Monroe’s Diplomacy in England July 1803
Monroe’s Diplomacy in England August 1803
Monroe in England in Fall of 1803
Monroe in England January-May 1804
Monroe in England June-September 1804
James Monroe arrived at London on 18 July 1803 to replace Rufus King
as the American minister, and in this letter to Madison on the 20th he reported
on current conditions and referred to the guarantees of the First Consul Napoleon:
I am too recently on this theatre to give you any
information of the state of public affairs which you will not
obtain of the Gazettes, which I shall therefore not repeat.
It will be more useful to go back to the transactions in which
I have been lately engaged, and to communicate
some incidents which occurred in them,
with which you are not yet acquainted.
The pressure of business at the time, the necessity of
hastening here as soon as that measure was decided on,
& the hope that I should enjoy more leisure here
than I had done in France, induced me to reserve
these for the present communication.
You saw by my letters after the conclusion of our
treaties with France, that I had in a great measure
decided to proceed to Spain, on the idea that by so doing
I should best fulfill the ulterior object of my instructions.
You saw likewise by the joint letter of Mr. Livingston &
myself of June 7th that I had been prevented pursuing
that object by an obstacle, the circumstances
attending which were fully detailed in it.
There occurred however another difficulty
which you are yet to be apprised of.
At the time when my Judgement inclined in favor of that
measure, I applied to Mr. Talleyrand for the support of his
government in the negotiation, according to the promise
made us by Mr. Marbois, with which you are acquainted.
This application was made on the 19 of May
immediately before the discussion mentioned
in the letter of June 7th above referred to.
On the Sunday following, three or four days
afterwards, I dined with the Consul Cambacérès
who had been with the first Consul in Council
at St Cloud, whence he returned late to dinner.
He said to me soon after he entered the room
“you must not go to Spain at present.”
I asked his reason.
He replied “it is not the time; you had better defer it.”
I revived the subject repeatedly,
but he declined going further into it.
After dinner when we were in the saloon, he came up
to me and on my informing him that he had given me
much concern by what he had said, he replied
“that it was only his opinion; but you will talk on the
subject with the Minister of the Public Treasury,”
which I assured him that I would not fail to do.
I went immediately to Mr. Marbois, but had
not the good fortune to find him at home.
On the Tuesday following I saw the Consul le Brun,
who suggested to me precisely the same idea which
I had received from the Consul Cambacérès,
& who I was persuaded had imbibed it at
the same time in the Council at St. Cloud.
I proposed to him the same question that I had done
to his Colleague and received nearly the same answer.
He told me “that we should obtain our object
but that this was not the time for it.”
About this time the incident mentioned in the
letter of June 7th occurred, which increased &
continued my suspense till we received yours of
the 18 & 20 of April which directed my route.
As soon as my course was marked, I called on
the Minister of foreign affairs, and reminded him
of my application to him for the aid of his
Government in our negotiation with Spain,
which as he well recollected had been promised.
I then told him without waiting for an answer, that my
route was changed; that I had just received the order of
the President to proceed to England in case our affairs
were amicably adjusted with France, that the motive for it
was a knowledge that Mr. King was about to return home;
the probability of a rupture between France and Britain
and the consequent exposure of our commerce; and the
propriety of our being represented there in case of that
event: that the urgency was increased by the circumstance
under which I received the order; Mr. King having
sailed without having nominated any one to take
charge of our affairs till his successor arrived.
I adverted in the commencement to the affair with Spain,
to fix in his mind by evidence not to be resisted, an
important fact, the date at which the late order was
received, that he might see that it grew out of recent
circumstances, those mentioned, and was not the part of a
system of menace adopted at the time of my appointment.
I had seen the advantage of inculcating this truth
on more than one occasion, or thought I had and
wished to leave it in full force on the present one.
The Minister acknowledged in explicit terms the
frankness of the communication, which he considered
as a strong proof of the fair dealing of our government
in its conduct towards his, and of its sincere desire to
preserve peace & friendship between the two Nations.
Then taking a cursory view of what had passed in the
late negotiation, he declared that nothing short of the
course which had been taken by our Government
would have produced the result which had attended it.
He asked me when I proposed
setting out on the proposed mission.
I answered very soon, as there was
nothing to detain me longer there.
I requested him to communicate the above to
the First Consul, and to express my wish to be
favored with a private audience, for the purpose
of taking my leave of him before my departure.
This he readily undertook, but observed that as the
First Consul was to set out in a few days for the Belgic;
& his time was pre-engaged by appointments for
the whole of the interval, he doubted whether it
would be in his power to grant me an audience,
though he was persuaded he would if he could.
Having asked an audience I was resolved to wait
an answer till his departure, & the more so,
because I knew it could not detain me long.
As soon as I had made the above communication to the
Minister, I made a like one to Mr. Marbois, whose candid
& upright deportment through the whole of our negotiation,
had inspired me with a very high respect for his character.
I asked and obtained about the same time & for the same
purpose a private audience of the Consuls Cambacérès
& le Brun, by whom I had been received with kindness
& treated with attention during my mission in France, &
who I had reason to believe had promoted the object of it.
It was not strictly in course to make to these characters
such a communication, but I felt that I owed it to the
part they had taken in the late important transactions
with our country, and am persuaded that it was
received in the spirit in which it was made.
I called on Joseph Bonaparte the elder brother of
the First Consul with the same view; but as he
had left town, I had not the pleasure to see him.
The day before the Consul commenced his tour
I received a note from the Minister of foreign affairs
requesting me to meet him the next day at one o’clock
at St. Cloud to be presented by him to the First Consul;
which was accordingly done.
The audience was of some length.
I made to him a communication similar in substance to
what I had already done to the Minister, to which I added
that it was the wish of the President that I should assure
him before my departure of his high respect & esteem
for him personally & for the French Nation, and of his
earnest desire to preserve peace & friendship with it.
The First Consul reciprocated the sentiment towards
the President & the United States in strong terms.
He said that he considered the President as a virtuous
and enlightened man, who understood & pursued the
interest of his country; as a friend of liberty and equality:
that no one wished more than himself the preservation of
a good understanding between the two Republics: that
he had been prompted to make the late cession to the
United States not so much on account of the sum given
for the territory as from views of policy: that France
had been their first friend & he wished to preserve that
relation between the two countries for ever: he had
perceived that we entertained a jealousy of their possession
of Louisiana which was likely to drive us into measures
& connections that would prove not only hurtful to France,
but as he presumed to ourselves also: he therefore wished
to remove the cause by an act which would free us from
all apprehension on that head and leave us at liberty to
pursue our course according to our interest and inclination.
I told him in reply that I had considered the cession of
Louisiana as having been prompted by the motives which
he stated, as being an act of great and enlightened policy
rather than an affair of commerce, and was persuaded
that our Government would view it in the same light:
that the cession would place us on the ground he
mentioned of real independence: that we had however
been willing to give what was deemed an equivalent for it.
He observed that there was no rivalship between us,
our relation to France being chiefly commercial;
but that we must be on our guard,
not to give the protection of our flag to the British.
I told him that the latter was a question which merited
all his deliberation & candor, since the principle that
free ships made free goods, if sustained by him as I
understood it to be, precluded any discussion on that point.
He admitted that there were difficulties in
the case which he should examine with care.
He then observed, without my leading to the subject
Though I had intended doing it, with respect to Florida
that this was not the time to pursue that object:
that the Spaniards had complained much of the
cession they had made to us of Louisiana.
I told him that we were neighbors of Spain & wished much
to be on friendly terms with her, which the possession of
Florida would promote: that it was a little piece of land
comprised within our present limits which we ought to have.
He replied that it was because we were their neighbors
that they were jealous of our possessing that territory
which by its ports commanded the gulf of Mexico.
I told him that it would be better for Spain that we held it
than the British, which might take place if we did not.
Still he urged that this was not the time to negotiate for it.
I ceased therefore to press the subject further, preferring
to let it be understood that the negotiation was postponed
for the present, to be renewed at a more suitable season,
when we should expect his good offices in it,
to which he seemed to assent.
It is to be presumed that the natural weight &
respectability of the United States will enable
their Government to obtain this object of Spain
without the aid of any other power.
It cannot be doubted, however, that France has the means
of essentially promoting or embarrassing it at present.
It was on that principle that we sought to avail
ourselves of her aid in the late negotiation, and that
I applied for it when I was about to go to Spain.
To have gone after the promise made us, without this
communication, might have produced an ill effect;
to have gone after my application for it in opposition
to her advice would most probably have had the same
tendency, which it seemed to be peculiarly proper to avoid
especially while our treaties with her were depending.
The Consul sat out on his tour the evening of the day on
which I had the above audience which was on the 3 of June.
On the Monday following I requested my passport
of Mr. d’Hermand, the chief in the department of
foreign relations charged with that business
who I found had not the power to grant one.
I immediately wrote to the Minister of Foreign Relations,
who had left Paris about the same time with the Consul,
to apprise him of this fact, & to request that he would
be pleased to send me a passport immediately,
as I was ready for my journey and only waited one.
As it was arranged when the first Consul left Paris,
that no passports should be granted for England except
such as were signed by him & the Minister did not take
the same route to Brussels with the Consul, the latter
pursuing the coast to visit the ports as he advanced,
I was detained longer than I had expected to be.
As soon however as they met, a passport was signed
by the first Consul and forwarded to me by the Minister,
under which I sat out immediately and reached this,
as you were apprised by my last on the 18 instant.
As I had communicated, while I contemplated going
to Spain with the Chevalier d’Azara, her ambassador in
France, & with Mr. Pinckney, Minister of the United States
at Madrid, and given them reason to believe that I should
do so, I thought it proper to apprise them of the late
change in my destination, and of the motive for it,
that they might see that it was the effect of imperious
causes & did not proceed from the want of a due
respect for his Catholic Majesty.1
James Monroe left Spain in July 1805 and returned to London where
on July 26 he wrote this letter to Secretary of State James Madison:
On the 20th Ultimo I wrote Lord Hawkesbury by
Mr. Sumter & apprized him of my arrival in town in the
character of Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States
to his Britannic Majesty & requested that he would be
pleased to appoint a time when I might have the
honor to wait on him with my letters of credence.
His Lordship answered that he would receive
me the next day at one o’clock at his office
if that hour was convenient to me.
I called there at that hour with
Mr. Sumter & was received by him.
I gave him a copy of my letters of credence
& expressed a desire to be presented to their
Majesties as soon as it might be convenient.
He regretted that I had not arrived a few days sooner,
as in that case I might have been presented at the
last levee but added that it should be soon done.
I asked him in what mode I should proceed,
whether I should call on him again for information?
He replied that Sir Stephen Cotterel would present
me by whom I should be informed of the time.
Not much conversation took place
on political subjects in the interview.
He observed that all the points in which there had been
heretofore any collision between the two Nations were
now happily arranged, such as the debts, Spoliations
& boundaries the latter of which he had adjusted
by treaty with Mr. King just before he sailed.
I assured him in general terms, that it was
the wish of our government to be on the
most friendly terms with Great Britain.
He then congratulated me on the conclusion
of our treaty with France which he said I had
found in a good train on my arrival there &
been lucky enough to arrange to my satisfaction.
I replied that I hoped it had been concluded on terms
that would be found advantageous to our country
& be approved by our government: that we had
been careful in forming the treaty not to interfere
with the rights of any other friendly power.
The conversation was otherwise not
sufficiently interesting to be repeated.
As such interviews are formal, especially when
the parties are entirely strangers to each other
as we were, they are, I believe, generally short.
As soon therefore as it appeared that the object
of the interview was fully answered, I withdrew.
The next levee is early in the next month at which time
I hope to be presented to his Majesty, & in the interim
I shall endeavor to make myself acquainted with the state
of our affairs in this country, with which we have so many
relations that are so highly interesting to us, and which
I shall endeavor to preserve & if possible improve.
You will observe that I expressed myself in my
replies to Lord Hawkesbury’s remarks in general
rather than precise terms, and from your knowledge
of facts you will, I am persuaded, be sensible that
it was impossible for me to do otherwise.
As I knew nothing of the treaty lately concluded with this
got by Mr. King, I could of course say nothing about it;
nor could I well reply otherwise to his allusion to the state
in which I found the negotiation on my arrival in Paris.
His Lordship did not state the pretensions of any party
to agency or service in that transaction which I knew
to be unfounded, and it was therefore unnecessary
& impolitic to presume such was his intention.
Still as his allusion might be construed into a countenance
of such pretensions, I thought it my duty to express
myself in a manner which while it Manifested a disposition
to conciliate, should nevertheless give them no sanction.
It would be matter of regret if such pretensions existed,
since every transaction should appear in its true
character, and be attributed to its proper causes.
Justice & candor require this in all cases
in reference to the parties concerned.
In the present one it is peculiarly important that
this correct maxim should be strictly observed.
This affair is not yet concluded, though I hope it is in
a good train & will soon be put beyond the reach of fortune.
Our Government ought to know to the minutest detail the
motives which induced the government of France to
adopt this measure, to enable it to do justice to those
motives & bring the affair itself to a happy conclusion.
The extrication of ourselves from a dangerous, perhaps a
disastrous war by the acquisition of an important territory
which gives such vast relief & comfort to some of our
people, is an event which, if the causes which produced
it are well understood, may serve as a monitory
lesson to influence if not prescribe the course to
be pursued in our future controversies with
the European powers, if any should occur.
America certainly has a very distinct relation to Europe,
from what the several powers of the latter bear to each
other which it is equally important for her to
understand and to have understood by the latter.
Of this truth the event referred to is a striking
example, as it is a very satisfactory illustration.
I should weary you if I pursued this subject.
I have touched it to remark that for these and other
obvious reasons I have considered it my duty to
communicate to you every fact belonging to this
transaction with which I was acquainted, that it
might be seen by the President in its true light.
To these I shall at present take the
liberty to add a few observations.
You saw by Mr. Livingston’s & my joint letter which bore
date a day or two before I left Paris about the 11th Ultimo,
that the English Government had no agency in this affair:
that it never had made a question of Louisiana
in its discussions with the Government of France
at any period since the French possessed it.
This information was obtained of Lord Whitworth on
the application of Mr. Livingston on his and my part
at a time when we deemed it important to know what
interest this power had taken in the affair if any.
Lord Whitworth’s answer was, as I understood,
frank and explicit to that effect.
It therefore proves fully that the cession of Louisiana did not
proceed from any interference of great Britain respecting it.
The proof is in other respects positive and conclusive
that it was produced by the measures of our government,
and that the decision to make the cession was intended
to meet them in the spirit in which they were taken.
It is a well established fact that before those
measures were known in France, the First Consul
had manifested no inclination to make the cession.
For some time after they were known his disposition
to retain the territory remained unshaken, though
it was evident that he had become more conciliatory
in his deportment towards our country.
As late as the 10th of March he announced his resolution
not even to discuss the subject in any light until after he had
sent a Minister to the United States & received from him
such information as he deemed necessary for the purpose.
On the 22nd of March he manifested his desire to retain
the country to be as strong as ever, intimated that he had
always considered the possession of it as furnishing him
with the means of giving new proofs of his friendship for
the United States, by which he meant, as is presumed, the
opening of the river to our citizens on more favorable terms
than had yet been enjoyed by them, he absolutely refused
to treat at that time, though he acknowledged his sensibility
to the conduct of the President in the conjuncture which had
produced an extraordinary mission, and declared that he
would receive the Envoy with pleasure & hoped that his
mission would terminate to the satisfaction of both powers.
The decision to make the cession was taken on the 10th of
April after the arrival of that Envoy at Hâvre
(which was on the 8th) was known at Paris,
and with a view to lay the foundation of the
negotiation which was so soon to commence.
For the proof of these facts I refer you to the official
notes of Mr. Talleyrand to Mr. Livingston of the 10th
& 22nd of March, which I presume, are in your
possession, and to such other information as
you have heretofore received of the latter.
The demonstration which they furnish of what I have above
stated is too strong to be resisted by anyone whose mind
is not sealed by prejudice against the clearest result.
Had the disposition of the first Consul to make the cession
been produced by any but the measures of our government
and Country taken together, but more especially by the
firm & dignified yet conciliating conduct of the President,
he would not have postponed the discussion of the subject
till he was apprised of those measures, nor would he after
he knew of them, have delayed the avowal of his disposition
to the period that he did, or have assigned the motive
which he gave in the letter of March 22nd for the delay.
It was impossible, had we possessed the requisite
power, after our negotiation commenced to have
opened any communication with this government
without great hazard to our interest and credit, while
it was impossible to derive any advantage from it.
A proposition to Britain for her agency in the affair
could not have been expected to succeed without
our paying some equivalent for it, which must have
been by making common cause with her in her own
controversy and perhaps also by giving her some portion
of the territory or rights in the navigation of the river.
Had we stipulated either of these considerations
we should most probably have been carried into
the war with her, the result of which is very uncertain.
By making any stipulations in favor of Great Britain
we should have tied up our hands in the degree
from doing anything for ourselves, while
we bound ourselves to her fortunes.
Had we made any overture for such an arrangement,
we hazarded its being made known with a view to her
own interest, to the French Government with whom it
could not fail to have produced an ill effect in regard to ours.
Perfect freedom, to take such part as our interest required,
was the happiest situation in which we could be placed in
the negotiation, and it equally comported with honor and
policy not only to remain so in reality, but to preserve also
the appearance of it, while there was a prospect of success.
Had we erred in the present case our folly & disposition
for intrigue must have been extreme, since from the
commencement there was great probability of success,
which continued to increase till the object was accomplished.
It cannot be doubted that there were a variety of
causes which contributed to produce a change in
the mind of the First Consul relative to Louisiana
and facilitate the cession which I flatter myself
our Government has been fortunate in obtaining.
Among these may be calculated the failure of the expedition
to St. Domingo, the press of the crisis in Europe &c.
These are occasions which it is fair and honorable
for every government to take advantage of &
which none fail to do when those at their head
have discernment enough to see them.
They are such as our distance from Europe and
fortunate situation in other respects will, I hope,
always furnish us when they may be necessary.
I affirm however with perfect confidence in the opinion,
that notwithstanding these favorable circumstances,
we should not have succeeded, had the amicable relations
between America & France been broken, or had the
President taken an attitude of menace towards that power,
or any other than precisely that which he did take.2
Madison wrote this important letter to Livingston and Monroe on 29 July 1803:
Your dispatches including the Treaty and two Conventions
signed with a French Plenipotentiary on the 30th of April
were safely delivered on the 14th by Mr. Hughes,
to whose care you had committed them.
In concurring with the disposition of the French
Government to treat for the whole of Louisiana although
the western part of it was not embraced by your powers,
you were justified by the solid reasons which you give for it;
and I am charged by the President to express to you
his entire approbation of your so doing.
This approbation is in no respect precluded by
the silence of your commission and instructions.
When these were made out, the object
of the most sanguine was limited to the
establishment of the Mississippi as our boundary.
It was not presumed that more could be sought by
the United States either with a chance of success or
perhaps without being suspected of a greedy ambition
than the island of New Orleans and the two Floridas
it being little doubted that the latter was or would be
comprehended in the cession from Spain to France.
To the acquisition of New Orleans and the Floridas
the provision was therefore accommodated.
Nor was it to be supposed that in case the French
government should be willing to part with more than
the territory on our side of the Mississippi an arrangement
with Spain for restoring to her the territory on the other side
would not be preferred to a sale of it to the United States.
It might be added that the ample views of the subject
carried with him by Mr. Monroe, and the confidence
felt that your judicious management would make
the most of favorable occurrences, lessened the
necessity of multiplying provisions for every turn
which your negotiations might possibly take.
The effect of such considerations was diminished
by no information or just presumptions whatever.
The note of Mr. Livingston in particular, stating to the
French Government the idea of ceding the western
country above the Arkansas and communicated to this
Department in his letter of the 24th of January, was not
received here till April 5th more than a month after the
instructions and Commission had been forwarded.
And besides that this project not only left with France
the possession and jurisdiction of one bank of the
Mississippi from its mouth to the Arkansas but a part
of West Florida the whole of East Florida and the harbors
for ships of war in the gulf of Mexico, the letter enclosing
the note, intimated that it had been treated by the
French government with a decided neglect.
In truth the communications in general between
Mr. Livingston and the French government both of
prior and subsequent date manifested a repugnance
to our views of purchase which left no expectation of
any arrangement with France by which an extensive
acquisition was to be made unless in a favorable
crisis of which advantage should be taken.
Such was thought to be the crisis which gave birth to
the extraordinary Commission in which you are joined.
It consisted of the state of things produced by the breach
of our Deposit at New Orleans, the situation of the French
Islands, particularly the important Island of St. Domingo,
the distress of the French finances, the unsettled posture
of Europe, the increasing jealousy between Great Britain
and France, and the known aversion of the former to
see the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of the latter.
These considerations it was hoped might so far open the
eyes of France to her real interest, and her ears to the
monitory truths which were conveyed to her through
different channels, as to reconcile her to the establishment
of the Mississippi as a natural boundary with the
United States; or at least to some concessions
which would justify our patiently waiting for a fuller
accomplishment of our wishes under auspicious events.
The crisis relied on has derived peculiar force from the
rapidity with which the complaints and questions between
France and Great Britain ripened towards a rupture;
and it is just ground for mutual and general felicitation,
that it has issued under your zealous exertions,
in the extensive acquisition beyond the Mississippi.
With respect to the terms on which the acquisition
is made, there can be no doubt that the bargain will
be regarded as on the whole highly advantageous.
The pecuniary stipulations would have been more
satisfactory if they had departed less from the plan
prescribed and particularly if the two millions of dollars
in cash intended to reduce the price or hasten the
delivery of possession had been so applied and the
assumed payments to American claimants placed
on the footing specified in the instructions.
The unexpected weight of the draught now to be made
on the treasury will be sensibly felt by it and may possibly
be inconvenient in relation to other important objects.
The President has issued his proclamation convening
Congress on the 17th of October in order that the exchange
of ratifications may be made within the time limited.
It is obvious that the exchange to be within the time,
must be made here and not at Paris; and we infer
from your letter of 3 that the ratifications of the
Chief Consul are to be transmitted hither with that view.
I only add the wish of the President to know from you
the understanding which prevailed in the negotiation with
respect to the boundaries of Louisiana and particularly
the pretensions and proofs for carrying it to the river
Perdido or for including any lesser portion of West Florida.3
Monroe from London wrote this letter to
Secretary of State Madison on 15 August 1803:
I wrote you lately by Mr. Baring since which nothing
material has occurred here, except that I was called on
yesterday by Sr. Stephen Cotterel & notified that I
should be presented to the King on Wednesday next.
After the presentation I shall give you the result.
The enclosed which I received last night from Paris
by an American gentleman, containing important
information, is therefore transmitted to you.
I intimated to you by Mr. Baring that the power over
the two millions of dollars subjected to our disposition
by the act of Congress & order of the President,
would so far as depended on me, be applied to
a guaranty of the stipulations of the treaty.
This measure is nothing more than a faithful
performance of what was promised in the course of
the negotiation, & throughout the early stages of the
business, or in other words, than a guaranty to the
extent in obedience to powers committed to us
for the purpose of the execution of the treaty itself.
I flatter myself that Mr. Livingston will concur with me
in the object, since I am persuaded that he must see
the importance of it in the present state of affairs.
I shall give you a more correct
view of this business in my next.
I consider the present moment an all-important one
in our history, and that much perhaps everything depends
on what is done by our government in its several branches.
If the treaty is ratified, so that the President is left free
to carry it into effect, the most prompt and decisive
measures appear to me to be necessary on his part.
My advice is that he order the troops down
immediately to take post at New Orleans.
In a mild and friendly manner the Spaniards should see
that he expects they will surrender the territory promptly.
Perhaps they will give it up without delay or equivocation.
If they do not and our government does not
take an imposing attitude, the favorable
moment may pass, & everything be lost.
If the affair is whiled away by negotiation,
France may assume the character of mediation
between us, and a year hence a bargain be
made up by compromise much to our injury.
But if the President pushes the affair with decision &
promptitude, the first consul will find himself bound by
honor & interest to take a part in it which must be in
the present juncture in favor of the United States.
He must interpose so as to compel Spain to
yield & put us in possession of the territory
we have bought of & paid France for.
Should the Spaniards delay, the incident may
probably furnish another occasion for the President
to give a new proof of the energy of his character,
& the happy effects of his administration.
I am persuaded that a tone of decision, should the
occasion require it, would give great effect to the proposed
negotiation with Spain for Florida & the debts, while it made
immediately a very favorable impression with the powers in
this quarter, which would probably increase their respect
for our flag and give additional security to our commerce.
I would not hesitate on the arrival of the troops at
New Orleans, to consider the jurisdiction of Spain as
terminated, to open the port under the authority of the
United States, & exercise all the rights of sovereignty.
By giving them time to remove the troops according
to the treaty, or rather longer if necessary, every
accommodation will be given them that they have
a right to expect, and the interest & character of
the United States at the present moment will permit.4
On 17 August 1803 Monroe was given an
audience with 65-year-old King George III.
In a letter to Secretary of State Madison on August 31 Monroe wrote
about the situation in Britain and some results from the Louisiana cession:
I was presented by Lord Hawkesbury to the King on
Wednesday the 17 instant, who received me with attention.
The audience, according to usage was private,
no other person being present.
I endeavored in a short address which the occasion invites,
is always expected & I believe made, to do justice to the
amicable policy of our Government towards Great Britain.
I informed his Majesty that I was instructed, when I
should have the honor of being presented to him,
to express in strong terms the desire of the President
to maintain the best understanding between the
two Nations, & his intention to cultivate it by a
conduct the most just, fair & honorable on his part.
I adverted to the motives of interest that are felt and
acknowledged in favor of that policy by the United States,
which I observed we presumed & hoped were reciprocal,
and added that I was happy to be the organ of sentiments
which it would be the object of my conduct to exemplify.
His Majesty replied that nothing was more reasonable than
what I had said: that since our revolution he had taken
an interest in our welfare & wished our prosperity:
that the motives to a sincere & constant friendship were
many & strong such as having the same origin, speaking
the same language, great commercial intercourse &c.
The sequel of his conversation which was generally on
American Affairs was in the same spirit of conciliation.
The reception appeared to be intended as a favorable one,
& I did not fail to show that I was not insensible of it.
As soon as an opportunity offered,
I presented him my letter of credence & retired.
In the early part of the day I had some conversation
with Lord Hawkesbury on the subject of our late treaty
with France, which he asked me what were the limits
of Louisiana. I spoke of its western and southern limits as
being undefined, otherwise than as bounding on Mexico,
but observed that we were of opinion that it extended
eastward to the River Perdido, or to the ancient limit
of East Florida, & comprised of course West Florida.
He seemed to be struck with the remark, but not in a
manner to excite a belief that he wished it to be
otherwise, for he immediately added that
East Florida would soon become ours also.
I told him we hoped & expected that it would.
I thought it proper to express Myself frankly to him
on this subject, since a Knowledge of our views might
dispose this government not to interfere with them: though
indeed I have no reason to suppose that it contemplates
any measure in that quarter having such a tendency.
I do not think that Great Britain is desirous of adding to
her possessions on the American continent: I am satisfied
she will not attempt it at the expense of a collision with us.
The aggrandizement of France there was
calculated to excite her jealousy from many
considerations which are not applicable to us.
On that account our acquisition of Louisiana
must have been satisfactory to her.
It is probable however that she had fostered the
expectation that it would not have been so easily
acquired but have become in the pursuit a cause of
serious contestation with France from which she might
have derived some advantage in the present juncture.
If such a hope was entertained, its disappointment
may have drawn after it some degree of Mortification,
though none of resentment towards us,
since we gave her no cause for it.
Our government pursued its object with our
own means in an open, direct & manly manner
with the power interested, & succeeded.
It made to Great Britain no deceptive overtures,
no false professions & has therefore nothing
wherewith to reproach itself in the transaction
nor can she reproach it with anything.
Under such circumstances her government must in candor
admit the delicate propriety of our conduct towards her
while I am persuaded it finds in the result a sufficient Motive
to applaud the Wisdom of the Measures which produced it.
In consequence of a late application from Mr. Marbois.
I have executed an act of guarantee in favor of Hope & Co.
for 10 Millions of livres, on which if Mr. Livingston joins in it,
the French Government will be able to command
that sum of that Company on account of the stock
to be created under our treaty with France.
It was understood in the commencement of the
Negotiation by Mr. Marbois, and in every subsequent stage,
that I would (so far as depended on me) give such a
guarantee if it should be desired by his government,
which idea was again suggested on the 7 of June
as you were apprized in my letter of 8 June.
It was therefore impossible for me to refuse it on the late
application, especially as I could see no objection to it, of
such weight as to counterbalance the arguments in its favor.
I consider the measure, if carried into effect in the
manner proposed, as making perfectly secure the
Cession of Louisiana to the United States.
This Government cannot object to it on
principle if it was disposed so to do.
But I cannot conceive that it is so disposed.
The strong manner in which it expressed its approbation
of the cession to Mr. King in reference to Great Britain
proves the contrary, & it is fair to infer that it must also
approve whatever is done within the scope of the treaty
to confirm & secure its execution on the part of France.
By Mr. Livingston’s letter to me it appears that he has
shown a disposition to throw the whole responsibility
of this act on me, from which I am not inclined to
shrink so far as it is properly attributable to me;
though in my answer I took occasion to intimate
that I did not fully accede to his doctrine.
I have transmitted to him the instrument with
my signature which if executed by him will
be effectual to the object intended by it.
Had it not been for the incident communicated in
our joint letter of June 7th this measure would most
probably have been avoided, for had there not been
a new motive the intervention of the war would
have furnished an excuse for declining it.
That incident showed clearly to Mr. L. & myself that
the object was insecure, & that any of the ordinary
casualties to which public events, indeed all human affairs,
are subject might jeopardize an interest of the first
importance to our Country, on which so much anxiety
had been felt, so much exertion bestowed: at a time
too when it was thought to be completely attained.
I own I felt strongly the force of that danger & was desirous
to avert it, at the hazard of any responsibility to myself;
for it is to be observed that this act is not the act of our
government which is of course not responsible for it;
but strictly my own unless Mr. Livingston
is willing to participate in it.
If the treaty is not ratified in time that casualty will
be guarded against, if it is the French Government will
command on rather better terms than it might otherwise do,
a small portion of the consideration given for the territory,
a month or two sooner than it would in the ordinary Course.
In neither case will it cost the United States a single cent.
It is only in the event of a total rejection of the treaty &
the failure for the present of all amicable compromise that
the guarantee can become a charge to the United States.
Even in that case, which I deem quite an improbable one,
it is to be presumed that the lien which such a payment
would give us on the territory, by excluding the
pretensions of other powers & weakening those
of France would be worth what it costs us.
On a full view of all the circumstances
I think the measure a sound one.
Be that however as it may I have adopted it under
the calm influence of my judgement, with the best
intentions to the interest of my country & am
perfectly willing to take the responsibility of it.
In a permanent view I consider this event of vast
importance to great Britain since it may open to her
manufactures & shipping at our own expense all the
ports of the Mississippi: Since it removes France from a
command of the Gulf of Mexico & perhaps of all the adjacent
islands, she ought therefore & I presume does in that view
rejoice at this event & at whatever gives stability to it.
If this affair is happily concluded, it will I trust go far
to terminate our political connections with Europe
by placing us beyond the reach of her powers.
It secures to us everything which is essential
to the sovereignty of our Country to the peace,
prosperity & happiness of our people.
We shall I think cease to be from that moment in a great
measure the object of intrigue or solicitude to any of them.
The accommodation shown us by France by that event on
a calm appeal to the interest & wisdom of her councils,
under the guidance of a chief who is certainly not
wanting in political firmness, is a strong proof of
the idea entertained by that nation of the
growing importance of the United States.
It is to be hoped & presumed that other powers
will profit by the example & leave us to the undisturbed
enjoyment of those blessings which we so highly merit.
The period therefore may not be remote when our
pacific system will be placed on a solid and secure basis;
when that strict & impartial justice & respect for
their rights which we observe in our intercourse with
other nations will be reciprocated to us by them all.
This happy state of things is certainly within the reach of the
United States, & I trust that they will not fail to Attain it.5
On 21 October 1803 President Thomas Jefferson
sent this special message to the Congress:
In my communication to you of the 17th
instant I informed you that conventions had
been entered into with the Government of France
for the cession of Louisiana to the United States.
These with the advice and consent of the Senate,
having now been ratified and my ratification
exchanged for that of the First Consul of France
in due form, they are communicated to you
for consideration in your legislative capacity.
You will observe that some important conditions cannot
be carried into execution but with the aid of the Legislature,
and that time presses a decision on them without delay.
The ulterior provisions also suggested in the same
communication for the occupation and government
of the country will call for early attention.
Such information relative to its government as time and
distance have permitted me to obtain will be ready to
be laid before you within a few days; but as permanent
arrangements for this object may require time and
deliberation, it is for your consideration whether you
will not forthwith make such temporary provisions
for the preservation in the meanwhile of order and
tranquility in the country as the case may require.6
The next day the Republicans in the House of Representatives
approved a resolution to put the treaties into effect.
President Jefferson sent General John Armstrong to replace Livingston,
and on November 8 those two agreed with Monroe
on terms to send to the Foreign Minister Talleyrand.
Monroe wrote this letter to the Secretary of State Madison on 16 November 1803:
Within a few days past I have received your letters of the
29 of July, the first addressed to Mr. Livingston & myself,
the second to me singly, with separate letters to him & Mr.
Pinckney, & also your letter to me of the 29 of September.
These are the only communications that I have
received from you since my arrival in this country.
The letters to Mr. Livingston & Mr. Pinckney
shall be immediately forwarded to them.
Your last letter to me I have deciphered;
the first is not yet finished.
Being yet alone, Mr. Purviance not having joined me,
and other business pressing me, will probably put it
out of my power to do it before this is forwarded,
though I perceive by the last letter that it is not
very material at this moment, since its contents
are applicable to our interests in another quarter.
I see very clearly the propriety of the injunction
not to proceed to Spain till I receive the
further order of the President so to do.
I could not pursue the object depending with that
power with advantage till the affair with France
is completely adjusted, & the assurance of her
government given to support the negotiation.
There seems also to be a propriety in my
remaining here steadily some months longer
to give this government a suitable impression
of the just views & correct policy of our own.
If I pass over to the continent at this time or shortly,
it might excite suspicions here, which could not be
advantageous to us with this government, whose
situation makes it alive to every incident of the kind.
It is also possible that circumstances may occur after
our treaty with France is known to invite explanations on
topics connected with it that may be necessary and useful.
I flatter myself that by the Spring our affairs will stand with
both these powers, on that amicable footing, that each will
cheerfully instruct its minister at Madrid to give what aid
he can in support of our pretentions with the court of Spain.
The interval will enable you to decide with greater
satisfaction whether, and when I ought to proceed there
and what ought to be the precise objects and conditions
of any treaty which might be formed with that power.
Since my last I have conferred with Mr. Addington
& Mr. Yorke generally on the subject of our relations
with this country, on which occasions I have endeavored
to impress them with just sentiments of the amicable
policy of our government towards Great Britain.
I have gone into no particulars, such as the conditions
on which our treaty ought to be renewed, whether it is
considered as expiring with reference to the preliminary
or definitive articles of the late treaty of peace,
or indeed any other precise object of the kind.
I expressed the desire of our government to be,
to preserve by a fair & impartial conduct towards this
& other powers, perpetual peace & amity with this nation.
I assured them that that relation would never be disturbed
by any improper act on our part; & while I acknowledged
in suitable terms the general conduct of his Majesty’s
government towards the United States as being amicable
& satisfactory, I took occasion to intimate that some
outrages had been committed by the impressment of
our seamen, which I was persuaded the government
would see the propriety of enquiring into, & would
give such orders as would prevent the repetition of.
Those gentlemen assured me that their government
was disposed to do everything in its power to
satisfy our just claims in that & every other respect.
I am assured through another channel that orders
have been issued from the Admiralty in conformity
with the sentiments which they thus expressed.
You will observe by the papers which accompany this
that it is reported here that a negotiation is depending
between the United States & Great Britain for the
renewal of the treaty of commerce of 1794 which is
represented to be conducted in a high tone on my part.
This report has produced much sensation in the commercial
world and furnishes proof that any collision with us would
be deemed a real misfortune to the nation at this epoch.
I have taken no notice of it otherwise than by remarking
that nothing had ever passed between this government
and myself, that was not on both sides, of the most
friendly & conciliating nature; and that I was persuaded
nothing would occur to disturb the harmony & good
understanding subsisting between the two powers.7
James Monroe on November 25 made a much longer report to Madison.
On December 13 Madison wrote this letter to Monroe:
You must be already acquainted with many of the
circumstances respecting the purchase made in France
by General Ira Allen of a quantity of Arms and field
pieces which on their passage to the United States
were captured towards the close of the year
1796 by the British Ship of War Audacious.
General Allen having requested a recommendation
of his interest to your patronage, I the more readily
give it, as according to the proofs he has produced,
the interruption of his voyage was not confined in
its effects to his private concerns, but operated to
deprive the Militia of Vermont of a supply of the
articles which formed the object of his Speculation.
In the enclosed statement and remarks he has
entered so fully into the details of the transaction
and the reflections arising out of it, that on comparing
them with the information which Mr. Erving may
obtain for you from the proctor who has the
management of the business, you will be enabled to
appreciate its merits and ascertain its present state.
The letter from the Department of State to Mr. King of
which a copy is herewith enclosed must have long ago
satisfied the British Government that the arms and
Artillery were really intended for the militia of Vermont
and not for any hostile purpose against their Dominions.
How justice has happened to be so long delayed, whether
from the tardiness of the Courts or any laches imputable
to the claimant is to be ascertained best at London;
but if the latter has not been in fault, the delay which has
taken place amounts almost to a refusal of justice and in
its effect may produce consequences equally injurious, as
Messrs. Bird, Savage and Bird who were bail on the return
of the arms to General Allen, and to whom he therefore
mortgaged and was compelled to deliver them as a counter
security, have lately failed after having sold them.8
On December 14 or 15 Monroe sent this report to Secretary Madison:
I have just received your circular letter of October 22nd
with a copy of the President’s message to the
Congress at the commencement of the session.
It is with the highest satisfaction I learn, that the treaty
and conventions with France are ratified by the President
with the advice of the Senate; that the ratifications
are exchanged; and that the ceded territory will be
taken possession of immediately by our troops.
These events are of incalculable advantage to
our country, as they secure to us the great
object on which its happiness is so dependent.
By taking possession of the territory the business
may be considered as essentially concluded.
It is impossible that we should ever
be disturbed in the enjoyment of it.
Spain will never be able to molest us,
if she should have the inclination: nor can any
other power be so disposed, if it had the ability.
The promptitude and decision with which the object
is pursued, will I am persuaded reflect much honor
on our councils, while it produces the happiest
effect in our concerns with every European power.
Had the President hesitated to take possession
of the country, other powers might have been
prompted thereby to intermeddle in the affair.
Good offices might have been offered us by
some to pursue the object; while she might
have been encouraged by others to oppose us in it.
But by taking immediate possession, all political calculation
or speculation respecting either party is at an end.
We want no aid of any power to secure us in it, and
certainly none will be offered her to turn us out of it.
Our title under our treaty with France is as good to
Louisiana, as it is under our revolution and charters to any
portion of the Old States, and I would as soon submit to
negotiation a question relative to the one as the other.
The President’s message to Congress
Has, I think, produced a good effect here.
It has been published in all the papers and
criticized in one only, which is enclosed.
A principal ground of objection in that is, the application
of the term “enlightened” to the government of France,
which the writer tortures into the expression of an Opinion
on the merits of the controversy between these powers.
The sentiment has not been adopted by any other editor,
nor have I heard it expressed in conversation.
All impartial persons seem aware that the phrase is
applicable only to the great transaction between the
two countries, to which it specially refers, and though
a handsome, was nevertheless a fair and candid
comment on the motives which governed the
councils of France in the part she acted in it.
The Strong manner in which it announces a resolution
to observe an impartial neutrality in the present war
and to cultivate the friendship of the parties to it by fair
and honorable means, appears to give satisfaction to all.
I have lately presented a note to this government on the
impressment of our seamen, of which I send you a copy.
It is founded as you will see on a report of Mr. Erving,
which being drawn on due consideration, and appearing
well adapted to the object, I did not enlarge on it.
I expect soon to get a satisfactory answer to it;
though as it goes to an object in detail of great
importance to them, especially at this moment,
it is natural to infer that it will be referred to the Admiralty
and be a subject of much deliberation in their councils.
In conversations with the Ministers, which were frequent
before the note was presented, I had assurances that
any communications I might find necessary to make
them on the subject would be duly attended to.
I thought it better to present a note than to rely on
informal conversations alone, since although by the
latter mode occasional accommodations in special
cases may be obtained, yet by the former only can any
useful principles or regulations be established for the
common interest and harmony of the two countries.
You will, I am persuaded, find by the communication, that
although our rights and views are sufficiently explained and
vindicated, yet no specific point is positively insisted on.
If this government accedes to what we have a just right to
claim, its conduct will be the more deserving of our esteem,
since by the mode of application it will be the more
voluntary than under a stronger pressure.
By the mode nothing is conceded on our part, so that
I have it in my power to take the course which you
shall instruct on a view of all the circumstances which
merit attention in the present juncture of affairs.
Whether Russia or any other power will take
part in the war seems to be quite uncertain.
Great reliance has been placed on Russia here of late,
but not on ground sufficiently satisfactory that I have seen;
though it is possible that others may
be better informed on that head.
All the powers on the continent, especially those in the
neighborhood of France, were so exhausted by the late war,
that I am persuaded they will not embark in it, unless
some very favorable occasion should invite them,
or urgency in other respects make it inevitable.
Much may depend on the issue of the projected invasion,
whether it succeeds, fails, or is declined: and as much
must depend also in either case on the circumstances
attending it, it would be vain to hazard any
conjecture on events so contingent.
I see no symptom which indicates any immediate change
being likely to take place in the Ministry; nor is there
anything more doubtful, than of what characters
it would be composed should one take place.
The respective parties, at whose head are
Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, have opposite views.
The first seems to be friendly to a vigorous prosecution
of the war and a support of the high prerogatives
of the crown; the second to peace and a reform.
The ministry seems to have compromised itself with
neither as yet, while by pursuing the war it has the
support in a certain degree, of the first, and by its
moderation and amiable deportment, in a certain
degree also, of the other; so that any conjectures
on this point would likewise be equally vague.
I am happy to observe that I see no reason to suppose
that there would be any alteration in the conduct of
this government towards us under any change
which might possibly take place in the Ministry.9
On 17 December 1803 Monroe wrote an even longer letter to Madison about
the Louisiana deal with France that he and Livingston were handling.
He began by noting that Spain was opposing the American treaty with France.
On December 26 Madison sent these private instructions to Monroe:
I have received I believe all your letters public
and private down to that of October 22, written
merely to say that all continued well.
I have taken due care of the communications
on the subject of your ___(debts?)___.
Everything seems to be well understood
on this side the water.
I cannot say more now as I write
of necessity without cypher.
Mr. Merry has been with us some time.
He appears to be an amiable man in private Society,
and a candid and agreeable one in public business.
A foolish circumstance of etiquette has created some
sensibility in Mrs. Merry and perhaps himself; but they
will find so uniform & sincere a disposition in all connected
with the Government to cultivate a cordial society
with them, and to manifest every proper respect
for their characters and station, that if any unfavorable
impression has happened, it must be very transient.
It would be unfortunate if it were otherwise, because
a dissatisfaction of whatever sort, or however produced,
might mingle itself with his general feelings and
through them with the agency committed to him.
We have had several conversations both incidental &
formal on the topics most interesting to the two Countries.
I have taken pains to make him sensible of the
tendency of certain proceedings on the British side,
and of their injustice as well as impolicy.
I communicated to him a few days ago, the intention of the
President to explain our views fully to you on these topics,
and to authorize you to negotiate such conventional
eclaircissements and arrangements, as may put an
end to every danger to which the harmony
between the two countries is now subjected.
His ideas appeared to be moderate,
& his dispositions conciliating.
As he will doubtless communicate to his Government
what passed between us, I think it proper, in order to
place you on a level of information, to observe briefly,
that the plan will be to get rid of impressments altogether
on the high seas, to define blockades & contraband
according to the last Treaty between Great Britain & Russia,
to regulate visits & searches of our vessels, according to
the Treaty of 1786 between Great Britain and France,
to put aside the doctrine, that a Colonial trade, not
allowed in time of peace, is unlawful in time of war;
and in return to agree to a mutual surrender of deserters
from ships and from garrisons, and to a legislative
provision against exporting articles enumerated as
contraband to places within the jurisdiction of an enemy.
This will be the outline, excepting a few minor propositions.
The subject is now before the Cabinet, and it will not
be long before it will be forwarded to you in its details.
It is much to be desired that something may be done
to consolidate the good understanding between the two
nations, and I really believe that there is nothing aimed
at by us that is not for the true interest of both parties.
I am not without hopes that Mr. Merry sees the business
in a good degree in the same light, and that his
representations will co-operate with your reasonings on it.
I am glad to learn that in Europe violations
of our maritime rights are so much mitigated
in comparison with the former war.
It is a good omen.
In the American seas however the scene is
very different, and I fear is growing worse & worse.
Impressments and other outrages on our flag are
multiplying, and the depredations under pretext
of blockades, are going on in rivalry with
all the extravagances of the last war.
I will send herewith if I can, certain documents, both
as to impressments and blockades which will explain
the justice of these remarks, and satisfy you, as they
ought to do, the British Government that the friendship
& patience of this Country are put to a severe trial.
A Bill has been brought into Congress
with a view to some remedy.
It proposes to forbid the use of our pilots, our ports,
and our supplies & hospitalities to any Ship of war
which shall be proved & proclaimed to have impressed
or otherwise insulted those on board our vessels.
Whether it will be pursued into a law is uncertain; but if it
should not the forbearance will proceed merely from a hope
that a remedy to the evil is contemplated by negotiation.
The public mind is rising to a state of high sensibility,
and no other consideration than such a hope would,
I am persuaded, suspend the effect
of it on the Legislative Councils.
It is to be wished that the introduction of
the Bill may not be misconstrued into any
unfriendly disposition towards Great Britain.
I have every reason to believe that the supposed
necessity of it is deeply regretted, and that a just
accommodation of all differences with Great Britain
will give the most sincere and general satisfaction.
Louisiana was delivered by the Spanish Authorities
at New Orleans to Laussat on the 30th of November.
Our Commissioners Claibourne & Wilkinson with
their troops were at Fort Adams on their way
to receive the transfer to the United States.
All difficulties are therefore at an end in that quarter.
Nothing appears to have passed in relation to
West Florida or the boundaries in general.
It is understood that Spain does not include
any territory East of the Mississippi except the
Island of New Orleans in the idea of Louisiana.
It will be an easy matter to take
possession according to our idea.
The mode alone can beget a question.10
Madison wrote a long letter of instructions to Monroe on January 19.
Monroe would not get letters from America for several weeks.
He wrote a long letter to Madison on January 9 and another letter on the 12th.
Monroe then wrote to Livingston on the 13th.
Monroe sent a letter on these issues on January 22 to Virginia’s
US Senator Wilson Cary Nicholas, and he wrote to Barbé Marbois on February 14.
On that day Monroe wrote to Madison and Livingston again.
On February 26 Monroe wrote letters to seven different people.
Also on that day Madison wrote this private letter to Monroe:
I have received several letters of late from some
of our friends, who complain of the arrangement or
rather provision made in the treaties with France
for American creditors, to whom they intimate an
attention was paid which may embarrass our treasury.
It is presumable that we might have placed them on
any reasonably satisfactory ground that we would
have proposed; but as the payment of no part of their
claims was to take place till the treaties were ratified
& the territory surrendered, I thought, it would be
better to agree that they might be paid as their claims
were liquidated, to an amount not exceeding 20 millions,
the sum France was willing to appropriate to that
object & which we thought would be adequate.
It was to be presumed that it would be satisfactory to the
French government, to know that they were paid, & highly
so to the parties and their connections in the United States.
With regard to the price given for the territory,
I have no reason to think that an agreement to pay
the 2 millions of dollars in cash would have lessened it.
My impression was otherwise, though had I been the sole
agent I might have pressed that point more frequently.
Had I had any reason to suppose that the sum might
have been lessened I should still have done so.
We had not much time; the object was all important,
and I hoped as the debt to France was to be funded,
that the payment to our citizens could be
made without embarrassing the treasury.
Having occasion to write John Randolph the other day about
his nephew, I expressed sentiments to this effect to him;
& in reply to others I propose writing a few letters which
will be committed to a gentlemen for New York who will
go thence to the federal city in the same spirit.
It were to be regretted if improper ideas should
be entertained on these points or any of them.
I shall enclose those letters to you open with
power to deliver or retain them as you find proper.
Of the letter to Mr. Randolph I have no copy.
I wrote in some hurry, though I believe,
with sufficient caution.
I have written to no other person, & perhaps you
had better see that to him, which he will show you.
The letters will be sent in the course of a week.11
On 3 March 1804 Monroe wrote this private letter to Madison:
I wrote you on the 26th a private letter which was
sent with my public one of the day before by Liverpool,
respecting some objections which had been made to me
by some friends to the arrangement about our citizens’
creditors of France in the late treaties with that power.
I promised you in that letter one to some friends,
open to be delivered or withheld as you thought fit,
explanatory of the points to which those objections
applied, which is accordingly here enclosed.
It is addressed to Wilson Nicholas alone,
as if delivered it will answer all the purposes
to be desired by such a communication.
The objections did not come from him,
which however is not material.
I could not but disapprove of Mr. Livingston’s conduct in
communicating with Mr. Marbois on a subject committed
to us jointly, after I arrived at Paris, especially as
Mr. Marbois’s agency was then only in contemplation,
referred to or rather grew out of a decision taken after
my arrival at Havre was known, to cede the territory,
which decision was actually produced by my arrival;
and the more so as I was at his house when Mr. Marbois
called on him, when if an interview: at that time was
at all proper, under the then circumstances, it would have
been as easy to have arranged a joint as a separate one.
To Mr. Marbois it was equally agreeable as was evident
by his entering into conversation with me with the same
freedom immediately afterwards at Mr. Talleyrand’s,
as you were informed in my official letter of that period.
Still I had no reason to think, but was on the contrary
strongly impressed with the opposite opinion, that any
application that we could have made of the two millions
of dollars would have lessened the total amount.
In my correspondence with him respecting the guaranty,
I told him that, had I been the sole agent, I should most
certainly have provided for an advance of that sum to
France for the reasons stated in one of my letters: and I find
intimated that he was not so anxious for that advance as
myself, which was true: but yet it was not my intention to
imply that such advance would have diminished the sum.
I presume his desire was to apply it to the creditors,
indeed I am convinced of it; from a fear that if the
advance was made to France, the payment
of their claims must have been postponed.
The affair ended as I should probably have
placed it had I been sole agent by securing
by guaranty the advance of that amount by
the bankers on the credit of the stock sold them.
A principal motive for the private interview above
referred to, I always supposed was a desire to give
to the transaction the fallacious appearance which was
afterwards attempted in the United States & elsewhere.
So much I have thought proper to state on this subject;
in questions of character the most liberal
constructions should be given to the acts
of those in the service of the government.
If the enclosed letter is delivered be so good as instruct
Mr. Nicholas to show it to his colleague, to Mr. Breckenridge
& Brown if with the latter he is on a good footing & no other
objection occurs, to Mr. Macon, Nicholson, John Randolph
& Mr. Dawson; he will mention that it is shown at my
request with that kind of confidence which is proper.
He will also show it to Major Butler & Col. Taylor
when he sees him; and to the Senators of Maryland,
Georgia & whom you & he think proper, observing
again that the whole is under your control.
On the subject of Etiquette I will add something.
The opposition of Mr. M. to what is understood to
have been the arrangement of the President,
was severely censured & ridiculed by Cobbet,
the other papers inserted paragraphs from the
federal prints in the United States without a comment.
In conversation with indifferent people it was invariably
admitted, that if a question was made, the government
& heads of departments were always superior at home.
Those in place here never spoke to me on the subject
& would I have no doubt have acquiesced in any
general arrangement that might have been made on it:
though disappointed as they were at our
adjustment with France &c, I am inclined to
think it was a circumstance which vexed them.
The accommodation which is now reported has
Excited more surprise, as it was not expected;
but I do not know that it will lessen us anywhere.
It is a proof of moderation and respect for other
powers, which they are not disposed to show.
There is a ground on which it may be placed
that the government, being at home shows
attention like every well bred host to strangers.
On my own part I have no reason to be satisfied, with the
station we appear to have held & now hold here in that
respect, that is in case a question is to be made of the kind.
We have no fixed place, and precedence seems to be
given to the most subaltern powers, even Portugal,
to Naples, Sardinia, &ca, powers which have not
one hundredth part the political weight in the affairs
of the world that we enjoy, even at this court.
The ministers here expect visits from but never
return them to foreign ministers as I am told,
at least only one of them has to me, Mr. Yorke.
Neither Lord nor Lady Hawkesbury have
returned Mrs. Monroe or my own visits.
We accepted their invitation to dinner and repeated
the visit to Lady Hawkesbury lest the first should
have been misunderstood, but without effect.
Since that we have been again invited
to dinner but declined accepting it.
Mrs. Monroe has been very sick lately but is now better.
We intend, as soon as she recovers, to invite them
to a dinner, & if they come, endeavor through
some suitable channel to obtain an explanation.
My object has been to excite no discussion or question
on such a subject if to be avoided without real degradation.
I know that we shall pass by them soon, and it is little
worth our while to discuss such light topics, especially
to give them importance at the present time.
Sometimes remarks are made respecting our country,
and in one or two instances in my hearing
which were very disgusting to me.
The Queen, at the time the Etiquette story was in
circulation, I thought passed me in the crowd intentionally.
It might not be so, as her drawing room is without order,
a confused multitude, & those are sooner dispatched
who have most strength of body & nerves, and as
she is old and might see or seeing, not know me.
In all cases of the kind I have commanded myself,
being resolved to make them subordinate to great objects,
or if ever noticed to do it on a suitable occasion.
In profession the King, the old Lady & the ministers have
not been wanting, so that if anything of the opposite kind
has been intended, I know it was the impulse of ancient
feelings excited at present by light causes in which
I had no part; for I was never so exact in attention
to these things or careful in the whole of my conduct,
as I have been here, and not the part of a system.
Relative to presentments at court I could
wish to have some instruction: perhaps
a general instruction might be proper.
It appears to me it ought to be confined to those who have
held or actually hold certain offices under our government.
I found on my arrival here that there was no rule,
& that the practice was to present every one of
good appearance & decent society who would
incur the heavy expense of a court suit.
Hence I have been troubled on that subject.
I expect to commit this to Mr. Gore who sails in a day or two
for Boston the commission having concluded its business.
If he stays longer, I will write you again
especially if anything material occurs.12
Secretary of State James Madison sent another letter on 9 January 1804 to Monroe
that he received on March 5 with much information on the political situation in Europe.
Since my last of February 14th
I have received yours of November 16.
The accounts of some jar between you and the British
administration, republished from the English newspapers
had begun to excite here considerable attention, and
comments of different kinds from different quarters.
As we knew that neither your disposition, nor
instructions could lead to any unfriendly or unnecessary
discussions on the points said to have produced them;
our conjectures did not go beyond the possibility that
some such discussions might have incidentally grown
out of your efforts for putting an end to the impressment
of seamen and other maritime irregularities.
It is however remarkable that statements having
no basis whatever should have first appeared in
papers considered as Ministerial vehicles, and that
they should have been so long kept afloat as to
create inquietude in the world of business.
It appears by letters from Commodore Preble to the
Navy Department that he had proclaimed the port of
Tripoli to be in a state of blockade, on the grounds
and in the form of British proclamations, used in
cases where no effective blockade had taken place.
That this measure may not be cited against the principle of
blockades maintained by the United States, it is proper you
should know that no instruction was given to the American
Commander to that effect, and that the instructions since
transmitted him will set and keep him right on that subject.
From a letter lately received by this Department from
Mr. Jarvis, our Consul at Lisbon, it appears that he has
fallen into an error on another subject which might tend
to mislead the British Government in their estimate of
our principles and policy with respect to their claim
of seamen serving in vessels of the United States.
In a spirit of liberality he signified to a British Naval
Commander at Lisbon that in order to prevent a resort
to impressment by British Commanders, he was willing,
on proper application to deliver seamen from American
vessels, who should appear to be British subjects.
You too well know the principles maintained by the
United States on this subject to be at a loss in repelling any
inference that may be drawn from this circumstance, or
from any others, in favor of a claim which can be reconciled
neither with our national rights, nor the honor of our flag.
In a late Conversation with the Marquis D’Yrujo,
it was hinted to him that the use of Spanish ports in
the West Indies, particularly Cuba, were allowed to
French cruisers capturing American vessels, and that
I should soon be under the necessity of claiming his
interposition in cases where vessels had been actually
sanctioned and sold as prizes within Spanish jurisdiction.
He answered that the vessels in question were probably
taken in a trade with the negroes of St Domingo;
that this trade by supplying such a description of
people with arms &c was dangerous to all the
West India Colonies, and that from the proximity
and exposure of those of Spain in particular, she
would be justified in contributing to put an end to it.
My reply was that the commerce between the United States
and a French Island was to be regulated between France
and the United States, and that Spain would be responsible
to the latter for whatever proceedings might take place
under her authority, contrary to the law of Nations
and not permitted by Treaty.
This is the substance of what passed in
a desultory discourse of some length.
The day following I received his letter of the 23rd of
February of which a copy is enclosed, and to which
the answer was given of which a copy is also enclosed.
As not only France but Great Britain are implicated in the
Extraordinary language held by the Spanish Minister, it has
been thought proper to make a frank communication of this
correspondence not only to Mr. Pichon but to Mr. Merry, and
it is still more proper that it should be understood by you.
The Communication of it to the British Government will
not only be a proof of our candor and confidence
towards it, but will afford an occasion for collecting
with more precision its relations to Spain as well as
its dispositions towards the United States.
From the complexion of the Marquis’s letter it would
seem that all the great powers having Colonies in America,
not excepting Great Britain, were in concert to invite
or to force the United States into a co-operation
against the negroes of St Domingo.
The presumptions against such a concert
are sufficiently obvious.
But it is in every view desirable that the matter
should be thoroughly understood by the United States.
This occurrence, with other considerations incident
to the mutual posture of Spain and the United States
to each other, as well as to the general state of things
in Europe, incline the President to think the present
moment not adapted to the experiment which is
the object of your proposed mission to Madrid.
You will therefore keep your arrangements for
it in suspense without forgetting that more
favorable appearances may quickly produce
instructions for your repairing thither.
The Treaty of 1794 so far as it relates to commerce
having expired on the 1st day of October last,
(that being the date of the preliminary articles)
the commercial intercourse between the two
Countries is left to the regulations which the
parties separately may think fit to establish.
It may be expected however that the friendship and
mutual interest between them will produce a continuance
on both sides of such regulations as are just and equal,
and an accommodation to these principles of such
as on either side are otherwise than just and equal.
On the side of the United States their Commercial
regulations place Great Britain in every respect
on the footing of the most favored nation.
Great Britain cannot say as much with respect to hers.
One instance at least is explained in a letter from this
Department to Mr. King, of which a copy is enclosed,
in which you will see that although the act of Parliament
to which it refers, be no longer a breach of Stipulation,
it is not less a violation of equality than it is of sound policy.
With respect to the British West Indies, it is not known
that the United States are on a worse footing than
other nations, whatever want of reciprocity there
may be to the liberal regulations of the United States.
With respect to the East India Trade, it is understood that
the Treaty of 1794 by denying to American vessels both
the coasting branch of it and a direct intercourse between
India and foreign Countries other than America, the
United States were in both instances placed on a
worse footing than other nations, and even on a worse
footing than they themselves enjoyed prior to the Treaty.
The expiration of the Treaty, and the friendly and
favorable equality allowed by the United States to
Great Britain in every branch of their trade ought
certainly to restore what the Treaty suspended.
These observations are made not with a view to any
negotiations whatever leading at the present moment
to a Treaty on those or any other Commercial points,
or to discussions which might be misconstrued into a
wish to take unreasonable advantage of a critical moment,
but to enable you to present the ideas of your Government
with more precision, to vindicate our commercial policy
against misconceptions, and to avail yourself the better
of fit occasions for obtaining from the British Government
such relaxations, as may be due to our example,
and be calculated to cherish amity and useful
intercourse between the two nations.
In my letter of 7 I stated the reasonableness
of admitting American Consuls in the dependencies
of Great Britain whenever and wherever the
American commerce should be admitted.
The principle urged in this case is applicable
to the East as well as to the West Indies.
During the last war an American Agent was
informally at least allowed to reside at Calcutta,
and take care of the trade of his countrymen.
Mr. Jacob Lewis who was appointed to succeed him,
proceeded to London on his way thither, but peace having
intervened, his application for an Exequatur was refused.
It is of real importance to our trade with that Country
that such a functionary should be permitted to reside in it,
the more so, if it be true that the rule forbidding
foreign factors to do so, be enforced there.
Be so good as to sound the British Government
on this subject and communicate its sentiments,
for the information of the President.
March 9th: I now add the sequel of the correspondence
with the Marquis D’Yrujo on the trade to St. Domingo.
You will observe that he disavows all pretension
to speak the intentions of the great powers
of Europe holding West India Colonies.
It is hence less necessary to make to the French
and British Ministers here the formal
communication which I had proposed.
I have already however disclosed the matter to
Mr. Pichon and shall take occasion to do so to Mr. Merry;
and it is left with your discretion to make any or no use
of it with the British Government as you may think fit.
The interposition of D’Yrujo against the trade to
St. Domingo has led Pichon to the same step, as you will
find by his letter of this date of which a copy is enclosed.
Although he highly disapproved of D’Yrujo’s
correspondence, particularly as it insinuated the views
of other Governments he thought the occasion called
on him to assert the policy and expectation of his own,
as far as he was possessed of them.
To show you the ground taken by the President,
and to which the answer to Pichon will be accommodated,
I enclose an extract from late instructions
given to Mr. Livingston on this subject.
The late Act of Congress for collecting the revenue
in Louisiana authorized the President to erect a district
comprehending the river and Bay of Mobile with their
shores, when he should deem it expedient.
As the other district was created by the law itself, while
this was provisionally committed to the President,
the distinction was thought a sufficient reference to
the presumed objections of Spain to our claim to
the territory between the Iberville and the Perdido,
which has not been delivered to France and
consequently not to the United States.
D’Yrujo has remonstrated against the act both
verbally and on paper in a style so insolent
as to produce a painful dilemma.
I leave for future communication what it may
be useful for you to know concerning the matter.13
After receiving the President’s letter sent on January 8,
Monroe wrote back to his friend Jefferson on 15 March 1804,
From the view I am able to take of the subject
I am of opinion that my appointment to Louisiana
will be incompatible with the duties I am to
perform in this quarter.
To conclude a treaty with this government, or to make such
an experiment as would authorize me to say that one cannot
be had, to regulate on just principles the points in question
between the two nations, will require at least two months;
to proceed to Madrid through Paris, conclude a treaty with
the minister of Spain, & return here, will consume six more;
and to reach the United States perhaps two more.
If an experiment is made, it ought to be a fair one
so as to terminate in case of success forever all points
in controversy or likely to be so between the parties,
or in case of failure to put them completely in the wrong.
Perhaps it may require less time to adjust the business
with both powers, but the presumption is otherwise.
Under such circumstances it seems proper that I should
pursue one or other of the objects only, and being on
the ground, already charged with these duties,
it is possible that some inconvenience might
attend my withdrawing from it, especially in
reference to this power at this moment.
Several incidents have occurred which
however unimportant or correct in principle,
have nevertheless produced some sensation here.
The rejection of the treaty lately formed by Mr. King,
as is said to be the case; the proposition in Congress
of some defensive measure against the impressment
of our seamen, and the affair of Etiquette with
Mr. Merry are of this kind.
But the incident which produced that state of mind,
which is susceptible of irritation by light causes,
was the adjustment of our affair with France,
which this government did not expect, & has most
probably subjected it to much embarrassment.
To remove these impressions and arrange our affairs with
this government on just & equal principles, in cases of
necessary contact or rather of actual collision, will require
more time than the pressure of any other duty will permit,
especially one of great expectation, a failure to perform
which might compromise my friends as well as myself.
I consider the affair with Spain as being likewise of
importance and am not without every sanguine hope
of succeeding in it in case I proceed thither.
I have much reason to count on the strong aid of France,
independent of which I think our present attitude
must be an imposing one there.
I shall therefore make up my mind to pursue these
objects with the attention they merit, and to give
them the time they may require.
With this power there will be some difficulty from the nature
of the questions themselves, its pretensions & former
practice in respect to some of them, and the expectation
it has constantly fostered of holding a relation to us more
close & connected than comports with an adjustment,
which separates us forever, and leaves the United States
to that high career which their destiny seems to promise.
They must see distinctly that by separating ourselves
from Europe, placing our maritime rights on a just footing,
remaining neutral and respected, while they are at war,
we must soon become one of the greatest,
as we are the most interesting & happiest of nations.
Many circumstances have tended to convince me that
they entertain very false impressions with respect to
our growth, and that they view the rapid advancement
we have made & are making with no very favorable eye.
They seem to consider our prosperity not simply as a
reproach to them, but as impairing or detracting from theirs.
Without possessing the means of retarding it, but at the
hazard of equal perhaps greater danger to themselves,
they have not yet attained that enlarged & liberal
state of mind which inspires a desire to promote it.
Thus I think that whatever accommodation is obtained,
however just and fair the principle may be on which
it is claimed, will be yielded with reluctance & slowly.
It is not impossible that procrastination will be attempted
from the consideration of what is to occur in the
United States at the end of the present year in the hope
that something may result from it favorable to their views.
In revolving this subject over I have sometimes
doubted whether it would not be better for the
present to leave the business here untouched,
and attempt an adjustment of that with Spain first.
It might give time for the passions which have
been improperly excited by light causes to subside,
& in case of a favorable issue of a better
prospect of success here afterwards.
On the whole however I am led to conclude,
that as it would be the most frank and respectful
course of proceeding to this power, and at the
same time most conciliatory, to commence
here, to adopt that conduct, which I shall
accordingly do as soon as I am prepared for it.
To be thus prepared will not require more than a week
or fortnight at most, when I shall ask an interview
with Lord Hawkesbury & open the subject to him.14
Monroe wrote to Madison on March 18, on April 25, 17 and 26, and on May 5 and 6.
On 3 May 1804 Monroe wrote this letter to Secretary of State Madison:
I received by duplicate two days past yours of
March 5th to which due attention shall be paid, in
the progress of the business entrusted to me here.
I had been advised by Commodore Preble of the
blockade of Tripoli by the squadron under his command
which he requested me to notify to this government.
But as I doubted the propriety of the measure,
I thought it best to take no step in it.
Of course it cannot be attributed to our government
or give any sanction to the doctrine in other cases.
In some late questions in the House of Commons
relative to the public defense the ministry, by the union
of the several parties who in different degrees had
been lately opposed to it, was left in a small majority.
The first of these was moved by Mr. Fox
and supported by Mr. Pitt.
The second was moved by the latter
and supported by the former.
A like proceeding was expected to have taken place
immediately afterwards in the House of Lords.
A notice for a similar motion having been given by one of
its members for Friday last, at the moment when he was
about to make it, Lord Hawkesbury desired a postponement
for some days on considerations, which although he deemed
it improper to communicate, yet he assured the House they
were of a nature to secure a general acquiescence if known.
The postponement was accordingly granted.
Every one inferred that his Lordship alluded to a change
in the Ministry which it seems is about to be verified.
It is believed that the opposition in the House of Lords,
had a vote been taken, would have proved
at least as formidable as in the Commons.
It is reported apparently on good authority, that a
communication has been since opened from Buckingham
House, the residence of the King, with Mr. Pitt, by virtue
of which he has presented to his Majesty a plan of
administration, which it is expected comprises the
leading members of the late combined opposition,
placing himself in his former station, Mr. Fox in the
department of foreign affairs; Lord Grenville in the
Home Department, and also gives employment to
Mr. Wyndham, Mr. Grey, Lord Melville and others.
A few days will reduce this business to a certainty.
It is evident that the whole power of the state is taken
into the hands of the opposition whose members dictate
to its chief the terms that are likely to be adopted.
Their views however seem to extend no further
than a change of men; they do not appear
even to contemplate a change of measures.
Mr. Fox it is true in the Speech which introduced his
motion, took ground which manifested a determination
that whatever might be the result with respect to the
new field which was opening, he meant that his
future life should be consistent with the past.
He seemed to anticipate a change in which he might
possibly be called to act a part, and to avail himself
of the occasion of announcing to all who were
interested, what that part would be.
He did not hesitate to reprobate the war, to express a
strong desire for peace if to be obtained on suitable terms;
and to speak of the doctrine of prerogative which he said
had been carried too far in a late act of parliament,
which ought to be expunged from the code.
But those parts of Mr. Fox’s speech were not adverted
to by any of those who supported his motion, and
are therefore not to be Considered as among
the motives which united the opposition.
Indeed it is doubted by many whether Mr. Fox
will be appointed to the ministry; but from what
I have seen, I am led to conclude that he will.
I cannot think that the King, if the state of his health permits
his attention to the subject, after acceding to the removal of
his present ministers, and accepting others none of whom
are perhaps agreeable to him, will object to Mr. Fox alone;
for yielding at all the probability is that he will do it fully.
Nor is it probable that the others by whose efforts
combined with his, this change has been produced,
will feel themselves at liberty, to form any
administration which leaves him out.
Although no express agreement may have been made
between the parties as to the result, yet such a conduct
would be likely to expose its authors to such reproach,
as might injure them in the sequel.
There are other considerations of great weight
which make it presumable that he will
not be neglected in the arrangement.
The declining state of the King’s health, and the
approaching elevation of the Prince of Wales, by
succession or as regent, in case of the death or continued
indisposition of his father, and the partiality which the
Prince is believed to have for Mr. Fox, are circumstances
which are not likely to be lost sight of on this occasion.
The conduct which is now observed towards
him may be reciprocated hereafter.
For good offices at this time a return may be
expected from him when in his power.
Besides it appears to me doubtful whether Mr. Pitt
would be willing to embark again in a war against France
with any association of character which could be
formed to which Mr. Fox was not a party.
The present war is in truth not to be viewed in any
other light than as a continuation of the former one.
Nor does there seem to be any reason to conclude that
the result of it will be more favorable to this country.
The part which Mr. Fox acted in the last war, and the
opinion he is Known to entertain of the present one,
make it probable that he would be able to obtain a
better peace than any other person: or should peace
be unattainable on reasonable terms, and a vigorous
prosecution of the war deemed necessary, it seems
equally probable that the energies of the government
will be increased, and the responsibility of others
much diminished by having his support.
It appears from what I hear that neither of these
gentlemen was desirous of going into the ministry
without the other, or rather in opposition to the other.
In this idea I do not speak of them as individuals,
but as leaders of parties whose views have
been in many respects essentially opposite.
I rather think in the present state of the world, that each
would be glad to have the other as a shield to break the
responsibility to which he would be exposed, in case of
a possible series of events, should either stand alone.
Whether the new administration, if one is formed out
of this new opposition, will be really desirous of peace
or prefer a prosecution of the war is very doubtful.
If Mr. Fox is brought into it on equal terms, by which I mean
such an arrangement of character as will secure an equal
vote in the cabinet, in favor of what appear to be his views,
I shall think that they seriously contemplate peace.
If he is brought into the ministry on less favorable terms,
I shall still think that they mean to have the alternative in
their hands, and be the object what it may, nevertheless to
impress the nation and Europe with a belief that it is peace.
If peace is made, the House of Bourbon will most
probably be abandoned forever by this government,
and a new and closer connection formed
with the present government of France.
While they are at variance, we are perfectly safe;
but whenever an union or concert takes place
between them there is just cause for apprehension.
This government cannot well be
at repose nor allow it to other nations.
In commencing this war, there is reason to think, that
South America and all the neighboring islands were among
the objects, and that we might have commanded our own
terms if we would have been a party to the enterprise.
Disappointed there, and in any project which it might have
entertained with respect to France, if peace should follow,
and a concert of views and measures take place between
the two governments, is it not probable that new schemes
may be projected in which we may be interested,
though not in the same mode?
Our standing at present is good with France, as it is here.
It may perhaps be preserved at all times with both powers,
but that will depend upon circumstances.
In some views we seem to be an object of jealousy
to both governments; in many to this.
Peace and a concert of measures between them,
though an improbable is by no means an impossible event.
It is observable that in none of the discussions which
have taken place in parliament, has that degree of
the virulent abuse of the government of France,
been seen that was formerly practiced.
Mr. Pitt more especially has been very guarded on that
point: he has said much of the growth of French power,
but very little of those who wielded it.
New causes of irritation are therefore avoided,
and should peace take place and other interests and
views arise, the ancient animosity might not present
an insurmountable impediment to their execution.
These are cautionary hints, and I trust entirely visionary,
though the danger to which they refer appears to me
not to be too remote to be altogether disregarded.
You will perceive that they are of a nature, a disclosure
of which could not be productive of advantage.
You will readily perceive that in this state of things
I have been able to make no progress in the
business depending with this government.
As soon as a new ministry is formed, should such
be the result, I will resume the affair
with the successor of Lord Hawkesbury,
who will leave it as you Know in the first stage.
Your communications with the Spanish minister, a copy of
which is received with the letter above acknowledged, will
be essentially useful to me in the points to which they refer.
You will receive herewith a copy of my answer to Lord
Hawkesbury’s circular letter to the foreign ministers
accredited with his government, on the subject of the
conduct with which Mr. Drake British Envoy at Munich
is charged by the Government of France.
I have endeavored in it to show a suitable attention
to this government without saying anything
on the merits of the question.15
In this letter to Madison on 22 May 1804 Monroe
reported another change in the British ministry:
As I shall write you a public letter soon, I take occasion to
observe in this that the material changes in the ministry
are Mr. Pitt in the room of Mr. Addington, Lord Harrowby
in that of Lord Hawkesbury who has taken that of
Mr. Yorke retired; Lord Melville at the head of the
admiralty instead of Lord St. Vincent.
The Grenvilles & Wyndham refused to enter
the ministry without Mr. Fox, who it is expected
will unite with him in the opposition.
It is said that the king refused to take
Mr. Fox into the ministry.
Thus matters now stand.
The foreign ministers have had one interview with
Lord Harrowby, which was merely introductory.
In that, which was private with each, I mentioned all
our concerns to him & was answered by a desire,
that as he had so lately come into office & had so many
objects to attend to of the first importance to his country,
that I would not press him on those of the United States,
which he presumed were not so urgent to either party.
I informed him that I had already shown a disposition of
that character in all my transactions with his government,
which I should certainly observe with him, but nevertheless
earnestly hoped that he would soon give me a day when
I might call on him to confer further on those subjects,
and more especially pressed that he would conclude
the business with Mr. Pinkney as soon as possible.
His manner was conciliating, though he observed
that he could give no opinion on any one point.
Three days since Mr. Livingston our minister
at Paris arrived here on a trip of amusement.
His visit will certainly not be well received
by the government, at least such is my opinion.
It seems to excite a considerable sensation,
and in the present state of parties here, may
very probably be attributed to some political motive.
If he has any, I am altogether ignorant of it.
We have been much together,
& nothing of the kind has been suggested.
As it is the unquestionable duty of our country to have
nothing to do with the political controversies of Europe,
it is my opinion, as it has been my practice, that its public
agents abroad should adapt their conduct to that principle.
This movement naturally draws the attention of three
distinct parties: the government of France,
of this country, & the opposition to it.
Although it may be totally unconnected with all,
yet each will be affected by it.
I have reason to think that this government
will show him no attention, or rather let it be seen
that it is not pleased with the visit.
It places me in rather an unpleasant dilemma,
to avoid the suspicions which attach to him without
giving offense here and elsewhere to those whose
good opinion it is important in my situation to preserve.
I consider it however my duty to show him all suitable
attention, relying on the just & inoffensive motives of his
visit, and on the propriety of my own conduct in other
respects to shelter me from any improper imputations.
The business at Paris you will have found
has got into an embarrassed situation.
I think it all important that it be settled without delay,
more especially that it be concluded before the end
of the term specified by the convention.
It is possible he may contemplate some
conversation with me on this subject.
I do not know that it will be proper for me to say
anything on the subject to the commissioners.
Indeed I am too ignorant of the grounds of the
difference between him & the commissioners
to have any opinion on the subject at present.
I need not tell you that I am perfectly satisfied if they have
erred, which I am far from presuming, being altogether
unacquainted with the merits of the question, that the
error cannot possibly be ascribed to any improper motive.
I have the most perfect confidence in their integrity
& in that of Mr. Skipwith the agent.
To carry all these things through, considering the state
in which they are, the propriety of moderation in reference
to the principle of our government, the credit & advantage
of it in reference to foreign & domestic concerns,
requires all the wisdom & prudence of our government.
On hearing Mr. Livingston’s statement, if my advice
can be of any use either to him or the commissioners,
it will certainly not be withheld.
In this day’s paper there is a Declaration of the Emperor
of Russia relative to the infraction of territory of the prince
of Baden by the first consul, in the case of the Duke of
Enghien, which is thought to promise a cooperation
on the part of that power with this against France.
I enclose it with this.
In itself there is nothing conclusive.
I enclose you a letter for our estimable friend Mr. Jones.16
Monroe on 3 June 1804 wrote a longer letter to Madison on British politics
and the role of the American Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.
The late struggle in the parliament has produced the
appointment of Mr. Pitt to the place of Mr. Addington,
of Lord Harrowby to that of Lord Hawkesbury, the
latter being removed to the home department from
which Mr. Yorke retired, and Lord Melville to the head
of the admiralty in the room of Lord St. Vincent.
Not many other changes are made, the present ministry
being formed principally of Mr. Pitt and some few of
his friends with the other members of the late one.
It is understood that the King would not consent to the
admission of Mr. Fox into the ministry, in consequence of
which the Grenvilles and Mr. Wyndham refused to enter it.
While the late ministry was on the decline,
it seemed useless to press it on any concerns of ours.
I remained tranquil in the hope of availing myself with
effect of the moment when it should either recover its
strength, or retiring give place to another with which
I might treat on the important concerns entrusted to me.
As soon as Lord Harrowby came into office, he notified it
to the foreign ministers and invited them to an interview
at his office on the concerns of their respective countries.
As each was introduced separately, I took occasion to
mention to him, the subjects which were depending with
his predecessor, more especially the project of a treaty
concerning impressments & other topics, & the interest
of the State of Maryland in some bank stock,
which I hoped might soon be concluded.
I mentioned to him also that I had lately received from
you the ratification of the treaty respecting boundaries,
by the President with the advice of the Senate,
with the exception of the 5th article, which
I wished to submit to his consideration.
He replied that he was glad I had turned his attention
to these subjects, since he would make them the
particular object of his research but hoped that
I would not press any of them, as he had so lately come
into office & had so many concerns before him of the first
importance to his country & of a nature very urgent.
I assured him that I had no disposition to hurry any point;
should wait with pleasure his accommodation,
though I hoped it would suit his convenience to
conclude soon the affair of the bank stock which
was entrusted to the care of Mr. Pinckney.
He promised me to examine the papers immediately,
& to write me as soon as he understood them.
Near a fortnight afterwards elapsed,
and I heard nothing from him.
As Mr. Pinckney was extremely impatient,
and I really wished to get into communication
on the other topics also, I wrote him a note on
the 2 ultimo requesting an interview on the general
subject with permission to present to him Mr. Pinckney
at the same time, which was granted on the 30th.
As the particulars which occurred in this interview
appear to me to be of a nature very interesting,
I shall endeavor to state them with the utmost accuracy.
Mr. Pinckney opened his subject, the result of which
seemed to promise a speedy conclusion of it
in a manner satisfactory to him.
As he will doubtless communicate everything that occurs
in that concern, it is useless for me to repeat anything
that you will receive more fully from him.
He withdrew as soon as his object was accomplished.
I then asked his Lordship if he had read the project
relative to seamen &c which I had given to Lord
Hawkesbury some time since, and which I had
mentioned to him in our former interview.
He replied that he had not: that I would recollect that
he had requested me to delay the examination of it
for the present, as it did not press, the congress having
adjourned & the bill concerning it being postponed.
I replied that I did recollect it, but that I had hoped by
this time he had examined it, and being one which involved
no difficulty that he would be prepared to act in it.
He said that he was not, nor did he know that
he should be during the session of parliament.
I told him that his mind being thus expressed I should
certainly say nothing more on this subject for the present.
I then asked him if he was disposed to examine the
ratification of the treaty respecting boundaries which
I had also mentioned to him in our former interview.
He said he had not time but would be glad to know
in what manner it had been ratified.
I replied with the exception of the 5th article.
He censured in strong terms the practice into which
we had fallen of ratifying treaties with exceptions
to parts of them, a practice which he termed new,
unauthorized, & not to be sanctioned.
I replied that this was not the first example of the kind;
that he must recollect one had been given in a transaction
between our respective nations in their treaty of 1794;
that in that case the proposition for a modification was
well received & agreed to; that to make such a
proposition was a proof of an existing friendship &
a desire to preserve it; that a treaty was not obligatory
till it was ratified, and in fact was not one till then.
He said that the doctrine was not so clear as I had
stated it to be; that there were other opinions on it,
and seemed to imply, though he did not state it,
that an omission to ratify did an injury to the
other party of a very serious kind.
He asked me why the 5th article had been
excepted from the ratification?
I replied that a doubt had arisen whether the ratification
of it might not lay the foundation for disputes hereafter
from a cause which had no connection with this transaction.
This treaty was signed on the 12 of May 1803.
The late treaty with France which obtained the cession
of Louisiana bore date on the 30th of April preceding.
At the time this treaty was formed neither our minister
or his had any knowledge of that with France—that the
cession of Louisiana was not in the contemplation of either
government or its agent, when their instructions were given
or acted on, and in consequence that the rights acquired
under it, ought not & could not be affected by this treaty.
He observed with some degree of severity in the manner,
in substance, as well as I recollect, that having discovered
since this treaty was formed, that you had
ceded territory which you do not wish to part with,
you are not disposed to ratify that article.
I replied that he had misconceived my idea—that we did not
admit that the treaty could have any such effect, since it
could not operate on an interest which did not exist when
it was made: that we were however anxious to prevent any
misunderstanding on the subject by previous explanation
& arrangement: that by postponing the subject for the
present the door was left open for amicable negotiation
& adjustment which we wished: that at present we were
treating on a subject too remote from our settlements
to be well understood or in point of interest pressing:
that by the delay there was no privation of right,
and the amicable disposition which now subsisted between
the two nations remaining, the affair could not otherwise
than be adjusted hereafter to their mutual satisfaction.
He repeated again the idea which he first expressed,
implying strongly that we seemed to be desirous of
getting rid of an article in finding that it did not suit us.
I could not but feel the injustice of the insinuation,
which was made much stronger by the manner
which accompanied it, nevertheless I only added
that he ought not to expect to derive an advantage
from a treaty, the conditions of which were not known
to his or our government, when this treaty was made,
in an interest for which we alone
had paid the whole consideration.
I offered to leave the ratification with him,
but he declined taking it, observing that it was
useless as he could not act on the subject at present.
The conduct of Lord Harrowby through the whole
of this conference was calculated to wound & to irritate.
Not a friendly sentiment towards the United States
or their government escaped him.
In proposing a postponement of the interests in which we
were a party, he did not seem to desire my sanction, but to
assume a tone which supposed his will had settled the point.
By his manner he put it out of my power in assenting to the
delay to mingle with it any expressions declaratory of the
pleasure with which I acceded to an arrangement
which accommodated his government or himself.
Such expressions can never be used with propriety,
except where they are voluntary & acknowledged
to be founded in generous motives.
But no sentiment of that kind seemed
to animate him on this occasion.
Everything that he said was uttered in an unfriendly tone,
and much more was apparently meant than was said.
I was surprised at a deportment of which I had seen
no example before since I came into the country,
and which was certainly provoked by no act of mine;
yet I am persuaded it did not produce
an improper effect on my conduct.
I did not reciprocate the irritation by
anything that escaped me.
I am equally well persuaded that I made no improper
concession, & let it be clearly seen that I felt that
I represented a respectable and independent nation,
whose government could not be intimidated or
compelled to lose sight of its dignity by an abandonment
of its just claims in its transactions with any other.
I now consider these concerns as postponed indefinitely.
I do not foresee at what time it will be
proper for me to revive the subject.
Much is said of the probability of a coalition between
Great Britain & the northern powers, and the frequent
cabinet consultations at which the ministers of Russia
& Sweden assist, give countenance to the report.
If that should be the case, it is probable that the
policy and tone of this government towards neutral
powers may be less friendly or accommodating.
The new minister may seek to distinguish his career
from that of his predecessor by measures
which may be deemed more enterprising.
His system in the last war, so far as it affected us,
was marked by an extraordinary harassment of neutral
commerce by the blockade of France, the Islands &ca.
Our unexampled prosperity & rapid rise, it is well known,
excites their jealousy and alarms their apprehensions.
It may be painful for them to look on at the comforts &
blessings which we enjoy in contrast with the sufferings
to which by the calamities of war they are doomed.
Whether the conduct of Lord Harrowby was produced
by any change of policy towards us or by any other
cause transient or otherwise, it is utterly
out of my power to ascertain at present.
My most earnest advice however is to
look to the possibility of such a change.
The best security against it will be found in the firmness of
our councils and the ability to resent and punish injuries.
It is said, on what authority I know not, that
Mr. Merry will be recalled, & some person
of the first distinction sent in his stead.
If this is the case, although the exterior may be otherwise,
yet it ought not to be considered as a measure adopted
with a view to harmony or from motives of respect to
our government, since if such were the objects,
the tone which I have above communicated would
not have been assumed by Lord Harrowby,
nor should I be among the last to hear of it.
These remarks I have deemed it my duty to make,
from the circumstances on which they are founded.
Being sincerely anxious for peace from a knowledge,
such is the happy condition of our country, that much
expense & injury must result from war, while it is impossible
for us to derive any advantage from it, you may rest
satisfied that I shall cherish our present amicable relations
by all the fair & honorable means in my power: that I shall
also be observant of events & not fail to communicate to
you with the greatest dispatch possible whatever occurs
which may be deemed worthy your attention.17
Monroe on 28 June 1804 wrote another long letter to Madison about the English.
While still in London on July 1 he wrote to Madison
about these wider issues of foreign policy:
I have made it a rule to throw together occasionally what
occurred to me of fact or remark relative to our affairs,
and give it you in a private letter in aid of my public one.
Although this has been done without method yet
I have hoped that you would be able to extract
from the mélange something that might be useful.
About ten days since one of our vessels the Virginia
captain Dixon (I think it was) was seized by the
revenue officers for putting on board a few sheep
& pigs for the use of his passengers, without the
permit of the government & of course contrary to law.
She was subject by it to forfeiture & so
rigorous is the practice here in such cases
that all the parties expected that result.
They applied to Mr. Erving & he to me on it.
I stated the case to the government & requested her
discharge on the ignorance of the captain of the law,
which I heard last night was granted
by information from the parties.
The official communication is yet to be received.
The truth is that our commerce never enjoyed
in any war as much freedom and indeed favor
from this government as it now does.
The little bickering produce no effect on the
conduct of this government in that respect.
It shows the weight which our government
and country enjoy here.
Such are not known to exist, and I am persuaded that this
government does not wish it known that such do exist.
There is a great difference between obtaining a treaty
which trenches on their ancient usages and pretensions,
or what they call their maritime rights,
and an accommodation precisely the same
in effect by their own orders to the admiralty.
On the same principle, or rather for the same reason,
it is not easy to obtain of the government an
avowal that its conduct towards the neutral
powers is more moderate & just than heretofore.
This is I think precisely the state of things at present.
Whether any treaty will be obtained is uncertain.
If any is, it is more than probable that it will apply
only to seamen, though certainly I shall endeavor to
make it as comprehensive as possible, in reference
to the objects embraced by my instructions.
I do not think that this government is likely to
change its attitude towards us for the present.
I rather think when its passions subside, which have
been excited by the trivial topics known to you, that
it may be practicable to get into communication with
the minister and put an end to these things at once.
To hurry such a communication has appeared
to me to be highly improper, since it was
not likely to produce the desired effect.
If the high tone which it was probable would have been
assumed here, had been met with a correspondent one,
(and it would not have been easy for me to assume
any other) things would have been made worse.
And if I had shown any condescension,
they would have trampled me under foot.
I have therefore remained silent, observing in my
whole intercourse a distant but respectful attention
to the government & those in power.
Whenever we meet, it is on the ground
of perfect independence & equality.
I do not know that this government is likely
to change its tone towards us at any time.
During the war it seems to be difficult if not impossible
for it to do so; and what may happen afterwards
it is impossible to foresee.
The probability is that we shall gain ground with both
powers & Europe generally every day in war & peace;
that is provided all things go right at home.
I dined yesterday in company with eight or ten
members of parliament, mostly of the lords.
It was observed that our commerce was much
pillaged in the West Indies by French privateers.
I replied that in the trade to St. Domingo, I believed
it had been; but that there was no reason to think
that the proceeding was sanctioned by the government:
that I had heard that the privateers
were fitted out from Spanish ports.
They asked if that was not cause
of complaint against Spain?
I replied, if the charge was true, that I thought it was:
that our government would not be inattentive to its just
rights or dignity; but that it took time to know the nature
of the injury, by which it showed its moderation,
and was enabled to act with more effect.
It is much to be wished that all that West India brigandage
was put an end to, and I think it quite possible to do it.
Is all trade with St. Domingo prohibited by France?
I cannot suppose, if it was known to her government
that we will go into no treaty arrangement with a
foreign power or the blacks, relative to the Island
or its trade, that all commerce or barter with it,
would be attempted to be prohibited.
It seemed to be admitted by the whole company yesterday
that the destiny of all those Islands is in our hands.
The same sentiment is probably entertained
in some degree in France.
I should really think then that some agreement might be
made with her government to let us trade at certain ports,
which if necessary might also be sanctioned here,
though on that head I can say nothing
not having conferred with the government on it.
If some of our frigates were made to coast it awhile
through the Islands, though under secret orders to
touch no vessel, yet it might perhaps impose a
useful awe on the freebooters, that infest them and us.
They might enter the Mississippi &c, as a pretext or even
any of the Islands of the several powers owning them.
Such a movement would be felt by Spain & observed by all.
I should think that a very peremptory tone
might be taken with Spain on that subject.
Her minister has, I fear, been injured
by being too much caressed and favored.
It is time he knew the difference between the present
state of things & that which existed when he arrived there.
The United States have taken an imposing attitude,
and they can very easily preserve it.
He ought to be sensible that his tone is
calculated to injure his country & ruin himself.
Lord St. Helens asked me yesterday how Mr. Merry was:
I told him well I believed.
He said he had not lately heard from him,
but that he wished him well and hoped he succeeded:
I replied in terms of civility.
I perceived by this that he knew nothing of the Etiquette
story, though he is in the diplomacy of the country,
& at present a lord in waiting: I inferred from that
circumstance that the government gave no eclat to the
incident; I am the more inclined by it to think that the
report which I heard first of his being instructed to conform
is correct, or to suspect, if not acted on, that it is left in the
present state, in the expectation it may be useful in a certain
view & to a certain description of persons where he is.
If the latter is the case, it would be a singular
incident in the history of political maneuvering.
While the great outline of the government is friendly to the
United States, a little chimney corner bickering, is affected
to be kept up, with intention to counteract the effect of the
greater measures: carried on too in a manner as it were
secret, & not avowed—for they have never spoken to me
about it, or manifested a desire to withdraw the mission
& terminate the relations between the governments.
I rather think this government can never act in that
manner—that in leaving it unacted on, if such is the case,
it has been owing to the vast pressure of other business;
to a desire to get further information &c; perhaps to the
expectation that I may finally speak to them about it,
as I shall certainly do, when advised by you that the
affair is still open, or invited by a favorable occasion.
Permit me to remark that I think the incident ought to
be lost sight of altogether in official communications
to Congress, especially in the opening of the session,
if not settled before, and if the present friendly deportment
towards us is preserved, that in doing justice to the several
powers with whom we have relation, a reference to this
deportment by this power will not only show how much
the president’s mind is above such a trifling occurrence
but produce good effect in other respects.
The adjustment of the claims with both governments
& payment, if such is the case, is a topic on which a
conciliatory remark may also be made.
If wound up amicably without my speaking to this
government, Mr. Merry ought to know the fact
and that I was never instructed so to do.
Perhaps when Mr. Thornton arrives, it may be terminated,
& that he may even assist in bringing it to a proper issue.18
Monroe in a letter to President Jefferson on 25 September 1804
discussed their diplomatic challenges and strategies:
My letters to Mr. Madison are so full on what
concerns us, as to leave me little to add to you.
I never experienced more difficulty in any case,
than in deciding whether to hasten the negotiation
with this government to a conclusion, & set out
immediately in pursuit of the other object, or to
let it take its natural course and consume a couple
of months more, and pursue that object afterwards.
The considerations which create the embarrassment
are adverted to in my private letter to Mr. Madison.
My judgment inclines rather in favor of the delay as well
in respect to what is due to this power, as on the idea that
little will be done in France, which pressing emergencies
do not impose till after the 9th of November.
Still if I can get off in a few days, which depends
altogether on this government, I shall not fail to do so.
If I could foresee the probability of any change
in affairs likely to prove injurious to us in the interim,
I should be decided to proceed.
But there does not appear to be any likelihood
of such a change.
Nor am I aware that any change could take place
which would put us on a disadvantageous
footing in the negotiation with Spain.
I think she is much more interested than we
in pressing an amicable arrangement of boundaries.
The territory we now hold puts her
possessions pretty much at our mercy through
the whole extent of the Southern continent.
She knows this and is alarmed at it.
Her apprehensions are seen by everything
we hear from Madrid, though the effect is
not precisely what might be expected from it.
It is said, as I hear by Mr. Frere, that Mr. Pinckney
has left Madrid without taking leave.
The cause of this I know not,
since it is long since I heard from him.
To obtain a favorable result, I am not sorry that this
incident has occurred, because I think the more
a crisis is created the better the effect will be.
This government can never unite with Spain against us,
that is, such an event is among those which are so
improbable that it ought scarcely to be taken
among data on which our calculations are to be formed.
Nor will France be apt to join Spain against us,
for the very reasons which induced her
(so far as they were of a general political nature)
to cede to us Louisiana.
I think our attitude is not likely to be less imposing
a few months hence with Spain than it now is.
If she has assumed a high tone in the communications
with Mr. Pinckney, I do suspect it is more the effect of
transient causes produced by what has occurred at Madrid,
or by the communications of her minister at Washington,
than any settled opinion of the policy
she ought to observe towards us.
She will probably get the better of her
passions on some short reflection.
But I hazard remarks on facts which are presumed,
& therefore may err.
If the business fails here in respect to the seamen,
for in every other point it has substantially succeeded,
in practice though not by treaty with this government,
it remains to be decided in what light
it is to be viewed in America.
So far as I can form any opinion on the subject,
it is that it should produce no irritation in our proceedings.
The thing will come right here at no remote period of time
& in my opinion sooner by a firm manly style of conciliation,
which shows it is not prompted by unworthy motives,
than by an irritating, defying one.
The people have considerable influence
over this government;
such a tone would impose a great restraint
on it in respect to us; in fact I think it would
produce here in many respects a good effect.
And in our interior, the effect would be equally salutary.
A certain description of people with us
have no hope but in foreign wars.
Their power attained great height
in the controversy with France.
Their present last resource is in one with England:
they care but little with whom it is, so that it harasses our
country, expends money, & is likely to create discontent.
This remark I apply only to certain leaders, not to the body,
as I presume the latter has already
seen enough to be satisfied.
It was obvious to a distant spectator, and of course more so
to those on the ground, that the discussions respecting
seamen last winter in the Congress gave them pleasure;
in their toasts they took the side
(that is certain individuals did) of the British;
intimated that the seamen taken were British not American
(as is probably often the case), & thus encouraged the
practice heretofore pursued by this power,
& lessened the disposition to arrange it by treaty.
I do not mention these things as criminal in these persons:
such mode of discussion is incident to free government
and ought to be protected not persecuted.
But it shows that the public mind is not altogether ripe
for a rupture on that ground, since the quarter of the union
most injured by these acts, not only
does not complain but vindicates them.
It seems to me as if an exhibition to the world,
that our footing in all great points was perfectly friendly
with the European powers; that important questions
had been amicably arranged with them;
that others which remained to be adjusted were
in train, & it was not doubted would be concluded to the
satisfaction of the parties, would deprive these gentry of
the last resource, at the same time that it would be likely
to produce the desired effect here with every power.
Permit me to ask will it not be better to shut up
the country westward of the Mississippi
for many years yet to come?
Or if any exception is made to the doctrine,
that it be in permitting the settlement at a
suitable time of the right bank of the river only?
If the territory is opened for sale westward of it, I think
it will depopulate the old States and endanger a separation.
To secure the union forever I think the progress should
be slow in that quarter that is westward of the river;
that we should make sure the steps we take,
and see by the habitual exercise of government for
some time over that region, that is the eastern side,
what the effect of any other measure is likely to be.
By such a course the present lands
will be sold to advantage;
American population will be planted on the Eastern side of
the river, who will cross & carry with them their principles
of government, of union, of local attachment, &c.
This subject will, I well know, be sufficiently weighed.
Feeling much anxiety on it I have taken the liberty
to intimate concisely what I think on the subject.
I have this moment read what is stated in the
gazettes of the day of the probability of an approaching
rupture between this government and Spain,
as suggested by Lord Harrowby to some
merchants of the city convened to receive it.
It is possible his Lordship may be induced to delay
his communication with me, on that account,
though I confess I do not clearly see the motive of it,
unless this should be a maneuver intended to
produce an adjustment with Spain before I get there.
Should that even happen, I do not think it would be likely
to prevent our success, because Spain is more interested
in the adjustment on fair terms than we; and because
if the war lasts, I do not think that any arrangement
between Great Britain & Spain can be considered as final,
since it must depend on other circumstances, not within
the control of either party, certainly not of Spain.
However I sincerely wish I may be able to get off soon.
To push the affair on the moment of this
publication would appear to be connected with it,
and a measure produced by it.
Still as his Lordship has not been open in his
communications to me, he ought not to be surprised
if I did so; they must feel mortified to see us
profit of their follies, or likely to do so;
yet it is surprising that they have not sufficient elevation
of mind to act in such manner as to make the aids
we derive from their measures gain them
some credit or acknowledgment on our part.
Should anything occur before the ship sails,
I will not fail to communicate it.19
Notes
1. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806 ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, p. 44-52.
2. The Political Writings of James Monroe ed. James P. Lucier, p. 374-377.
3. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe, 29 July 1803 (Online).
4. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 61-63.
5. Ibid., p. 69-75.
6. Thomas Jefferson Message to the Senate and House of October 21, 1803 (Online).
7. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 96-98.
8. From James Madison to James Monroe, 13 December 1803 (Online).
9. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 110-114.
10. From James Madison to James Monroe, 26 December 1803 (Online).
11. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 146-147.
12. Ibid., p. 148-152.
13. From James Madison to James Monroe, 5 March 1804 (Online).
14. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 153-156.
15. Ibid., p. 174-180.
16. Ibid., p. 188-191.
17. Ibid., p. 191-199.
18. Ibid., p. 218-223.
19. Ibid., p. 252-257.