On 9 January 1812 the Secretary of State James Monroe wrote this letter
to his good friend, the former President Thomas Jefferson:
A circumstance has occurred with which it may
be useful for you to be made acquainted
merely to put you on your guard.
You have doubtless seen a letter published in the
gazettes, which is imputed to General Wilkinson
& said to be written from this place in 1803 to
Mr. Power at New Orleans requesting him to use
the General’s influence with the Spanish authority
there to prevent the restoration of the Deposit.
It is understood that the authenticity of the letter is
admitted, & the explanation given of the measure,
which I have recently & casually heard, is the
circumstance with which I wish you to be acquainted.
It is this, that the letter was written with yours &
General Dearborne’s knowledge & approbation, & that
a copy of it was at that time deposited in the war office.
Knowing of this explanation you will be prepared by
reflection for the answer which ought to be given to any
application that may be made to you on the subject.1
Monroe from the Department of State wrote this letter to the
United States Minister to France Joel Barlow on February 23:
The Constitution has reached our Coast, and Lieutenant
Morris who left her off the Capes of the Chesapeake just
arrived here with you and Mr. Russell’s dispatches.
I shall be able to say little more by this opportunity than
to acknowledge the receipt of your communication.
Your strong reasoning in favor of a change of
commercial policy in France is well calculated to
promote the desired effect, and it is hoped that
her Government will not fail to render to the
United States the justice to which they are entitled.
From the view as yet taken of the subject it would seem
not advisable to give to the result of your negotiations
the form and character of a commercial Treaty unless
indeed it should include a due provision for spoliations.
The idea of placing the Citizens of each Country
in the ports of the other on the footing of natives,
though favorable in some respects as you observe,
is on the whole thought more proper for future
consideration than immediate adoption.
Without a reduction of the tariff corresponding
with the liberality of our duties, it is obvious that a
Commerce with France cannot be advantageous to us.
We are not however prepared to bind the United States
to any given rate, especially as great augmentations
may become necessary for public exigences.
This communication is forwarded to you by in the Wasp.
He is also charged with dispatches to Mr. Russell and
such communications as you may think proper to
make to him relating to our affairs with France.
If essential accommodations are made to the
United States by the French Government,
Mr. Russell’s knowledge of the fact may produce
a salutary effect on our concerns in England.2
The next day Monroe wrote this letter to Barlow:
No intelligence is yet received of a change of policy
in England, nor is there any certainty of such a change,
even after the Prince Regent is invested with the full power
of the Crown, although it be by the demise of his father.
It is to be presumed therefore that our affairs will go
forward in a uniform direction to the result to which they
point and to which they are invited by accumulated injuries.
Great exertions will be made to bring into activity the
force provided for by law with the least possible delay.
Some months however must elapse before it can be raised.
In the interval the door is open to propositions of
accommodation from Great Britain, and it is hoped that a
more just and enlightened view of her interests and of our
rights will be taken by her Government before it is too late.
The French Government must not suppose that the
attitude now taken by the United States towards Great
Britain has changed their sentiments or their expectation
of redress for the various injuries received from the
French Decrees enumerated in your instructions.
The impulse which this Nation has received proceeds
from a strong sense of injury from both the Belligerents.
A fair discrimination has been made in favor of France in the
particular circumstances in which her conduct has merited it.
But on every other ground of complaint the sensibility
and opinion of this Government are the same.
Nor will the pressure on France be diminished by any
change which may take place in our relations with
England to whatever extent it may be carried.3
Monroe wrote to Jefferson again about President James Madison’s
communication to Congress on 9 March 1812:
The President will communicate today to the Congress
the discovery which has been lately made to the
government of an attempt of the British government
through the governor general of Canada or at least
by him, with the subsequent approbation of that
government to promote division & disunion in the
year 1809, the period of difficulty under the embargo
by means of a secret mission to Boston the object
of which was to intrigue with the disaffected.
The agent a captain John Henry, formerly an officer
of the United States of the Corps of Artillery, appointed
in 1798 & having served till 1802 has made the discovery
himself & delivered up all the original documents.
He had been promised reward & honor for his service in
that affair; & been disappointed and revenge for the injury
is among the strong motives to the measure on his part.
The compromitment of the British government is complete
to the extent stated; and the compromitment of some
leaders of the federal party by designation & strong
circumstances, though without naming them, equally clear.
He insisted that the people with whom he
communicated had not broken their faith with him,
as the British government had,
& that therefore he could not give them up.
The documents carry with them the
complete evidence of authenticity.
It is not probable that they will be contested.
Many will shrink from the tendency they will have
with those acquainted with the events of that period
in the Eastern states to draw attention to them.
I will send you a copy of the documents as soon
as they are published, which will be forthwith.
The intimation which I gave you of the vindication
said to have been set up by general Wilkinson of
himself against a certain charge, was taken from
a member of Congress, who had received it
from Dr. Kent, a particular friend of the general.
As it was not relied on in the trial, it is probable
that it was merely the suggestion of a friend,
who hazarded it to meet a document which was
making an unfavorable impression against him.4
Speaker of the House of Representatives Henry Clay opposed the Republicans
and in a letter to James Monroe he proposed a 30-day embargo
of the British with a secret message to London.
If they did not cooperate, he urged a declaration of war.
Clay was supported by other “war hawks” who were preparing for a war.
President Madison and Secretary of State Monroe believed the British
were
trying to take a political advantage over the United States but not with the military.
After a major earthquake destroyed much of Caracas and La Guaira
killing 20,000 people in Venezuela, Monroe requested that aid be sent to the survivors.
Congress was preoccupied with the war issues, yet they appropriated $50,000 in aid.
Monroe expressed his views on military preparation in this letter to
his local physician Dr. Charles Everett on 23 March 1812:
I have had the pleasure to receive yours of the 12th.
It has given me great concern that the pressure of
affairs has been such as to render it impossible for
me to acquit myself to the just claims of my friends.
I have really not been able to discharge to my own
satisfaction my duties to the public & in consequence
thereof have been forced to fail to my friends.
The reference for recommendation to supply officers
for the force to be raised to the representatives in Congress,
which became necessary by the number to be appointed &
the haste with which the nominations were to be made,
put it out of my power to be as useful to many for
whom I took an interest as I might otherwise have been.
As soon however as I received a letter from Col. Yancey
in favor of Captain Robertson which I did some weeks past,
I said everything in his favor that I had been requested.
I shall at your instance repeat the same today,
though I do not think, in the state in which
the business is, that it will be effectual.
Each district has a company to
which the officers are appointed.
Seven other companies are to be raised, & the officers
are to be chosen through the whole State, and these from
what the Secretary of War states, long since decided on.
In the case of Brand I give you full
authority to adjust it as you think fit.
I want no money.
The just sentiment expressed by a respectable jury,
which although they united in no sum, was decided
against such an act, affords me great satisfaction.
The God who made us made the black people,
and they ought not to be treated with barbarity.
Settle it as you think proper, and I will be quite contented.
I fear that affairs must grow worse
before we can hope a change.
There is no prospect of a revocation
of the British orders in council.
Your friends here have done everything in their
power to bring you into a useful and honorable
station, but I can say nothing of the result.5
President James Madison on 1 April 1812
called for a 60-day embargo on the British,
and on April 9 he let James Monroe publish
“Reflections on the Present Crisis of Our Affairs”
in the National Intelligencer in which he wrote,
“If the reports we now hear are true, that with England all hope of honorable
accomplishment is at an end, let war be forthwith proclaimed against England.”
He admitted “We are not prepared for war,” though he believed
“Our preparations are adequate to every essential object.”6
In May locusts caused a famine in the Canary Islands,
and Monroe asked for aid again.
This time Congress responded that the reports were not adequate.
President Madison in a message to Congress on June 1
asked for a declaration of war against Great Britain.
The House of Representatives approved this 79 to 49, though the Senate
took two weeks while they debated whether trade
with the British should be allowed during the war.
Then they approved it 13 to 9.
Col. John Taylor was the President of the Virginia Agricultural Societies,
and in a long letter to him on 13 June 1812 Monroe concluded with this:
In the commencement of this European war
the United States had the alternative either
to leave our commerce to itself or to
yield it all the protection in their power.
I am convinced if the former plan had been adopted,
that the republican party would have been overset
long since, if the Union itself had not been dissolved.
The Eastern people would have complained that their
rights and interests were sacrificed by those in power,
who were planters & negro holders, who cared for
the sale of their wheat, corn, and tobacco only.
The other plan was preferred, of yielding
to it what protection we could.
In pursuing this plan I have always thought that
a fair and reasonable arrangement with the great
maritime power was the true interest of this country.
On this principle I signed the treaty with England,
which was rejected, & its rejection has been
followed with the restrictive system of embargo,
non-intercourse &c., which failed in their object.
In coming here I found my country in the same
controversy with the same powers & at issue
particularly with Great Britain, & the question after the
failure of the negotiation with Mr. Foster, if it may be so
called, whether we shall submit or maintain our rights
against that power; on that point I could have no doubt.
My letter from Richmond did not
propose a surrender of those rights.
It explained the treaty which had been
rejected according to our understanding of it.
It did not even say that it ought to have been adopted.
It expressed a confidence in the patriotism and wisdom
of the administration and a wish to aid it in asserting
our rights under the restrictive system, aided no doubt
by other causes, particularly a desire in those out of
power to get into power, a desire in many to change our
system of government, in others to separate the Union.
A strange revolution has been produced considering
the interests of the different parts of the United States
as to the supporters & opponents of present measures.
It is strange to see Southern people supporting neutral
& maritime rights, who have comparatively so small an
interest in their support against Eastern people, whose
prosperity depends on the support of those rights.
The truth is the restrictive system
contributed much to produce this effect.
The government had it in its power to make a compromise
in this point with its opponents by retiring from the contest
with Great Britain, repeating the non-importation act &
leaving our commerce to be regulated by her government.
The opponents of the government, federalists & others,
invited this course, and had it been taken
their opposition must have ceased.
But where would it have left the United States?
& what effect would it have had on the character
& destiny of our republican system of government?
My idea was that such a step would have put it in
great danger, if it had not subverted it eventually.
The government thought it important to the best interests
of our country to go forward and push the controversy
with decision, since it could not be avoided.
My candid opinion is that we shall succeed in obtaining
what it is important to obtain, and that we shall experience
little annoyance or embarrassment in the effort.
I have great hope that decision here will at an early
date rid the British nation of its present ministry,
and that an accommodation will soon follow the change.
Should the war however be prolonged, I do not apprehend
either invasion, the desolation of our coast, the battering
of our towns, or even any greater injury to our commerce
than has existed since 1807, the period of the first embargo.
I am persuaded, on the contrary, that it would be
more flourishing in war than it has been since 1807,
taking the whole term of five years together.
Spain & Portugal must have provisions;
Britain herself wants & must have them, as do her islands.
If war does not procure immediate accommodation,
her government will afford vast facilities to our trade.
It will find its way to hungry mouths.
Nor do I apprehend any dismemberment of
the Union or opposition to the government.
These are idle fears.
They serve to excite alarm, to aid the cause of opposition,
but if we open our ports & trade & fight, & fight & trade,
& let all the embarrassments proceed from the enemy,
& none from our own government, I think
we shall soon have much internal quiet.7
From May 30 to June 21 in 1812 the British Ambassador
Augustus John Foster wrote six letters to Secretary of State Monroe,
and he wrote five letters in return to Foster.
President Madison made a “Memorandum of a Conversation
with Augustus J. Foster” on June 23.
In conversation Monroe and Foster threatened war against each other.
Jonathan Russell was the United States Minister to Britain from 27 July 1811
to 18 June 1812, and he wrote letters to Monroe on June 3, 6, 8, 11, and 21.
Monroe wrote this letter to Russell on 26 June 1812:
It will, it is presumed, occur that a prosecution
of the War for one Year or even a few months,
if not for a shorter term, will present very serious
obstacles on the part of the United States to
an accommodation, which does not now exist.
I will advert to one only.
Should our troops enter Canada, you will perceive the
effect which that measure cannot fail to have by the
compromitment it might make of the United States to
the inhabitants of the British Provinces, and the effect
which success (which could not fail to attend it) might
have on the public mind here, making it difficult to
relinquish Territory which had been conquered.
It is proper to observe to you that the
United States are under no engagement
of any kind to the French Government.
With that Government our affairs are as yet
in many important circumstances unsettled.
It is not wished to connect ourselves with
France, nor shall we if to be avoided.
Nothing but the prosecution of the war against
us by England, attended with much calamity,
would produce that effect.
This therefore in every view that can be taken
of the subject is the most favorable moment
for an accommodation with England.8
On June 19 President Madison announced that Congress had declared war
that now existed between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
and the dependencies and the United States of America and their Territories.
Monroe on 1 July 1812 wrote a letter to John Quincy Adams
who was the first American ambassador to Russia.
Madison with Monroe met with forty delegates from the Iowa, Sioux, and
Winnebago nations at the President’s House, and they attempted to persuade them
not to fight for the British and Canadians but rather with the 18 states of the Americans.
Riots against the Federal Republican newspaper in Baltimore
involving those who opposed the war had erupted on 22 June 1812.
Federalists were protected in a house.
On July 27 the Federal Republican published an editorial on “Mobocracy.”
This provoked a larger attack on that night.
The militia was called out, and many people were arrested.
Some of the rioters attacked the county jail on July 28.
The newspaper sent out columns by mail on August 3,
and the post office was threatened.
Monroe in a letter on August 4 to President Madison wrote:
We hear nothing certain of Commodore John Rodgers,
& the accounts of the affair at Baltimore
still leave it in much obscurity.
However much to be regretted & censured popular
movements of this kind always are, nothing can be
said in favor of a party organized for the purpose of
its combating the mob, unknown to the law, equally
in defiance of it, and which could not fail by the
excitement it was sure to produce to bring on the contest.
Mobs however must be prevented, & the punishment
even of such men as the Editors of that paper
must be inflicted by law, not mob movements.
It would do credit to the Executive of Maryland
to reestablish that paper, and the credit would
be in proportion to its past & future excesses.
I fear that if some distinguished effort is not made in favor
of the authority of the law, there is danger of a civil war,
which may undermine our free system of government.9
On 28 August 1812 Secretary of State Monroe
wrote in a letter to the war hawk Henry Clay:
We have just heard with equal astonishment
and concern that General Hull has surrendered
by capitulation the army under his command
at Detroit to the British force opposed to him.
The circumstances attending this most
Mortifying and humiliating event are not known;
but so far as we are informed on the subject,
there appears to be no justification of it.
I cannot suspect his integrity; I rather suppose
that a panic had seized the whole force, and that
he and they became victims of his want of energy,
promptitude of decision, and those resources, the
characteristics of great minds in difficult emergencies.
We understand that after passing the river he suffered
his communication to be cut off with the States of Ohio
and Kentucky, and without making any active movement
in front to strike terror into the enemy, he remained
tranquil, thereby evincing a want of confidence in his
own means and giving time to collect his forces together.
No intelligence justifies the belief that
he gave battle in a single instance.
It appears that he surrendered on a summons from
Fort Sandwich on the opposite side of the river, after
firing of some cannon or mortars which did no mischief.
Before this disastrous event was known, the force now,
I presume, on its march was ordered from Kentucky,
and the appointment of brigadier had
been conferred on Governor Harrison.
Your letters had produced all the effect on
those subjects, which their solidity justly merited.
I most sincerely wish that the President could
dispose of me at this juncture in the military line.
If circumstances would permit, and it should be thought
that I could render any service, I would in a very few
days join our forces assembling beyond the Ohio and
endeavor to recover the ground which we have lost.10
James Monroe wrote this letter on August 31 to Thomas Jefferson:
We have heard with equal astonishment
and concern that General Hull has surrendered
the army under his command to the British
force opposed to him in upper Canada.
No letter has been yet received from him,
but communications from the Governor of Ohio,
& others in that state leaves no doubt of the fact.
Till his report is made, it is impossible to form a
just opinion of his conduct; but from everything
that is known, it appears to have been beyond
example, weak, indecisive, and pusillanimous.
When he passed the river, he had 3 or 4 times the force
of the enemy; yet he remained inactive, by reasons which
if good at all, were equally good against passing the river,
by which he gave the enemy time to collect its force,
recover its spirits, and assume the offensive; in which
time too, the hesitating mind of the Indians and Canadians
became fixed, that of the former to cling to their ancient ally,
and of the latter to risk nothing on an event so precarious.
After pausing a long time without doing anything,
he retired to Detroit, where he surrendered on a summons
from the other side of the river after a short cannonade.
It is possible that in this shape it might have been
impossible to maintain his ground at Detroit,
but why he did not retreat I cannot imagine;
nor can it be conceived why he suffered his
communication to have been previously
cut off, with the States of Ohio & Kentucky;
for if he was not in a situation to attack Malden,
he surely had the means of
securing the country opposite to it.
This most disgraceful event may produce good.
It will rouse the nation.
We must efface the stain before we make peace,
& that may give us Canada.11
On 8 September 1812 President Madison wrote this to Monroe:
I have received yours of the 6th.
I am sorry to find that Pike confides
so little in our prospects.
From a letter of General Dearborn to the
Secretary of War, it appears that the force
at his disposal is more scanty than was hoped.
I am not sure whether his immediate plan is to
take advantage of the detachments of the British
force from Montreal by directing his principal
operations towards that place or to draw away the
force from above in order to strike at that at Niagara.
Whatever the purpose may be, I perceive no foundation
for sanguine hopes of a success in either quarter that
will heal the wound which Hull has given to the Campaign.
It becomes the more necessary to avail ourselves of the
western spirit in order to recover if possible what he has
lost, and even to accomplish what he might have gained.
As men in abundance are already in motion
or awaiting orders, nothing is necessary but to
give them a head that will inspire confidence,
concentrate their force, and direct the application of it.
I am not without hopes that in some way or other
this critical service may proceed from you.
If neither a regular commission, nor a brevet can
arm you with the regular authority, it will only
remain to substitute the expedient already suggested,
unless it be practicable to cover your services with
a Volunteer Commission under the Act of February.
My impression has been & still is that the enrollment of the
Volunteers is to precede the appointment of the officers.
But a blank commission of Major General might be
carried in your Pocket; & it being understood that you
were to command such a force, it would both promote
the enrollment; and in case of failure give the better
gloss to your junction with the army and guiding
its councils if not commanding its operations.
Should you go in any capacity, the Secretary of war will
doubtless co-operate on your preparatory arrangements.
If other than persons in military office be desirable to you,
they must of course accompany you as volunteers.
I hope the difficulties as to competent ordinance will
have been overcome, and that provisions & all other
essential supplies may by proper exertions be attainable.
Should the lateness of the season be found a bar
to success, great good will result from such
exhibitions of zeal, of numbers, and of effort, as may
demonstrate that that was the only bar to success.
It would have a most salutary effect on the savages;
and abroad also; whether there be a desire in the
enemy to prosecute the war, which is to be discouraged,
or difficulties are to be met in the terms of peace.
Your interview with Onís will, I see, be fruitless.
It is clear that he has no powers now, if he ever had,
and improbable that he ever had them, to cede Territory.
The general terms in his commission, prove nothing.
He would have sent his instructions along with it, or extracts
at least, if his advances had been supported by them.
His object is to bring himself into importance, & to gain time.
The Spanish anxiety to prevent extremities is seen,
in the neutrality avowed at the Havanna.
I observe in the intercepted letters of the
Governor at St. Augustine, that he has
deliberately employed Indian hostilities against us.
This will justify his expulsion; if nothing else would do it; and
the reason seems to be the same as to Mobile & Pensacola.
I think it would not be amiss, to let Onís know
that we have discovered these hostile
proceedings on the part of the Spaniards.
If Castlereah was sincere & the weight of the Cabinet
in saying to Mr. Russell, that a declaration of war here
without our knowledge of the repeal of the Orders in Council
would not shut the door to adjustment, we may momently
expect interesting communications on the subject.
If certain passages in Russell’s letters which are
not to be used officially, could like one from a
former letter, go anonymously to the public,
they would be seasonable & useful.12
On 17 September 1812 Monroe wrote to Henry Clay:
I have had the pleasure to receive several letters
from you in relation to our affairs to the westward,
and I hope that one which I wrote you on the receipt
of the first has long since reached its destination.
Every effort has been made by the government to remedy
the shameful and disastrous loss of the army and fort at
Detroit, and I hope the best effect will result from them.
In aid of the force which has so generously volunteered
its service from Kentucky and Ohio, fifteen hundred are
ordered from Pennsylvania, and a like number from Virginia,
so that I think you will have on the borders of Lake Erie
early in the next month eight thousand or ten thousand
men well quipped, prepared to march on to recover the
ground lost and resume the conquest of Upper Canada.
I have the utmost confidence in the success of the
expedition which is set on foot, because the spirit of
the people appears to be roused to that state which
is best adapted to manly and heroic achievements.
I am willing to trust to their sense of honor and
to their patriotism to efface the stigma which
has been fixed on our national character.
I hope they will exhibit a noble contrast to that
degenerate spirit which has of late and continues to
exhibit itself to the eastward in the dominant party there.
The command of this force is committed to
Governor Harrison, who it is believed will justify
the favorable expectation entertained of him by
those who are best acquainted with his merit.
You and our other friends in Kentucky will find
that the utmost attention has been paid to your
opinions and wishes on all these subjects.
A large park of heavy artillery is sent on to Pittsburg
to be forwarded thence toward Cleveland for the use
of the army, whose duty it will be to retake Detroit
and expel the British from Malden and Upper Canada.
In short, every arrangement is made to give
effect to our operations in that quarter
that has appeared to be necessary.
On the intelligence of the surrender of Detroit,
the President expressed a desire to avail himself of my
services in that quarter and had partly decided so to do.
He proposed that I should go in the character
of a volunteer with the rank of major general
to take command of the forces.
I expressed my willingness to obey the summons,
although it was sudden and unexpected, as indeed
the event which suggested the idea was.
On mature reflection however, he concluded
that it would not be proper for me to leave
my present station at the present juncture.
I had no opinion on the subject but was
prepared to act in any situation in which
it might be thought I might be most useful.
From the northern army we have nothing which
inspires a confident hope of any brilliant success.
The disaffection in that quarter has paralyzed
every effort of the government and rendered
inoperative every law of Congress; I speak
comparatively with what might have been expected.
On the public mind however, a salutary effect is
produced even there by the events which have occurred.
Misfortune and success have alike diminished the
influence of foreign attachments and party animosities,
and contributed to draw the people closer together.
The surrender of our army excited a general grief,
and the naval victory a general joy.
Inveterate Toryism itself was compelled in both
instances to disguise its character and hide its feelings
by appearing to sympathize with those of the Nation.
If Great Britain does not come forward soon and
propose honorable conditions, I am convinced that the
war will become a national one and will terminate in the
expulsion of her force and power from the continent.13
Monroe wrote this short letter to Jefferson on 11 November 1812:
Mr. Russell has arrived at New York
& is expected here in a day or two.
He made the second proposition to the British
government authorized by his instructions, which
you have seen published, which was also rejected,
& in terms rather acrimonious, imputing to it a
character—which it did not merit.
This government has been sincerely desirous of
an accommodation but it appears that the British
government will not even treat on the subject
of impressment as a condition of or connected
with measures leading to peace.
Put down our arms, and they will receive our
communications on that subject & pay to them the
same favorable attention that they have heretofore done.
The Massachusetts elections are terminating unfavorably,
as will probably those of New Hampshire.14
On 23 December 1812 Secretary of State Monroe sent his
“Explanatory Observations” to George W. Campbell who was Chairman
of the Senate’s Military Committee that described in detail “Defense of the Coast”
and comprehensive “Notes on Idea of a Plan of Campaign for the Year 1813.”15
On 31 January 1813 Secretary of State James Monroe
wrote in a letter to General Dearborn:
I have just received yours of the 25 inst. enclosing
the answer of General Prevost to the proposition for the
exchange of General Hull, which you had made him in
consequence of instructions from the Department of War.
I am astonished at his reply, because we had no
knowledge of any such exchange of the men
taken at sea by the Essex, as he suggests.
The subject shall however be fully investigated
tomorrow, & I will write you officially on it without delay.
It is probable, even admitting the fact to be as he states,
that under the letter to Major Murray an exchange
may be effected so as to proceed in the trial directed
to be held of General Hull on the 25 of next month.
On taking a temporary charge of the Department of War,
I have called on in answer to certain inquiries of the
committee of the House of Representatives on military
affairs to digest something like a plan whereby to
estimate the force necessary for offensive &
defensive operations next campaign.
I enclose you a copy of it in confidence.
It is not a question what species of force is best, but
what we can get to take the field with early in the spring.
Is then this force, I mean the 12-months men,
better than militia or volunteers?
This is regular, enlisted for too short a term I admit;
at the end of the year it may be
re-enlisted into the five-year service.
It would be new when first raised if raised for five years,
and at the end of the next campaign, if successful,
it is to be hoped that 35,000 would keep the whole country.
It is not contemplated to raise this force over
the whole nation, but near the theatre of war
according to an idea suggested in one of your letters.
I regret that you cannot make a visit to this place.
I will communicate your letter immediately to the
President & give you his sentiments on it without delay.16
On 25 February 1813 Secretary of State James Monroe
wrote this letter to President James Madison:
You intimated that you had understood that General
Armstrong intended to repair to the northern frontiers
and to direct the operations of the campaign; and it
was afterwards suggested to me, that he would as
Secretary at war perform the duties of Lt. General.
It merits consideration how far the exercise of such
a power is strictly constitutional & correct in itself,
& secondly how far it may affect the character of your
administration and of those acting in it, & thirdly, whether
it is not otherwise liable to objection on the ground of policy.
I shall be able to present to your consideration
a few hints only on each of these propositions.
The departments of the government being recognized
by the constitution, have appropriate duties under it.
As organs of the Executive will, they contain records of its
transactions and are in that sense checks on the Executive.
If the Secretary at war leaves the seat of government,
(the chief magistrate remaining there) and performs the
duties of a general, the powers of the chief magistrate, of
the Secretary at war, & general, are all united in the latter.
There ceases to be a check on Executive power
as to military operations: indeed the Executive
power as known to the constitution is destroyed.
The whole is transferred from the Executive
to the general at the head of the army.
It is completely absorbed in hands
where it is most dangerous.
It may be said that the President is commander in chief;
that the Secretary at war is his organ as to military
operations, and that he may allow him to go to the army,
as being well informed in military affairs, & act for himself.
I am inclined to think that the President, unless
he takes the command of the army in person,
acts in directing its movements more as the
executive power than as commander in chief.
What would become of the Secretary at war,
if the President took command of the army, I do not know.
I rather suppose however, that although some of his
powers would be transferred to the military staff,
about the President, he would nevertheless, retain his
appropriate constitutional character in all other respects.
The adjutant general would become the organ of the
Executive, as to military operations, but the Secretary
of war would be that for every other measure,
indeed for all except movements in the field.
The department at war would therefore still form some
check on the Executive at the head of the army, but
there would be none on the Secretary when he was general.
On the 2nd head the effect it might have on the credit
of your administration &c, there can be little doubt.
If there is cause to suspect the measure on
constitutional grounds, that circumstance
alone would wound its credit deeply.
But a total yielding of the power, as would be inferred,
& might and probably would be assumed, for any act which
would be performed, or order given without the sanction
of the chief magistrate would in the degree operate in that
way, would affect it in another sense not less injuriously.
It is impossible for the Secretary at war to go to the frontier,
and perform the offices contemplated without exercising
all those of the military commander especially.
He would carry with him of course those of the war
department, for by the powers of that department, would
he act as general & control all military & other operations.
And being forced to act by circumstances &
take his measures by the day, he could have
no order or sanction from the chief magistrate.
This would be seen by the public & injure
greatly the credit of the administration.
If General Armstrong is the person most fit to
command the armies, let him be appointed such;
there will then be a check on him in the
chief magistrate & in the War Department.
Does he possess in a prominent degree
the public confidence for that trust?
Do we not know the fact to be otherwise?
that it was with difficulty he was appointed
a Brigadier general, & still greater difficulty
that he was appointed Secretary at war?
On the ground of policy I have already made some
remarks; but there are other objections to it on that ground.
If he withdraws from the government & takes his station
with the northern troops, what will become of every other
army, that under Harrison, Pinckney, & Wilkinson and of
those stationed in other quarters especially along the coast?
Who will direct the general movement,
supervise their supplies, &c?
I cannot close these remarks without
adding something in relation to myself.
Stimulated by a deep sense of the misfortunes of our
country, as well as its disgrace by the surrender of Hull,
the misconduct of Van Ranslear, & Smyth, and by the
total want of character in the northern campaign,
and dreading its effects on your administration, on the
republican party & cause, I have repeatedly offered my
service in a military station; not that I wished to take it by
preference to my present one, which to all others I prefer,
but from a dread of the consequences above mentioned.
I was willing to take the department of war permanently,
if in leaving my present station, it was thought I might
be more useful there than in a military command.
I thought otherwise.
What passed on this subject proves that
I considered the department of war as a very
different trust from that of the military commander.
You appeared to think I might be more
useful with the army, as did Mr. Gallatin
with whom I conferred on the subject.
I was convinced that the duties of Secretary
of war & military commander were not only
incompatible under our government, but that
they could not be exercised by the same person.
I was equally satisfied that the Secretary
at war could not perform in his character
as Secretary the duties of general of the army.
The movement of the army must be regulated daily by
events which occur daily, and the movement of all its parts
to be combined & simultaneous, must be under the control
of the general in the field, not of the war department.
That this is the opinion of General Armstrong also
is evident from his disposition to join the army.
He knows that here he cannot direct
the movements of the armies.
He knows also that he could not be appointed
the Lt. General, and that it is only in his present
character as Secretary at war that he can
expect to exercise the functions of general.
As soon as General Armstrong took charge
of the Department at War, I thought I saw his plan,
that is, after he had held it a few days.
I saw distinctly that he intended to have no grade in the
army, which should be competent to a general control
of military operations; that he meant to keep the whole
in his own hands; that each operation should be distinct &
separate; with distinct and separate objects, & of course to
be directed by himself, not simply in the outline but detail.
I anticipated mischief from this, because I knew, that
the movement could not be directed from this place.
I did not then anticipate the remedy which he had in view.
I was animated by much zeal in offering my services
in a military station in favor of your administration
& the cause of free government, which I have
long considered intimately connected together;
I flattered myself that by my long services, & what
the country knew of me, that I should give some impulse
to the recruiting business & other ways aid the cause.
The misfortunes and dangers attending the cause
produced so much excitement, that my zeal may
have exposed me to the appearance of repulse
and disappointment in the course things have taken.
But as I well know that you have justly appreciated my
motives, and that the public cannot fail to do it, should
any imputation of the kind alluded to be made, these
are considerations which have no effect on my mind.
Having seen into these things from my little knowledge
of military affairs, and the management of the War
Department for some weeks, which gave me a knowledge
of the state of things there, and foreseeing some danger
to your administration as well as to the public interest
from the causes above stated, I have felt it a duty
which I owe to you, as well as to the public,
to communicate to you my sentiments on them.
I have written them in much haste & without reserve.
You will I am satisfied bestow on them
the consideration they deserve.
I will add that I cease to have any desire of a
military station, having never wished one, with a view
to myself, & always under a conviction that I should
incur risks & make sacrifices by it; it is in consequence of
feeling it strongly my duty that I entirely relinquish the idea.
These hints are intended to bring to your consideration
the other circumstances to which they allude.17
On 13 April 1813 Monroe wrote this to President Madison:
On my return home I met the secretary of the navy
who intimated his wish to go to Baltimore to make
some arrangements for the naval defense of that place,
& that he would probably set out in the morning.
This circumstance, together with my anxiety for the situation
of the inhabitants on their coast or rather shores of the bay
& rivers emptying into it, as well as of the principal towns,
induces me to suggest a few ideas for your consideration.
At present there is nothing like a system of
defense organized for the general protection
of these places against this squadron.
It moves about without having even
a corps of observation to follow it.
There is no concerted plan of communication
from county to county on each side of the bay
and at the mouths of the principal rivers.
Each part looks to itself in consequence whereof
the alarm spreads from place to place as the
squadron appears and thus becomes general.
No preparation is made for it till the danger is
at hand, & then, everything is hurry & confusion.
This must lessen the confidence in the general government.
There being no provision under its authority for
these purposes, it necessarily devolves on the
state governments to make such provision.
Their power will of course rise on the inaction of the
general government, as took place last year at Niagara.
What I would suggest is this that a major general should
have command of all the forces, of every kind regulars,
volunteers & militia that are to bear on this squadron.
That he should watch & follow its movements, in person
when necessary, as it always would be, when it approached
& menaced a principal town such as Baltimore or Norfolk.
That he should have power to call out the militia
in any county where it might be necessary—
to organize telegraphs or establish lines of communication
by express in such directions as might appear proper.
In short that wherever he might be, he should be the
center of intelligence & communication from every part
of the military district and every party in motion however
small, in every quarter and also with the government.
Such an officer moving about with activity and
looking to everything would soon inspire confidence
in the people by seeing that they were taken
care of and would not be taken by surprise.
In connection with this plan there ought to be several
swift sailing craft in the bay above the British ships and
some at the mouths of this & other large rivers and also
some flying artillery which might occasionally by means of
these craft be taken from one side to the other of the rivers.
An officer of intelligence acting this part might diminish
considerably the public expense, as no force would
be called out anywhere not absolutely necessary.
And most of it might be of the volunteer kind,
raised for the moment, as the squadron advanced,
which would cost nothing, the rations excepted.
By means of the craft well manned, all communication
between the squadron & the shore might be cut off,
and all the tenders and small vessels
kept close in with the ships of war.
If they are at liberty to catch our vessels & man them
and sail up our rivers, we having nothing to meet them,
there is not a farm or a house on
the whole bay that will be secure.
We must be superior to them in our waters,
in everything but large ships, or
the consequences may easily be anticipated.
To organize such a plan and carry it into effect requires
a person of talents, activity, & conciliatory deportment.
It will require his whole time & all his energies.
He should act in concert with the
governors of Maryland & Virginia.
I really think that not a moment should be lost in
calling General Hampton here, if he is designated for it.
For the defense of this district including the
government & all its offices and also the navy yard,
particular provision ought to be made.
Not a moment should be lost in making that provision.
Every corps of horse, infantry, & artillery if any,
should be under orders and in a state of
preparation to move at a moment’s warning.
Their muskets, flints, cartridges &cc all in excellent order.
To make this preparation will cost nothing.
To find that attention in the government
would be delightful to the people,
who are agitated and complain of the want of it.
They want no pay.
They will do any that is requested of them,
so far as to prepare themselves for an
emergency and to act in it, should it occur.
I merely suggest these hints for your
consideration and without form.18
Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin was chosen to be a member of the commission
to negotiate in Europe a peace treaty between the United States and Britain.
Monroe wrote in a private letter to Gallatin on 5 May 1813:
As the contemplated arrangements on the subject of
impressment will be reciprocal in form; as what Great
Britain may deem a concession will be balanced by a
concession on the part of the United States; as the question
of right can be put out of view in stipulating a course of
practice; and as the stipulations will be in a treaty limited for
a fixed term of years, it is not presumable that any motive
or scruple, much less any serious difficulty, will be opposed
to an article in the usual form providing for the object.
The President being desirous that no unessential
consideration should embarrass your negotiation or
endanger its result, intends that in providing against the
practice of impressment from American vessels you should
exercise an entire discretion as to the mode and shape
of the provision, taking care only that it be such as by fair
construction will bind the faith of the British Government
to an effective discontinuance of the practice in question.
This practice being essentially a cause of war, and the
primary object of your negotiation, a treaty of peace
leaving in silence and trusting to a mere understanding
liable to doubts and different explanations would not be
that security which the United States has a right to expect.
With respect to West Florida, possession will be taken of it
before you get far on your voyage, if it is not already done,
orders having been some time since given for that purpose.
That is a question settled.
Orders have been given for the evacuation of
East Florida, of which I will endeavor to send
you a copy in this Conveyance….
The copies of the Census which you desire will be sent.
I send a copy of certain letters from the government of
East Florida respecting some measures of a hostile nature
towards the United States, the more reprehensible being
after the conduct of General Matthews had been disavowed
& steps taken for the evacuation of the territory.19
Monroe after receiving a letter from Gallatin on May 4
wrote in a longer letter to Gallatin on May 6:
We have already manifested our willingness, Congress
and Executive, to remove the British cause of complaint.
It is to be presumed that if any arrangement is made,
this will be done.
It would be deplorable indeed if we did all that we
could and received in return nothing but the informal
promise of the British Commissioners or government
to do what it is otherwise their duty to do.
I believe that such an arrangement would
not only ruin the present Administration
but the Republican party and even the Cause.
This nation is high-minded and expects a result
correspondent with our rights, and these are certainly
moderately, or rather modesty estimated in the instructions.
It is not easy to decide where a treaty which
should fall short of the reasonable expectations
of the country would place the United States.
It would be considered by Europe that we
had no government whatever, and they would
all begin immediately to trample us underfoot.
The expulsion of the present people from office with
ignominy would be among its least important effects.
The opposition coming in on its principles—
I speak of many of its leaders—could not resist the
British pretensions, though I should not be surprised
in the temper of the nation under such circumstances,
if we should be visited by other and greater calamities.
There seems therefor to be but one course for the
government and yourselves to pursue, marked by your
instructions and otherwise too well traced to need repetition.
I have no doubt of ultimate success,
provided our nerves are equal to the crisis:
first, because I believe that your mission will succeed,
for I cannot think that England will prolong the war
when so fair an opportunity is presented to her
to terminate it with honor and advantage;
secondly, I think, if your mission fails, that it will
arouse more fully the energies of the nation and lead
by greater efforts to a more honorable termination by
the complete expulsion of the British from the Continent.
In any event I think it better for the United States and
more honorable for the government, that we continue to
maintain in the best manner we can the public rights until
we succeed, or our constituents, wearied with the effort,
remove us from office and transfer the power to others.
Should that be the case, we should at least
leave a useful example to the country.20
On 7 June 1813 Monroe wrote this long letter to Thomas Jefferson:
During the last session of Congress the current business
pressed so heavily on me, and after its adjournment the
preparation of instructions for our ministers employed
under the mediation of Russia, and in other duties
connected with it, kept me so constantly engaged that
I have scarcely had a moment of respite since I left you.
I seize one to communicate some details,
which it may be satisfactory to you to know.
As I make the communication in confidence,
it will be without reserve.
When we were together last summer, we conferred
on the then state of the departments of war & navy,
and agreed that whatever might be the merit of the
gentlemen in them, which was admitted in certain
respects, a change in both was indispensable.
I mentioned that I had intimated to the President before
we left Washington, my willingness to take the former if
he thought that the public interest would be advanced by it.
It seemed to be your opinion that it would on returning here,
such was the pressure of public opinion, supported by all our
friends in Congress, that a change in the department of war
was soon decided on, & even solicited by Mr. Eustis himself.
In conversation with the President I repeated
what I had said before and intimated that I would
either take that department or a military station,
as might be thought most advisable.
On the surrender of Hull, I had offered to proceed to the
state of Ohio, and to take the command in that quarter
with a volunteer commission to which he willingly assented.
In consequence, I had with his approbation sent off
the cannon &ca from this place and made every
other arrangement for the prosecution of the campaign
against upper Canada and was on the point of
setting out when it was thought best to decline it.
The President was particularly induced to adopt
this latter counsel, by the appointment conferred on
General Harrison by the governor of Kentucky and
his apparent popularity in the western country.
I do not recollect that I mentioned this to you before.
To the offer which I now repeated, the President replied
that he did not wish me to leave my present station,
which though inactive at the time, might not long continue
so, for an inferior one, to hold it while I remained in service.
The state of public affairs led again
to a general view of the whole subject.
Our military operations had been unsuccessful;
one army had been surrendered under circumstances
which impeached the integrity of the commander;
and to the north in the whole extent of that country,
so important & delicately circumstanced, as it was,
the management had been most wretched.
The command at the important post of Niagara
had been suffered to fall into state hands,
and to be perverted to local & selfish purposes.
Van Ranslear, a weak incompetent
man with high pretentions, took it.
It was late in the year before General Dearborn
left Boston and repaired to Albany.
He had given no impulse to the recruiting business in
the Eastern States by passing through them, and making
appeals to the patriotism of the people, and when he took
the command at Albany, it was in a manner to discourage
all hope of active operations during the favorable season.
The commander ought to lead every important movement.
If intended to assail Montreal, that being
the grand attack, his station was there.
If a smaller blow only could be given, the feint
against Montreal should have been committed
to another, while he commanded in person
where real service was to be performed.
It was soon seen that nothing would be done
against Lower Canada; General Dearborn
doubtless saw it on his first arrival at Albany,
if he did not anticipate it before he left Boston.
Niagara was the object, next in importance, and had he
taken the command there, he might and probably would
by superseding little people & conducting our military
operations have prevented the riotous & contentious
scene exhibited there, saved the country and the
government from the disgraceful defeat of Van Ranslaer, &
the more disgraceful & gasconading discomfiture of Smyth.
The experience of the campaign had excited a
doubt with many, if not with all, whether our military
operations would prosper under General Dearborn;
he was known to have merit as a patriot, a republican,
and that in many other respects he was a safe man,
but he was advanced in years, infirm, and had given
no proof of activity or military talent during the year.
He did not animate or aid in any way the republican
party to the Eastward, while by his conduct as a partisan,
he excited & invigorated the opposition to the government.
Being at war, everything would depend on success,
and if he was not likely to succeed,
a substitute ought to be provided.
If he could not sustain his ground, those next in rank
would push him aside, and as the army would be increased,
and if the war continued, become strong, attention ought
to be paid with a view to the liberties of the country, to the
character of the person to be placed in the chief command.
I stated that if it was thought necessary to remove me from
my present station on the idea that I had some military
experience, and a change in the command of the troops
was resolved on, I would prefer it, to the department
of war in the persuasion that I might be more useful.
In the Department of War a man might form a plan
of a campaign & write judicious letters on military
operations, but still these were nothing but essays.
Everything would depend on the execution.
I thought that with the army I should have better control
over operations & events, and might even aid, so far as I
could give aid at all to the person in the department of war.
I offered to repair instantly to the northern army,
to use my best efforts to form it, to promote the
recruiting business in the Eastern States, to conciliate
the people to the views of the government and
unite them, so far as it might be possible in the war.
The President was of opinion that if I quitted my present
Station, I ought to take the command of the army.
It being necessary to place someone immediately in
the Department of War to supply the vacancy made
by Mr. Eustis’ retreat, the President requested me
to take it pro tempore, leaving the ultimate decision
on the other question open to further consideration.
I did so and immediately set to work
on the important duties of the office.
I send you a copy of a report which I made to
the military committees of Congress, which laid
the foundation of some changes in the military
establishment with which you are acquainted.
It was intended merely as a skeleton.
It was soon found to be improper at a period
of so much danger & urgency to keep that
department in the hands of a temporary occupant.
It ought to be filled by the person, who
would have to form the plan of the campaign
in every quarter & be responsible for it.
It being indispensable to fill it with a permanent
character, and the question remaining undecided
relative to the command of the army, most persons
thinking a change urgent, and the opinion of
the President in regard to me being the same,
General Armstrong was put in the Department of War.
Had it been decided to continue the command of
the army under General Dearborn, and the question
been with me, would I take the Department of War,
the President & other friends wishing it,
I would not have hesitated a moment in complying.
But it never assumed that form.
To secure the command of all important stations along
the coast & elsewhere to men of talents & experience,
who should be in the service of the United States,
I had recommended a considerable augmentation
of general officers, which was approved by
General Armstrong & adopted by Congress.
On the day that the nomination of these officers was
made to the Senate, the President sent for me & stated
that the Secretary at war had placed me in his list of
major Generals at their head and wished to know
whether I would accept the appointment, intimating
that he did not think that I ought to do it,
nor did he wish me to leave my present station.
I asked where I was to serve.
He supposed it would be with the
northern army under General Dearborn.
I replied that if I left my present office for such a command,
it would be inferred that I had a passion for military life,
which I had not: that in such a station, I could be of no
service in any view to the general cause or to military
operations, even perhaps with the army in which
I might serve that with a view to the public interest,
the commander ought to receive all the support which
the government could give him: by accepting the
station proposed, I might take from General Dearborn
without aiding the cause by any thing that I might add.
I stated however that the grade made no difficulty with me,
a desire to be useful being my only object, and that if the
command was given me, even with a lower grade, than
that suggested, admitting the possibility, I would accept it.
The difficulty related to General Dearborn, who
could not well be removed to an inactive station.
I observed that if it was intended to continue him
in the command, he would have my best support,
as he already had had, as no one respected
or esteemed him more than I did.
To a strong desire to make you acquainted with the real
state of things in regard to this question, I have felt an
additional motive growing out of the conversation between
us above alluded to, to communicate to you the causes
of certain events which may have excited your surprise.
It is proper to add that, had I been transferred
to the army, Mr. Gallatin claimed & would have
succeeded to the vacancy in this department.
The campaign has commenced tolerably well
and with a good prospect of success, though
the movement has been rather slow, which
may give time for reinforcements from Europe.
An opinion begins to circulate here, that a person
of more vigorous mind should be on the frontier
with the northern army to direct its movements,
& that the secretary of war is that person.
This idea is founded on a doubt of the
competency of those now there.
The effect would be to make the Secretary
at war commander in chief of the army
in the character of Secretary at War.
While here, orders emanate from the President, in which
case, the President, the secretary at war, and commander
of the troops are checks on each other; but in the other
case the powers of all three would be united in the
Secretary, much to the disadvantage of the President, who
by the distance could have nothing to do in the business.
Besides, if the secretary takes the command of the
northern army, who would supply his place in the
Department of War and direct the operations of the
army against Detroit & Upper Canada, of that on
the Mississippi, and of the extensive & burdensome
operations along the coast, and of the supplies in
munitions of war & provisions necessary to each forming
separately an important duty, but in the whole a very
complicated & arduous one, requiring also daily attention.
Troops have been collecting for some time at Bermuda,
destined against some part of our country.
Should they be brought to bear against this city or
New Orleans, & the Secretary be absent, what the effect?
These objections have weight, yet a new & serious
discomfiture might shake the administration to the
foundation and endanger the republican party &
even the cause so nicely balanced are the dangers
attending either course in the present state of things
admitting that the Secretary might be able to supply
any deficiency in those with the northern army,
that it is difficult to say which scale preponderates.
My reflections on the subject are known to the
President, but I take no part in the question.
The mediation of Russia offers some prospect of
accommodation with Great Britain but no certainty of it.
It is not known that she has accepted the overture.
The Russian minister was informed that the President
accepted it because he wished peace on honorable
conditions and was willing to avail himself of every fair
opportunity to promote it: that he did not ask whether
Great Britain had accepted the mediation, because it
was sufficient that the Emperor had offered it; and
that the President sought by the manner of accepting it,
to evince his high respect for the character of the Emperor.
It became a question whether authority should
be given to Mr. Adams alone to manage the
negotiation or eclat be attached to the mission by
adding two Envoys to it to be sent from this country.
The latter course was preferred, & Mr. Gallatin
being desirous of acting in it, he was employed.
Before I knew this latter fact, I had thought that it would
be well to engage in the service some distinguished
popular man from that portion of our country, the western,
which had given such support and suffered so much
by the war to secure the confidence of its people in
the negotiation & reconcile them to any result of it.
But on finding that Mr. Gallatin, for whom I have
always entertained a very high respect & esteem,
desired the appointment, and that the President was
willing to confer it on him, I readily acquiesced, though
not without serious apprehension of the consequences—
Mr. King has begun his new career by an attack
on the measure, objecting to Mr. Gallatin’s
absence at this time to the union of two such
important offices in the same person &ca.
The nomination is still depending before the Senate.
It will I doubt not terminate favorably,
but still it has increased our difficulties.21
On 16 June 1813 Monroe wrote to Jefferson again about
deploying the naval force and the nominations of diplomats:
At the commencement of the war I was decidedly
of your opinion, that the best disposition which could
be made of our little navy, would be to keep it in a
body in a safe port, from which it might sally only on
some important occasion to render essential service.
Its safety in itself appeared to be an important object,
as while safe, it formed a check on the enemy in all its
operations along our coast, and increased proportionally
its expense in the force to be kept up, as well
to annoy our commerce as to protect its own.
The reasoning against it in which all our naval
officers have agreed, is that if stationed together
in a port, New York for example, the British would
immediately block it up there by a force rather
superior & then harass our coast & commerce
without restraint & with any force however small.
In that case a single frigate might by cruising along the
coast and plundering & menacing occasionally at different
points, keep great bodies of our militia in motion: that while
our frigates are at sea, the expectation that they may be
together will compel the British to keep in a body, wherever
they institute a blockade or cruise a force equal at least to
our whole force: that being the best sailors, they hazarded
little by cruising separately or together occasionally,
as they might bring on an action or avoid one, whenever
they thought fit: that in that manner they would annoy the
enemy’s commerce wherever they went, excite alarm in the
West Indies & elsewhere, and even give protection to our
own trade by drawing at times the enemy’s squadron off
from our own coast: that by cruising our commanders
would become more skillful, have an opportunity to
acquire glory, and if successful, keep alive the public spirit.
The reasoning in favor of each plan is so nearly equal,
that it is hard to say which is best.
I have no doubt at some future day, that a fortification
will be erected on the bank in the middle of the bay
and be connected in the manner you propose with a
naval force in Lynnhaven Bay for the protection of Norfolk
and all the country dependent on the Chesapeake.
In time of war it will be difficult to
accomplish so extensive an object.
The nomination of ministers for
Russia is still before the Senate.
Mr. Giles & General Smith uniting with Mr. King
& others against Mr. Gallatin have so far
succeeded in preventing its confirmation.
They appointed a committee, the object of which was
to communicate with the President on the subject & give
him to understand that if he would supply his place in the
Treasury, they would confirm the nomination to Russia.
The President, had before answered a call of the Senate,
that the appointment to Russia did not vacate the
commission in the Department of the Treasury
& that the Secretary of the Navy did the
business in Mr. Gallatin’s absence.
To the chairman, who asked & obtained a personal
interview, he communicated his objections to a conference
with the committee on the ground that the resolution
under which they were appointed did not authorize it,
even could any advantage result from it, which however
was improbable, as neither party would be apt to
change its opinion, and on the principle of compromise
that nothing could be done or ought to be done.
Various resolutions, tending to embarrass the
nomination divide the republican party in the Senate &
perpetuate that division by irritating its members towards
each other, have been introduced & are still depending.
Among these is one, intended to express the sense
of the house against the compatibility of the two offices.
The delay has done harm & doubtless
was intended to have that effect.
The result is yet uncertain.22
Jefferson responded with this letter to Monroe on June 19:
Your favors of the 7th & 16th are received, &
I now return you the Memoir enclosed in the former.
I am much gratified by its communication because,
as the plan appeared in the newspapers soon
after the new Secretary at War came into office,
we had given him the credit of it.
Every line of it is replete with wisdom; and we
might lament that our tardy enlistments prevented
it’s execution, were we not to reflect that these
proceeded from the happiness of our people at home.
It is more a subject of joy that we have
so few of the desperate characters
which compose modern regular armies.
But it proves more forcibly the necessity
of obliging every citizen to be a soldier.
This was the case with the Greeks & Romans
and must be that of every free state.
Where there is no oppression
there will be no pauper hirelings.
We must train & classify the whole of our
male citizens and make military instruction
a regular part of collegiate education.
We can never be safe till this is done.
I have been persuaded ab initio that what we are
to do in Canada must be done quickly: because our
enemy with a little time can empty pickpockets upon us
faster than we can enlist honest men to oppose them.
If we fail in this acquisition, Hull is the cause of it.
Pike in his situation would have swept
their posts to Montreal, because his army
would have grown as it went along.
I fear the reinforcements arrived at Quebec will be at
Montreal before General Dearborn, & if so, the game is up.
If the marching of the militia into an enemy’s
country be once ceded as unconstitutional
(which I hope it never will be) then will their force,
as now strengthened, bid us permanent defiance.
Could we acquire that country, we might perhaps
insist successfully at St. Petersburg on retaining all
westward of the Meridian of Lake Huron or of Ontario
or of Montreal according to the pulse of the place,
as an indemnification of the past & security for the future.
To cut them off from the Indians, even West
of the Huron would be a great future security.
Your kind answer of the 16th entirely satisfies my
doubts as to the employment of the Navy, if kept within
striking distance of our coast; & shows how erroneous
views are apt to be with those who have not all in view.
Yet as I know from experience that profitable
suggestions sometimes come from lookers on,
they may be usefully tolerated, provided
they do not pretend to the right of an answer.
They would cost very dear indeed were they to occupy the
time of a high officer in writing when he should be acting.
I intended no such trouble to you, my dear Sir:
and were you to suppose I expected it,
I must cease to offer a thought on our public affairs.
Although my entire confidence in their direction prevents
my reflecting on them but accidentally, yet sometimes
facts, & sometimes ideas occur, which I hazard as
worth the trouble of reading but not of answering.
Of this kind was my suggestion of the facts which
I recollected as to the defense of the Chesapeake,
and of what had been contemplated at the time
between the Secretaries of War & the Navy & myself.
If our views were sound, the object might be effected in
one year, even of war, and at an expense which is nothing
compared to the population & productions it would cover.
We are here laboring under the most extreme
drought ever remembered at this season.
We have had but one rain to lay the dust in two months.
That was a good one but was three weeks ago.
Corn is but a few inches high & dying.
Oats will not yield their seed.
Of wheat the hard winter & fly leave us about ⅔
of an ordinary crop so that in the lotteries of human
life you see that even farming is but gambling.
We have had three days of excessive heat.
The thermometer on the 16th was at 92
on the 17th 92½ & yesterday at 93.
It had never before exceeded 92½ at this place,
at least within the periods of my observation.23
On 28 June 1813 Monroe informed Jefferson that Madison and
General Dearborn were ill, and he discussed the current political situation.
From the date of my last letter to you the President has
been ill of a bilious fever; of that kind called the remittent.
It has perhaps never left him, even for an hour, and
occasionally the symptoms have been unfavorable.
This is I think the 15th day.
Elzey of this place & Shoaff of
Annapolis with Dr. Tucker attend him.
They think he will recover.
The first mentioned, I have just seen, who reports that
he had a good night & is in a state to take the bark, which
indeed he has done on his best day for nearly a week.
I shall see him before I seal this & note any change,
should there be any, from the above statement.
The federalists aided by the malcontents have done,
and are doing, all the mischief that they can.
The nominations to Russia & Sweden, the latter made
on an intimation, that the crown prince would contribute
his good offices to promote peace on fair conditions,
they have embarrassed to the utmost of their power.
The active partisans are King, Giles, and as
respects the first nomination Samuel Smith.
Leib German & Gilman are habitually in that interest,
active, but useful to their party by their votes only.
The two members from Louisiana, Gailliard,
Stone, Anderson, & Bledsoe are added
to that corps on those questions.
They have carried a vote 20 to 14 that the appointment
of Mr. Gallatin to the Russian mission is incompatible
with his station in the Treasury, & appointed a committee
to communicate the resolution to the President.
They have appointed another committee to
confer with him on the nomination to Sweden.
The object is to usurp the Executive power
in the hands of a faction in the Senate.
To this several mentioned are not parties,
particularly the four last.
A committee of the Senate ought to confer with a
committee of the President, that is, a head of a department,
and not with the chief magistrate, for in the latter case
a committee of that house is equal to the Executive.
To break the measure & relieve the President from the
pressure at a time when so little able to bear it, indeed
when no pressure whatever should be made on him,
I wrote the committee on the nomination to Sweden,
that I was instructed by him to meet them, to give all
the information they might desire of the Executive.
They declined the interview.
I had intended to pursue the same course respecting
the other nomination, had I succeeded in this.
Failing, I have declined it.
The result is withheld from the President.
These men have begun to make calculations & plans,
founded on the presumed deaths of the President
& Vice President, & it has been suggested to me
that Giles is thought of to take the place of President
of the senate, as soon as the Vice President withdraws.
General Dearborn is dangerously ill,
& General Lewis is doing little.
Hampton has gone on to that quarter,
but I fear on an inactive command.
General Wilkinson is expected soon, but
I do not know what station will be assigned him.
The idea of a commander in chief is in circulation,
proceeding from the War Department,
as I have reason to believe.
If so, it will probably take a more decisive form,
when things are prepared for it.
A security for his the Secretary’s advancement to
that station is, I presume, the preparation desired.24
On 7 June 1813 Monroe wrote this long letter to Thomas Jefferson:
During the last session of Congress the current business
pressed so heavily on me, and after its adjournment the
preparation of instructions for our ministers employed
under the mediation of Russia, and in other duties
connected with it, kept me so constantly engaged that
I have scarcely had a moment of respite since I left you.
I seize one to communicate some details,
which it may be satisfactory to you to know.
As I make the communication in confidence,
it will be without reserve.
When we were together last summer, we conferred
on the then state of the departments of war & navy,
and agreed that whatever might be the merit of the
gentlemen in them, which was admitted in certain
respects, a change in both was indispensable.
I mentioned that I had intimated to the President before
we left Washington, my willingness to take the former if
he thought that the public interest would be advanced by it.
It seemed to be your opinion that it would on returning here,
such was the pressure of public opinion, supported by all our
friends in Congress, that a change in the department of war
was soon decided on, & even solicited by Mr. Eustis himself.
In conversation with the President I repeated
what I had said before and intimated that I would
either take that department or a military station,
as might be thought most advisable.
On the surrender of Hull, I had offered to proceed to the
state of Ohio, and to take the command in that quarter
with a volunteer commission to which he willingly assented.
In consequence, I had with his approbation sent off
the cannon &ca from this place and made every
other arrangement for the prosecution of the campaign
against upper Canada and was on the point of
setting out when it was thought best to decline it.
The President was particularly induced to adopt
this latter counsel, by the appointment conferred on
General Harrison by the governor of Kentucky and
his apparent popularity in the western country.
I do not recollect that I mentioned this to you before.
To the offer which I now repeated, the President replied
that he did not wish me to leave my present station,
which though inactive at the time, might not long continue
so, for an inferior one, to hold it while I remained in service.
The state of public affairs led again
to a general view of the whole subject.
Our military operations had been unsuccessful;
one army had been surrendered under circumstances
which impeached the integrity of the commander;
and to the north in the whole extent of that country,
so important & delicately circumstanced, as it was,
the management had been most wretched.
The command at the important post of Niagara
had been suffered to fall into state hands,
and to be perverted to local & selfish purposes.
Van Ranslear, a weak incompetent
man with high pretentions, took it.
It was late in the year before General Dearborn
left Boston and repaired to Albany.
He had given no impulse to the recruiting business in
the Eastern States by passing through them, and making
appeals to the patriotism of the people, and when he took
the command at Albany, it was in a manner to discourage
all hope of active operations during the favorable season.
The commander ought to lead every important movement.
If intended to assail Montreal, that being
the grand attack, his station was there.
If a smaller blow only could be given, the feint
against Montreal should have been committed
to another, while he commanded in person
where real service was to be performed.
It was soon seen that nothing would be done
against Lower Canada; General Dearborn
doubtless saw it on his first arrival at Albany,
if he did not anticipate it before he left Boston.
Niagara was the object, next in importance, and had he
taken the command there, he might and probably would
by superseding little people & conducting our military
operations have prevented the riotous & contentious
scene exhibited there, saved the country and the
government from the disgraceful defeat of Van Ranslaer, &
the more disgraceful & gasconading discomfiture of Smyth.
The experience of the campaign had excited a
doubt with many, if not with all, whether our military
operations would prosper under General Dearborn;
he was known to have merit as a patriot, a republican,
and that in many other respects he was a safe man,
but he was advanced in years, infirm, and had given
no proof of activity or military talent during the year.
He did not animate or aid in any way the republican
party to the Eastward, while by his conduct as a partisan,
he excited & invigorated the opposition to the government.
Being at war, everything would depend on success,
and if he was not likely to succeed,
a substitute ought to be provided.
If he could not sustain his ground, those next in rank
would push him aside, and as the army would be increased,
and if the war continued, become strong, attention ought
to be paid with a view to the liberties of the country, to the
character of the person to be placed in the chief command.
I stated that if it was thought necessary to remove me from
my present station on the idea that I had some military
experience, and a change in the command of the troops
was resolved on, I would prefer it, to the department
of war in the persuasion that I might be more useful.
In the Department of War a man might form a plan
of a campaign & write judicious letters on military
operations, but still these were nothing but essays.
Everything would depend on the execution.
I thought that with the army I should have better control
over operations & events, and might even aid, so far as I
could give aid at all to the person in the department of war.
I offered to repair instantly to the northern army,
to use my best efforts to form it, to promote the
recruiting business in the Eastern States, to conciliate
the people to the views of the government and
unite them, so far as it might be possible in the war.
The President was of opinion that if I quitted my present
Station, I ought to take the command of the army.
It being necessary to place someone immediately in
the Department of War to supply the vacancy made
by Mr. Eustis’ retreat, the President requested me
to take it pro tempore, leaving the ultimate decision
on the other question open to further consideration.
I did so and immediately set to work
on the important duties of the office.
I send you a copy of a report which I made to
the military committees of Congress, which laid
the foundation of some changes in the military
establishment with which you are acquainted.
It was intended merely as a skeleton.
It was soon found to be improper at a period
of so much danger & urgency to keep that
department in the hands of a temporary occupant.
It ought to be filled by the person, who
would have to form the plan of the campaign
in every quarter & be responsible for it.
It being indispensable to fill it with a permanent
character, and the question remaining undecided
relative to the command of the army, most persons
thinking a change urgent, and the opinion of
the President in regard to me being the same,
General Armstrong was put in the Department of War.
Had it been decided to continue the command of
the army under General Dearborn, and the question
been with me, would I take the Department of War,
the President & other friends wishing it,
I would not have hesitated a moment in complying.
But it never assumed that form.
To secure the command of all important stations along
the coast & elsewhere to men of talents & experience,
who should be in the service of the United States,
I had recommended a considerable augmentation
of general officers, which was approved by
General Armstrong & adopted by Congress.
On the day that the nomination of these officers was
made to the Senate, the President sent for me & stated
that the Secretary at war had placed me in his list of
major Generals at their head and wished to know
whether I would accept the appointment, intimating
that he did not think that I ought to do it,
nor did he wish me to leave my present station.
I asked where I was to serve.
He supposed it would be with the
northern army under General Dearborn.
I replied that if I left my present office for such a command,
it would be inferred that I had a passion for military life,
which I had not: that in such a station, I could be of no
service in any view to the general cause or to military
operations, even perhaps with the army in which
I might serve that with a view to the public interest,
the commander ought to receive all the support which
the government could give him: by accepting the
station proposed, I might take from General Dearborn
without aiding the cause by any thing that I might add.
I stated however that the grade made no difficulty with me,
a desire to be useful being my only object, and that if the
command was given me, even with a lower grade, than
that suggested, admitting the possibility, I would accept it.
The difficulty related to General Dearborn, who
could not well be removed to an inactive station.
I observed that if it was intended to continue him
in the command, he would have my best support,
as he already had had, as no one respected
or esteemed him more than I did.
To a strong desire to make you acquainted with the real
state of things in regard to this question, I have felt an
additional motive growing out of the conversation between
us above alluded to, to communicate to you the causes
of certain events which may have excited your surprise.
It is proper to add that, had I been transferred
to the army, Mr. Gallatin claimed & would have
succeeded to the vacancy in this department.
The campaign has commenced tolerably well
and with a good prospect of success, though
the movement has been rather slow, which
may give time for reinforcements from Europe.
An opinion begins to circulate here, that a person
of more vigorous mind should be on the frontier
with the northern army to direct its movements,
& that the secretary of war is that person.
This idea is founded on a doubt of the
competency of those now there.
The effect would be to make the Secretary
at war commander in chief of the army
in the character of Secretary at War.
While here, orders emanate from the President, in which
case, the President, the secretary at war, and commander
of the troops are checks on each other; but in the other
case the powers of all three would be united in the
Secretary, much to the disadvantage of the President, who
by the distance could have nothing to do in the business.
Besides, if the secretary takes the command of the
northern army, who would supply his place in the
Department of War and direct the operations of the
army against Detroit & Upper Canada, of that on
the Mississippi, and of the extensive & burdensome
operations along the coast, and of the supplies in
munitions of war & provisions necessary to each forming
separately an important duty, but in the whole a very
complicated & arduous one, requiring also daily attention.
Troops have been collecting for some time at Bermuda,
destined against some part of our country.
Should they be brought to bear against this city or
New Orleans, & the Secretary be absent, what the effect?
These objections have weight, yet a new & serious
discomfiture might shake the administration to the
foundation and endanger the republican party &
even the cause so nicely balanced are the dangers
attending either course in the present state of things
admitting that the Secretary might be able to supply
any deficiency in those with the northern army,
that it is difficult to say which scale preponderates.
My reflections on the subject are known to the
President, but I take no part in the question.
The mediation of Russia offers some prospect of
accommodation with Great Britain but no certainty of it.
It is not known that she has accepted the overture.
The Russian minister was informed that the President
accepted it because he wished peace on honorable
conditions and was willing to avail himself of every fair
opportunity to promote it: that he did not ask whether
Great Britain had accepted the mediation, because it
was sufficient that the Emperor had offered it; and
that the President sought by the manner of accepting it,
to evince his high respect for the character of the Emperor.
It became a question whether authority should
be given to Mr. Adams alone to manage the
negotiation or eclat be attached to the mission by
adding two Envoys to it to be sent from this country.
The latter course was preferred, & Mr. Gallatin
being desirous of acting in it, he was employed.
Before I knew this latter fact, I had thought that it would
be well to engage in the service some distinguished
popular man from that portion of our country, the western,
which had given such support and suffered so much
by the war to secure the confidence of its people in
the negotiation & reconcile them to any result of it.
But on finding that Mr. Gallatin, for whom I have
always entertained a very high respect & esteem,
desired the appointment, and that the President was
willing to confer it on him, I readily acquiesced, though
not without serious apprehension of the consequences—
Mr. King has begun his new career by an attack
on the measure, objecting to Mr. Gallatin’s
absence at this time to the union of two such
important offices in the same person &ca.
The nomination is still depending before the Senate.
It will I doubt not terminate favorably,
but still it has increased our difficulties.21
On 16 June 1813 Monroe wrote to Jefferson again
about deploying the naval force and the nominations of diplomats:
At the commencement of the war I was decidedly
of your opinion, that the best disposition which could
be made of our little navy, would be to keep it in a
body in a safe port, from which it might sally only on
some important occasion to render essential service.
Its safety in itself appeared to be an important object,
as while safe, it formed a check on the enemy in all its
operations along our coast, and increased proportionally
its expense in the force to be kept up, as well
to annoy our commerce as to protect its own.
The reasoning against it in which all our naval
officers have agreed, is that if stationed together
in a port, New York for example, the British would
immediately block it up there by a force rather
superior & then harass our coast & commerce
without restraint & with any force however small.
In that case a single frigate might by cruising along the
coast and plundering & menacing occasionally at different
points, keep great bodies of our militia in motion: that while
our frigates are at sea, the expectation that they may be
together will compel the British to keep in a body, wherever
they institute a blockade or cruise a force equal at least to
our whole force: that being the best sailors, they hazarded
little by cruising separately or together occasionally,
as they might bring on an action or avoid one, whenever
they thought fit: that in that manner they would annoy the
enemy’s commerce wherever they went, excite alarm in the
West Indies & elsewhere, and even give protection to our
own trade by drawing at times the enemy’s squadron off
from our own coast: that by cruising our commanders
would become more skillful, have an opportunity to
acquire glory, and if successful, keep alive the public spirit.
The reasoning in favor of each plan is so nearly equal,
that it is hard to say which is best.
I have no doubt at some future day, that a fortification
will be erected on the bank in the middle of the bay
and be connected in the manner you propose with a
naval force in Lynnhaven Bay for the protection of Norfolk
and all the country dependent on the Chesapeake.
In time of war it will be difficult to
accomplish so extensive an object.
The nomination of ministers for
Russia is still before the Senate.
Mr. Giles & General Smith uniting with Mr. King
& others against Mr. Gallatin have so far
succeeded in preventing its confirmation.
They appointed a committee, the object of which was
to communicate with the President on the subject & give
him to understand that if he would supply his place in the
Treasury, they would confirm the nomination to Russia.
The President, had before answered a call of the Senate,
that the appointment to Russia did not vacate the
commission in the Department of the Treasury
& that the Secretary of the Navy did the
business in Mr. Gallatin’s absence.
To the chairman, who asked & obtained a personal
interview, he communicated his objections to a conference
with the committee on the ground that the resolution
under which they were appointed did not authorize it,
even could any advantage result from it, which however
was improbable, as neither party would be apt to
change its opinion, and on the principle of compromise
that nothing could be done or ought to be done.
Various resolutions, tending to embarrass the
nomination divide the republican party in the Senate &
perpetuate that division by irritating its members towards
each other, have been introduced & are still depending.
Among these is one, intended to express the sense
of the house against the compatibility of the two offices.
The delay has done harm & doubtless
was intended to have that effect.
The result is yet uncertain.22
Jefferson responded with this letter to Monroe on June 19:
Your favors of the 7th & 16th are received, &
I now return you the Memoir enclosed in the former.
I am much gratified by its communication because,
as the plan appeared in the newspapers soon
after the new Secretary at War came into office,
we had given him the credit of it.
Every line of it is replete with wisdom; and we
might lament that our tardy enlistments prevented
it’s execution, were we not to reflect that these
proceeded from the happiness of our people at home.
It is more a subject of joy that we have
so few of the desperate characters
which compose modern regular armies.
But it proves more forcibly the necessity
of obliging every citizen to be a soldier.
This was the case with the Greeks & Romans
and must be that of every free state.
Where there is no oppression
there will be no pauper hirelings.
We must train & classify the whole of our
male citizens and make military instruction
a regular part of collegiate education.
We can never be safe till this is done.
I have been persuaded ab initio that what we are
to do in Canada must be done quickly: because our
enemy with a little time can empty pickpockets upon us
faster than we can enlist honest men to oppose them.
If we fail in this acquisition, Hull is the cause of it.
Pike in his situation would have swept
their posts to Montreal, because his army
would have grown as it went along.
I fear the reinforcements arrived at Quebec will be at
Montreal before General Dearborn, & if so, the game is up.
If the marching of the militia into an enemy’s
country be once ceded as unconstitutional
(which I hope it never will be) then will their force,
as now strengthened, bid us permanent defiance.
Could we acquire that country, we might perhaps
insist successfully at St. Petersburg on retaining all
westward of the Meridian of Lake Huron or of Ontario
or of Montreal according to the pulse of the place,
as an indemnification of the past & security for the future.
To cut them off from the Indians, even West
of the Huron would be a great future security.
Your kind answer of the 16th entirely satisfies my
doubts as to the employment of the Navy, if kept within
striking distance of our coast; & shows how erroneous
views are apt to be with those who have not all in view.
Yet as I know from experience that profitable
suggestions sometimes come from lookers on,
they may be usefully tolerated, provided
they do not pretend to the right of an answer.
They would cost very dear indeed were they to occupy the
time of a high officer in writing when he should be acting.
I intended no such trouble to you, my dear Sir:
and were you to suppose I expected it,
I must cease to offer a thought on our public affairs.
Although my entire confidence in their direction prevents
my reflecting on them but accidentally, yet sometimes
facts, & sometimes ideas occur, which I hazard as
worth the trouble of reading but not of answering.
Of this kind was my suggestion of the facts which
I recollected as to the defense of the Chesapeake,
and of what had been contemplated at the time
between the Secretaries of War & the Navy & myself.
If our views were sound, the object might be effected in
one year, even of war, and at an expense which is nothing
compared to the population & productions it would cover.
We are here laboring under the most extreme
drought ever remembered at this season.
We have had but one rain to lay the dust in two months.
That was a good one but was three weeks ago.
Corn is but a few inches high & dying.
Oats will not yield their seed.
Of wheat the hard winter & fly leave us about ⅔
of an ordinary crop so that in the lotteries of human
life you see that even farming is but gambling.
We have had three days of excessive heat.
The thermometer on the 16th was at 92
on the 17th 92½ & yesterday at 93.
It had never before exceeded 92½ at this place,
at least within the periods of my observation.23
On 28 June 1813 Monroe informed Jefferson that Madison and
General Dearborn were ill, and he discussed the current political situation.
From the date of my last letter to you the President has
been ill of a bilious fever; of that kind called the remittent.
It has perhaps never left him, even for an hour, and
occasionally the symptoms have been unfavorable.
This is I think the 15th day.
Elzey of this place & Shoaff of
Annapolis with Dr. Tucker attend him.
They think he will recover.
The first mentioned, I have just seen, who reports that
he had a good night & is in a state to take the bark, which
indeed he has done on his best day for nearly a week.
I shall see him before I seal this & note any change,
should there be any, from the above statement.
The federalists aided by the malcontents have done,
and are doing, all the mischief that they can.
The nominations to Russia & Sweden, the latter made
on an intimation, that the crown prince would contribute
his good offices to promote peace on fair conditions,
they have embarrassed to the utmost of their power.
The active partisans are King, Giles, and as
respects the first nomination Samuel Smith.
Leib German & Gilman are habitually in that interest,
active, but useful to their party by their votes only.
The two members from Louisiana, Gailliard,
Stone, Anderson, & Bledsoe are added
to that corps on those questions.
They have carried a vote 20 to 14 that the appointment
of Mr. Gallatin to the Russian mission is incompatible
with his station in the Treasury, & appointed a committee
to communicate the resolution to the President.
They have appointed another committee to
confer with him on the nomination to Sweden.
The object is to usurp the Executive power
in the hands of a faction in the Senate.
To this several mentioned are not parties,
particularly the four last.
A committee of the Senate ought to confer with a
committee of the President, that is, a head of a department,
and not with the chief magistrate, for in the latter case
a committee of that house is equal to the Executive.
To break the measure & relieve the President from the
pressure at a time when so little able to bear it, indeed
when no pressure whatever should be made on him,
I wrote the committee on the nomination to Sweden,
that I was instructed by him to meet them, to give all
the information they might desire of the Executive.
They declined the interview.
I had intended to pursue the same course respecting
the other nomination, had I succeeded in this.
Failing, I have declined it.
The result is withheld from the President.
These men have begun to make calculations & plans,
founded on the presumed deaths of the President
& Vice President, & it has been suggested to me
that Giles is thought of to take the place of President
of the senate, as soon as the Vice President withdraws.
General Dearborn is dangerously ill,
& General Lewis is doing little.
Hampton has gone on to that quarter,
but I fear on an inactive command.
General Wilkinson is expected soon, but
I do not know what station will be assigned him.
The idea of a commander in chief is in circulation,
proceeding from the War Department,
as I have reason to believe.
If so, it will probably take a more decisive form,
when things are prepared for it.
A security for his the Secretary’s advancement to
that station is, I presume, the preparation desired.24
On 12 July 1813 Secretary of State Monroe sent this
comprehensive report with his explanations to President Madison:
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred several
resolutions of the House of Representatives of the 21st
ultimo, requesting information on certain points relating
to the French decree of the 28th April 1811, has the
honor to make to the President the following report:
In furnishing the information required by the House of
Representatives the Secretary of State presumes that
it might be deemed sufficient for him to state what is
now demanded, what part thereof has been heretofore
communicated, and to supply the deficiency.
He considers it however more conformable to the
views of the House to meet at this time without
regarding what has been already communicated,
every enquiry, and to give a distinct answer to each,
with the proper explanation relating to it.
The House of Representatives has requested information,
when, by whom, and in what manner, the first intelligence
was given to this Government of the Decree of the
Government of France, bearing the date on 28th April 1811,
& purporting to be a definitive repeal of the decrees of
Berlin & Milan; whether Mr. Russell late Chargé des affaires
of the United States to the Government of France ever
admitted or denied to his Government the correctness of the
declaration of the Duke of Bassano to Mr. Barlow, as stated
in Mr. Barlow’s letter of the 12th May 1812 to the Secretary
of State, that the said decree had been communicated to his,
Mr. Barlow’s predecessor there, and to lay before the House
any correspondence with Mr. Russell on that subject which
it may not be improper to communicate, and also any
correspondence between Mr. Barlow and Mr. Russell
in possession of the Department of State; whether the
Minister of France to the United States ever informed this
Government of the existence of the said decree, and to lay
before the House any correspondence with the said Minister
relative thereto, not improper to be communicated;
with any other information in possession of the Government
which he may not deem it injurious to the public interest
to disclose, relative to the said decree, tending to show at
what time, by whom, and in what manner, it was first made
known to this Government, or to any of its representatives
or Agents; and lastly to inform the House whether the
Government of the United States has ever received from
that of France any explanation of the reasons of that decree
being concealed from this Government, and its Minister for
so long a time after its date, and if such explanation has
been asked by this Government and has been omitted to
be given by that of France, whether this Government has
made any remonstrance or expressed any dissatisfaction
to the Government of France at such concealment.
These enquiries embrace two distinct objects.
The first relates to the conduct of the
Government of France in regard to this Decree.
The second to that of the Government of the United States.
In satisfying the call of the House on this latter point,
it seems to be proper to meet it in a two-fold view;
first as it relates to the conduct of this Government
in this transaction; secondly, as it relates to its
conduct toward both belligerents in some
important circumstances connected with it.
The resolutions do not call specially for a report of such
extent, but as the measures of the Executive, and the acts
of Congress, founded on communications from the Executive
which relate to one of the belligerents, have by necessary
consequence an immediate relation to the other, such a
report seems to be obviously comprised within their scope.
On this principle the report is prepared, in the expectation
that the more full the information given, on every branch
of the subject, the more satisfactory will it be to the House.
The Secretary of State has the honor to report in reply
to these enquiries, that the first intelligence which this
Government received of the French decree of the 28th April
1811, was communicated by Mr. Barlow in a letter bearing
date on the 12th of May 1812, which was received by this
Department on the 13th of July following: that the first
intimation to Mr. Barlow of the existence of that decree,
as appears by his communications was given by the
Duke of Bassano in an informal conference on some day
between the 1st and 10th of May 1812, and that the official
communication of it to Mr. Barlow was made on the 10th
of that month at his request: that Mr. Barlow transmitted
a copy of that decree and of the Duke of Bassano’s letter
announcing it to Mr. Russell in a letter of May 11 in which
he also informed Mr. Russell, that the Duke of Bassano had
stated that the decree had been duly communicated to him:
that Mr. Russell replied in a letter to Mr. Barlow of
the 29th of May, that his first knowledge of the
decree was derived from his letter, and that he has
repeatedly stated the same since to this Government.
The paper marked A is a copy of an extract of Mr. Barlow’s
letter to the Department of State of May 12, 1812—
B of the Duke of Bassano’s letter to Mr. Barlow of the
10th of the same month: C of an extract of Mr. Barlow’s
letter to Mr. Russell of May 11th: D of an extract of
Mr. Russell’s answer of the 29 May, and E of Mr. Russell’s
letter to the Department of State of the 30th.
The Secretary of State reports also that no communication
of the decree of the 28th April 1811 was ever made to the
Government by the Minister of France or other person than,
as is above stated, and that no explanation of the cause
of its not having been communicated to this Government
and published at the time of its date was ever made
to this Government, or so far as it is informed, to the
representatives or Agents of the United States in Europe.
The Minister of France has been asked to explain the
cause of a proceeding apparently so extraordinary and
exceptionable, who replied that his first intelligence of
that decree was received by the Wasp in a letter from
the Duke of Bassano of May 10th 1812, in which he
expressed his surprise that a prior letter of May 1811,
in which he had transmitted a copy of the decree for the
information of this Government had not been received.
Further explanations were expected
from Mr. Barlow, but none were given.
The light in which this transaction was viewed by
this Government was noticed by the President in
his message to Congress and communicated also to
Mr. Barlow in the letter of 14 July 1812 with a view to
the requisite explanation from the French Government.
On the 9th day of May 1812 the Emperor left
Paris for the North, and in two days thereafter
the Duke of Bassano followed him.
A negotiation for the adjustment of injuries
and the arrangement of our commerce with the
Government of France long depending, and said to
have been brought nearly to a conclusion at the time
of Mr. Barlow’s death, was suspended by that event.
His successor, lately appointed, is authorized
to resume the negotiation and to conclude it.
He is instructed to demand redress of the French
Government for every injury and an explanation of its
motive for withholding from this Government a knowledge
of the Decree for so long a time after its adoption.
It appears by the documents referred to, that
Mr. Barlow lost no time after having obtained a
knowledge of the existence of the French decree
of the 28 April 1811, in demanding a copy of it and
transmitting it to Mr. Russell, who immediately laid it
before the British Government, urging on the ground
of this new proof of the repeal of the French decrees
that the British Orders in Council should be repealed.
Mr. Russell’s note to Lord Castlereagh bears
date on 20 May; Lord Castlereagh’s reply on
the 23rd, in which he promised to submit the
decree to the consideration of the Prince Regent.
It appears however, that no encouragement was given
at that time to hope that the Orders in Council would be
repealed in consequence of that decree; and that although
it was afterwards made the ground of their repeal, the
repeal was nevertheless to be ascribed to other causes.
Their repeal did not take effect until the 23rd June,
more than a month after the French decree had been
laid before the British Government; a delay indicating
in itself at a period so momentous and critical,
not merely neglect but disregard of the French decree.
That the repeal of the British Orders in Council
was not produced by the French decree,
other proofs might be adduced.
I will state one, which in addition to the evidence
contained in the letters from Mr. Russell herewith
communicated marked G is deemed conclusive.
In the communication of Mr. Baker to Mr. Graham on
the 9th August 1812, (marked H.) which was founded on
instructions from his Government, of as late date as the
17th June in which he stated, that an official declaration
would be sent to this Country, proposing a conditional repeal
of the Orders in Council, so far as they affected the United
States, no notice whatever was taken of the French decree.
One of the conditions then contemplated was, that the
orders in Council should be revived at the end of 8 months,
unless the conduct of the French Government and the result
of the Communications with the Government of the
United States should be such, as in the opinion of the
British Government to render their revival unnecessary:
a condition which proves incontestably that the French
decree was not considered by the British Government
a sufficient ground on which to repeal the Orders in Council.
It proves also that on that day the British Government
had resolved not to repeal the orders on the basis of that
decree; since the proposed repeal was to depend, not
on what the French Government had already done, but on
what it might do and on arrangements to be entered into
with the United States, unconnected with the French repeal.
The French decree of the 28th April 1811 was transmitted
to the United States by the Wasp, a public vessel, which had
been long awaiting at the ports of Great Britain and France,
dispatches from our Ministers relating to these
very important concerns with both governments.
It was received at the Department of State
on the 13th July 1812, nearly a month after
the declaration of War against Great Britain.
Intelligence of the repeal of the Orders in Council was
not received until about the middle of the following month.
It was impossible therefore that either of those acts,
in whatever light they might be viewed, should have
been taken into consideration, or have had any
influence in deciding on that important event.
Had the British Government been disposed to repeal
its orders in Council in conformity with the principle
on which it professed to issue them, and on the
condition which it had itself prescribed, there was
no reason to delay the repeal until such a decree
as that of the 28 April 1811 should be produced.
The declaration of the French Government of 5 August 1810
had fully satisfied every claim of the British Government
according to its own principles on that point.
By it the decrees of Berlin and Milan were declared
to be repealed, the repeal to take effect on the
1st November following, on which day it did take effect.
The only condition attached to it was either that
Great Britain should follow the example and repeal
her Orders in Council, or that the United States should
carry into effect against her their non-importation act.
This condition was in its nature subsequent, not precedent,
reserving a right in France to revive her decrees
in case neither alternative was performed.
By this declaration it was put completely in the
power of Great Britain to terminate this controversy
in a manner the most honorable to herself.
France had yielded to her the ground on a condition
with which she had declared her willingness to comply.
Had she complied, the non-importation act
would not have been carried into effect,
nor could the French decrees have been revived.
By refusing to comply, she has made herself
responsible for all that has since followed.
By the decree of the 28 April 1811 the decrees of
Berlin and Milan were said to be definitively repealed,
and the execution of the non-importation act against
Great Britain was declared to be the ground of that repeal.
The repeal announced by the declaration of the
5th August 1810 was absolute and final, except
as to the condition subsequent attached to it.
This latter decree acknowledges that that condition
had been performed and disclaims the right to
revive it in consequence of that performance;
and extending back to the 1st of November,
confirms in every circumstance the preceding repeal.
The latter act therefore as to the repeal is
nothing more than a confirmation of the former.
It is in this sense that those two acts
are to be understood in France.
It is in the same sense that they
are to be regarded by other powers.
In repealing the Orders in Council on the pretext
of the French decree of the 28th of April 1811, the
British Government has conceded that it ought to have
repealed them on the declaration of the 5th August 1810.
It is impossible to discriminate between the two acts,
or to separate them from each other, so as to justify
on sound and consistent principles the repeal of
the Orders in Council on the ground of one act,
and the refusal to repeal them on that of the other.
The second act makes the repeal definitive;
but for what reason?
Because the non-importation act had been
put in force against Great Britain in compliance
with the condition subsequent attached to the
former repeal and her refusal to perform it.
That act being still in force, and the decree of the 28th April
1811 being expressly founded on it, Great Britain repeals
her Orders in Council on the basis of this latter decree.
The conclusion is therefore irresistible that by this repeal,
under all the circumstances attending it, the British
Government has acknowledged the justice of the claim
of the United States to a repeal on the former occasion.
By accepting the latter repeal, it has sanctioned the
preceding one; it has sanctioned also the conduct of this
Government in carrying into effect the non-importation act
against Great Britain founded on the preceding repeal.
Other important consequences result from
this repeal of the British Government.
By fair and obvious construction the acceptance
of the decree of the 28th April 1811 as the ground
of the repeal of the Orders in Council, ought to be
construed to extend back to the 1st November 1810,
the day on which the preceding repeal took effect.
The Secretary of State has full confidence that if the
question could be submitted to the judgment of an
impartial judicial tribunal, that such would be its decision.
He has equal confidence that such will be the judgment
pronounced on it by the enlightened and impartial world.
If however these two acts could be separated from each
other, so as that the latter might be made the basis of the
repeal of the Orders in Council, distinct from the former,
it follows that bearing date on the 28th April 1811,
the repeal ought to have relation to that date.
In legal construction between nations as well as
individuals, acts are to be respected from the time
they begin to operate, and where they impose a moral
or political obligation on another party, that obligation
commences with the commencement of the act.
But it has been urged that the French decree
was not promulgated, or made known to the
British Government until a year after its date.
This objection has no force.
By accepting an act bearing date a year
before it was promulgated, it is admitted that
in the interval nothing was done repugnant to it.
It cannot be presumed that any Government would accept
from another as the basis on which it was to found an
important measure, an act of anterior and remote date,
pledging itself to a certain course of conduct which that
Government had in the interval departed from and violated.
If any Government had violated an act the injunctions
of which it was bound to observe by an anterior one,
in relation to a third party, and which it professed
to have observed before its acceptance by the other,
it could not be presumed that it would
cease to violate it after the acceptance.
The conclusion is irresistible that if the other Government
did accept such act with a knowledge of its antecedent
violation, as the foundation of any measure on its own part,
that such act must have been the ostensible only,
and not the real motive to such measure.
The declaration of the Prince Regent of the
21st April 1811 is in full confirmation of these remarks.
By this act of the British Government it is formally
announced on the authority of a report of the
Secretary of foreign affairs to the conservative senate
of France that the French decrees were still in force,
and that the Orders in Council should not be repealed.
It cannot fail to excite considerable surprise that the
British Government should immediately afterwards,
that is on the 23rd June, repeal its Orders in Council
on the ground of the French decree of the 28th April 1811.
By this proceeding the British Government
has involved itself in manifest inconsistency.
It has maintained by one act, that the French
decrees were in full force, and by another that
they were repealed during the same space of time.
It admits also that by no act of the French Government,
or of its cruisers had any violation of the repeal announced
by the declaration of the French Government of the
5th August 1810 been committed, or at least that
such violation had not had sufficient weight
to prevent the repeal of the Orders in Council.
It was objected that the declaration of the French
Government of the 5 August 1810 was not such an act
as the British Government ought to have regarded.
The Secretary of State is thoroughly satisfied
that this objection is altogether unfounded.
It was communicated by the Emperor through his highest
official Organ, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to the
Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris.
It is impossible to conceive an act more formal, authentic or
obligatory on the French Government, than that alluded to.
Does one Government ever ask or expect from another to
secure the performance of any duty, however important,
more than its official pledge, fairly and fully expressed?
Can better security be given for its performance?
Had there been any doubt on this subject,
the conduct of Great Britain herself in similar
cases would have completely removed it.
The whole history of her diplomatic intercourse
with other Powers on the subject of blockade is in
accord with this proceeding of the French Government.
We know that when her Government institutes a blockade,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs announces it to the
Minister of other Powers at London, and that the
same form is observed when they are revoked.
Nor was the authenticity of either act
thus announced ever questioned.
Had a similar declaration been made by the
Minister of France in the United States to this
Government by the order of his own, would it
not have been entitled to respect and been respected?
By the usage of Nations such respect
could not have been withheld.
The arrangement made with Mr. Erskine is a full
proof of the good faith of this Government and of its
impartiality in its transactions with both the belligerents.
It was made with that Minister on the ground of
his public character and the confidence due to it:
on which basis the non-intercourse was removed
to England & left in full force against France.
The failure of that arrangement was imputable
to the British Government alone, who in
rejecting it took on itself a high responsibility,
not simply in regard to the consequences attending it,
but in disavowing and annulling the act of its minister
without showing that he had exceeded his authority.
In accepting the declaration of the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs in proof of the French repeal,
the United States gave no proof of improper
credence to the Government of France.
On a comparison of both transactions, it will appear
that if a marked confidence and respect was shown
to either Government, it was to that of Great Britain.
In accepting the declaration of the Government of
France in the presence of the Emperor, the
United States stood on more secure ground, than in
accepting that of a British Minister in this Country.
To the demand made by the United States of the
repeal of the British Orders in Council, founded on
the basis of the French repeal of August 5th 1810,
the British Government replied by demanding a Copy
of the orders issued by the French Government
for carrying into effect that repeal; a demand
without example in the intercourse between Nations.
By this demand it ceased to be a question
whether the French repeal was of sufficient
extent or was founded on justifiable conditions.
The pledge of the French Government was doubted;
a scrutiny was instituted as to the manner in which
it was to be discharged, and its faith preserved,
not by the subsequent conduct of its cruisers
towards the Vessels of the United States,
but by a Copy of the orders given to its cruisers.
Where would this end?
If the French Government intended a fraud by its
declaration of repeal announced to the Minister of
the United States and afterwards to this Government,
might it not likewise commit a fraud in any
other communication which it might make?
If credit was refused by the British Government to the
act of the French Government, thus formally announced,
is it probable that it would have been given by it to any
document of inferior character, directed to its own people.
Although it was the policy and might be the interest
of the British Government to engage the United States
in such a controversy with the French Government,
it was far from comporting with their interests to do it.
They considered it their duty to accept the repeal already
made by the French Government of its decrees, and to look
to its conduct and to that of its cruisers, sanctioned by the
Government for the faithful performance or violation of it.
The United States having been injured by both powers,
were unwilling in their exertions to obtain justice of
either to become the instrument of the other.
They were the less inclined to it in the present instance,
from the consideration, that the party making the pressure
on them, maintained in full force its unlawful edicts against
the American Commerce, while it could not deny that a
considerable advance at least had been made by the other
towards a complete accommodation, it being manifest to
the world, not only that the faith of the French Government
stood pledged for the repeal of the decrees, but that the
repeal did take effect on the 1st of November 1810 in
regard to the United States; that several American
Vessels taken under them had been delivered up;
and judicial decisions suspended on all by its order,
and that it also continued to give the most positive
assurances that the repeal should be faithfully observed.
It has also been urged that the French repeal was
conditional and for that reason could not be accepted.
This objection has already been fully answered.
It merits attention however that the Acts of
the British Government relating to this subject,
particularly the declaration of the 21st April 1812,
and the repeal of the 23rd June of the same
year are equally and in like manner conditional.
It is not a little surprising, that the British Government
should have objected to a measure in another Government,
to which it has itself given a sanction by its own acts.
It is proper however to remark that this objection
has been completely waved and given up by the
acceptance of the decree of the 28th April 1811.
The British Government has urged also, that
it could not confide in the faithful performance
by the French Government of any engagement
it might enter into relative to the repeal of its decrees.
This objection would be equally applicable to
any other compact to be entered into with France.
While maintained, it would be a bar to any Treaty,
even to a Treaty of Peace between them.
But it also has been admitted to be unfounded by
the acceptance of the decree of the 28th April 1811.
The Secretary of State presumes that these facts and
explanations, supported as they are by authentic documents,
prove first, that the repeal of the British Orders in Council
was not to be ascribed to the French decree bearing
date on the 28 April 1811; and secondly, that in
making that decree the basis of their repeal, the
British Government has conceded that it ought to
have repealed them on the ground of the declaration
of the French Government of 5th August 1810,
so as to take effect on the 1st November following.
To what cause the repeal of the British Orders
in Council was justly attributable cannot now
remain a doubt with any who have marked
with a just discernment the course of events.
It must afford great consolation to the good
people of these States to know that they
have not submitted to privations in vain.
The discussion of other wrongs, particularly
that relating to impressment had been
closed sometime before the period alluded to.
It was unworthy the character of the United States
to pursue the discussion on that difference, when it
was evident that no advantage could be derived from it.
The right was reserved, to be brought forward
and urged again, when it might be done with effect.
In the meantime the practice of
impressment was persevered in with rigor.
At the time when war was declared against
Great Britain, no satisfactory arrangement was
offered or likely to be obtained respecting impressment,
and nothing was more remote from the expectation of
this Government, than the repeal of the Orders in Council.
Every circumstance which had occurred tending to
illustrate the policy and views of the British Government,
rendered such an event altogether improbable.
From the commencement of that system of hostility,
which Great Britain had adopted against the United States,
her pretensions had gradually increased, or at least become
more fully unfolded according to circumstances, until at
the moment when war was declared, they had assumed
a character which dispelled all prospect of accommodation.
The Orders in Council were said to have been adopted on
a principle of retaliation on France, although at the time
when the order of May 1806 was issued, no measure
of France had occurred on which it could be retaliatory,
and at the date of the next order, January 1807,
it was hardly possible that this Government should have
even heard of the decree of Berlin to which it related.
It was stated at the time of their adoption and for
some time afterwards, that they should be revoked
as soon as France revoked her decrees, and that
the British Government would proceed with the
Government of France pari passu in the revocation.
After the declaration, however, of the French Government
of the 5th August 1810 by which the Berlin and Milan
decrees were declared to be repealed, the British
Government changed its tone, and continued to rise
in its demands to the moment that war was declared.
It objected first, that the French repeal was
conditional and not absolute; although the only
condition attached to it was that Great Britain should
follow the example, or the United States fulfil their
pledge by executing the non-importation act against her.
It was then demanded that France should
repeal her internal regulations, as a condition
of the repeal of the British Orders in Council.
Next, that the French repeal should be extended to all
neutral nations, as well as to the United States, and lastly,
that the Ports of her Enemies and all Ports from
which the British flag was excluded, should be
opened to British manufactures in American Vessels:
Conditions so extravagant, as to satisfy all
dispassionate minds, that they were demanded
not in the expectation that they would or could
be complied with, but to terminate the discussion.
On full consideration of all circumstances,
it appeared that the period had arrived when it
became the duty of the United States to take that
attitude with Great Britain, which was due to their
violated rights to the Security of their most important
interests and to their character as an independent nation.
To have shrunk from the crisis would have been
to abandon everything valuable to a free people.
The Surrender of our Seamen to British impressment
with the destruction of our navigation and commerce,
would not have been its only evils.
The desolation of property, however great and widely
spread, affects an interest which admits of repair.
The wound is incurable only which
fixes a stigma on the national honor.
While the spirit of the people is unsubdued, there will
always be found in their virtue a resource equal to
the greatest dangers and most trying emergencies.
It is in the nature of free government to inspire
in the body of the people generous and noble sentiments,
and it is the duty of the constituted authorities
to cherish and to appeal to those sentiments and
rely on the patriotic support of their constituents.
Had they proved themselves unequal to the crisis,
the most fatal consequences would have resulted from it.
The proof of their weakness would have
been recorded; but not on them alone
would its baneful effects have been visited.
It would have shaken the foundation of the Government
itself and even of the sacred principles of the
revolution on which all our political institutions depend.
Yielding to the pretentions of a foreign power
without making a manly effort in defense of our rights,
without appealing to the virtue of the people or to the
strength of our Union, it would have been charged and
believed, that in these sources lay the hidden defects.
Where would the good people of these States
have been able to make another stand?
Where would have been their rallying point?
The Government of their choice, having been dishonored,
its weakness, and that of their institutions, demonstrated,
the triumph of the Enemy would have been complete.
It would also have been durable.
The constituted authorities of the United States
neither dreaded or anticipated these evils.
They had full confidence in the strength of the Union,
in the firmness and virtue of the people and were satisfied
when the appeal should be made, that ample proof would
be afforded, that their confidence had not been misplaced.
Foreign pressure, it was not doubted would soon
dissipate foreign partialities and prejudices, if such existed,
and unite us more closely together as one people.
In declaring war against Great Britain,
the United States have placed themselves in a
situation to retort the hostility, which they had
so long suffered from the British Government.
The maintenance of their rights was the object of the war.
Of the desire of this Government to terminate the war
on honorable conditions, ample proof has been afforded
by the proposition made to the British Government
immediately after the declaration of war, through
the chargé des affaires of the United States at London,
and by the promptitude and manner of the acceptance
of the mediation of the Emperor of Russia.
It was anticipated by some, that a declaration
of war against Great Britain would force the
United States into a close connection with
her adversary, much to their disadvantage.
The Secretary of State thinks it proper to remark
that nothing is more remote from the fact.
The discrimination in favor of France, according to law,
in consequence of her acceptance of the proposition
made equally to both powers produced a difference
between them in that special case, but in that only.
The war with England was declared without any
concert or communication with the French Government;
it has produced no connection between the
United States and France or any understanding
as to its prosecution, continuance, or termination.
The ostensible relation between the
two countries is the true and only one.
The United States have just claims on France for spoliations
on their commerce on the high Seas and in the Ports of
France, and their late minister was, and their present
minister is, instructed to demand reparation for these
injuries and to press it with the energy due to the justice
of their claims and to the character of the United States.
The result of the negotiation will be
communicated to Congress in due time.
The papers marked (I) contain copies of two letters
addressed from this Department to Mr. Barlow, one
of the 16th June 1812, just before the declaration of war,
the other of the 14th July following, which
show distinctly the relation existing between the
United States and France at that interesting period.
No change has since occurred in it.25
On 12 August 1813 James Monroe wrote this letter to President Madison:
Mr. Wyer left this place this morning with
the dispatches for our ministers in Russia.
He takes two sets, one under the seal of
Mr. Daschkoff, another that of the Department of State.
He promises to make the greatest effort
to reach his destination as soon as possible.
He will call on Mrs. Gallatin for her letters &
expects to get to sea in a fortnight at the latest.
On her application I have remitted to her
750 Dollars out of Mr. Gallatin’s salary &
according to his request before he sailed.
Two gentlemen from Annapolis,
(Col. Duvall was one of them) arrived here yesterday
evening in consequence of some menacing maneuvers
of the enemy, who lie with great force off that town & on
Kent Island, and of an order from General Smith to Col.
Carbery, to march his force immediately to Baltimore.
These gentlemen brought a letter from the Colonel
to the Secretary at War, which after being opened
by Mr. Parker, was brought by them to me,
he having no authority to interfere.
They represented that the removal of the force
from Annapolis, where little other was or could
be collected, would invite an attack on the place,
already sufficiently menaced: that the people there
would be in despair if Col. Carbery left them,
and all who had the means would move off.
I went with them to the Secretary of the Navy.
We both thought that they had better follow
General Armstrong to Baltimore, where he might still be.
On enquiry they concluded that he would
have departed before they could get there.
Carbery’s letter to the Secretary at war states that he should
not obey General Smith’s order till he showed his authority
to give it, but Mr. Parker stated to these gentlemen, that
he was not aware that any such authority had been given
to General Smith, though he thought it probable that it
might be done, as he had heard the Secretary say
before his departure that he should arrange that affair
with the general as he passed through Baltimore.
Their anxiety was increased by a fear that as only the
claims of Baltimore might be heard there, the authority
would be given, & the order be immediately issued.
The Secretary of the Navy intimated to these gentlemen,
that, as the frigate in this river was moving up to the
Navy yard, he could spare Captain Morris with his crew
for the forts at Annapolis, where he would place them,
provided they could have the command in the forts,
which was presumed on all sides.
They urged strongly the measure; as likely to produce
the happiest effect in that exposed town and as being
the more important, as Captain Morris would put
the forts in order, they being quite out of repair.
With respect to Col. Carbery’s removal, we stated it
as our opinion, that it ought to be avoided if possible,
because Annapolis was menaced more than Baltimore;
that Baltimore was better able to defend itself, & that the
removal of the troops from Annapolis would not only expose
that town to attack, but leave the road open to this place.
We stated however, that all that we could do, would be to
authorize them to communicate the above as our opinion
to Col. Carbery, merely with a view if he should think it
entitled to such weight to the suspension of his march
in case the order with sufficient authority should have been
issued until the arrival of General Bloomfield, who had
been appointed to command here, & who would doubtless
be instructed on the subject by the Secretary at War.
I intimated to Major Gardner yesterday,
that if there should be any case in the absence of the
Secretary at war, on which my advice might be useful,
I should at all times be ready & happy to give it.
He thanked me, saying that he should often apply to me.
I shall give the same intimation to Mr. Parker today,
of which they will be authorized to apprise the Secretary.
The affair at Sandusky, gives some
encouragement to hope a change in that quarter.
Mr. Jones says the flotilla is out on lake Erie,
& the enemy in sight.
He is confident of success.26
James Monroe in a letter to President Madison on August 30 wrote,
The idea that the Russian mediation has been rejected
by the British government seems to gain strength from
every light which continues to be shed on the subject.
Since writing the above, Mr. Parker has been with me on
some affairs of the War Department in the Southern States.
It appears that certain tribes of the Creek nation in a
state of hostility with us have been supplied by Governor
Manrique of Pensacola with munitions of war for the
express purpose of making war on the United States.
This is received from Judge Toulmin & Mr. Gaines,
transmitted by Governor Holmes, who intimates
that a part of the Choctaws will join the Creeks.
Governor Willie Blount of Tennessee has put the
troops of that state under Major General Jackson,
as is understood a circumstance which may cause
difficulty about rank between the two states.
There appears also to be much difficulty respecting
supplies for the expedition, the quarter masters of
each state, not being the best qualified for the
business, & without funds and those connected
with the commands of General Pinckney & Flournoy,
being neither of them instructed to act in the case.
It occurs to me that it would be most advisable
to order General Pinckney to take the command
of the expedition in which case he would take
his staff with him & likewise his contractors.
If any change in the contract applicable to the troops
under General Pinckney along the coast should be
proper, he would be the fittest person to make it.
Under him it appears to me, that the expedition
might be immediately organized.27
On 1 October 1813 in a letter to Thomas Jefferson the
Secretary of State Monroe criticized Alexander’s Hamilton’s
financial system, and he discussed Jefferson’s plan.
I have read with great interest & satisfaction your
remarks on finance, which I return by the bearer.
We are now at the mercy of monied institutions,
who have got the circulating medium into their hands,
& in that degree the command of the country by the
adventurers in them, who without much capital
are making fortunes out of the public and individuals.
Many of these institutions are hostile to the government,
and the others have already gone far in loans made to it.
Hamilton’s plan was a reliance on monied institutions,
aided by taxes at the head of which he had placed a
national bank since extinct; and Gallatin’s has been
the same in respect to a national bank, having proposed
to reinstate it & in respect to any species of taxes.
Yours appears to me to be more simple, more consistent
with original principles & with those of the Constitution,
much more economical and certain of success in
both its parts, if it could be got into operation.
I fear however that that has become difficult if not
impracticable by the ascendancy gained by the existing
institutions, & the opposition they would be sure to
make to its introduction in the radical form proposed,
on which its success would principally depend.
These corporate bodies would make a great struggle,
before they would surrender—either their power
or the profit they are making by the use of it.
Something however ought to be done to
relieve the nation from the burdens &
dangers inseparable from the present plan.
The fatiguing process of my concerns here
has kept me constantly at home and engaged.
We will have the pleasure to dine with you tomorrow
if the weather permits, and Mr. George Hay,
who joined us last night indisposed will
accompany us, if his health should improve.28
In November 1813 the British Prime Minister Liverpool sent
a message to Monroe suggesting direct negotiations between
Britain and the United States to be held at Ghent in Belgium.
The diplomat John Quincy Adams was already in Ghent, and
Monroe proposed Henry Clay as a diplomat even though he was a “war hawk.”
James Monroe on 27 December 1813 wrote from Washington this letter
to President Madison, and he included several pages of his
“Views Respecting the Rejection of the Mediation of Russia”
in which he discussed the following three points:
1 If it is usual for England to send more
than one minister on such occasions.
2. Appointment should be delayed till intelligence
mentioned Lord Castlereagh’s dispatch received—
the President intimated as much himself.
3. Are there any instances of a government
accepting a mediation and acting without knowing
that it was accepted by the opposite party?29
Here is Monroe’s letter of December 27:
Just before I left the office he came into it and informed
me that General Armstrong had adopted the idea of a
conscription and was engaged in communications with
members of Congress in which he endeavored to reconcile
them to the measure, stating that the militia could not
be relied on, & that regular troops could not be enlisted.
Mr. Jones was fearful, should such an idea get into
circulation, that it would go far to ruin the administration.
He told me that he had his information from General Lacock,
& he authorized me to communicate it to you.
I suspect that many other members have already
been sounded on the subject, as Mr. Roberts
remarked to me yesterday, that General Armstrong
had returned & had many projects ready for them.
Other circumstances which have come
to my knowledge ought to be known to you.
Mr. Dawson called on me yesterday week, & informed
me that Mr. Fisk of New York intended to move on the
next day a resolution calling on you to state by what
authority General Armstrong had commanded the
northern army last campaign—who had discharged
the duties of the War Department in his absence
and for other information relating particularly
to his issuing commissions and exercising all
the duties of the Secretary at War on the frontier.
I satisfied Mr. Dawson that an attack on the
Secretary at War on those grounds would
be essentially an attack on you, & that we
must all support him against it to support you.
He assured me that he should represent it
in that light to Mr. Fisk, & endeavor to
prevail on Mr. Fisk to decline the measure.
I presume he did so.
General Hampton, whom I have seen, informed me
that this gentleman was engaged in the seduction of
the officers of the army, particularly the young men
of talents, promising to one the rank of Brigadier
to another that of major General, as he presumed
without your knowledge, teaching them to look to
him & not to you for preferment, and exciting their
resentment against you, if it did not take effect.
He assured me that a most corrupting system
had been carried on in the state of New York
by placing in office particularly the Quarter Masters
Department, his tools & instruments, & the sons
of influential men under them as clerks &c.
I did not go into detail.
Other remarks I will take another
opportunity of communicating to you.
It is painful to me to make this communication to you,
nor should I do it, if I did not most conscientiously
believe, that this man if continued in office,
will ruin not you and the administration only,
but the whole republican party and cause.
He has already gone far to do it, and it is my opinion that
if he is not promptly removed, he will soon accomplish it.
Without repeating other objections to him, and the
above facts if true are sufficient, he wants a head
fit for his station, indolent except for improper
purposes, he is incapable of that combination
and activity which the times require.
My advice to you therefore is to remove him at once.
The mere project of a conscription,
adopted & acted on without your approbation
or knowledge, is a sufficient reason.
The burning of Newark, if by his order, is another.
The failure to place troops at Fort George, another.
In short, there are abundant reasons for it.
His removal for either of the three would
revive the hopes of our party, now desponding,
and give a stimulus to measures.
I do not however wish you to act on my advice—
consult any in whom you have confidence.
He has, as you will find, but few friends, and some
of them, I suspect, cling to him either from improper motives,
or on a presumption that you support him.
This communication is of course made in confidence there
being no reason that it should be otherwise considered.
The facts may be obtained of the parties mentioned,
if desired, as I presume, and their truth is
the only material point in question.30
Notes
1. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816 ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton,
p. 197-198.
2. https://monroepapers.com/items/show/2256
3. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 198-199.
4. Ibid., p. 199-200.
5. Ibid., p. 201-202.
6. James Monroe: A Life by Tim McGrath, p. 305.
7. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 209-212.
8. Ibid., p. 212-213.
9. To James Madison from James Monroe, 4 August 1812 (Online).
10. Ibid., p. 217-218.
11. Ibid., p. 219-220.
12. From James Madison to James Monroe, 8 [September] 1812 (Online).
13. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 221-223.
14. Ibid., p. 226-227.
15. See The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 227-241.
16. Ibid., p. 241-242.
17. Ibid., p. 244-250.
18. To James Madison from James Monroe, 13 April 1813 (Online).
19. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 252-253.
20. Ibid., p. 257-258.
21. Ibid., p. 259-268.
22. Ibid., p. 268-271.
23. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 19 June 1813 (Online).
24. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 271-273.
25. To James Madison from James Monroe, 12 July 1813 (Online).
26. To James Madison from James Monroe, 12 August 1813 (Online).
27. To James Madison from James Monroe, 30 August 1813 (Online).
28. Ibid., p. 273-274.
29. Ibid., p. 277-281.
30. Ibid., p. 275-277.