Monroe January-July 1807
Monroe October-December 1807
Monroe in February-April 1808
Monroe in October-December 1808
On 3 January 1807 James Monroe and William Pinkney wrote an extremely long letter
to Secretary of State James Madison explaining the “Treaty of Amity Commerce and
Navigation Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America”
that they had made with the British and signed on 31 December 1806.
Grenville and the British would not agree to the words “ban” and impressment.”
President Jefferson and his administration also rejected the long treaty,
and in March 1807 they decided not to send the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
Monroe wrote from London in a letter to President Jefferson on 11 January 1807:
On the subject of our treaty we have said so much in
our public letter that nothing remains to be added here.
It will be recollected that no aid has been derived in this
business from any neutral power, Denmark being indeed
the only one that could be thought of in such a case, &
she in a situation more to require than to give aid: that
in all points on which we have had to press this government,
interests of the most vital character were involved to it,
at a time too when the very existence of the country
depended on an adherence to its maritime pretensions.
I trust it will be seen that we have gained something
on those questions, and on the whole done as
much as could reasonably have been expected.
It is important for us to stand well with some power.
I think the United States have sustained the attitude
they took with dignity, and that by this arrangement they
will terminate a controversy, not in favor of themselves
alone, but of neutral rights with some degree of credit.
The movement has drawn the attention of Europe & will
make us better known & more respected as a power.
It is a singular circumstance that most of the
northern powers, though at war with France,
have wished us success against England without
however being able to give us any the slightest aid.”1
On 18 March 1807 Madison responded to Monroe and Pinkney with this letter:
Your dispatch of January 3rd with the Treaty signed
December 31 with the British Commissioners,
were safely delivered on the 15th inst.
Your letter of December 27, notifying the
approach of that event, had been previously
received, in time to be included in a communication
of the President to Congress then in Session.
A copy of the instrument in its actual form with the
declaration of the British Commissioners on signing it,
was received by Mr. Erskine on the day of the adjournment
of Congress, and communicated by him to the Executive.
The observations relating to the whole subject as it is
now presented with such instructions in detail as will
explain the views of the President, will be prepared with
as little delay as possible, and transmitted by Mr. Purviance,
who holds himself in readiness to be the bearer.
For the present I am charged by the President to refer
you to my letter of February 3rd and to signify his desire
that the negotiation may proceed in the form therein
stated but without being brought to an absolute
conclusion until farther instructions shall arrive.
You will conform also to the views of the President in
forbearing to enter into any Conventional arrangements
with the British Government which shall embrace a
trade or intercourse of its subjects with the Indian
tribes within any part of the territories westward of
the Mississippi under the authority of the United States.
Considerations derived from a recent knowledge
of the state and of the aboriginal inhabitants
of that extensive region irresistibly oppose
the admission of foreign traders into it.
I have only to add that a proclamation will
immediately issue, suspending the non-importation
measure until the next Session of Congress.
This will be a sufficient evidence to the British Government
of the conciliatory sentiments of the President, and
of his sincere desire, that no circumstance whatever
may obstruct the prosecution of experiments for
putting an end to differences, which ought no longer
to exist, between two nations having so many
motives to establish and cherish mutual friendship.2
On 21 March 1807 President Jefferson wrote
this letter to Monroe about the flawed treaty:
A copy of the treaty with Great Britain came to
Mr. Erskine’s hands on the last day of the session of
Congress, which he immediately communicated to us;
and since that Mr. Purviance has arrived with an original.
On the subject of it you will receive a
letter from the Secretary of State of about
this date, and one more in detail hereafter.
I should not have written, but that I perceive uncommon
efforts, and with uncommon wickedness are making by
the Federal papers to produce mischief between myself
personally & our negotiators and also to irritate the
British government by putting a thousand speeches
into my mouth, not one word of which I ever uttered.
I have therefore thought it safe to guard you by
stating the view which we have given out on the
subject of the treaty in conversation & otherwise;
for ours, as you know, is a government which
will not tolerate the being kept entirely in the dark,
and especially on a subject so interesting as this treaty.
We immediately stated in conversation to the members
of the legislature & others, that having by a letter
received in January, perceived that our ministers
might sign a treaty not providing satisfactorily against
the impressment of our seamen, we had on the 3rd of
February informed you that should such a one could have
been forwarded, it could not be ratified, & recommending
therefore that you should resume negotiations for inserting
an article to that effect, that we should hold the treaty in
suspense until we could learn from you the result of our
instructions which probably would not be till summer,
& then decide on the question of calling the Senate.
We observed too that a written declaration of the British
commissioners given in at the time of signature would
of itself, unless withdrawn, prevent the acceptance
of any treaty, because it’s effect was to leave us
bound by the treaty, & themselves totally unbound.
This is the statement we have given out, and nothing
more of the contents of the treaty has been made known.
But depend on it, my dear Sir, that it will be
considered as a hard treaty when it is known.
The British Commissioners appear to have
screwed every article as far as it would bear,
to have taken everything & yielded nothing.
Take out the 11th article, and the evil of all
the others so much overweighs the good,
that we should be glad to expunge the whole.
And even the 11th article admits only that
we may enjoy our right to the indirect
colonial trade during the present hostilities.
If peace is made this year, and war resumed the next,
the benefit of this stipulation is gone, and yet we are
bound for 10 years to pass no non-importation or
non-intercourse laws, or take any other measures to
restrain the unjust pretensions & practices of the British.
But on this you will hear from the Secretary of State.
If the treaty cannot be put into an acceptable form,
then the next best thing is to back out of the negotiation
as well as we can, letting that die away insensibly,
but in the meantime agreeing informally that both
parties shall act on the principles of the treaty,
so as to preserve that friendly understanding which
we so sincerely desire, until the one or the other
may be disposed to yield the points which divide us.
This will leave you to follow your desire of
coming home as soon as you see that the
amendment of the treaty is desperate.
The power of continuing the negotiations will pass over to
Mr. Pinckney who by procrastinations can let it die away,
and give us time, the most precious of all things to us.
The government of New Orleans is
still without such a head as I wish.
The salary of 5,000 Dollars is too small,
but I am assured the Orleans legislature
would make it adequate would you accept it.
It is the 2nd office in the United States in importance,
& I am still in hopes you will accept it.
It is impossible to let you stay at home
while the public has so much need of talents.
I am writing under a severe indisposition of
periodical head-ache, with scarcely command
enough of my mind to know what I write.
As a part of this letter concerns Mr. Pinckney as well as
yourself, be so good as to communicate so much of it to
him, and with my best respects to him, to Mrs. Monroe
& your daughter be assured yourself in all cases of my
constant & affectionate friendship and attachment.3
On 29 May 1807 President Thomas Jefferson
wrote this letter to James Monroe:
I have not written to you by Mr. Purviance because he
can give you vivâ voce all the details of our affairs here with
a minuteness beyond the bounds of a letter, and because
indeed I am not certain this letter will find you in England.
The sole object in writing it is to add another little
commission to the one I had formerly troubled you with.
It is to procure for me a ‘machine for ascertaining the
resistance of ploughs or carriages, invented & sold
by Winlaw in Margaret street Cavendish square.’
It will cost I believe 4 or 5 guineas, which shall
be replaced here instantly on your arrival.
I had intended to have written to you to counteract
the wicked efforts which the federal papers are
making to sow tares between you & me, as if I were
lending a hand to measures unfriendly to any views,
which our country might entertain respecting you.
But I have not done it, because I have before assured you
that a sense of duty, as well as of delicacy would prevent
me from ever expressing a sentiment on the subject;
and that I think you know me well enough to be assured
I shall conscientiously observe the line of conduct I profess.
I shall receive you on your return with the warm affection
I have ever entertained for you, and be gratified
if I can in any way avail the public of your services.
God bless you & yours.4
The Secretary of State Madison wrote letters to
James Monroe on May 20, 22, and 25.
On June 22 the British HMS Leopard off the coast of Norfolk, Virginia
defeated and took over the American frigate USS Chesapeake.
Madison wrote to Monroe about this on 6 July 1807.
The documents herewith enclosed from No. 1 to No. 9
inclusive explain the hostile attack with the insulting
pretext for it lately committed near the Capes of
Virginia by the British ship of war the Leopard
on the American Frigate the Chesapeake.
No. 10 is a copy of the Proclamation issued by
the President, interdicting in consequence of that
outrage, the use of our waters and every other
accommodation to all British armed ships.
1st. This enormity is not a subject for discussion.
The immunity of a National ship of war from every
species and purpose of search on the high seas
has never been contested by any nation.
Great Britain would be second to none in resenting such
a violation of her Rights and such an insult on her Flag.
She may bring the case to the test of her own feelings,
by supposing that, instead of the customary demand of our
mariners serving compulsively even, on board her ships
of war, opportunities had been seized for rescuing them
in like manner, whenever the superiority of force or the
chance of surprise might be possessed by our ships of war.
But the present case is marked by
circumstances which give it a peculiar die.
The seamen taken from the Chesapeake had been
ascertained to be native Citizens of the United States;
and this fact was made known to the bearer of the demand,
and doubtless communicated by him to his Commander
previous to the commencement of the attack.
It is a fact also affirmed by two of the men with every
appearance of truth that they had been impressed from
American vessels into the British Frigate from which
they escaped, and by the third, that having been
impressed from a British Merchant ship, he had
accepted the recruiting bounty under that duress,
and with a view to alleviate his situation till he could
escape to his own Country: Add that the attack was
made during a period of negotiation, and in the midst
of friendly assurances from the British Government.
The Printed Papers herewith sent will enable you to
judge of the spirit which has been roused by the occasion.
It pervades the whole community, is abolishing the
distinctions of Party; and regarding only the indignity
offered to the Sovereignty & Flag of the nation, and
the Blood of Citizens so wantonly and wickedly shed,
demands in the loudest tone an honorable reparation.
With this demand you are charged by the President.
The tenor of his proclamation will be your guide in
reminding the British Government of the uniform proofs
given by the United States of their disposition to maintain
faithfully every friendly relation; of the multiplied
infractions of their rights by British Naval Commanders
on our Coasts and in our Harbors; of the inefficacy of
reiterated appeals to the Justice & Friendship of that
Government; and of the moderation on the part of the
United States which reiterated disappointments had
not extinguished; till at length no alternative is left but
a voluntary satisfaction on the part of Great Britain or
a resort to means depending on the United States alone.
The nature and extent of the satisfaction ought to be
suggested to the British Government not less by a sense
of its own honor than by Justice to that of the United States.
A formal disavowal of the deed, and restoration of the
four seamen to the Ship from which they were taken are
things of course and indispensable as a security for the
future, an entire abolition of impressments from Vessels
under the Flag of the United States if not already arranged,
is also to make an indispensable part of the satisfaction.
The abolition must be on terms compatible with the
Instructions to yourself and Mr. Pinkney on this subject;
and if possible without the authorized rejection
from the Service of the United States of British
Seamen who have not been two years in it.
Should it be impossible to avoid this concession on
the part of the United States it ought (as of itself
more than a reasonable price for future Security)
to extend the reparation due for the past.
But beyond these indispensable conditions the
United States have a right to expect every solemnity
of form and every other ingredient of retribution and
respect, which according to usage and the sentiments
of mankind, are proper in the strongest cases of insult
to the Rights and Sovereignty of a nation and the
British Government is to be apprised of the importance
of a full compliance with this expectation to the
thorough healing of the wound which has been
made in the feelings of the American Nation.
Should it be alleged as a ground for declining
or diminishing the satisfaction in this case, that
the United States have themselves taken it
by the interdict contained in the President’s
Proclamation; the answer will be obvious.
The Interdict is a measure not of reparation, but of
precaution and would besides be amply justified by
occurrences prior to the extraordinary outrage in question.
The exclusion of all armed ships whatever from our
waters is in fact so much required by the vexations and
dangers to our peace experienced from their visits, that
the President makes it a special part of the charge to
you to avoid laying the United States under any
species of restraint from adopting that remedy.
Being extended to all Belligerent nations, none of them
could of right complain; and with the less reason, as the
Policy of most nations has limited the admission of Foreign
Ships of War into their Ports to such numbers as being
inferior to the naval force of the Country, could be
readily made to respect its authority and Laws.
As it may be useful in enforcing the Justice of the
present demand to bring into view applicable cases,
especially where Great Britain has been the complaining
Party, I refer you to the ground taken and the Language
held by her in those of Falklands Island and Nootka Sound;
notwithstanding the assertion by Spain in
both cases, that the real Right was in her
and the possessory only in Great Britain.
These cases will be found in the Annual Registers for 1771
and 1790 and in the Parliamentary Debates for those years.
In the latter you will find also two cases referred to; in one
of which the French King sent an Ambassador Extraordinary
to the King of Sardinia in the most public and solemn
manner with an apology for an infringement of his
Territorial Rights in the pursuit of a smuggler and murderer.
In the other case an Ambassador Extraordinary
was sent by the British Government to the Court
of Portugal with an apology for the pursuit and
destruction by Admiral Boscawen of certain
French Ships on the Coasts of this last Kingdom.
Many other cases more or less analogous, may doubtless
be found; see particularly the reparation by France to
Great Britain for the attack on Turks Island in 1764,
as related in the Annual Register & in Smollet’s continuation
of Hume volume 10; the proceedings in the case of an
English Merchantman, which suffered much in her crew
and otherwise from the fire of certain Spanish Xebecs
cruising in the Mediterranean; and the execution of
the Lieutenant of a Privateer for firing a gun into a
Venetian merchantman which killed the Captain
as stated in the Annual Register for 1781 p. 94.
The case of an affront offered to a Russian Ambassador
in the reign of Queen Anne, though less analogous,
shows in a general view the solemnity with which
reparation is made for insults having immediate
relation to the Sovereignty of a nation.
Although the Principle which was outraged in the
proceedings against the American Frigate is independent
of the question concerning the allegiance of the Seamen
taken from her, the fact that they were Citizens of the
United States and not British Subjects, may have such
an influence on the feelings of all and perhaps on the
opinions of some unacquainted with the Laws and
usages of Nations, that it has been thought proper
to seek more regular proofs of their national character
than were deemed sufficient in the first instance.
These proofs will be added by this conveyance if
obtained in time; if not, by the first that succeeds.
The President has an evident right to expect
from the British Government, not only an ample
reparation to the United States in this case, but
that it will be decided without difficulty or delay.
Should this expectation fail, and above all should
reparation be refused, it will be incumbent on you to
take the proper measures for hastening Home, according
to the degree of Urgency, all American vessels remaining
in British ports; using for the purpose the mode least
likely to awaken the attention of the British Government.
Where there may be no ground to distrust the
prudence or fidelity of Consuls, they will probably
be found the fittest vehicles for your intimations.
It will be particularly requisite to communicate to our
Public Ships in the Mediterranean, the state of appearances
if it be such as ought to influence their movements.
All negotiation with the British Government on
other subjects will of course be suspended
until satisfaction on this be so pledged and
arranged as to render negotiation honorable.
Whatever may be the result or the prospect, you
will please to forward to us the earliest information.
The scope of the Proclamation will signify to you
that the President has yielded to the Presumption,
that the hostile act of the British Commander
did not pursue the intentions of his Government.
It is not indeed easy to suppose that so rash & so
critical a step should have originated with the Admiral;
but it is still more difficult to believe that such orders were
prescribed by any Government under circumstances such
as existed between Great Britain and the United States.
Calculations founded on dates are also strongly
opposed to the supposition that the orders in
question could have been transmitted from England.
In the same scale are to be put that apparent and declared
persuasion of the British Representative Mr. Erskine that
no orders of a hostile spirit could have been issued or
authorized by his Government; and the coincidence of
this assurance with the amicable professions of Mr. Canning,
the organ of the new administration, as stated in the
Dispatch of April 22nd from yourself and Mr. Pinkney.
Proceeding on these considerations, the President
has inferred that the Justice and Honor of the British
Government will readily make the atonement required;
and in that expectation he has forborne an immediate
call of Congress; notwithstanding the strong wish which
has been manifested by many, that measures, depending
on their authority, should without delay be adopted.
The motives to this forbearance have at the same time
been strengthened by the Policy of avoiding a course
which might stimulate the British Cruisers in this
quarter to arrest our Ships and Seamen now arriving
and shortlyexpected in great numbers from all quarters.
It is probable however that the Legislature will be
convened in time to receive the answer of the British
Government on the Subject of this Dispatch, or even
sooner if the conduct of the British Squadron here,
or other occurrences should require immediate
measures beyond the Authority of the Executive.
You are not unaware of the good will and Respect for the
United States, and personally even for the President, which
have been manifested by the Emperor of Russia, nor of the
inducements to cultivate the friendship of so great a Power,
entertaining principles and having interests according in
some important views with those of the United States.
This consideration combined with the subsisting relations
between Russia and Great Britain make it proper in the
opinion of the President that in case of an express or
probable refusal of the satisfaction demanded of the British
Government, you should take an early occasion if there be
no special objection unknown here of communicating to the
Russian Minister at London the hostile insult which has been
offered, as well as the resort which may become necessary
on our part to measures constituting or leading to war,
and of making him sensible of the regret which will be
felt at a rupture with a power to which the Emperor
is allied by so many close and important Interests.
In order to give the more expedition and security to
the present Dispatch a public armed Vessel, the Revenge
is specially employed; and Doctor Bullus is made the
Bearer, who was on board the Chesapeake, on his
way to a Consulate in the Mediterranean and will be
able to detail and explain circumstances which may
possibly become interesting in the course of your
communications with the British Government.
The vessel after depositing Doctor Bullus at a British
Port will proceed with dispatches to a French port,
but will return to England with a view to bring the
result of your transactions with the British Government.
The trip to France will afford you and Mr. Pinkney a
favorable opportunity for communicating with our Ministers
at Paris, who being instructed to regulate their conduct on
the present occasion by the advices they may receive from
you, will need every explanation that can throw light on
the probable turn and issue of things with Great Britain.5
Madison also wrote to Monroe on July 17, 23, 25, 30 and two letters on August 4.
From 11 January 1807 to 18 April 1808 Monroe
and Madison wrote 52 letters to each other.
On 29 July 1807 the British Foreign Minister George Canning granted the
ambassador James Monroe an interview in the Foreign Office.
On August 14 Monroe wrote this letter to Secretary of State James Madison:
I had the honor to transmit you with my letter of the
4 inst. a copy of a correspondence with Mr. Canning relative
to the late aggression in the case of the Chesapeake frigate.
You will receive with this a copy of a
more recent one on the same Subject.
By Mr. Canning’s queries in his last note
I was led to consider it as preparatory
to an embargo on American vessels.
I could not conceive why he should request
information of me, whether the President’s
proclamation was authentic and when it would
be carried into effect, if it was not intended to found
some measure on my reply of an unfriendly nature.
The information desired was not necessary to remove
any doubts of his government on the points to which
it applied or to do justice to the United States in
regard to the aggression of which they complained.
The presumption that an embargo was intended
gained Strength from the Circumstance that most
of the gazettes had recommended, and that the
public mind seemed to be essentially prepared for it.
It was my most earnest wish to prevent as far as
in my power So unjust and pernicious a procedure.
As the measure contemplated, whatever it might be,
seemed to be suspended for my answer, I was
extremely solicitous by the manner to deprive this
government of all pretext for any of the Kind alluded to.
By replying generally that I had no instruction from my
government and could state nothing on its part respecting
the late occurrence, I avoided giving a direct answer to
Mr. Canning’s queries; and by drawing his attention to
the application which it was to be presumed would
soon be made on the part of my government on that
Subject, I endeavored to show more strongly the
impolicy and injustice which would stamp any Such
measure on the part of Great Britain in the present Stage.
No step has yet been taken by this government of
an unfriendly character towards the United States,
and from the communication which Mr. Canning made
to the House of Commons on the day he received
my last note, which You will find in the gazettes sent,
I am persuaded that things will remain in the state
in which they are, till your dispatch is received.
I trust that a disposition exists to make such
reparation on the point in question, as will be
satisfactory to the United States, and that it will be
practicable and not difficult to preserve the friendly
relations subsisting between the two Countries.
The party however in favor of war consisting of the
combined interests mentioned in my last is strong and
active so that it is impossible to foresee the result.6
James Monroe in London wrote this letter to
Secretary of State Madison on 10 October 1807:
I have the honor to transmit to you by
Doctor Bullus a copy of my correspondence with
Mr. Canning on the subject which was committed
to my care by your letter of the 6th July last.
You will find by it that the pressure which has been
made on this Government in obedience to the instructions
contained in that letter has terminated in a decision to send
a Minister to the United States to adjust the business there.
What the powers of that Minister will be;
whether it is intended to confine them to the sole
object of reparation for the special outrage or to
extend them in case the proposed separation of that
from the general topic of impressment is admitted
to the latter object, it is not in my power to state.
Mr. Canning has given me no information on that
head in conference, and his note is not explicit on it.
It states that the Minister who shall be sent to the
United States to bring the dispute relative to the
attack on the Chesapeake to a conclusion, shall not be
empowered to entertain as connected with that subject
any proposition respecting the search of merchant vessels.
A presumption is authorized by these terms that
the Minister will have power to proceed to treat on
the general topic after the special one is arranged.
But it is possible that that presumption may have been
raised for some other purpose or that the terms which
excite it were introduced merely to convey the idea that
the Mission should be confined to the special object.
In the discharge of this delicate and important
trust, I thought I should be able more effectually
to promote its object by opening the subject to
Mr. Canning in conference than by an official note.
As the attitude taken by my government, which was
evidently supported by the whole nation, was of a very
impressive nature, it seemed probable from the feverish
state of the public mind here in regard to us, that a tone
of conciliation which should not weaken the pressure
would be more likely to succeed in obtaining the reparation
desired than in an official and peremptory demand.
Under this impression I had several conferences
with Mr. Canning, the substance of which in
each I will endeavor to state with precision.
A knowledge of what passed in these interviews in aid of
that which is afforded by the correspondence will enable
you to form the most correct idea of the object of the
proposed Mission, that present circumstances will admit of.
The first interview was on the 3rd of September
as soon as it could be obtained after the receipt
of your letter of July 6 which was on the 30 August.
I informed Mr. Canning that as I wished the discussion
in which we were about to enter to terminate amicably
and favorably to both our Governments, I had asked
the interview for the purpose of promoting that
desirable end and by explaining to each other fully,
in friendly conference, the views of our respective
Governments relative to the late aggression.
I was persuaded that it would be more easy for us
to arrange the business to the satisfaction of both
parties, than by any other mode which we could pursue.
He expressed his sensibility to that which I
had chosen, and his readiness to concur in it.
I then stated in detail in explicit terms the reparation
which my government thought the United States entitled
to and expected that they should receive for the injury
and indignity offered by the late aggression: that the
men taken from the frigate should be restored to it;
that the Officers who had committed the aggression
should be exemplarily punished; that the practice of
impressment from Merchant vessels should be suppressed;
and that the reparation consisting of those several acts
should be announced to our Government through the
medium of a special mission, a solemnity which the
extraordinary nature of the aggression particularly required.
I observed that as the aggression and the principle on
which it was founded had been frankly disavowed
as soon as known by his government; I was persuaded
that there could be no serious objection on its part to any
of the acts which it was desired should constitute the
proposed reparation: that to the first act, the restoration
of the men, there could doubtless be none; as the least
that could be done after such an outrage would be to
replace the United States as far as it might be practicable
on the ground they held before the injury was received:
that the punishment of the Officers followed as a
necessary consequence to the disavowal of the act:
that the suppression of the practice of
impressment from Merchant vessels had
been made indispensable by the late
aggression, for reasons which were
sufficiently well known to him.
I stated to him the mode in which it was desired that
the reparation should be made by a Special mission,
was that which had been adopted by other powers
and by Great Britain herself for injuries less severe
than the one alluded to, of which I gave him the
examples furnished me in your letter of July 6th.
Mr. Canning took a note of what I had stated and made
some general remarks on the whole subject, which were
intended to give his view of it on each point, but without
compromising himself in a positive manner on any one.
He said that by the proclamation of the President and the
seizure and detention of some men who had landed on the
coast to procure water, the government seemed to have
taken redress into its own hands; he complained of the
difference which he said we had made between France and
England by restoring deserters to the vessels of the former
and not the latter: he insisted that the late aggression was
an act which differed in all respects from the former
practice; and ought not to be connected with it, as it showed
a disposition to make a particular incident in which they
were in the wrong, instrumental to an accommodation in
a case where his government held a different doctrine.
I urged in reply that the proclamation could not be
considered as an act of hostility or retaliation for injuries,
though the aggression had provoked and would have
justified any the strongest act of reprisal, but as a mere
measure of Police which had become indispensable for the
preservation of order within the limits of the United States.
I informed him that the men who had landed from the
Squadron in defiance of the proclamation, and of the law
on which it was founded, had been restored to it, that
with respect to the other point, the difference said to
be made in the case of deserters from British and
French ships I was unacquainted with the fact,
but was satisfied if the statement was correct
that the difference was imputable to the local authorities,
and not to the national government, because as the
United States were not bound by Treaty to restore deserters
from the service of either nation, it was not presumable
that their Government would interfere in the business.
I observed however that if such a preference had been
given, there was a natural and justifiable cause for it,
proceeding from the conduct of the squadrons of France and
England on the coast of the United States, and on the main
ocean, it being a well known fact, that the former did not
maintain as a right or adopt in practice the doctrine of the
latter to impress seamen from our merchant vessels.
I then discussed at length and urged with great
earnestness the justice and policy of his terminating
at this time all the differences which had arisen between
our Governments from this cause by an arrangement which
should suppress the practice on the part of Great Britain,
and remedy the evil of which she complained.
In aid of those reasons which were applicable
to the merits of the question, I urged the example
given by the late Ministry in the paper of November 8
presented to Mr. Pinkney and myself by the British
Commissioners, which had, as I thought laid
the foundation of such an arrangement.
I stated that as it was stipulated by that paper, that
the negotiation should be kept open for the purpose
of arranging this great interest without prejudice to
the rights of either party, it was fairly to be understood
as the sense of both parties that our rights were to be
respected ’till that arrangement was concluded, whence
it would follow that the same effect would be produced
in practice as if it had been provided for by Treaty.
I relied on this paper and the construction which I thought
it admitted, with which however the practice had since,
in no degree corresponded, to show the extent to
which the former Ministry had gone in meeting the
just views of our government, and thereby to prove
that the present ministry in improving that ground
had nothing to apprehend from the preceding one.
Mr. Canning admitted that the view which I had taken
of that paper derived much support from its contents, and
the time and circumstances under which it was presented,
but persisted in his desire to keep the subjects separate.
I proposed as an expedient to get rid of his objection,
that we should take up and arrange both points informally,
in which case provided it was done in a manner to be
obligatory I offered to frame my note, which should
demand reparation for the outrage in general terms,
so as that it should not appear by official document
that the subjects had any connection in the negotiation.
I urged that unless it was intended to make no provision
against impressment from Merchant vessels, I could
see no objection to his meeting me on that ground,
as after what had passed it was impossible to take up
either subject without having the other in view, and
equally so to devise any mode which should keep them
more completely separate than that which I proposed.
Mr. Canning still adhered to his doctrine of having nothing
to do with impressment from Merchant vessels, till the
affair of the Chesapeake was disposed of, after which he
professed his willingness to proceed to the other object:
In this manner the Conference ended; without having
produced the arrangement which I had hoped for from it.
Mr. Canning’s conduct was in all other respects conciliatory.
My note to Mr. Canning was founded
on the result of this conference.
As it had not been in my power to come to any agreement
with Mr. Canning on the great subject of impressment
from merchant vessels, I considered it my duty to combine
it with the affair of the Chesapeake in the paper which
I presented him to claim reparation for the outrage.
I thought it best however to omit the other acts of
which it was desired that the reparation should consist.
It seemed probable that a specification of each
circumstance in the Note would increase the indisposition
of the Ministry to accommodate and give it support with
the Nation in a complete rejection of the demand.
I expressed myself therefore in regard to the
other acts, in general and conciliatory terms,
but with all the force in my power.
The details had been communicated to Mr. Canning
in conference too recently to be forgotten.
Still it was just that no improper inference
should be drawn from the omission of them.
To prevent it I obtained an interview of Mr. Canning
immediately after my note was presented in which
after reminding him of the omission alluded to,
the motives to which I presumed he could not mistake,
I added that my object in asking the interview had
been to repeat to him informally what I had stated
in the former one, the other acts of which my
government expected that the reparation should consist.
In this interview nothing occurred without the limit
of the special object for which it had been obtained.
Mr. Canning did not lead the conversation
to any other topic, and I could not invite it.
Mr. Canning’s answer to my note
was delayed more than a fortnight.
Having refused to treat the subjects in connection,
and intimated in plain terms that if I was not
authorized to separate them, it would be
needless to prolong the discussion.
I thought it improper to press it.
My reply was equally explicit,
so that with it, the negotiation ended.
The measure which he announced as being determined
on by the King in case I could not agree to the
separation was completely the act of his government.
You will observe that it is announced in a form which
precludes in a great degree the idea of its being adopted
at my suggestion as an act of reparation, and in a
tone of decision which seemed equally to preclude
my holding any communication with him on it.
My mission being thus brought to an end
has afforded an opportunity for me to return
to the United States, as I have long desired.
Nothing but the great interest I take in the welfare
of my country, and my earnest desire to give all
the aid in my power to the present administration
in support of the pure principles of our most excellent
Constitution, would have detained me here so long.
In the present state however, it is not possible,
if in any it would be, for me to render any
service by a longer continuance here.
As soon therefore, as I had answered Mr. Canning’s
Note, I communicated to him my intention to
return and requested that he would be so good
as to obtain for me an audience of the King
for the purpose of taking my leave of him.
This was granted on the 7th of this Month,
in which I renewed the Assurance of the sincere
desire of my government to preserve the most friendly
relation between the United States and Great Britain,
which sentiment was reciprocated by His Majesty.
Mr. Pinkney succeeds me by an arrangement
with Mr. Canning, which will appear in the enclosed
Copy of my correspondence with him, and which
I have full confidence the President will approve.
I regret that in transferring the business into his hands,
I do not leave him altogether free from difficulty.
I have the honor to be &c
Jas Monroe
P. S. Not being satisfied with the undefined character of
the proposed Mission to the United States, and Mr. Canning
having communicated nothing to me on the Subject,
in my interview with him on the day I was presented to
the King, although an opportunity was afforded for the
purpose, I wrote him a note after the commencement of
this letter to make certain enquiries on that head, a copy
of which note and of his answer is herewith enclosed.
You will observe that he still holds himself aloof on it.
I thought it my duty and that it comported with strict
delicacy to make the enquiry, and I cannot but consider
his reserve as affording cause for an unfavorable inference.
It is probable however, as the door is left open for
further communication between us, the moment of
my departure that he will take some other occasion
to explain himself more fully on the subject.
You may be assured that I will seek every favorable
opportunity to obtain such explanation of him.7
On 21 October 1807 Secretary of State Madison
wrote this letter to James Monroe:
I enclose for your information copies of the
letters which have passed on several subjects
between Mr. Erskine and the Department of State;
and which it may be useful for you to possess.
The proceedings at Halifax with respect to one of the
men taken from the Chesapeake, and whose restoration
was included in the demand of reparation for that outrage,
are calculated to inspire great distrust of the temper and
intentions of the British Government towards this Country.
Is it conceivable that at so late a day Berkley could be
unapprised of the light in which his original offense was
viewed by his superiors, or that if apprised of their
displeasure at it, he would brave the consequences
of an additional temerity of so irreparable a character.
Before the receipt of this communication you will probably
have been enabled to interpret the phenomenon,
and this communication suggests the light in which
it is to be presented to the British Government.
If the responsibility rests on Berkeley or any other
officer, and that Government means to give the
satisfaction due to the honor of the United States,
there can be no pretext for refusing to make the
severest example of the offender or offenders.
Among the papers accompanying this will be found
British evidence that the seaman sentenced to
death was not a deserter from a British ship of war
as alleged on his trial, but from a merchantman only.
You will find also that, according to information received
here through the Collector of Baltimore the Court martial
at Halifax, disregarding still further every restraint of law,
of decency and of common prudence, proceeded to the
trial of the three other men taken from the Chesapeake,
without even pretending that they were British subjects,
that a partial execution of the sentence on one of them
was fatal to his life, and that the two others were forced
into the service of a British ship of War, by making that
the alternative of the doom to which they were sentenced.
Should this information be confirmed, and it has not yet
been impaired by any circumstance whatever, the
measure of atrocity will be filled up, and every motive
supplied for requiring on our part and for affording on that
of Great Britain the full measure of punishments due to it.
The last letter received from Mr. Erskine respecting
the detention of a letter to him from Vice Admiral
Berkeley will not be answered, unless the subject
should be resumed after receiving mine which
had not reached him at the date of his.
If a further answer should be required, it may be
necessary to remind him that if the ground for a
prosecution were as legal as he supposes, the
measure however it might be dictated by the respect
which the United States owe to themselves, could not
be demanded of right by a Government which has left
unpunished the repeated violations committed by its
officers on the most solemn dispatches of the United States.
Instances of these have from time
to time been transmitted to you.
In that of the letter from the President to the
King of Holland, with the great seal externally
impressed, the offense was of the most flagrant
kind, and rendered the more conspicuous
by its publication in the British Newspapers.
This circumstance, while it necessarily brought the
aggravated insult to the notice of the Government
might the rather have been expected to be followed
by the punishment of the guilty officer, as this
course alone could guard the Government itself,
to which the copy of the President’s letter must
be presumed to have been sent by the officer
who violated it, against appearances and
conjectures of the most unfavorable sort.8
Monroe from London sent this report to
Secretary Madison on 28 October 1807:
I have the honor to send you a copy of a
correspondence with Mr. Canning touching a
difficulty which he supposed Mr. George Rose might
experience in entering the bay of Chesapeake, in
consequence of the proclamation of the President.
In the interview invited by his last note I expressed
my surprise that any doubt should exist on the
subject of it, and assured him that Mr. Pinkney &
myself would be responsible for Mr. Rose’s prompt
admission into our harbors, & arrival at Washington
without suffering the slightest molestation; on the
contrary, that he should receive every attention
& facility on the route which he might require.
I told him that no document from us would be necessary
for that purpose, but that, to put the question beyond all
doubt we would give him a passport which should go to
every object in detail, and that we would also give him
letters of introduction to the Governors of Maryland &
Virginia, the States through which he would pass, to be
taken advantage of, if he found that they would be useful.
With this explanation & arrangement
Mr. Canning was satisfied.
I also send you a copy of a letter from
Mr. Rose senior and of my answer relative
to the mission of his son to the United States.
Although Mr. Rose’s letter is unofficial,
I have thought it proper in consideration of
his near connection with the minister, and
his station in the government to communicate it.
I leave this tomorrow to meet in the channel
the Augustus the ship in which I propose
to sail with my family to the United States.
She has left this port and is on her way to
Portsmouth, where she will receive us.
Mr. Rose by going in a frigate will most probably
arrive before me & even before Doctor Bullus.
It is important that you should possess all the
information which I can give, respecting the business
in which I have been lately engaged with Mr. Canning,
and of Mr. Rose’s mission at the moment of his arrival.
I have therefore thought it advisable to commit to him
this letter & a copy of my correspondence with Mr. Canning,
as Mr. Pinkney & I have done of our joint dispatch.
I expect to be at sea in a week from this date and shall
proceed to Washington immediately after my arrival
in the United States to communicate to you such further
information, as I may impart, relative to the important
concerns of our country in which I have been employed.9
After having been in Europe for four years, Monroe returned
to Norfolk, Virginia on 13 December 1807.
On that day Monroe wrote this letter to Secretary of State Madison:
I arrived here today, with my family in the American
ship the Augustus in 28 days from Portsmouth.
It is my intention to set out for Richmond without delay, &
leaving my family there, to proceed thence to Washington,
for the purpose of giving you all the information in my
power respecting our affairs with the British government.
We are much exhausted by fatigue & sickness on the
voyage, & there will be difficulty in getting the means of
conveying us to Richmond with any of comfort, so that
I do not expect to leave this till Tuesday or to be able to
move with much rapidity till I leave that place, but you
may be assured, that I will be with you as soon as I can.
I had expected to hear on my arrival that pursued by
Dr. Bullus in the Revenge, & Mr. Rose who it was
reported at Portsmouth had sailed days before me,
but I find that neither of them has reached the
Chesapeake, to which each was destined.
I sent by him a copy of my dispatch by Dr. Bullus, & of
some subsequent communications, comparatively of
inferior importance; between Mr. Canning & myself
on the subject of it, & Mr. Pinkney & I sent you a
copy of Mr. Canning’s letter to us in reply to our
letter to him in obedience to your instructions by
Mr. Purviance, and we also communicated to
you what had passed in an interview with him
(at his request for the purpose of asking
Explanations on certain parts of our letters)
relative to the late proclamation of our
government concerning impressments.
We thought it important that you should be acquainted
with his observations on the latter subject before
the arrival of Mr. Rose; and as there was reason
to presume that he would get here before me or
indeed any other opportunity that offered, deemed it
expedient to make him the bearer of that dispatch.
I should send you those papers by the mail, but as
I left the ship with most of my baggage in the road,
it is not in my power to do it at present.
I will however not fail to bring them with me.
According to present appearances I shall be at
Washington on Sunday next or Monday week at
the latest, though I will be there sooner if in my power.
I beg you to present my respectful compliments to
the President & to inform him that I have brought the
instruments which he desired me to obtain of Jones in
London, & shall send them to Richmond with my baggage,
when they will be disposed of according to his desires.
I write you this in haste merely to apprise you of my
arrival, to give you some idea of the communications
which have already been forwarded to you, & of my
intention to set out & get to Washington for the purpose
of adding any other in my power as soon as possible.10
President Thomas Jefferson’s Embargo Act was introduced i
the United States Senate on 18 December 1807 by Maryland’s
Senator Samuel Smith, who was also President pro tempore of the Senate.
Also on that day Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin
wrote this letter to President Jefferson:
Reflecting on the proposed embargo and all its bearings,
I think it essential that foreign vessels may be excepted
so far at least as to be permitted to depart in ballast or with
such cargoes as they may have on board at this moment.
They are so few as to be no object to us;
and we may thereby prevent a similar detention
of our vessels abroad or at least a pretense for it.
Such a seizure of our property & seamen in
foreign ports would be far greater than any
possible loss at sea for six months to come.
I wish to know the name of the member to whom
Mr. Rodney sent the sketch of a resolution, in order
to mention the subject to him & also, if you approve,
that you would suggest it to such as you may see.
I also think that an embargo, for a limited
time will at this moment be preferable in
itself & less objectionable in Congress.
In every point of view privations, sufferings,
revenue, effect on the enemy, politics at home &c.,
I prefer war to a permanent embargo.
Governmental prohibitions do always more mischief than
had been calculated; and it is not without much hesitation
that a statesman should hazard to regulate the concerns
of individuals as if he could do it better than themselves.
The measure being of a doubtful policy & hastily adopted
on the first view of our foreign intelligence, I think that
we had better recommend it with modifications & at
first for such a limited time as will afford us all time
for re-consideration &, if we think proper, for an
alteration in your course without appearing to retract.
As to the hope that it may have an effect on the
negotiations with Mr. Rose, or induce England to
treat us better, I think it entirely groundless.11
The United States Congress approved the Embargo Act on December 22.
On that day President Jefferson signed it into law,
and it was to become effective on the 23rd.
On 18 February 1808 President Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Monroe,
You informed me that the instruments you had
been so kind as to bring for me from England would
arrive at Richmond with your baggage, and you
wished to know what was to be done with them there.
I will ask the favor of you to deliver them to
Mr. Jefferson who will forward them to Monticello
in the way I shall advise him: and I must entreat
you to send me either a note of their amount, or
the bills that I may be enabled to reimburse you.
There can be no pecuniary matter between us
against which this can be any set-off; but if, contrary
to my recollection or knowledge, there were anything,
I pray that that may be left to be settled by itself.
If I could have known the amount before hand
I should have remitted it, and asked the advance
only under the idea that it should be the same
as ready money to you on your arrival.
I must again therefore beseech
you to let me know it’s amount.
I see with infinite grief a contest arising
between yourself and another who have been
very dear to each other, and equally so to me.
I sincerely pray that these dispositions may not be
affected between you: with me I confidently trust
they will not, for independently of the dictates of public
duty which prescribe neutrality to me, my sincere
friendship for you both will ensure its sacred observance.
I suffer no one to converse with me on the subject.
I already perceive my old friend
Clinton estranging himself from me.
No doubt lies are carried to him, as they will be
to the other two candidates, under forms which,
however false, he can scarcely question.
Yet I have been equally careful as to him
also never to say a word on his subject.
The object of the contest is a fair & honorable one,
equally open to you all; and I have no doubt the
personal conduct of each will be so chaste as to
offer no ground of dissatisfaction with each other.
But your friends will not be as delicate.
I know too well from experience the progress
of political controversy, and the exacerbation
of spirit into which it degenerates, not to fear
for the continuance of your mutual esteem.
One piquing thing said, draws on another, that a third,
and always with increasing acrimony, until all restraint
is thrown off, and it becomes difficult for yourselves
to keep clear of the toils in which your friends will
endeavor to interlace you, and to avoid the
participation in their passions which they will
endeavor to produce a candid recollection of what
you know of each other will be the true corrective.
With respect to myself I hope they will spare me.
My longings for retirement are so strong that I
with difficulty encounter the daily drudgeries of my duty.
But my wish for retirement itself is not stronger than
that of carrying into it the affections of all my friends.
I have ever viewed Mr. Madison and yourself
as two principal pillars of my happiness.
Were either to be withdrawn, I should consider
it as among the greatest calamities which
could assail my future peace of mind.
I have great confidence that the candor & high
understanding of both will guard me against this misfortune,
the bare possibility of which has so far weighed on my
mind that I could not be easy without unburdening it.12
On 27 February 1808 James Monroe wrote
this letter in Richmond, Virginia to President Jefferson:
My great anxiety to forward to you the account and
receipt for the sum which I paid for your mathematical
instruments at London, when I should acknowledge your
kind letter of the 18th, prevented my answering it sooner.
To obtain them I was forced to ransack all my papers,
which required much time, & in truth I did not
succeed in finding them till this morning.
I have now the pleasure to enclose you
those papers, by which it appears, that
the sum which I paid amounted to £34.10.
I had sent the box to Mr. Jefferson the day before I
received your letter, having been so much engaged in other
business that I had not been able to attend to it before.
To the receipt of the sum paid I have no objection,
though I well know that I am indebted
to you an equal if not a greater amount.
I shall be able to satisfy you of
this fact hereafter–when we meet.
In the meantime as you desire it, I will
with pleasure receive that sum & leave
other matters of account to rest as they are.
I can assure you that no occurrences of my
whole life ever gave me so much concern as
some which took place during my absence abroad,
proceeding from the present administration.
I allude more especially to the mission of Mr. Pinkney
with all the circumstances connected with that measure,
and the manner in which the treaty which he and I formed,
which was in fact little more than a project, was received.
I do not wish to dwell on those subjects.
I resolved that they should not form any motive of my
public or private conduct, and I proceeded to execute
my public duty in the same manner, and to support and
advance to the utmost of my power your political &
personal fame, as if they had not occurred.
The latter–object has been felt through life by me
scarcely as a secondary one, for from the high
respect which I have entertained for your public
services, talents & virtues I have seen the national
interest, and your advancement and fame so intimately
connected, as to constitute essentially the same cause.
Besides I have never forgotten the proofs of kindness
& friendship which I received from you in early life.
When I returned to the United States, I found that
heavy censure had fallen on me in the public opinion,
as I had before much reason to believe was the case,
in consequence of my having signed the British treaty.
And when I returned here from Washington, I was assured
that that circumstance was wielded against me with great
effect in relation to a particular object; that it was relied
on to impeach my character in the most delicate points.
Conscious that I had served my country & the administration
in the several trusts confided to me abroad with the utmost
integrity, industry & zeal; that in some cases I had rendered
useful service; that in all I had done the most that could be
done under existing circumstances; that my private
fortune had been essentially injured by those
employments, it was impossible for me to be
insensible to the effect produced by those attacks.
They have injured & continue to injure
me every day in the public estimation.
I trust however that means may be found to
do me justice without the slightest injury to you.
Be that as it may, you may be assured that
I shall never cease to take a deep interest
in your political fame & personal happiness.
I informed Mr. Madison when I was at Washington
that I should write him a letter in reply to his of
May 20th 1807 on the subject of the treaty to answer
some of his objections to it, and place in a just light the
conduct of the American Commissioners in that transaction.
I informed him also that as I wished to couch that letter in
the most amicable terms, if he should find any passage in it,
which failed in that respect, I should be happy to alter it,
having in mind only a fair vindication of my conduct.
I have almost concluded the letter & shall forward it in
the course of the next week, the early part of it if possible.
My private concerns have subjected me to much
interruption, or I should have finished it sooner.
In regard to the approaching election I have been and
shall continue to be an inactive spectator of the movement.
Should the nation be disposed to call any citizen
to that station it would be his duty to accept it.
On that ground I rest.
I have done nothing to draw the attention of anyone
to me in reference to it, nor shall I in future.
No one better knows than I do the merit of Mr. Madison,
and I can declare that should he be elected, he will have
my best wishes for the success of his administration,
as well on account of the great interest which I take
in what concerns his welfare as in that of my country.
His success will give me no personal mortification.
It will not lessen my friendship for him
which is sincere & strong.13
President Jefferson, learning that his two best friends, James Madison
and James Monroe were running for the Republican nomination for President
of the United States, wrote to Monroe again on March 10.
I some days ago made a remittance to Mr. Jefferson
with a request that he would pay you the amount of
Jones’s bill with the costs and other disbursements.
For these last he would have to ask your
information as they were not stated on the bill.
With this be so good as to accept my thanks
for the attention you have paid to this
commission and the trouble it has given you.
From your letter of the 27th Ultimo I perceive that painful
impressions have been made on your mind, during your
late mission, of which I had never entertained a suspicion.
I must therefore examine the grounds, because explanations
between reasonable men can never but do good.
1. You consider the mission of Mr. Pinckney as an
associate, to have been in some way injurious to you.
Were I to take that measure on myself, I might say
in its justification that it has been the regular &
habitual practice of the U. S. to do this under every
form in which their government has existed.
I need not recapitulate the multiplied instances,
because you will readily recollect them.
I went as an adjunct to Dr. Franklin & Mr. Adams,
yourself as an adjunct first to Mr. Livingston, and then to
Mr. Pinckney, & I really believe there has scarcely been
a great occasion which has not produced an extraordinary
mission. still however it is well known that I was strongly
opposed to it in the case of which you complain.
A Committee of the Senate called on me with
two resolutions of that body on the subjects of
impressment & spoliations by Great Britain,
& requesting that I would demand satisfaction.
After delivering the resolutions the committee entered
into free conversation and observed that although the
Senate could not in form recommend an extraordinary
mission, yet that as individuals there was but one sentiment
among them on the measure, and they pressed it.
I was so much adverse to it, & gave them
so hard an answer that they felt it and spoke of it;
but it did not end here.
The members of the other house took up the subject
and set upon me individually, and these the best friends
to you as well as myself, and represented the responsibility
which a failure to obtain redress would throw on us both,
pursuing a conduct in opposition to the opinion
of nearly every member of the legislature.
I found it necessary at length to yield my own opinion to the
general sense of the national council, and it really seemed
to produce a jubilee among them: not from any want of
confidence in you, but from a belief in the effect which an
extraordinary mission would have on the British mind by
demonstrating the degree of importance which this country
attached to the rights which we considered as infracted.
2. You complain of the manner in which the
treaty was received, but what was that manner?
I cannot suppose you to have given a moment’s credit
to the stuff which was crowded in all sorts of forms
into the public papers, or to the thousand speeches they
put into my mouth, not a word of which I had ever uttered.
I was not insensible at the time of the views to mischief
with which these lies were fabricated. but my confidence
was firm that neither yourself nor the British government,
equally outraged by them, would believe me capable
of making the editors of newspapers the confidents
of my speeches or opinions. the fact was this:
the treaty was communicated to us by
Mr. Erskine on the day Congress was to rise.
Two of the Senators enquired of me in the evening whether
it was my purpose to detain them on account of the treaty.
My answer was ‘that it was not: that the treaty containing
no provision against the impressment of our seamen,
and being accompanied by a kind of protestation of the
British ministers which would leave that government
free to consider it as a treaty or no treaty,
according to their own convenience, I should
not give them the trouble of deliberating on it.’
This was substantially, & almost verbally what I said
whenever spoken to about it, and I never failed, when
the occasion would admit of it, to justify yourself and
Mr. Pinckney by expressing my conviction that it was all
that could be obtained from the British government;
that you had told their commissioners that your government
could not be pledged to ratify, because it was contrary
to their instructions, of course that it should be considered
but as a Project; and in this light I stated it publicly in
my message to Congress on the opening of this session.
Not a single article of the treaty was ever made known
beyond the members of the administration; nor would
an article of it be known at this day but for its publication
in the newspapers as communicated by somebody
from beyond the water as we have always understood.
But as to myself I can solemnly protest as the most
sacred of truths that I never one instant lost sight of
your reputation and favorable standing with your country,
& never omitted to justify your failure to attain
our wish as one which was probably unattainable.
Reviewing therefore this whole subject I cannot
doubt you will become sensible that your
impressions have been without just ground.
I cannot indeed judge what falsehoods may
have been written or told by you and that
under such forms as to command belief.
But you will soon find, my dear Sir, that so inveterate
is the rancor of party spirit among us, that nothing
ought to be credited but what we hear with our own ears.
If you are less on your guard than we are here at this
moment, the designs of the mischief-makers will not
fail to be accomplished, and brethren & friends will
be made strangers & enemies to each other without
ever having said or thought a thing amiss of each other.
I presume that the most insidious falsehoods are daily
carried to you, as they are brought to me, to engage
us in the passions of our informers, and stated so
positively & plausibly as to make even doubt a rudeness
to the narrator, who, imposed on himself, has no other
than the friendly view of putting us on our guard.
My answer is invariable, that my knowledge of
your character is better testimony to me of a
negative, than any affirmative which my informant
did not hear from yourself with his own ears.
In fact, when you shall have been a little longer
among us, you will find that little is to be believed
which interests the prevailing passions, and
happens beyond the limits of our own senses.
Let us not then, my dear friend, embark our happiness
and our affections, on the ocean of slander, of falsehood
& of malice, on which our credulous friends are floating.
If you have been made to believe that I ever did, said,
or thought a thing unfriendly to your fame & feelings,
you do me injury as causeless as it is afflicting to me.
In the present contest in which you are concerned,
I feel no passion; I take no part; I express no sentiment.
Whichever of my friends is called to the supreme
cares of the nation, I know that they will be wisely
& faithfully administered; and as far as my individual
conduct can influence, they shall be cordially supported.
For myself I have nothing further to ask of the world
than to preserve in retirement so much of their
esteem as I may have fairly earned, and to be
permitted to pass in tranquility in the bosom of
my family & friends the days which yet remain for me.
Having reached the harbor myself, I shall view with anxiety
(but certainly not with a wish to be in their place) those
who are still buffeting the storm uncertain of their fate.
Your voyage has so far been favorable, & that it
may continue with entire prosperity is the sincere
prayer of that friendship which I have ever borne you,
and of which I now assure you with the tender of my
high respect & affectionate salutations.14
On 22 March 1808 James Monroe wrote this
fairly long letter to President Thomas Jefferson:
I had the pleasure to receive your favor of the
11th instant the day after I returned from Albemarle.
It is very distressing to me to discuss with you
the topics on which it treats, but in the state in
which things are it is certainly best to come to a
perfect understanding on every point & to repair on
both sides any injury which may have been received.
To do you an injury or indeed anyone in the administration,
never entered into my mind, for while I labored under a
conviction, not only that I had been injured, but that the
friendly feeling which you had so long entertained for
me had ceased to exist, the only sentiment which I
indulged in consequence of it was that of sorrow.
At present I am happy to say that all doubt of your
friendship towards me having experienced any change
is completely done away, and that the only anxiety which
I feel is to satisfy you, that the impression was not taken
on light ground nor imputable to communications
made to me by persons out of the administration.
The mission in itself, of Mr. Pinkney or any other
person, would not have produced such an effect.
It resulted from a chain of circumstances
of which that measure was only a part.
When I left Madrid, I communicated to Mr. Madison
in aid of our public dispatches every idea which I had
formed of the state of our affairs there and in all their
relations by sending him a copy of my private journal
and adding in private letters what it did not contain.
Although it was my earnest desire to get home and
look to my private concerns, which I proposed to do
soon after my return to London, I intimated to him
that I was willing in consideration of the existing crisis,
to act in any situation in which I might be useful.
On my return to London I found that the seizures
which were commenced in my absence had
imposed on me a new & important Duty.
I resisted them & not without some effect.
By announcing to the British minister my intention
to return to the United States that autumn,
I assumed the character for every essential purpose,
of a special Envoy with which Mr. Madison was made
acquainted, as he was likewise with my determination
to remain there till the business was concluded.
The evidence before him seemed to be satisfactory that, as
nothing could be gained of the existing ministry but by force,
any change of the attitude taken on our part was likely to
do harm, & if the ministry retired that the danger if such
an effect would be increased by a change of attitude.
This latter idea was strongly urged in a
private letter to him of July 2nd 1806 with
my earnest advice against such a mission.
As the ship by which that letter was sent
arrived at Philadelphia on the 26th of March,
I concluded that he had received it on the 30th.
It was written in consequence of intelligence
from the United States that such a mission
was decided on by the government.
As I had received no answer to any of my
communications from Madrid or London after my
return, nor any acknowledgment of my services at
either place or expression of a desire that I would
come home or remain there, it seemed by the
measure alluded to, as if it was considered that I was
rather in the way of than of use to the administration.
Its reserve to me for so long a time and appointment
of an associate after the receipt of my private letter
of July 2nd & a public letter of nearly the same date,
& after the change of the ministry was known,
made a strong impression on my mind to that effect.
A special mission was never gratifying to that
on the ground, and perhaps never will be while
men are governed by those useful passions
which stimulate them to virtuous actions.
Such a mission reduces the resident minister however
respectable for his talents & character to a cypher,
from the moment it is known that it is contemplated,
and if it does not destroy him it is because his
character is sufficiently strong to bear the shock.
The footing on which I had left my country;
a consciousness of the zeal and integrity of my
conduct in the public service, and of my personal
attachment & devotion to the administration and a
firm belief that no change could be made to advantage,
most probably increased my sensibility to the measure.
Had such a one been contemplated I thought that I
should have been the first to hear of it in a private letter
from yourself or Mr. Madison, but I had to gather the
intelligence from the newspapers, the correspondence
of others, the hints of Lord Holland & even of Mr. Fox.
Mr. Madison’s first letter to me on that subject,
or on any other important one of the kind alluded to,
which entered at all into them, was of the
11th of March 1806, almost 10 months after
I had left Madrid & 8 after my return to London.
It was received on the 25th of April.
It seemed to be intended to apprize me of the proposed
measure, and from its style taken in connection with
the preceding circumstances, contributed greatly to
confirm the impression which they had already made.
The facility which it afforded to my departure
appeared to me to be the strongest feature in it.
The letter—which Mr. Pinkney brought me,
which was delivered to him & by him
to me open, was in the same tone.
It stated that I was included in the special mission,
but that Mr. Pinkney had brought a separate commission
with him to take my place in case I chose to return home.
It expressed no desire that I should
remain & unite in the negotiation.
The joint commission too seemed to be peculiarly adapted
to favor my return by authorizing one commissioner—
to act in the absence of the other in which it differed from
those which I had carried with me abroad, they giving
that power to one in case only of the death of the other.
I could see no reason for his bringing with him a separate
commissioner to succeed me in the ordinary mission, if my
immediate return had not been contemplated, as sufficient
time would have been allowed for supplying it, if I remained
& joined in the negotiation before it could be concluded,
as for the variance in the conditions of the joint one.
All those circumstances tended to convince me,
that the administration had withdrawn its
confidence from & really wished to get rid of me.
I was struck with astonishment and deeply
affected by the reflection, as it was utterly
impossible for me to trace the cause.
Had I followed the impulse of my feelings,
it would have been to have withdrawn on the arrival
of Mr. Pinkney, but many considerations of great
weight admonished me to pursue a different course.
I had had much communication with Mr. Fox,
and entertained great hope that through him
our affairs might be settled to advantage.
It did not seem probable that any other person
could derive the same aid from those communications
that might be done by a party to them.
By remaining I thought that I might give
support to the administration at home,
which I most earnestly wished to do.
For these and other reasons of the same kind
I resolved to remain & unite in the negotiation
with such character as might be sent of which
I informed Mr. Madison in my letter of the 29th of April
which was written a few days after the receipt of his
of March 11th, and in which I gave him distinctly to
understand that that measure would be no cause of
disagreement between the administration & myself.
I remained & acted accordingly & did everything in my
power to accomplish the views of my government &
country, & finally concluded with Mr. Pinkney the best treaty
which it was possible to obtain of the British government.
In uniting in the negotiation & signing the treaty I committed
my reputation on the result, and it is only by the course
which the business afterwards took, that any unpleasant
occurrence has arisen between the administration & myself.
These were the circumstances which produced
the impression, which I have acknowledged
in the commencement of this letter, that your
friendship had been withdrawn from me.
But the assurances which you now make me
& the perfect knowledge which I have of your
rectitude & sincerity have completely effaced that
impression and restored to my mind that entire & friendly
confidence which it had always been accustomed to cherish.
I am perfectly satisfied that you never meant to injure me
& that a belief that I had suffered by any act to which
you were an innocent party would give you great pain.
Still the circumstance of my having signed a treaty,
which was disapproved for imputed great defects;
of having exceeded our powers in signing it,
which I should not have done, but in a firm belief
that I promoted thereby the best interests of my country
& of the administration, while I exposed myself to great
responsibility by the measure, have given a handle to
those who have wielded it with great effect against me.
You can little imagine to what extent
the mischief has been carried.
I could give you many details which it would be
as painful for you to read as for me to recite.
When I saw that I was depressed in a country which I had
so long served with fidelity & zeal, I could not be indifferent
either to the cause or the consequences resulting from it.
My sensibility was naturally increased by the excitement
of those on the ground, who by taking part in my favor,
had essentially compromised themselves.
I replied to the denunciation that was circulated
against me here for improper purposes to many
of my friends who called on me in decisive terms
and complained earnestly of the injury done me by it.
The sum of these conversations which
were always of a nature confidential,
it is not in my power to recollect with precision.
It is possible that in some cases I may have
expressed myself with too much zeal,
and in others been misconceived.
You may however be assured that my sole object was
to do justice to myself in a case of peculiar injustice,
& that I never went beyond its just limit.
I look with extreme concern to the violent course
which is pursued in the discussion which now agitates
the country & trust that it will be possible to moderate it.
This sentiment is excited in a peculiar manner
by what I have seen in the Enquirer of Friday last.
I neither know the author of the piece or from whom
he derives his information in the passage to which I allude,
nor indeed do I recollect the circumstance
on which he relies in one case.
I feel happy that we have had
this explanation with each other.
It has satisfied me that I had misconceived
your feelings & disposition towards me.
Nothing remains but to prevent
as far as possible all further inquietude.
From the period above alluded to of peculiar
excitement I have been attentive to this object
& shall pursue it in future with still greater zeal.
I estimate the acts of my friends by the intention only.
Being satisfied on that point I can bear with patience
any consequences which may casually result from them.
I am aware that under free government, it is difficult to
avoid those of the kind alluded to, for perhaps no important
good was ever altogether free from some portion of alloy.
I am however equally aware that the evils which are
incident to the system, if indeed there are any,
even to the individual who suffers by them, are trifling
when compared with the great blessings which it imparts.15
On 26 March 1808 James Monroe sent to Secretary of State James Madison
documents and papers to be given to Congress, and he wrote,
I am persuaded that the more comprehensive
the submission to Congress is of the documents
relating to the late negotiations with
Great Britain the better the effect will be.
I am not aware that they contain anything with
which the British Commissioners or the friends
of Mr. Fox, or those who were parties to the
negotiation before him, should it be deemed proper
to go so far back, ought to be or would be offended.
The greatest delicacy was observed towards
all the parties to the negotiation in all the
communications to you of what occurred in it.
I endeavored to draw a line of separation between
the parts which ought to be communicated to
Congress & withheld on my return from
Washington, & I found, that it would be extremely
difficult to do it on any consistent principle.
I suggest this only as a general idea.
On receiving the list which you promise me I will
endeavor to render you all the aid in my power to
enable you to supply everything which may be wanting.16
James Monroe in Richmond wrote this letter
to President Jefferson on 18 April 1808.
I had the pleasure to receive some days past
your favor of the 11th & that of the 13 today.
Being perfectly satisfied by the explanations &
assurances which you had given me in your preceding
letters that I had taken an improper idea of your
disposition towards me, the details contained in
your last one were not necessary in that view.
I receive them however with great interest, because in
giving them you afford me a new proof of your friendship.
I think I informed you or Mr. Madison that the Barings
had agreed to wait the term mentioned in your letter,
or some such term, for the reimbursement of the
money with interest, which they had advanced to
General La Fayette, on being secured in it.
Such was the fact, it having been communicated
to me by Alexander Baring for yours & Mr. Madison’s
information just before I left London.
It seems therefore most advisable to proceed on
that idea & to give information of it to La Fayette.
I will however be happy to write Mr. Baring if you
deem it necessary after receiving this information.
I am just setting out for Loudon to look after my
interest there, & after that of the son of my late
much esteemed relative and friend Mr. Jones.
Should you think it best to write Mr. Baring,
& be so good as to intimate it to me by a line at
Fredericksburg it shall be duly attended to.17
In a letter to President Jefferson on 24 October 1808 Monroe agreed to accept
the arrangement made by the President, who was not seeking re-election, to share
their correspondence by allowing it to be made public by a gazette in Washington.
Monroe made these observations about the political situation
in a long letter to L. W. Tazewell on October 30,
It is to be observed that when an election is made on
existing circumstances, that is, is dependent in any degree
on the success of public measures, the person whose
fortune is connected with the government has greatly
the advantage of those who may be opposed to him.
The people naturally cling to their government;
I speak of the great mass, & often those in office
& those who wish to be in office, side with it also.
Whether the measures of the administration, such as
the rejection of the treaty, & the previous measure of a
special mission, were intended to favor a particular object
cannot perhaps be satisfactorily determined at this time.
You will see in the papers a copy of a correspondence
between the President & me, on those two acts of his
administration, in which I have acknowledged myself to be
satisfied, in respect to his disposition towards me personally.
My objections however to the measures remain unmoved.
The publication of the correspondence presents
substantially to view my objections to those measures,
as I presume it does his vindication of them.
I have known & esteemed him long; his life has been
useful; and although I suffered much from those
measures in more than one respect, yet I feel
an interest in his future tranquility & happiness….
The danger is that this contest, which on our part, is
known to be commenced & maintained for the safety of the
union, & to have been conducted with unexampled delicacy
& propriety, may degenerate into a mere struggle as it
approaches a conclusion, between federalists & republicans.
The more it gets into that state
the better for our adversaries.
The majority of Electors will be republican, as we have
the fair prospect since the late election in Pennsylvania.18
President Jefferson because of his age at 65 declined to run for a third term
in 1808 even though legislators from eight states wanted him to run again.
James Monroe chose to run against his good friend James Madison,
who, as Secretary of State, was heavily favored.
Madison overwhelmed Monroe in the Republican caucus with 83 votes to 3.
Madison in Virginia got 14,655 votes to Monroe’s 3,408.
Monroe did not win any electoral votes.
Despite this contest they continued to be friends.
The Democratic Republicans nominated the sitting Vice President George Clinton
for re-election as Madison’s running mate.
In the election on 7 December 1808 they received more than twice the popular vote
than the Federalists got, and Madison easily defeated the Federalist
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney with a 122 to 47 victory in the Electoral College.
Clinton won the contest for Vice President over Rufus King 113 to 47.
Republicans in the US Senate retained 27 seats to 7 for the Federalists.
In the House of Representatives the Republicans lost 22 of their 116 seats
to the Federalists and still held a 94-48 advantage.
John Quincy Adams had left the Federalist party in 1807, and it was declining.
Notes
1. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 1-2.
2. From James Madison to James Monroe and William Pinkney, 18 March 1807 (Online).
3. From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 21 March 1807 (Online).
4. From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 29 May 1807 (Online).
5. James Madison Writings, p. 673-679.
6. To James Madison from James Monroe, 14 August 1807 (Online).
7. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816 ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton p. 8-17.
8. From James Madison to James Monroe, 21 October 1807 (Online).
9. To James Madison from James Monroe, 28 October 1807 (Online).
10. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 20-22.
11. To Thomas Jefferson from Albert Gallatin, 18 December 1807 (Online).
12. From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 18 February 1808 (Online).
13. Ibid., p. 24-27.
14. From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 10 March 1808 (Online).
15. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 27-35.
16. Ibid., p. 36-37.
17. Ibid., p. 51-52.
18. Ibid., p. 73-74, 79.