Views Respecting the Rejection
of the Mediation of Russia” on 27 December 1813.1
President Madison appointed Speaker of the House of Representatives
Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell, who became the ambassador to Sweden
and Norway
on 8 January 1814, to join the American peace negotiators
at Ghent in the United Netherlands.
Albert Gallatin had been confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury,
and he was appointed to the team of the negotiators.
Senator George Campbell of Tennessee was Treasury Secretary for
most of 1814 and was succeeded by Alexander J. Dallas on October 5.
James Monroe on 5 January 1814 wrote this letter to Henry Clay:
The appropriation made for the last year for the
subsistence in foreign countries and the passages home
of our destitute seamen, being exhausted, and many
claims on that having been recently presented, which we
are unable to liquidate, I have to ask your early attention
to the subject of a new appropriation for this object,
conformable to the amount in the estimate laid before
you by the Treasury Department for the current year.
It seems proper, indeed, that the law of 1803 in
relation to seamen, which was adapted to a state
of peace, should be altogether repealed, and that
seamen, whether prisoners or not, in a destitute
condition, should be put on the same footing.
The law abovementioned according to the construction
given it, allows nothing more than ten dollars a man,
including provisions for the passage home, of seamen
from whatever part of the world they may have embarked.
In a state of peace this operation of the law was not
objected to, but since the war its effects on individuals
and even consuls have been very injurious.
With respect to prisoners it is different; there being
no law prescribing the allowances to be made on
their account, other than that appropriating a gross
yearly sum, a discretion is afforded for making
payments in relation to them, according to
circumstances, and as justice shall dictate.
I recommend therefore the abolition of the law of 1803
and the appropriation of a gross sum for destitute seamen,
to be expended on the same principle and under the
same supervision as that in relation to prisoners of war.2
On 18 January 1814 Secretary of State James Monroe sent a letter to
President Madison offering to provide information to help the peace negotiations
going on at St. Petersburg, Russia, and he wrote,
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the
Resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th inst.,
requesting the President to lay before the House such
documents relative to the Russian mediation, as in his
opinion it may not be improper to communicate, has the
honor to transmit to the President, for the information of the
House, the following letters in relation to that subject vizt.:
A letter in French (with a translation) from Mr. Daschkoff,
Envoy Extraordinary & minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to the
Secretary of State of the 8th March 1813, with the
answer of the Secretary of State of the 11th of March.
An Extract of a letter from the Secretary of State to
Mr. Adams, Minister of the United States at St. Petersburg
of the 1st July 1812 and four letters and extracts from
Mr. Adams to the Secretary of State, bearing date
respectively on the 30th September, 17th October
and 11th December 1812 & on the 26th June 1813.3
Monroe on 14 April 1814 sent this report to President Madison:
The Secretary of State to whom was
referred several Resolutions of the Senate of
the 2nd February and 9 March last, has the honor
to submit to the President the following report:
Although these resolutions are of different dates and
refer to subjects in some respects distinct in their nature,
yet as they are connected in others of considerable
importance which bear essentially on the conduct
of both parties in the present war, it is thought
proper to comprise them in the same report.
The first of these resolutions calls for the names of
the individuals who were selected from the American
prisoners of War and sent to Great Britain for trial;
their places of residence in the United States;
the times when and the Courts by which they were admitted
to become citizens, the regiments to which they belong,
when and where they were taken with copies of any official
correspondence respecting the treatment of prisoners of
war, and of any orders for retaliation on either side.
The other resolutions request information of the conduct
of Great Britain towards her native subjects, taken in arms
against her, and of the general practice of the nations of
Europe relative to naturalization, and the employment in
war, each of the subjects of the other; of the cases with
their circumstances in which any civilized nation has
punished its native subjects taken in arms against it,
for which punishment retaliation was inflicted by the
nation in whose service they were taken.
And lastly
Under what circumstances and on what grounds
Great Britain has refused to discharge native citizens
of the United States impressed into her service,
and what has been her conduct towards American
seamen on board her ships of war at and since the
commencement of the present war with the United States.
The paper marked A contains the names of the
American prisoners who were sent to England
for trial by the British Commander in Canada;
of the Corps to which they belong; of the times
when, and of the places where they were taken.
Of their places of residence in the United States;
of the times and the courts in which they were
admitted to become citizens, there is no evidence in
this Department, nor is there any to show whether they
were naturalized or native citizens of the United States.
This paper contains also a copy of the orders
of both Governments for retaliation and of the
correspondence between their respective
Commissaries, concerning the treatment of prisoners.
The paper marked B states various grounds on
which the British Government has refused to deliver
up American seamen impressed into the British
service on the application of the Agents of the
United States regularly authorized to demand
them with the correspondence relating to the same.
It communicates also such information as this
Department has been able to obtain of the
conduct of the British Government towards
American seamen on board British ships of war
at and since the commencement of the present war.
Among the causes assigned for their detention
the following are the most deserving of notice:
1 That they had no documents,
or that their documents were irregular.
2 That they were released from prison in Gothenburg.
3 That they were exchanged as British subjects.
4 Were said to be impostors.
5 To have married in England.
6 Did not answer the descriptions
given of them in their protections.
7 Had attempted to desert.
8 Were sent into the service for smuggling.
9 Were not to be found on board of the ship stated.
10 Had voluntarily entered into the British service.
11 Were natives of foreign Countries,
Prussia, Sweden, Italy &c.
It is possible that some of the seamen
whose discharges were demanded, may
not have been native Citizens of the United States,
but very presumable that the greater part were.
Indeed the pretext assigned for
their detention seems to admit it.
Had they been native subjects of England,
being there, their origin might have been traced.
But that is the ground in few instances only.
In urging that some had no protections or that their
protections were irregular; that others had been
exchanged as British prisoners; were impostors;
had attempted to desert; did not answer the protections
given them; were natives of Prussia, Sweden &c it is
fairly to be inferred that the public authority in England,
to whom this duty is assigned, sought rather to
evade the application, than to justify the refusal.
The pretext that some were natives of Prussia,
Sweden &c deserves particular attention.
On this circumstance the Secretary will remark only,
that in extending impressment in American vessels to
persons who could not be mistaken for British subjects,
and refusing to surrender them on application to
the voluntary service from which they were taken,
it is evident that the recovery of British seamen
has not been the sole object of the practice.
By the report of the American Commissary of
prisoners in England it appears that a considerable
number of our seamen have been transferred from British
ships of war to prisons; that their exchange for British
seamen taken in battle was demanded in the first instance;
but that that claim seems to have been since waived.
It might have been expected that the British Government,
on being satisfied that these men or that any of
them were American citizens would have liberated
and sent them home at its own charge.
They are however, still held prisoners in confinement.
That many of them, if not all, are native citizens,
cannot be doubted, for had the proof not been irresistible,
it cannot be presumed, while so many others are
detained on board British ships of war, that these
would have been exempted from that service.
That many are still detained on board British ships
of war may be fairly inferred, even without other evidence,
from the indiscriminate manner of British impressment;
from the distant service in which the men thus impressed
are often necessarily employed, depriving their
friends of an opportunity to communicate with them;
and from the inconsiderable number discharged,
compared with that which has been demanded.
Without relying altogether on the reports heretofore
made to Congress by this Department the letter
of Commodore Rogers, hereunto annexed, affords
data from which an estimate may be formed.
On this point the correspondence between
General Taylor and the Captain of the British
ship the Dragon, and Commodore Decatur and
Commodore Capel deserve also particular attention.
If the British Government would order a strict search
to be made through the British Navy for American seamen,
it would then be seen how many of our native citizens
have participated in the lot of the unfortunate men
mentioned in the correspondences referred to.
The contrast which these documents present in
the pretensions and conduct of Great Britain with
the pretensions and conduct of the United States
cannot fail to make a deep impression in favor of the latter.
The British Government impresses into its Navy native
citizens of the United States and compels them to serve in it,
and in many instances even to fight against their country,
while it arrests as traitors and menaces with death
persons suspected to be native British subjects for
having fought under our standard against British forces,
although they had voluntarily entered into our army,
after having emigrated to the United States, and
incorporated themselves into the American society.
The United States, on the other hand, have forced no
persons into their service, nor have they sought, nor
are they disposed to punish any who, after having freely
emigrated to any part of the British dominions and settled
there, may have entered voluntarily into the British army.
The remaining enquiries relate to objects other than
the immediate conduct of the parties in the present war.
They demand information of the conduct of
Great Britain and of other powers in past
Times without limitation in the retrospect in
circumstances bearing on the question of retaliation.
The information required relates to the following points:
1 The conduct of Great Britain and the other
nations of Europe as to naturalization and the
employment in war, each of the subjects of the other.
2 As to the punishment of their native subjects taken
in arms against them in the service of other powers.
3 Examples of retaliation by the latter in such cases.
These enquiries necessarily involve an extensive research
into the history and jurisprudence of the nations of Europe.
For so important a task, the other duties
of the Secretary of State have altogether
disqualified him, since the call was made.
The approaching close of the Session does not leave
him time for more than the following observations:
That all the nations of Europe naturalize foreigners;
That they all employ in their service the subjects
of each other, and frequently against their native
countries, even when not regularly naturalized;
That they all allow their own subjects
to emigrate to foreign Countries;
That although examples may be found of the
punishment of their native subjects taken in arms
against them, the examples are few and have either
been marked by peculiar circumstances, taking them
out of the controverted principle, or have proceeded
from the passions or policy of the occasion.
Even in prosecutions & convictions having the
latter origin, the final act of punishment has
with little exception been prevented by a sense
of equity and humanity, or a dread of retaliation.
It is confidently believed that no instance can be found
in which the alleged purposes of the enemy against the
23 prisoners in question, under all the circumstances
which belong to their case, even should any of them
not have been regularly naturalized, are countenanced
by the proceedings of any European nation.
That if no instances occur of retaliation in the
few cases requiring it, or in any of them, by the
Governments employing such persons, it has been,
as is presumed, because the punishment which
had been inflicted by the native Country, might
be accounted for on some principle other than
its denial of the right of emigration and naturalization.
Had the Government employing the persons so punished
by their native country retaliated in such cases,
it might have incurred the reproach either of countenancing
acknowledged crimes, or of following the example of the
other party in acts of cruelty, exciting horror, rather than
of fulfilling its pledge to innocent persons in support of rights
fairly obtained, and sanctioned by the general opinion, and
practice of all the nations of Europe, ancient and modern.
All which is respectfully submitted.4
On 14 May 1814 Monroe sent this letter on recent loans to President Madison:
I enclose you two letters on the subject of finance,
one from Mr. Astor, the other from Mr. Parish, the latter
sent me by Mr. Dallas whose letter is also enclosed.
The two last have been shown to Mr. Campbell;
the first would have been, had Mr. Astor
not have written it to Mr. Campbell himself.
On this subject I have put together some few
remarks, suggested to me, by what I saw abroad,
particularly in the negotiation for Louisiana,
and the communications into which it led with the
houses of Hope and Baring, which I also enclose to you.
The agent to be employed in such a trust, should in my
opinion be a political character of respectability & of
great purity, unconnected with commerce and loans.
In looking about for such a person, Mr. Short has
occurred as the most fit, but I have not mentioned
him to any one, nor indeed have I spoken to any one,
Mr. Campbell excepted of late, on the subject.
Mr. Campbell thinks that a contract might be
formed with Messrs. Astor, Parish & Girard,
for 5 or even ten millions on the terms of the
last loan, giving them credit for the payments.
I received yesterday a letter from Col. Pinkney
communicating the result of a conference with
Col. Baynes by which it appears that much surprise
was expressed by Prevost, that the idea of an
armistice along the coast should have been thought
of after the reply to General Winder on that point.
Mr. Prevost in appointing Baynes to treat gasconades
as usual, accepting to the overture as a favorable
evidence of the sincerity of this government to
terminate the negotiation at Gothenburg by peace.
I sent the dispatch to General Armstrong yesterday
but will endeavor to get & forward it to you today.5
Monroe also enclosed with that letter more information on various loans.
President Madison had replaced the unpopular Secretary of War William Eustis
in January 1813 by appointing General John Armstrong.
Monroe found Armstrong to be incompetent, and in August he warned him that the
British might sail their ships of the Potomac River to attack the capital city of Washington.
Armstrong replied that he did not think British ships could do that.
Monroe advised Armstrong to use a network of express riders
to watch the British around Chesapeake Bay.
Monroe had been warning Madison about Armstrong since February 1813,
and now Monroe decided to scout the British ships himself.
He criticized making the Secretary of War also the chief general.
When it was learned that British ships were in the Potomac River,
General Armstrong took his 600 troops to Fort Washington.
Brigadier General Winder had 250 men from Maryland’s militia, and he left
Washington to take them ten miles away to Bladensburg, Maryland.
On 20 August 1814 Monroe in this letter warned Madison
that British forces would likely attack the city of Washington:
I arrived here this morning at 8 o’ Clock, and have been
since within 4 miles of Benedict at Butler’s mill, where
it was reported the enemy on their march had arrived.
The report was unfounded.
The enemy landed yesterday at Benedict
and had advanced their pickets within a
mile and a half of that mill for security only.
From a height between that mill and the Patuxent,
I had a view of their shipping; but being at the distance of
three miles and having no glass, we could not count them.
We shall take better views in the course of the
evening, and should anything be seen material,
I will immediately advise you of it.
The general idea is that they are still debarking
their troops, the number of which, I have not
obtained any satisfactory information of.
The general idea also is that Washington is their object,
but of this I can form no opinion at this time.
The best security against the attempt is
an adequate preparation to repel it.6
On the next day Monroe sent this letter to Madison
to report on enemy troops he had observed:
I quartered last night near charlotte Hall and took a view
this morning at 8 o’ clock from a commanding height below
Benedict Creek of all the enemy’s shipping near the town
and down the river to the distance at least of 8 or 10 miles.
I counted 23 Square-rigged vessels.
Few others were to be seen and very few barges.
I inferred from the latter circumstance that the enemy had
moved up the river, either against Commodore Barney’s
flotilla at Nottingham, confining their views to that object,
or taking that in their way and aiming at the City
in combination with the force on the Potomac,
of which I have no correct information.
I had, when I left Acquasco mills last night, intended to
have passed over to the Potomac, after giving you an
account of their vessels from the height below Benedict;
but on observing the very tranquil scene, which I have
mentioned, I was led by the inference I drew from it,
to hasten back to take a view of the enemy’s movements
in this quarter, which it might be more important
to the government to be made acquainted with.
I am now on the main road from Washington
to Benedict 12 miles from the latter and find
that no troops have passed in this direction.
The reports make it probable, that a force by
land and water has been sent against the flotilla.
I shall proceed with Captain Thornton’s troop
Immediately to Nottingham and write you
thence whatever may be deserving notice.
The enemy have plundered the country to the
distance of three or four miles of all their stock &ca.
The intelligence of the enemies force in the
Potomac varies here as much as in Washington.
I have had no means of forming a correct estimate of it.7
Monroe wrote three letters to Madison on August 21,
and this is the third one written at 11 p.m.:
I have this moment arrived here from
Nottingham, which I left, as the enemy entered it.
Not knowing that there had been a correspondent
movement of troops by land with those in the barges
with any degree of certainty, when I wrote you last
and seeing nothing of such a force, as I went on to
Nottingham, I had almost discredited the report.
Nevertheless we placed a guard at some
distance in our rear as a measure of
precaution, which was drawn in too soon.
Having amused the enemy in advance before the town
with a show of our troops for some time to let some
property be moved off and delay their taking possession
in the hope of collecting some troops by the morning
for its defense, our retreat had like to be cut off
by a land force which was actually in our rear.
We observed it at the precise moment when our retreat
was still practicable, which we effected without delay,
& with that dispatch which the occasion required.
This is important as relates to the force.
This land force was afterwards observed by Col. Bell,
who commands the 17th Regiment, who says that the
whole lane for ¾ of a mile was covered with it in Column.
He thinks that this force must have
amounted to at least 4,000 men.
This being the case, it seems to be almost
certain that the city is the object, & we ought
to expect to see the force in motion tomorrow.
There were probably in the barges 8 or 1,000 men.
It was reported today that the vessels on
the Potomac had passed the kettle bottoms.
The movement in the two rivers is doubtless combined.
If it was known that that on the Potomac
was a feint, troops might be drawn thence
to meet the serious force in this quarter.
Not knowing it, we must act on a contrary principle.
General Winder intends placing the Alexandria brigade
on the Piscataway heights to support Fort Washington.
The neighboring militia of Virginia, should be hurried
down to occupy the ground below Alexandria,
or the British force will be landed on that side,
take Alexandria and approach the city.
This should be done tonight to
Loudoun, Fairfax, & other counties.
William Jones in the city, John Graham,
& his brother in Virginia, every man who
can raise a man should be drawn out.
The arrangement here will be by opposing the
movement in front with all the force we have to direct
the troops from Baltimore to attack the enemy in rear.
The difficulty is to find force to meet the enemy
at both points on so short a notice of their movement.
If they can be checked, we must destroy them,
& we surely can check them.
I have much confidence in our
success, but the trial will be great,
and I trust the exertion equal to it.8
On August 22 Monroe sent three short messages to Madison
at 5 and 10 in the morning and at 9 p.m.
This is what he wrote at 10 a.m.
Since mine of this morning Tatham has
arrived and speaks of reinforcements to the
first Column of the Enemy at Nottingham.
Taylor, I understand, is also here just from Parker
with a report that the Enemy have 3,000 in the Potomac.
This must be a great exaggeration, if there
be not more shipping than we know of.
It would seem not improbable that if they have
land force of any sensible importance, that it
would be equal to some distinct object, otherwise it
would not be taken from the real operative force.
It is said Parker is moving up parallel with the frigates;
but at what point they were I do not learn.
I take for granted that there are arrangements where
you are for quick intelligence from every important point.
The papers of all the Offices are
under way to retired places.
I fear not much can be done more than has been
done to strengthen the hands of General Winder.
As fast as succors arrive here, they will be hastened on;
but the crisis, I presume, will be of such short duration,
that but few even from the neighboring country
will be on the ground before it is over.
General Douglas’s Brigade will receive
another spur—so will the militia who are
to rendezvous at a Church in Fairfax near this.
Wadsworth is taking measures for defensive
works on the road about Bladensburg.
It appears that the reinforcements
in Canada amount to 8 or 10,000.9
On August 24 the British forces captured the city of Washington.
On August 26 at 10 p. m. Madison from Brookville sent this letter to Monroe:
I expected this morning to have reached
General Winder & yourself before your departure
from Montgomery Court House but was delayed
so that I did not arrive there till 6 o’ clock.
Partly to obtain quarters, partly with a view to be within
communication with you, I have proceeded thus far in
company with Mr. Rush General Mason &c; and avail myself
of the Bearer to inform you that I will either wait here till
you join me or follow & join you as you may think best.
Let me know your idea on the subject by the bearer.
If you decide on coming hither, the sooner the better.
Mr. Rush will remain here also.
Mr. Jones is with my family & his own on the
other side of the Potomac; but will come to
the City the moment he hears of its evacuation.
General Armstrong & Mr. Campbell are,
I understand, at Fredericktown.
I shall give them immediate notice of the change in
the state of things and desire them to conform to it.
A letter from General Smith (of Winchester) to General
Armstrong was put into my hands by an express at
Montgomery Court House stating that a Brigade of
Militia would come on or not as might be desired.
I have sent it open to General Winder who can
judge best of the answer proper to be given
and will act on the letter accordingly.10
The British in 24 hours destroyed every public building in Washington
except the Patent Office because they thought some British citizens
may have had patents from there.
The British had also spared residential houses except for four where
shots were fired at them from those.
Their soldiers left Washington on August 26.
The next day Madison and Monroe returned to the devastated capital,
and Madison appointed Monroe a temporary Secretary of War
and the supreme commander in the city.
Monroe informed Madison that General Winder had taken
his troops to defend Baltimore, Maryland.
Some citizens in Washington city were preparing to capitulate to the British,
and President Madison cancelled that.
Monroe said that “any deputation that moved toward the enemy
would be repelled by the bayonet.”11
On 1 September 1814 President James Madison and Secretary of State
James Monroe announced this Proclamation
upon British Depredations, Burning of the Capitol:
Whereas the enemy by a sudden incursion have
succeeded in invading the capital of the nation, defended
at the moment by troops less numerous than their own
and almost entirely of the militia, during their possession
of which, though for a single day only, they wantonly destroyed the public
edifices, having no relation in their structure to operations of war nor used at
the time for military annoyance, some of these edifices being also costly
monuments of taste and of the arts, and others depositories
of the public archives, not only precious to the nation as
the memorials of its origin and its early transactions,
but interesting to all nations as contributions to the general stock
of historical instruction and political science; andWhereas advantage has been taken of the loss of a fort
more immediately guarding the neighboring town of
Alexandria to place the town within the range of a naval
force too long and too much in the habit of abusing its
superiority wherever it can be applied to require as the
alternative of a general conflagration an undisturbed
plunder of private property, which has been executed
in a manner peculiarly distressing to the inhabitants,
who had inconsiderately cast themselves upon the
justice and generosity of the victor; andWhereas it now appears by a direct communication from
the British commander on the American station to be his
avowed purpose to employ the force under his direction
"in destroying and laying waste such towns and districts
upon the coast as may be found assailable," adding to
this declaration the insulting pretext that it is in retaliation
for a wanton destruction committed by the army of the
United States in Upper Canada, when it is notorious that
no destruction has been committed, which, notwithstanding
the multiplied outrages previously committed by the enemy
was not unauthorized, and promptly shown to be so,
and that the United States have been as constant in their
endeavors to reclaim the enemy from such outrages by
the contrast of their own example as they have been ready
to terminate on reasonable conditions the war itself; andWhereas these proceedings and declared purposes,
which exhibit a deliberate disregard of the principles of
humanity and the rules of civilized warfare, and which
must give to the existing war a character of extended
devastation and barbarism at the very moment of
negotiations for peace, invited by the enemy himself, leave
no prospect of safety to anything within the reach of his
predatory and incendiary operations but in manful and
universal determination to chastise and expel the invader:Now, therefore, I, James Madison. President of
the United States, do issue this my proclamation,
exhorting all the good people thereof to unite
their hearts and hands in giving effect to the
ample means possessed for that purpose.
I enjoin it on all officers, civil and military, to exert
themselves in executing the duties with which they
are respectively charged; and more especially I require
the officers commanding the respective military districts
to be vigilant and alert in providing for the defense
thereof, for the more effectual accomplishment of which
they are authorized to call to the defense of exposed and
threatened places portions of the militia most convenient
thereto, whether they be or be not parts of the quotas
detached for the service of the United States under
requisitions of the General Government.On an occasion which appeals so forcibly to the proud
feelings and patriotic devotion of the American people
none will forget what they owe to themselves, what
they owe to their country and the high destinies which
await it, what to the glory acquired by their fathers
in establishing the independence which is now to be
maintained by their sons with the augmented strength and
resources with which time and Heaven had blessed them.In testimony whereof I have hereunto
set my hand and caused the seal of the
United States to be affixed to these presents.12
Secretary of State Monroe was most useful to Madison
and was also put in charge of the War Department in September 1814.
Monroe wrote this letter to President Madison on September 7:
It is necessary that I should distinctly understand
my own situation to give to it the greatest effect.
In the absence of the Secretary of War,
on your arrival here and of General Winder,
the duties of both devolved on me.
It was your desire that I should act in both places,
and the desire of the officers & citizens concurred.
The duties of the military commander were undertaken
not on the principle that I might exercise them as
secretary at war, but common consent founded
on & growing out of the actual emergency.
In discharge of those duties I have acted on those
principles, and I think that affairs are in such a train
as to promise a happy result, not only here, but, at
Baltimore & elsewhere, provided I have adequate support.
Since my return, I understand that General Winder
has acted in my absence as commander of the district
in detailing a guard to you, and perhaps in other things.
This of course tends to deprive me of all military command.
You may recollect that before he came here, I offered
to you to resign the momentary power which I had
assumed, to him and repeated the same to him
after his arrival, which you forbade, & he declined.
Unless I am strongly supported I had better decline at once.
There can be no interfering command or authority,
and I am far from wishing to embarrass others.
I prefer to aid them as a volunteer,
though I am not unwilling to take any
ground with the responsibility attached to it,
which you may think proper & support me in.13
The Americans defeated a British attack on Baltimore on September 7,
and Francis Scott Key wrote a song about “bombs bursting in air.”
The “Star-Spangled Banner” would not become the official national anthem
until Congress and President Hoover approved it in 1931.
On September 14 the British forces ended their attacks on Fort McHenry
near Baltimore, and they retreated to Chesapeake Bay.
General Jackson’s army had fought against four British ships
at Pensacola on September 12.
Then he led them to New Orleans, and they arrived on December 1.
Monroe proposed a standing army of 100,000 men.
He suggested that Treasury Secretary Dallas and Congress found
the Second Bank of the United States with $50 million.
Congress approved an army of 10,000 and allowed the President
to call up as many as 40,000 for temporary service.
After the Federalists decided at Hartford not to secede,
Monroe ordered the militia there to stand down.
Monroe from the War Department wrote
to General Andrew Jackson on September 27:
By your last letters it seems probable that a
considerable British force had been landed at
Pensacola with the connivance of the Spanish authorities
there, and at Havana; and by other intelligence it may
be presumed that a pressure, or at least a menace
will be made on the Western side of the Mississippi by
Nacagdoches and Natchitoches, which latter will probably
be by Spanish troops and for the purpose of menace only.
You have had at your command all the regular
force in the District with the detailed militia in
Louisiana & Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee.
And you have also had authority to engage on our side
the warriors of the Choctaw, Chickasaw & Creek Nations,
or so many of them as you might think proper to employ,
having it in view at the same time to secure the affection
and neutrality of all the members of those tribes.
It is known that the regular troops are distributed
into many posts, and that the militia of Louisiana
will be less efficient for general purposes from
the dread of domestic insurrection, so that on the
militia of Tennessee your principal reliance must be.
The President, taking all circumstances into
consideration, has thought proper to order five
thousand additional troops from Tennessee to march
to your aid as soon as possible in the most direct and
convenient routes, unless before they set out on their
march they shall receive countermanding orders from you.
He has likewise requested the Governor of Georgia
to hold in readiness, subject to your order, twenty-five
thousand men, on the presumption that a cooperating
force from that quarter may possibly be necessary.
I send you a copy of my letter to the Governor
of Tennessee, to whom you will hasten
to communicate your views and wishes.
Full confidence is entertained in your judgment in the
discharge of this discretionary power vested in you.
Measures are taken for procuring in the
neighborhood towns, and forwarding to your
order, blankets, and some other presents for
the Creeks, Choctaws, and other friendly Indians.
These will be sent by wagons direct to—.
Apprehending much difficulty in the prosecution of
your campaign, which it may not be in your power to
remove without money, I have transmitted to Governor
Blount one hundred thousand dollars in Treasury notes
to be applied to the necessary expenses of the campaign,
in discharging Indian claims and supplying their wants,
an object to be attended to at the present time,
equally from motives of policy and humanity.
You will therefore draw on him for the necessary funds.
Should it be found more convenient,
you are authorized to draw on this Department
for such expenditures at sixty or thirty days sight.14
On 30 November 1814 James Monroe wrote this letter to Jefferson:
Dispatches are received from our ministers as late of
the 31 ultimo, at which time the negotiation was depending.
On paper serious difficulties seem to be
Removed, and few only to remain, the
principal one of which is however important.
Impressment is laid aside, for the reason urged in the
instructions to our ministers, which is strengthened by being
used as an argument on the part of the British ministers.
The Indian boundary is given up by them with
the claim to the exclusive command of the lakes
& occupancy of our Shore for military purposes.
A stipulation of peace for the tribes fighting on their
side to be reciprocal is all that is desired on that
point & to that our ministers have assented.
In this stage, the uti possidetis was proposed,
as the basis of the treaty relating to limits &
was suggested by intelligence that British troops
had taken possession of certain parts of Maine,
which was rejected by our gentlemen.
Thus it appears that the principal obstacle
to accommodation is the desire of the British
government to hold a part of Massachusetts,
to retain which the war goes on.
Our gentlemen think that if this difficulty was settled,
another would arise, believing that they are gaining
time only to see the result of negotiations at Vienna,
which is very uncertain, but more likely
to preserve peace than produce war.
The communication will go to Congress today but
presuming that it will not be in time for the mail—
I endeavor to give you an idea of the contents—15
James Monroe learned that 10,000 American soldiers in New Orleans
were lacking weapons, and he sent rifles with bayonets
to General Andrew Jackson in November.
Monroe from the Department of War wrote this letter
to General Jackson on 7 December 1814:
I hope that my letter to you of the 21st of October
had reached you in time to prevent the attack which you
then contemplated making on the British at Pensacola.
As the conduct of the Spanish authorities there may
justify the measure, the President desires that it
may be avoided in the hope that the new efforts
which he is now making to obtain justice, and
preserve amity with that power, may be successful.
Should you have made the proposed attack, you will,
on the receipt of this letter, withdraw your troops from
the Spanish Territory, declaring that you had entered it
for the sole purpose of freeing it from British violation.
General Gaines is ordered to join you and
act under you in the defense of New Orleans,
and of the district under your command.
Full confidence is entertained that the appointment
of an officer of his merit will afford you a very acceptable
aid in the discharge of your highly important duties.
Recent intelligence tends to confirm the intelligence
before entertained that the enemy have already,
or will soon make an attack on New Orleans.
A strong force from Europe connected with that
which lately infested this bay, and the troops
released from Guadeloupe and Martinique were
said to be making preparation to assail you.
I need not assure you of the entire confidence which exists,
that you and the troops under you will do your duty.
Much anxiety is felt lest you should remain too long
on the Mobile, or at other points east of New Orleans.
The city, it is presumed, is a principal object of the enemy,
and it cannot be defended on either of the passes by which
it may be approached, one by the river Mississippi itself,
another by La Fouche, the third by Lake Pontchartrain,
without occupying the ground bearing on those passes.
The Indian goods will have reached you,
I presume, before you receive this letter.
You shall want for nothing necessary to your comfort,
and to that of our fellow citizens acting under you,
which your country can supply.16
In December several New England states sent delegates to a convention
at Hartford, Connecticut, and they debated and eventually rejected secession.
Monroe sent Col. Thomas S. Jesup to Hartford as a confidential agent
who pretended that he was recruiting soldiers.
On 21 December 1814 James Monroe sent this letter to Thomas Jefferson:
On enquiry I found that Major Armstead had been
regularly appointed principal assessor for our district by the
advice of the Senate & been furnished with his commission.
It had been intended, as I understood, to appoint Mr. Minor,
but the office of Collector, having been disposed of in
our county, it was decided on the distributive principle to
confer the other office on some person in another county.
The functions of the assessor having hitherto
been suspended, led to the mistake that
the office had not been disposed of.
I have never been in a situation of so much difficulty
& embarrassment as that in which I find myself.
I came into it not as a volunteer.
This city might have been saved, had the
measures proposed by the President to the heads of
departments on the 1st of July and advised by them,
and ordered by him, been carried into effect.
For this there was full time before the attack was made.
Whatever may be the merits of General Winder,
who is undoubtedly intelligent & brave, an infatuation
seemed to have taken possession of General Armstrong,
relative to the danger of this place.
He could never be made to believe
that it was in any danger.
The representations of corporate bodies,
committees of citizens &ca, were slighted &
derided both before & after the first of July.
As late as the 23 of August, when the enemy were
within 10 miles by a direct route & marching against it,
he treated the idea with contempt although there was
no serious impediment in their way, for the force
intended for its defense was then to be collected
at the places of rendezvous & formed into an army.
The battle of the next day gave the city to the enemy.
The consternation attending in Alexandria &
the neighboring country need not be described.
The President, Mr. Rush & I returned on the 27th.
The squadron of the enemy was
then before Fort Washington.
Alexandria had capitulated; this city was
prepared to surrender a second time,
& Georgetown was ready to capitulate.
The infection ran along the coast.
Baltimore tottered, as did other places, all of which
were unprepared to resist an immediate attack.
Armstrong was at Frederick town & Winder at Baltimore.
No time could be spared.
The President requested me to act in their stead,
which I did as well as I could.
The citizens cooperated with me.
In two or three days the Secretary of war returned,
but all confidence in him was gone.
I observed to the President that the Secretary
having returned my functions must cease:
that the delicate relations subsisting between the heads
of departments rendered it improper for me to act
while he was here without his knowledge & consent.
The President saw the justice of the remark.
He had an immediate interview with the secretary,
the consequence of which was the departure
of the latter for his home next morning.
Such was the state of affairs and their evident tendency,
that no time could be spared for corresponding
with anyone at a distance to take the office.
The pressure on Alexandria, and approaching attack
on Baltimore with other dangers and in many quarters
allowed not a moment of respite for the department.
24 hours of inaction was sure to produce serious mischief.
Those considerations induced me to retain the office
& to incur a labor & expose myself to a responsibility,
the nature & extent of which I well understood,
& whose weight has already almost borne me down.
Our finances are in a deplorable state.
With a country consisting of the best materials in the world;
whose people are patriotic & virtuous, & willing to support
the war; whose resources are greater than those of any
other country; & whose means have scarcely yet been
touched, we have neither money in the treasury or credit.
My opinion always was that a paper medium supported
by taxes, to be funded at proper times would answer
the public exigencies with a great saving to the Treasury.
Your plan with some modifications appeared
to me to be admirably well adapted to the object.
Mr. Dallas had decided on another, which he reported
to the committee immediately after his arrival.
As soon as I obtained my papers from Leesburg,
I put your remarks on the subject into his hands.
He spoke highly of them but adhered to his own plan,
& such is the pressure of difficulties, and the danger
attending it; that I have been willing to adopt almost
any plan, rather than encounter the risk of the overthrow of
our whole system, which has been so obvious & imminent.
Secretary Dallas is still in possession of your remarks,
but I will obtain & send them to you in a few days.
Of the Hartford convention we have yet no intelligence.
These gentry will, I suspect, find that
they have over-acted their part.
They cannot dismember the union,
or league with the enemy, as I trust & believe,
& they cannot now retreat without disgrace.
I hope that the leaders will soon take rank
in society with Burr & others of that stamp.17
The bilateral peace treaty ending the War of 1812 was signed at Ghent
on December 25, and it was to become effective on 17 February 1815.
On 1 January 1815 former President Thomas Jefferson
wrote this letter to James Monroe:
Your letters of November 30 & December 21
have been received with great pleasure.
A truth now and then projecting into the ocean of
newspaper lies serves like headlands to correct our course.
Indeed my skepticism as to everything I see in a
newspaper makes me indifferent whether I ever see one.
The embarrassments at Washington in August last,
I expected would be great in any state of things;
but they proved greater than expected.
I never doubted that the plans of the
President were wise and sufficient.
Their failure we all impute
1. to the insubordinate temper of Armstrong:
2. & to the indecision of Winder.
However, it ends well.
It mortifies ourselves, and so may check perhaps the silly
boasting spirit of our newspapers, and it enlists the feelings
of the world on our side; and the advantage of public
opinion is like that of the weather gage in a naval action.
In Europe the transient possession
of our capital can be no disgrace.
Nearly every capital there was in
possession of its enemy, some often & long.
But diabolical as they paint that enemy,
he burnt neither public edifices nor private dwellings.
It was reserved for England to show that Bonaparte in
atrocity was an infant to their ministers and their generals.
They are taking his place in the eyes of Europe,
and have turned into our channel all its good will.
This will be worth the million Dollars the
repairs of their conflagrations will cost us.
I hope that to preserve this weather-gage of public
opinion & to counteract the slanders & falsehoods
disseminated by the English papers, the government will
make it a standing instruction to their ministers at foreign
courts to keep Europe truly informed of occurrences here
by publishing in their papers the naked truth always,
whether favorable or unfavorable.
For they will believe the good
if we candidly tell them the bad also.
But you have two more serious causes
of uneasiness: the want of men & money.
For the former nothing more wise, nor efficient
could have been imagined than what you proposed.
It would have filled our ranks with regulars, & that too
by throwing a just share of the burden on the purses of
those whose persons are exempt either by age or office;
and it would have rendered our militia, like those
of the Greeks & Romans, a nation of warriors.
But the go-by seems to have been given to
your proposition, and longer sufferance is
necessary to force us to what is best.
We seem equally incorrigible in our financial course.
Although a century of British experience has proved to
what a wonderful extent the funding on specific redeeming
taxes enables a nation to anticipate in war the resources
of peace, and although the other nations of Europe have
tried and trodden every path of force or folly in fruitless
quest of the same object, yet we still expect to find in
juggling tricks and banking dreams, that money can
be made out of nothing, and in sufficient quantity to
meet the expenses of a heavy war by sea and land.
It is said indeed that money cannot be borrowed
from our merchants as from those of England.
But it can be borrowed from our people.
They will give you all the necessaries of war they
produce, if instead of the bankrupt trash they
now are obliged to receive for want of any other,
you will give them a paper promise funded on a
specific pledge and of a size for common circulation.
But you say the merchants will not take this paper.
What the people take, the merchants
must take or sell nothing.
All these doubts & fears prove only the extent
of the dominion which the banking institutions have
obtained over the minds of our citizens, and especially
of those inhabiting cities or other banking places:
and this dominion must be broken, or it will break us.
But here, as in the other case, we must make up
our mind to suffer yet longer before we can get right.
The misfortune is that in the meantime we shall plunge
ourselves into inextinguishable debt and entail on our
posterity an inheritance of eternal taxes, which will bring
our government & people into the condition of those
of England, a nation of pikes & gudgeons, the latter bred
merely as food for the former—but however these two
difficulties of men & money may be disposed of, it is
fortunate that neither of them will affect our war by sea.
Privateers will find their own men & money.
Let nothing be spared to encourage them.
They are the dagger which strikes at the
heart of the enemy, their commerce.
Frigates and 74s are a sacrifice we must make,
heavy as it is to the prejudices of a part of our citizens.
They have indeed rendered a great moral service,
which has delighted me as much as anyone in the US.
But they have had no physical effect sensible to the enemy;
and now, while we must fortify them in our harbors,
and keep armies to defend them, our privateers are
bearding and blockading the enemy in their own seaports.
Encourage them to burn all their
prizes & let the public pay for them.
They will cheat us enormously.
No matter; they will make their merchants
feel and squeal & cry out for peace.
I much regretted your acceptance of the War Department.
Not that I knew a person who
I think would better conduct it.
But conduct it ever so wisely;
it will be a sacrifice of yourself.
Were an angel from heaven to undertake that office,
all our miscarriages would be ascribed to him.
Raw troops, no troops, insubordinate militia,
want of arms, want of money, want of provisions,
all will be charged to want of management in you.
I speak from experience when I was governor of Virginia.
Without a regular in the state and scarcely a musket to
put into the hands of the militia, invaded by two armies,
Arnold’s from the seaboard & Cornwallis’s from the
Southward, when we were driven from Richmond &
Charlottesville, and every member of my council fled
to their homes, it was not the total destitution of means,
but the mismanagement of them which, in the querulous
voice of the public caused all our misfortunes.
It ended indeed in the capture of the whole hostile
force, but not till means were brought us by General
Washington’s army, & the French fleet and army.
And although the Legislature, who were personally intimate
with both the means and measures, acquitted me with
justice and thanks, yet the lying Lee has put all those
imputations among the romances of his historical Novel
for the amusement of credulous & uninquisitive readers—
not that I have seen the least disposition to censure you.
On the contrary your conduct on the attack of Washington
has met the praises of every one, and your
plan for regulars and militia, their approbation.
But no campaign is as yet opened.
No generals have yet an interest in shifting their own
incompetence on you, no army agents their rogueries.
I sincerely pray you may never meet censure where you
will deserve most praise, and that your own happiness &
prosperity may be the result of your patriotic services.18
Not aware that the Peace Treaty had been signed
by the negotiators in Ghent on December 25, General Andrew Jackson
and his army soundly defeated the British on 8 January 1815 in New Orleans.
In the War of 1812 against the British the Americans
lost 1,877 who died, about 4,000 wounded, and millions of dollars.
As Secretary of War Monroe avoided using a draft for the army.
On January 27 a Congressional Act authorized the President to use state forces,
and the federal government was to pay them.
James Monroe resigned from his position as Secretary of War on March 15,
and he continued as Secretary of State.
After the war ended, the British began dumping their
accumulated manufactured goods on the American market.
The Peace Treaty in December ended most of the trade
from the West Indies to American ships.
American manufacturing had expanded during the War of 1812
especially in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania,
but now their products had to compete with British imports.
American exports had increased to $55 million in 1815 and to $84 million in 1816
while British imports went from $16 million to $85 million
and then in 1817 to $151 million.
Monroe wrote to Jefferson on February 15 about the Treaty of Ghent
that was being considered by the Senate that day:
It is with infinite satisfaction that I inform you of the
arrival of Mr. Carroll yesterday from Ghent with a treaty
of peace between the United States & Great Britain
which was concluded on the 24 of December last.
It is in all respects honorable to our country.
No concession is made of any kind.
Boundaries are to be traced on the principles of the treaty
of 1783 by Commissioners whose difference, should they
disagree, is to be left to the decision of a friendly power.
It is evident that this treaty has been
extorted from the British ministry.
The late victory at New Orleans terminates this contest with
peculiar advantage & even splendor to the United States.
The treaty will be submitted to the Senate today,
& I presume approved without opposition.
A Sketch will be in the Intelligencer of this date.19
On 20 February 1815 Monroe wrote this letter
about the situation in Algiers to President Madison:
The acting Secretary of State, to whom was referred
the Resolution of the House of Representatives of the 15th
instant, requesting the President of the United States to
cause to be laid before that House such information as
he shall deem necessary to be communicated, touching
the state of Relations existing between the United States
and the Barbary Powers, has the honor to state, that,
according to the latest accounts from Morocco, Tunis,
and Tripoli, our relations with those powers remained
upon their former footing, nor is there any particular
reason to believe that any change has since taken place.
It will appear by the Documents accompanying
the Message of the President to Congress on the
17th November 1812, that the Dey of Algiers had
violently and without just cause obliged the Consul of
the United States and all American Citizens then in Algiers,
to leave that place in a manner highly offensive to their
country and injurious to themselves and in violation of
the Treaty then subsisting between the two nations.
It appears moreover that he exacted from the
Consul under pain of immediate imprisonment
a large sum of money to which he had no
claim but what originated in his own injustice.
These acts of violence and outrage have been followed
by the capture of at least one American vessel and by the
seizure of an American Citizen on board a neutral vessel.
The unfortunate persons thus captured are
yet held in captivity with the exception of
two of them, who have been ransomed.
Every effort to obtain the release of the others has proved
Abortive, and there is some reason to believe that they
are held by the Dey as a means by which he calculates
to extort from the United States a degrading Treaty.20
In February 1815 James Monroe from the State Department sent a long letter
to the chairman of the Senate’s Military Committee on the relative command of
army and militia officers in the federal government and the states.
On February 22 from the War Department he wrote to the same military
committee on the reduction of the military establishment.
This is what he proposed:
It appears to me to be expedient to retain the corps
of engineers, and to give to the President the power
to employ a few others, not exceeding four, and to give
them brevet rank, not higher than that of colonel;
to retain the whole of the artillery, a portion of the cavalry,
of which two troops to be mounted, and the residue of
infantry including riflemen, making in the whole 20,000 men.
This establishment would seldom give us
15,000 effectives, and often less than 12,000.21
Secretary of State Monroe advised President Madison
of the current situation and gave his advice on 30 April 1815 in this letter:
Mr. Dallas informed me that he had forwarded
to you a communication to him from Philadelphia
founded on an account from Rochelle in France
of the restoration of Bonaparte in March last.
The details which have reached us, give to the
report a strong claim to credit independently of other
circumstances making such an event highly probable.
The whole army, marshals, generals, & soldiers,
have been, I presume, always with him.
They submitted from necessity with intention
to rise, as soon as the crisis had passed.
Talleyrand it is said has gone off with the Bourbons.
Few others will accompany them, for I do not think,
that this restoration was much promoted by internal
treason, though the disposition with many might favor it.
The old nobility was never trusted and ought not to be
considered Traitors; and so quick was the movement
& evidently the result of foreign force and general
the submission & adherence, even of Bonaparte’s
best friends afterwards, that it will be difficult to
discriminate between those who wished a change,
& those who submitted by necessity.
Marmont, & the other marshal or general who commanded
at Paris were, I presume, traitors, for they did not do
their duty according to the opinion I have formed.
What effect will this event have
on us is an important question?
An immediate war between France & England
seems likely to be the consequence;
indeed reports state that Bonaparte had seized all British
property in France, which would be an act of hostility.
It is said that the Archduke Charles had set out for
Paris at the head of 25,000 men with Bonaparte’s wife
& child, and that Murat had made his peace with him.
If these facts be true, his restoration is
probably an affair of concert between him,
the marshals of France, Austria & Murat.
Ought our squadron to sail for the Mediterranean,
or our army to be disbanded, until we know on what
ground this event will place us with both the parties?
The British government will make up its mind
either to renew impressment, blockades &c, or
to respect our rights and conciliate the United States.
If they adopt the first alternative, I should not be surprised,
if they seized our squadron, accompanying it with a
declaration, that considering us the tools of France
or rather of Bonaparte, and he being restored, & having
declared war against them, they could not do otherwise,
than consider us also at war with them.
The Algerine war in itself is little more than
a mere training exercise for our naval force.
In the Mediterranean it will be a hostage in the hands
of England for our good behavior, for I am satisfied
she would station a force in some quarter bearing on it,
so as to enable her to take it whenever she thought fit.
The question relating to the army rests on the same ground
in its application to the belligerents; it differs from it only in
regard to ourselves & particularly the law for disbanding it.
I think that our escape from another war, from impressment
& unlawful blockades, and other calamities will depend
probably on the attitude which we now take.
If it is inferred from any strong circumstance, that
we will not maintain the rights for which we lately
contended by war, the British government
will immediately renew the violation of them.
These points merit great consideration.
I merely hint the ideas which have occurred
without having thoroughly examined them.22
Monroe in a letter to John Quincy Adams wrote on May 11:
… The late events in France begin a new epoch,
which promises to be very interesting to most of the
Powers of Europe and may be seriously felt by this country.
If the Emperor is restored by the general consent of the
French people and especially if his movement was made in
concert with Austria or other leading power, it is probable
that the peace of Europe may be preserved whatever may
be the indications to the contrary in the commencement.
Should the war however be renewed, it is hoped that the
parties to it will not, as heretofore, encroach on our rights.
It is the sincere desire of the United States to remain
at peace equally with Great Britain and France.
No motive exists here to take any part in their contests.
The United States have no interest in beholding
the aggrandizement of either at the expense of the other:
none in promoting it.
Their interest consists in promoting their own growth
and prosperity which may be done most effectually by
standing aloof from their broils and preserving on equal,
just and honorable conditions peace with both powers.
It is expected however that our rights,
national and neutral, will not be violated.
Our late struggle in their defense indicates what
ought to be done again under similar circumstances.
It is hoped that it will serve as a useful warning
to those powers of what may be expected
from us under like causes.23
On 14 December 1815 Secretary of State Monroe
wrote a long letter to General Andrew Jackson. Then on
December 16 Monroe wrote this letter to Albert Gallatin:
An attack of the prevailing epidemic has
prevented my writing you as soon as I intended.
The prospect of a separation of France from England
and of a better understanding between France, Russia
& the United States has made it probable that the
situation of our minister in Paris will be more eligible than
circumstances seemed to admit when you were there.
The appointment of the Duke of Richelieu was made in
opposition to the British Cabinet and was resented in
an open & harsh manner by the Duke of Wellington.
It is understood to have been made at the instigation
of the Emperor Alexander; from which circumstances
taken together, hope is entertained that a division may
take place between those leading members of the
confederacy which may connect France with Russia
& contribute to the independence of the former.
Since you were here, I have received a letter from
the Duke of Richelieu announcing his appointment &
expressing in strong terms a desire to establish a good
understanding between the United States & France.
As he intimated at the same time his willingness
to communicate with Mr. Jackson on public affairs,
whereby the ordinary channel was opened and waived,
I have thought that some importance
might be attached to the preference given
to a direct notification to this department.
I wish I could add that the salary would be increased.
The reasons for it are conclusive, & the President, as well as
myself, is heartily for it, but that will depend on Congress.
Your declining has not been made public,
so that it is still in your power to accept the mission,
if on reconsideration you are so disposed.
I have thought that these circumstances were entitled to
some attention and have therefore communicated them.
Should they be deemed by you of sufficient weight to
produce a change in your mind, I will thank you to
have the goodness to communicate it to me.24
The Republican caucus in the Congress met on 16 March 1816, and they
voted 65 to 54 to nominate James Monroe over William Crawford for President.
In fall election Monroe received 73% of the votes and easily
defeated the Federalist candidate Rufus King.
Monroe won 183 electoral votes from 16 states while
King got only 34 from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware.
Daniel D. Tompkins, who had been Governor of New York since 1807,
was elected Vice President.
Many prominent men such as John Adams, Madison, Monroe,
and Daniel Webster preferred the status quo on suffrage
and opposed extending the vote to men without property.
After the 1816 elections Connecticut called a convention
to revise their state constitution, and they expanded the suffrage
to all adult white males who paid taxes or served in the militia.
The only northern state that had drawn the racial line before was New Jersey.
A Massachusetts convention also passed reforms which expanded religious liberty,
extending tax money to Unitarians and Congregationalists.
The federal post roads were 48,976 miles in 1816
and would increase to 72,496 miles by 1820.
Monroe asked if anyone could deny that no one had been oppressed
or deprived
of rights, ignoring the 1.5 million African slaves, Native Americans, and women.
He hoped that political parties would not be needed in a free government.
The US national debt hit a peak in 1816 at $127 million;
in his two terms Monroe would reduce it to $84 million.
On 15 March 1816 the New York legislature authorized $7 million
to build the Erie Canal from Albany to Buffalo.
Governor De Witt Clinton broke ground for it on July 4,
and it was to be about 500 miles long and the first canal designed by Americans.
By 1816 the US had only 100 miles of canals.
They would raise $8 million from sold land, taxes on salt,
auctions, lotteries, appropriations, and tolls.
On April 7 about 200 slaves attacked whites in St. Mary’s County, Maryland.
Many free blacks had gathered in Philadelphia and other places to oppose plans
to send them back to Africa by the American Colonization Society
which was founded in 1816 by Presbyterian minister Robert Finley,
Henry Clay, and other leaders in Washington.
From June 13 to September 22 Secretary of State Monroe to
President Madison wrote 57 letters and 6 more by the end of the year.
On 27 June 1816 Monroe wrote this letter about Algiers and Spain to Madison:
The case with Algiers is interesting.
The sentiments expressed in your letter of the 25th
which I have just received, accord in every circumstance
with those of the gentlemen in the administration here.
Anxious to communicate theirs to you, we had an informal
meeting on the subject yesterday, in which the questions
stated in yours were adverted to, & the opinion the same,
that is, that the treaty of the last year ought to be
maintained, & its ratification by the Dey demanded,
prior to which no discussion was to be admitted or claim
heard for reparation for any injury sustained by the Dey
by reason of the detention of the brig by Spain.
If any gratuity was given afterwards on that account, it
should be a mere gratuity, not a condition of the ratification.
The force already in the Mediterranean, augmented as it
will be by Commodore Channcey’s 74 will probably be
sufficient to secure a compliance with our demands.
The conduct of Spain is in this instance in accord with it,
in every other disrespectful disingenuous and unfriendly.
I shall write the letter which you suggest to Mr. Onís.
In his former letter he intimated that his government
had decided to give up the brig to Algiers, to prevent
any misunderstanding between the United States & Spain
from motives of friendship to the United States.
Will it not be better to rest the intended one to him
on that ground, expressing surprise that the Dey
should make demand on us on that account, especially
as we had fulfilled our gratuitous promise by putting
his officers in possession of her at Carthagena?
An enquiry may fairly be made of him, consistently with
that ground, whether the vessel was given up or the
crew for any consideration made directly to Spain,
not by way of implication against his government,
but to obtain such evidence, as to enable this government
to rebut any insinuation of the Dey to that effect.
If we quarrel with Spain, the more guarded we are
in every step we take, & the more we put her in the
wrong the better the effect here and in Europe.
How will it do to appoint Mr. Poinsett, one of three
commodores to manage this business with Algiers?
It requires skill in all its bearings
especially in relation to Spain.
The other two to be Mr. Shaler & Commodore Chauncey.
There is a small corvette, Mr. Crowninshield informs me,
which would be ready to sail in a fortnight, if you find it
necessary to communicate in haste with Mr. Shaler.
Another case has occurred with Spain
not less delicate than the preceding.
The enclosed papers show that not less than 25 vessels
have turned Cape Horn to take fish in the Pacific, one
of which has been seized at Lima by the government
of the place on the pretext that she wanted a sea letter.
Mr. Gardner of Nantucket has been deputed here by the
parties interested, who fear that all the vessels estimated
at ½ a million of Dollars will suffer the same fate.
The object of his visit is to lay the affair before the
government, & he states confidentially that it would be
highly gratifying to the parties interested and have a
happy effect on the public feeling in that quarter, if such
application, as the government may decide to make, could
be forwarded into that sea by a frigate & suitable agent.
Mr. Onís on application would probably facilitate the
measure, especially as the circumstances attending
the case might be explained to him, which would show,
that if a sea letter be necessary in any view the parties
were not to blame, as the government thought otherwise.
Mr. Crowninshield says that the Macedonian
may be expected back in two or three weeks,
& that she might be spared for such service.
Should you decide to send a frigate, who would
be the agent to take charge of the business with the
provinces where any of these vessels may be seized?25
On June 29 President Madison from Montpelier wrote this response to Monroe:
I have just read yours of the 27th.
As there is a concurrence in the opinion expressed
in my last, as to the course to be taken with Algiers,
little need be added on that subject.
It ought evidently to be marked with decision
& frankness, and with as much conciliation
as will consist with these essentials.
As the promise of Decatur was gratuitous; as it was
followed by a delivery to the Algerine Agent; and as the
vessel has been actually received by the Dey, no further
demand can be made by him, which is not founded in
arrogance and cupidity or in a collusion with Spain.
If Spain has given up the vessel without equivalent,
it is the same thing to the Dey, as if
he had received it directly from the U. S.
If for an equivalent, it is an acknowledgment by
Spain who sold and by Algiers who bought the vessel,
that Algiers had lost the right by the capture &
consequently that the capture was lawful.
In this point of view it is particularly desirable
that the nature of the transaction between
Spain & Algiers be ascertained.
If there was a quid pro quo in the case, Spain
will doubtless not be very ready to disclose or confess it.
Algiers on the other hand will find
her policy in bringing it into view.
If Mr. Poinsett will consent to take the place of Shaler,
after an adjustment with the Dey, there will be great
propriety in associating him in the negotiation.
Should he not acquiesce in the consular appointment, there
will be two objections to employing him in the negotiation;
1. the surplusage of agency & expense;
2. the situation in which a termination of
the transitory business will leave him.
Whether it be advisable to send the Corvette to
the Mediterranean will be a subject for consultation.
As it is possible that the instructions carried by
Chauncey will not supersede the appeal last made to
the decision of the Government here, it is of importance
that our final decision should be speedily transmitted.
The ground you propose to take
with Onís is a very proper one.
If he says the Brig was given up for value received,
he is pressed with the inference above noted,
as well as with the breach of promise to
promote our accommodation with Algiers.
If he says the surrender was gratis, Spain is bound in
justice & in fulfilment of that promise to take side with
us in quashing the pretensions of Algiers against us.
He will probably avail himself of the diplomatic resort;
that he is uninformed of what has passed
between his Government & the Dey; but that he
will forward your communications to the former.
You will of course transmit to Madrid the instructions
relating to Algiers with instructions adapted to them
& to your correspondence with Onís.
The Case of the Whaling vessel seized at Valparaiso,
& sent to Lima with the danger threatened by the pretext
for it to so many others has a just claim on our attention.
If the want of a Sea letter be the sole pretext,
it may be hoped that the Government
of Peru will not proceed to condemnation.
The sea letter is meant as a single document
to prove the ownership of the vessel and to
prevent her interruption on the high seas.
It is not meant as a sine qua non to invalidate
other proof, especially on a trial in port, unless
there be a positive stipulation to that effect.
The Ship Charles therefore may be acquitted at Lima,
and other seizures thereby prevented.
Not having the Spanish Treaty with me I cannot say what
its precise tenor may be on the subject of sea letters;
but it is not presumable that it can be fairly applied
to any other than the ordinary cases of war
between powers enjoying undisputed Sovereignty:
nor Could Spain in any view appeal to the Treaty
without admitting what she will not admit that
her Colonies are de facto Independent Nations.
It may be further remarked that the American
vessel was bound to Lima, a Royal Province, and
therefore no more liable to be seized for the want
of sea letter, than if bound to Cadiz or the Havana.
Nor can any pretext be drawn from the light in which
the U. S. have latterly placed the Contest between old
Spain & Spanish America, for if that could have the
effect of requiring sea letters, the evidence of the ground
taken by us could not have been known at, or rather was
long subsequent to the date of the seizure in question.
If your correspondence with Onís on this subject should
pledge him to second our demands on the Spanish
authorities in Chile or Peru, it will be worthwhile to send
a frigate with them, and the experiment may perhaps
be due to the case, even if he should not favor it.
I leave the decision with yourselves; unless you doubt
& there be time for further communication with me.
Will it not be proper if a Frigate be sent to that Quarter,
to let her visit the Mouth of Columbia, as belonging
to the United States but with instructions to avoid
using force in any way—unless in that of defense?
Bagot might be sounded, and at any rate
apprised of the measure if adopted.
I take for granted that whatever may pass with
Onís on this occasion, or be done without him,
will be added to your communications for Madrid.
Who would be the fittest Agent to go in a Frigate?
Would Poinsett go? or would he be
objectionable on the score of prejudices
against his former appearance in that quarter?
I wish, before a separation at Washington
takes place, that the critical state of our affairs
with Spain may undergo a liberal consultation.
Little more is wanting, if there be not enough
already, to call for some final explanation from her.26
On 7 July 1816 Monroe wrote to President Madison about the British.
I had an interview with Mr. Bagot
yesterday on the subject of the fisheries.
He proposes to allot for our use a certain tract on
the Labrador shore lying between Mt. Joli & the strait
of Belle Isle, the Esquimaux bay, a distance of more
than 150 miles, being between 2 and 3 degrees.
Ships which descend the St. Lawrence pass,
generally, I believe, through that Strait by Mt. Joli.
His idea is to stipulate this right to us and to preclude us
from curing & drying fish in any other part of the British
provinces, or fishing within the marine league of the shore.
I am inclined to think that he will agree to such a form of
stipulation, as will not presume a concession of the right
under the treaty of 1783, in consequence of the late war;
though we did not enter into any precise explanation
on that point, it being unnecessary to do it,
until I had ascertained the value of the coast offered.
We parted to afford me an opportunity to acquire that
knowledge, to obtain which I communicated with Mr.
Homans, and have likewise written to Mr. Crowninshield.
Mr. Homans knew little himself, but will apply to those
who are better acquainted for the desired information.
I do not know that Mr. Bagot will extend the
accommodation further or that he possesses the power.
His manner is candid; he wishes to put nothing
on paper to irritate; to agree, if we can, and in that case
in the simplest & most concise form; and if we cannot,
to let the affair rest, as if nothing had been done.
Two modes occur by which the arrangement
may be made without injury to our right.
1st. The obvious one of stating by preamble, that a
difference of opinion existing on that point, to obviate
which, it is agreed that each party shall retain its right,
but inasmuch as Great Britain is desirous of extending
to the citizens of the United States, the advantage
which they have heretofore enjoyed of fishing &c,
in a manner not to injure &c, and the United States
are equally desirous to enter into such an arrangement
as will prevent such injury, it is therefore agreed &c.
2nd. To state that it appearing that the use of those
shores for curing & drying fish by the citizens
of the United States had done injury to &c, by
interfering with the inhabitants and by favoring
contraband &c, to prevent which it was agreed &c.
I shall be glad to know in what mode, you think,
this arrangement, if any is made, had better be
entered into, and that you would be so kind if you
have leisure to sketch on paper the form of an article.
I fear that 10 days will elapse before I can
hope for an answer from Mr. Crowninshield.
Mr. Bagot informed me that he had a power to
arrange the naval force on the lakes, which we
would enter on after the other should be concluded.
On this subject also I shall wish
your sentiments and direction.
I have written fully to Mr. Adams, heretofore,
letters which you approved; but it is probable that
some ideas may have occurred to you since on it.
The affair of the consul with Russia; instruction to
Mr. Shaler founded on the communication with Mr. Onís,
respecting the Algerine brig; and the instruction to
Mr. Erving on the same subject with this business with
Mr. Bagot, will I fear keep me here a considerable time.
I do not see how I can get off till the whole is concluded,
and have no hope of that in less than a fortnight, if so soon.
Very respectfully & sincerely yours
Jas Monroe
The enclosed letter from Mr. Adams, goes to
many points to which the attention was naturally,
drawn by the expedition & arrangements of
Lord Exmouth in the Mediterranean.
Although I do not think that the British minister has
removed all cause for suspicion, that the practice
of the Dey is countenanced & sustained by his
government, it is gratifying to see that it will
not interfere with our operations there.27
In the United States elections from November 1 to December 4 the men
voting gave the Democratic Republican James Monroe 73% of the popular votes
over the Federalist Rufus King, and Monroe with 16 out of the 19 states
won in the Electoral College 183 to 34.
Republicans also won two more seats in the US Senate giving them a 25 to 13 advantage.
Henry Clay led the Republicans in the House of Representatives and
with 25 more seats they increased their domination over the Federalists to 144 to 40.
On 14 December 1816 President-elect James Monroe
in a long letter on various issues to General Andrew Jackson also wrote this:
In the formation of an Administration it appears to me
that the representation principle ought to be respected in
a certain degree at least, and that a head of a Department
(there being four) should be taken from the four sections
of the Union, the East, the Middle, the South and the West.
This principle should not be always adhered to.
Great emergencies and transcendent talents
would always justify a departure from it.
But it would produce a good effect
to attend to it when practicable.
Each part of the Union would be gratified by it, and
the knowledge of local details and means, which would
be thereby brought into the Cabinet, would be useful.
I am nowise compromitted in respect of anyone,
but free to act, should I have to act, according to
my own judgment, in which I am thankful for
the opinions of my friends and particularly yours….
This letter you will perceive is highly confidential,
a relation which I wish always to exist between us.
Write me without reserve, as you have done, and the
more so the more gratifying your communications will be.28
Notes
1. See The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton,
p. 277-281.
2. To Henry Clay, 5 January 1814 (Online).
3. To James Madison from James Monroe, 18 January 1814 (Online).
4. To James Madison from James Monroe, 14 April 1814 (Online).
5. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 281-282.
6. To James Madison from James Monroe, 20 August 1814 (Online).
7. Ibid., p. 289-290.
8. To James Madison from James Monroe, [21 August 1814] (Online).
9. From James Madison to James Monroe, [22 August 1814] (Online).
10. From James Madison to James Monroe, 26 August 1814 (Online).
11. James Madison: Commander in Chief 1812-1836 by Irving Brant, p. 311.
12. September 1, 1814: Proclamation upon British Depredations, Burning of the Capitol
(Online).
13. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 291-292.
14. Ibid., p. 296-298.
15. Ibid., p. 300-301.
16. Ibid., p. 301-302.
17. Ibid., p. 303-306.
18. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1 January 1815 (Online).
19. James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, 15 February 1815 (Online).
20. To James Madison from James Monroe, 20 February 1815 (Online).
21. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 326.
22. To James Madison from James Monroe, 30 April 1815 (Online).
23. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 380.
24. Ibid., p. 334-335.
25. Ibid., p. 336-338.
26. From James Madison to James Monroe, 29 June 1816 (Online).
27. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 338-341.
28. Ibid., p. 347-348, 349.