Monroe in Richmond in 1809
Monroe in Albemarle in 1810
Monroe in Government in 1811
On 7 January 1809 James Monroe in a letter to Nicholas Biddle expressed
his view on the value of elections in their democracy:
I most sincerely hope that our late elections will
have the effect which many have expected from them.
To promote that tendency as well as to avert any
injuries that might possibly result from a disappointment;
a union among us seems to be all important.
It has been my endeavor, so far as my limited means
have extended, to inculcate this doctrine.1
On 18 January 1809 James Monroe from Richmond in a letter to
President Thomas Jefferson proposed a new mission to France and England:
An idea has occurred to me which I will take
the liberty to submit to your consideration.
I have thought that you might command my
services before you retire from office, in a
mode which might prove advantageous to
our country & equally honorable to you & myself.
Our affairs are evidently at a pause, and the next step
to be taken without an unexpected change, unless some
expedient consistent with the honor of the government &
country is adopted to prevent it, seems likely to be the
commencement of a war with both France & England.
It is all important to avoid such a result if possible,
and in case it is not, that we should enter into the war
with the greatest union of which our system is capable.
It has occurred to me that before that last step is taken,
some signal effort should be made to avert the
necessity, and that a mission to both powers
should be resorted to for that purpose.
This mission should commence with France a
circumstance which ought to be considered as
honorable to the Emperor of France & proceed thence
to England, be the result with France what it might.
Its powers should be eventual or conditional,
& commensurate with the object.
They should be confided to one person who
should be the sole agent and have no connection
with the minister on the ground in either country.
Some solemnity should be attached to the
measure by sending the person appointed
in a frigate or other public armed vessel to
secure to it the happiest effect at home & abroad.
I am willing to undertake this trust & to set out in discharge
of it without a moment’s delay, leaving my family behind.
From my acquaintance with both governments I should
undertake it with strong hope of success, and should it fail,
I think that the attempt would produce a happy effect in
our interior by uniting all parties in a common effort to meet
the crisis which would be allowed by all to be inevitable.
I trust that my motive in making to you
this proposition will not be misconceived.
I have too much confidence in your justice &
magnanimity to indulge such an apprehension.
Should the measure be deemed inexpedient or
incompatible with any existing arrangement, it is my
earnest desire that it may be rejected without hesitation.
I have no wish on the subject except
such as is suggested by a view of the very
critical situation of our country at this time.
It is proper to add that although I have been prompted
equally by my judgment & feelings to make to you
this proposition, I would not venture to do it without
consulting those of my friends here with whom the
knowledge of it will remain exclusively confined.2
President Thomas Jefferson on 28 January 1809 wrote in a letter to James Monroe:
The idea of sending a special mission to France
or England is not entertained at all here.
After so little attention to us from the former & so
insulting an answer from Canning, such a mark of
respect as an extraordinary mission would be a
degradation against which all minds revolt here.
The idea was hazarded in the House of Representatives
a few days ago by a member, and an approbation
expressed by another, but rejected indignantly by
every other person who spoke, & very generally
in conversation by all others: and I am satisfied
such a proposition would get no vote in the Senate.
The course the legislature means to pursue may
be inferred from the act now passed for a meeting
in May, & a proposition before them for repealing
the embargo in June & then resuming &
maintaining by force our right of navigation.
There will be considerable opposition to this last
proposition, not only from the federalists, old & new,
who oppose everything, but from sound members of
the majority: yet it is believed it will obtain a good
majority, & that it is the only proposition which can
be devised that could obtain a majority of any kind.
Final propositions will therefore be soon dispatched
to both the belligerents through the resident ministers
so that their answers will be received before the
meeting in May & will decide what is to be done.
This last trial for peace is not thought desperate.
If, as is expected, Bonaparte should be successful
in Spain, however every virtuous & liberal
sentiment revolts at it, it may induce both
powers to be more accommodating with us.
England will see here the only asylum for her commerce
& manufactures worth more to her than her orders of
council, & Bonaparte having Spain at his feet, will look
immediately to the Spanish colonies & think our neutrality
cheaply purchased by a repeal of the illegal parts of his
decrees, with perhaps the Floridas thrown into the bargain.
Should a change in the aspect of affairs in Europe
produce this disposition in both powers, our peace
and prosperity may be revived and long continue.
Otherwise we must again take the tented field as
we did in 1776 under more inauspicious circumstances.
There never has been a situation of the world
before, in which such endeavors as we have
made would not have secured our peace.
It is probable there never will be such another.
If we go to war now, I fear we may renounce forever
the hope of seeing an end of our national debt.
If we can keep at peace 8 years longer, our income,
liberated from debt, will be adequate to any war
without new taxes or loans, and our position & increasing
strength will put us hors d’insulte from any nation.
I am now so near the moment of retiring that I take
no part in affairs beyond the expression of an opinion.
I think it fair that my successor should now originate
those measures of which he will be charged with
the execution & the responsibility, and that it is my
duty to clothe them with the forms of authority.
Five weeks more will release me from a drudgery
to which I am no longer equal, and restore me to
a scene of tranquility, amidst my family & friends,
more congenial to my age and natural inclinations.
In that situation it will always be a pleasure to
me to see you & to repeat to you the assurances
of my constant friendship & respect.3
On February 2 Monroe wrote a longer letter to Jefferson explaining
his proposed special mission to England and France in more detail.
Here are some of the arguments he made for the project:
You seem to apprehend that in case Bonaparte
succeeds in Spain, we shall be enabled to accomplish
our object in England; but I do not perceive that a result
so favorable to us is likely to proceed from that cause.
It is far from being certain that the mere subjugation
of Spain would overthrow the British ministry without
which that consequence could not well be expected.
The new prospect in Spain was opened to England after
our relations with her had assumed their present character;
France was omnipotent in Spain anterior to it &
would only recover then what she held before.
It seems probable that while England maintains her
independence & the ministry its ground, there is little
cause to expect in the course we are pursuing any
important change in our favor, & certainly there is
none to hope it from her subjugation by France.
It is more probable that a claim on South America
would fix the views of Bonaparte more steadfastly on us.
Success rarely moderates the pretentions of a conqueror.
He issued his decree when he had not a single ship at sea.
That fact shows that, if the United States were not its
principal object, their friendship had ceased to be
one which was deemed worthy his attention.
Connect that fact with his conduct in the Spanish
negotiation & the presumption is strengthened that
he views us with other eyes: that on the scale of his
vast & boundless ambition we occupy a place & are
destined to take our turn in the list of conquered people.
This sentiment is not of a very limited range.
The best friends of the United States in France
such as La Fayette, Volney & others entertain it.
No unfriendly feeling excites these remarks.
From Bonaparte himself I have received much kindness
& attention, of which proofs have been afforded by
his notice of me to others since I left the country.
For the nation I have high consideration & respect,
& for many friends there the sincerest regard.
But these circumstances will not blind me to the danger
or make me insensible to what I owe my country.
If the proposed measure was adopted and succeeded with
both parties, a great boon would be obtained to the country.
If it succeeded with either, much good would be done;
for if either revoked its decrees, & the other persisted
in maintaining them, the issue would be made up
with it alone, & we be freed from the other.
If England should be the party refusing, the country
would be prepared to meet the crises; if France refused,
the same would be the public sentiment & spirit.
If Bonaparte maintained his decrees after England
had agreed to revoke hers, it would prove that
nothing short of our becoming a party to the war
on his side would satisfy him, & that he would
make war on us, if we were contumacious.
War then would be our inevitable destiny, & it
would remain to be decided, whether we would
consent to be drawn into it on his side on his own terms,
subjecting ourselves to incalculable loss while it lasted
by the waste & pillage of our commerce, to which he
could give no protection, and to still worse disasters
if he succeeded by the conquest of England;
for in that case he would be the sole monarch of Europe.
Place him on that high ground, and the liberty
of the world is endangered, if not gone.
Our intermediate forbearance or accommodation
with his views would then avail us nothing.
His mandate must be obeyed or he
would send his marshals to enforce it.
I see no motive of interest to draw us to him on such terms.
If England revokes her orders, he ought to revoke his
& a mission to him in the first instance, which would
manifest superior respect, ought to draw him out on
that point, or failing to do it, justify & invite the most
unfavorable suspicions of his future views towards us.
But I indulge great hope that the proposed measure
would succeed in its object with both powers.
I cannot believe that either would suffer such a
mission to withdraw, & take to itself the responsibility
& the consequences of refusing conditions fair
& honorable to it, when thus pressed.4
On 25 February 1810 Monroe wrote to Virginia’s
Senator Richard Brent about his political prospects.
Monroe considered and declined to accept the position of Governor of Louisiana.
Monroe wrote,
Mr. Madison had had it in his power when he came
into office to avail himself and the public of my services,
had it been an object, and that in doing so he would
have displayed some magnanimity that there was but
one proposition which he could have made me, or I
have accepted, which was to have invited me into the
Cabinet in the place he had lately held: that in respect
to the military line, I was not desirous of obtaining an
office in it, intimating that I should be willing to serve
in that line only in case of an emergency….
My situation abroad had given me an opportunity
to take an enlarged view of our affairs, and so far as
my mind was equal to it, I did so, and dispassionately.
I acted on that view, and although conscious of injury,
by a series of actions all tending to degrade and
oppress me even at that period, I suppressed that
sentiment and every feeling it was calculated to excite.
I looked to the welfare of my country, to the support of
the republican cause, and the preservation of the friendship
which had so long subsisted between the administration
and me, and which I was extremely desirous of preserving.
I knew our arrangement with England was an advantageous
& honorable one, and that we should prosper under it,
if accepted and maintained by the government; but I also
knew that it was a hazardous one for me to sanction, since
if the government rejected it, which it might do, as it was
not obligatory, the current of opinion and prejudice would be
turned against me, which could not fail to bury me under it,
while the administration floated in security on the surface.5
The British Navy blockaded New York’s harbor in the
spring of 1810 and damaged the American economy.
James Monroe could have run for a vacant seat in the United States Senate,
but he did not think he could live on its salary.
He decided to run for Virginia’s House of Delegates, and his pledge to the voters
in Charlottesville was published on April 10 in the Richmond Enquirer:
I have always been a Republican.
I have fought and bled for the cause of Republicanism.
I have supported it for thirty years
with my most strenuous exertions.
Is it to be supposed that I will in the noon of life abandon
those principles which have ever actuated me?...
Mr. Madison is a Republican, and so am I.
As long as he acts in consistence with the
interests of his country, I will go along with him.
When otherwise, you cannot wish me to countenance him.6
On 10 September 1810 James Monroe wrote in a 30-page letter
to Col. John Taylor in which he reviewed the Jefferson Administration
including the rejected treaty, the adoption of the embargo and
diplomatic issues related to Spain, France and Louisiana.
Here are excerpts on Jefferson’s policies and his diplomacy with Spain and France:
The early stages of Mr. Jefferson’s administration
were attended with as great and brilliant success
as ever occurred to any government.
The latter period was undoubtedly
unfortunate in some important points.
I concur with an opinion expressed in one of your
papers, that the rejection of the British treaty &
adoption of the embargo are among his principal errors.
Those led to others and produced also various abortive
projects, some of them of a nature with those that
were resorted to by the preceding administrations.
Whether Mr. Jefferson gave his sanction to the
latter schemes, or they were the projects of
others only, I know not, but I have rather
supposed that the latter was the fact.
I have believed that he impelled by preceding success
and the ardor of the public feeling, confident too much
in the success of measures which were at best of doubtful
policy, and that the persons alluded to, more adventurous
and perhaps less scrupulous, finding that those
measures had not succeeded, were disposed for
consistency sake to bolster them up by the obnoxious
acts complained of, to which he gave no sanction.
I cannot think that Mr. Jefferson would consent to
any measure which violated the principles of free
government, or weakened its foundations.
I think also that Mr. Madison is
sincerely attached to those principles.
At the conclusion of the negotiation with Spain in
May 1805, believing as I then did and now do, that
France instigated Spain to reject our just claims to
boundary, and to an indemnity for spoliations, and that
both powers acted in confidence that we would submit
patiently to the injury, and believing also if we gave
ground in that instance, that there would be no limit
to their pretensions; that they would advance on our
retreating steps, violate our rights & interests, & insult our
government, whenever it suited them, or rather that France
would, for I considered Spain as a mere instrument in the
business, Mr. Pinckney & I advised the administration in
a private letter to make its stand there by taking such
an attitude as would force them into an accommodation.
The attitude which we recommended was that
the United States should take possession of both
the Floridas & of the country westward of the
Mississippi to the Rio Bravo, removing the
Spanish posts from within those limits and thus
menacing Mexico to negotiate on that ground.
This advice was afterwards modified in a letter
which I wrote from Paris in such a manner as that the
measures recommended should assume a character
more conciliatory towards France in the commencement,
but preserve in all other respects their full tone.
The Rio Bravo was our just western limit by the
cession of Louisiana, by which also West Florida
belonged to us; and East Florida was no more
than a moderate recompense only for spoliations.
We gave it as our opinion that if the administration made
such a stand, it would be sure to succeed without war.
As a reason for that opinion we urged the conduct of
France in that very negotiation in which, although she
supported Spain in pretensions that were inconsistent
with our just rights and equally so to her own faith as
pledged at the time of the cession of Louisiana, she
acted in other respects with such caution, as to convince
us that she did not mean to hazard a war at that time
with the United States for the objects in contestation.—
It is a remarkable fact that France supported Spain
against the United States on the Eastern side of the
Mississippi in her claim to West Florida, and the
United States against Spain on the Western side in
respect to the limits of Louisiana next Mexico seeking
thereby, as we supposed to keep the means of coercing
both parties in her own hands for her own purposes.
We were persuaded that France sought to make money
of both by a compromise, the conditions of which she
wished to control, and that she expected to succeed
best by sustaining the claim of each against the
other in the quarter where it was most vulnerable.
The United States for example could not fail to
be more sensibly affected by the interposition of
France in favor of Spain in regard to Florida than to
territory lying 200 leagues westward of the Mississippi;
nor could Spain have the same interest in retaining
territory lying Eastward of the Mississippi within our
acknowledged limits, which must finally belong to us,
that she would to that adjoining Mexico.
Entertaining this opinion of the views & policy of
France, we thought that it was advisable for the
United States to oppose them with decision at
once in a firm belief that we should succeed,
while there seem to be a probability of losing by it.
In great emergencies a nation must support its character.
An overcautious policy often risks more than a bold one.
In taking part with Spain against the United States,
France could have but one of two objects, either to
make a job of the controversy by compromise or
to nurse the quarrel between the parties as the
foundation of one between her and the United States,
when she should be better prepared for it.
If the first was the object, she would of course manage
it in character and relinquish it when she found that she
could make nothing by it; if the second, it followed that
the reason which induced her to wish delay ought to
be decisive with us to push the affair to a conclusion.
It could not be our interest to give her
time to prepare for a rupture with us.
Bonaparte was not then established in his new dignities.
Russia menaced, and Austria and
Prussia were ready to fall on him.
After he should accomplish all his great schemes
of ambition, we should oppose his views with less
prospect of success than while the result was uncertain;
and if he failed, as our decision would have
insured our success, we should have found in
it only the greater cause to approve our conduct.
We urged it also as an additional reason for pushing
the business with Spain that success there would be
sure to facilitate the adjustment of our differences with
other powers in all points in which they were unsettled.
We alluded in this remark more particularly to England
with whom a negotiation, which had been committed to me
before my visit to Spain, though suspended, was depending
and intended to be revived on my return to London.
A private letter containing these sentiments accompanied
these dispatches from Madrid of the date above stated.
They were communicated in a private letter from motives
of delicacy and sincere friendship to the administration,
because we feared if we included them in a public dispatch,
we might embarrass the government if it should differ
with us in opinion as to the course to be pursued,
instead of aiding it as we earnestly wished to do
in the critical conjuncture which had occurred.
On my return to England in July 1805 I found that
the British government, after renewing the coalition
with Austria, had recommenced the practice of the
preceding war in seizing our vessels and doing us other
injuries, for till then two years after the commencement
of the present one, it had abstained from it.
My resistance to those measures which had pushed
the controversy to the edge of war and left it there,
is well known to you and to my country.
In a public dispatch, which communicated the result
of my correspondence with the British ministry,
I took the liberty to give my advice as to the part
which we ought likewise to take with England.7
On 10 December 1810 James Monroe wrote this letter to
retired Thomas Jefferson on inland navigation and the Virginia Assembly:
I arrived here last night indisposed and must return in the
stage tomorrow or should have the pleasure to call on you.
It was necessary that I should be present at the transfer
of my property from one overseer to another, for which
purpose I obtained leave of absence for a few days.
Mr. Ritchie informed Mr. Coles that an anonymous
communication had been sent him, stating that you had
had a correspondence with the Commissioners or Trustees
for opening the river near Milton, throwing light on the
subject of inland navigation, and that application had
been made to them for a copy of it, with a view to
lay it before the public, which had been refused.
He consulted me on the subject.
I suggested the propriety of withholding the publication
for the present and writing to the Commissioners
for a copy on the idea that in that mode the object
might be obtained without the possibility of putting
you in collision with any of your neighbors.
The hint was adopted, as I was informed by Ritchie in
a conversation I had with him the day before I left town.
A knowledge of the occurrence may
possibly be of some use to you.
We have so far advanced in the business of the assembly
with much harmony, and there does not appear at this
moment to be in any one a disposition to interrupt it.
In my judgment the true course is to let the
legislature pass through the session without being
called on to interfere with the national concerns.
I think that such a course would tend essentially
to conciliate the members of the republican party
towards each other and to draw them more
closely together than has been done of late.
My earnest object is to promote that end, and if I am not
driven by propositions bearing unfavorably on transactions
to which I was a party in self-defense, to place my conduct
in a just light, it is possible that I may contribute to it.
Propositions of this kind, from what I can discern, are
not likely to come from any but such as profess to be
the friends of the administration but who have other
objects than its welfare, and who may be pleased at
a collision between it and me from motives very distant
from those that are connected with the public good.8
In January 1811 a federal judge died, and President Madison selected
Virginia’s Governor John Tyler to replace him so that James Monroe could be
elected Governor of Virginia again on January 18.
Three days later he wrote another letter to retired Thomas Jefferson in which
he asked for his guidance “in all things in which I may be useful.”
During 77 days in early 1811 James Monroe as Governor of Virginia had
moved up the ending of slavery there to 4 July 1827.
On 20 March 1811 President Madison wrote this letter to Gov. Monroe:
I may perhaps consult too much my own wishes
public & personal and too little a proper estimate of
yours in intimating the near approach of a vacancy in the
Department of State, which will present to your comparison,
as far as lies with me, that sphere for your patriotic
services with the one in which they are now rendered.
Should such a transfer of them be inadmissible or ineligible,
on whatever considerations, this communication will,
I am sure, be viewed in the light to which its motives
entitle it and may rest in confidence between us.
In a contrary result, be so good as to let me have
your agreeable determination as soon as possible.
Permit me to add that even in this result, it will be best
for reasons reserved for personal explanation, that the
precise turn of the communication may be confidential.
I am the more anxious to hear from you as soon as
possible, since besides the more obvious calls for it, the
business of that Department is rendered by the present
conjuncture, peculiarly urgent as well as important.
It would be of the greatest advantage, if it could
be in the hands which are to dispose of it in about
two weeks from this date and receive a close
attention for a short period thence ensuing.
It is probable that an interval of relaxation would
thereby be rendered consistent with the public interest.
Accept assurances of my great
esteem and sincere friendship.9
Governor James Monroe from Richmond wrote this letter
on March 23 to President James Madison:
Your letter of the 20th instant
reached me yesterday morning.
The subject which it presents to my view is highly
interesting, and has received all the consideration
which so short a time has enabled me to bestow on it.
My wish to give you an early answer in compliance with
your request, has induced me to use all the dispatch which
the delicacy & importance of the subject would permit.
The proof of your confidence which the proposition
communicated by your letter affords, is very gratifying to
me and will always be remembered with great satisfaction.
I have no hesitation in saying that I have
every disposition to accept your invitation,
to enter into the department of State.
But in deciding this question on your part as well as
on mine, some considerations occur which claim
attention from us both, & which candor requires
to be brought into view, & weighed at this time.
My views of policy towards the
European powers are not unknown.
They were adopted on great consideration, and are
founded in the utmost devotion to the public welfare.
I was sincerely of opinion, after the failure of the
negotiation with Spain, or rather France, that it was for
the interest of our country to make an accommodation
with England, the great maritime power, even on moderate
terms rather than hazard war or any other alternative.
On that opinion I acted afterwards, while I
remained in office, and I own that I have
since seen no cause to doubt its soundness.
Circumstances have in some respects changed,
but still my general views of policy are the same.
If I come into the government, my object will be
to render to my country & to you all the service in
my power according to the light, such as it is, of my
knowledge & experience faithfully & without reserve.
It would not become me to accept a station & to act
a part in it, which my judgment and conscience did
not approve, and which I did not believe would
promote the public welfare and happiness.
I could not do this, nor would you wish me to do it.
If you are disposed to accept my services
under these circumstances and with this
explanation, I shall be ready to render them,
whenever it may suit you to require them.
In that event a circumstance of importance and delicacy
will require attention from you as well as from me.
It relates to the office which I now hold.
I feel much difficulty in withdrawing from it, nor
could I do so but on considerations which it is fair
to presume would be satisfactory to my constituents.
I am persuaded that my fellow citizens would have
no objection to my leaving this station, to go into the
general government at a crisis so important to the
public welfare and to the republican cause from an
opinion, as the security of those great interests depends,
in the present conjuncture more on the councils and
measures of the general than of the State government,
that I might be able to render more service there than here.
They would, I am satisfied, be reconciled to the act,
if I received an invitation from you, suggesting a
motive for it, arising out of the present state of
public affairs, which I might lay before the council
when I communicated to it my acceptance of an
appointment under the general government.10
In March 1811 President James Madison
nominated James Monroe as Secretary of State.
After Monroe accepted the position,
Madison wrote back on March 29:
I have received your letter of the 26th instant.
Its contents are very satisfactory to me.
The just principles on which you have invited me
into the department of State, have removed every
difficulty which had occurred to me to the measure.
They afford also a strong ground for hope, that the joint
counsels & labors of those who are thus associated in the
government will promote the best interests of our country.
To succeed in that most desirable object
my utmost exertions will be made.
I add with pleasure that I shall carry into the
government, a sincere desire to harmonize in
the measures necessary to that end on the fair
and liberal principles expressed in your letter.
I shall be prepared to set out for Washington on
Tuesday next provided I receive your letter and the
Commission which is to accompany it on or before Sunday.
One day’s detention here after Sunday for the purpose of
taking my leave of the council in case these documents
are previously received is all that I shall require.
Every preparatory arrangement of a public and
private nature will be by that time completed.11
On April 2 Monroe resigned as Governor of Virginia.
He arrived at Washington on April 5, and the next day
he began working as Secretary of State.
Monroe shared his concerns about the situation
in his letter to Dr. Charles Everett on April 23:
The conduct of the President since my arrival
has corresponded with my previous anticipation;
it is perfectly friendly and corresponding with our
ancient relation, which I am happy to have restored.
On public affairs we confer without reserve,
each party expressing his own sentiments and
viewing dispassionately the existing state animated
by a sincere desire to promote the public welfare.
I have full confidence that this relation
will be always preserved in future.
That my appointment should have excited some
surprise in certain quarters it was reasonable to expect.
The near connections of my predecessor would
naturally feel some portion of resentment to me,
though the measure was decided on before I knew
anything of it, and I had only to say whether I
would accept a trust which had become vacant.
Time and reflection will probably produce more correct
& liberal sentiments on this, and other subjects of a
similar kind than I have witnessed in the breasts of
those persons since my return to the United States.
Without having given any cause I have found them
among my most persevering & unfeeling opponents
in every circumstance which involved my political
standing with my country, or which brought into
view those pretensions which were founded on
long & faithful, if not useful services.
I have endeavored on my part to evince my independence
of them only, having in truth no feeling of resentment to
gratify or any wish unfriendly to them.
Intelligence of importance is expected
by the Essex from France & England.
Mr. Pinkney returns in her with his family, &
Mr. Foster will probably arrive about the same time.
It is understood that he comes out
with power to resume the negotiation.
Most happy indeed will it be if our differences
can be adjusted on reasonable & satisfactory ground.
Certain it is that any proposition to that effect will
be met here with the best disposition to restore
commerce & friendship to both countries.
Till the Essex arrives, everything will
be in a great measure at a stand.12
On June 30 the French Ambassador Sérurier recorded that
Secretary of State Monroe had spoken this to him:
You are a witness, sir, to the candor of
our motives, to the loyalty to our principles,
to our immovable fidelity to our engagements.
In spite of party clamor and the extreme difficulty
of the circumstances, we persevere in our system;
but your government abandons us to the attacks
of its enemies and ours by not fulfilling on its side
the conditions set forth in the President’s proclamation.
We are daily accused of a culpable partiality for France.
These cries were at first feeble, and we flattered
ourselves every day to be able to silence them by
announcing the Emperor’s arrangements in conformity
with ours; but they become louder by our silence.
The Administration finds itself in the most extreme
embarrassment; it knows neither what to expect
from you, nor what to say to its own constituents.
Ah sir! if your sovereign had deigned to imitate the
promptness which our President showed in publishing
his proclamation; if he had reopened with the necessary
precautions concerted with us, his ports and his vessels,
all commerce of America was won for France.13
On July 10 Sérurier wrote that Monroe had said,
Believe me the American government will not be
inconsequent; but its patience is exhausted and …
it is determined to make itself respected.
People in Europe suppose us to be merchants
occupied exclusively with pepper and ginger.
They are much deceived, and I hope we shall prove it.
The immense majority of our citizens do not belong
to this class and are, as much as your Europeans,
controlled by principles of honor and dignity.
I never knew what trade was.
The President is as much a stranger to it as I;
and we accord to commerce only the protection that
we owe it, as … to an interesting class of citizens.14
In the fall of 1811 James Monroe in a letter to an English Lord (Auckland?)
wrote about the problems with the British and Augustus John Foster,
the new ambassador to the United States.
Monroe wrote,
The opportunity which my service in England presented
me of becoming acquainted with & acquiring the esteem
of Mr. Fox, yourself, and many others, is considered & felt
by me as one of the very interesting incidents in my life.
I came into the office which I now hold with the best
disposition to promote, as far as depended on me, an
accommodation of all differences between our countries,
& such has been unquestionably the wish of the President,
but under the instructions of your minister here, it has been
utterly impossible to succeed in that most desirable result.
Mr. Foster has demanded of the United States, not that
they should protest their neutral rights against France
in a commerce with Great Britain and her dominions,
but that they should open the continent to British
manufactures, and not succeeding in that, insisted
that Great Britain maintaining her orders in council,
the United States should repeal their non-importation Act.
A demand so entirely inconsistent with the rights
of the United States and degrading to them as an
independent nation, has been viewed in no other
light than that of an evidence of a determined
hostility in your government against this country
and a decision to push things to the worst.
This government has not however as yet resorted to war.
It has been content to prepare for it in the
hope that such a change of policy has taken
place in Great Britain as may prevent it.
To recede from the ground taken by
the non-importation acts is impossible.
To rest there, while war is carried on
on the other side, is equally unworthy
the character and inconsistent with
the true interests of the United States.
War, dreadful as the alternative is, could not
do us more injury than the present state of things,
and it would certainly be more honorable to the
nation and gratifying to the public feelings.
This result, I repeat, is approached with reluctance.
If our affairs take this crisis, it is easy to perceive
what injury we may do to each other.
That you could do as much is not denied, but the
pressure from Great Britain, and even the injuries
she might do to us, would produce results not less
injurious to her without taking into the estimation those
injuries of a positive kind which she would receive in return.
War would give activity to our infant manufactories, which
would soon be able to shut the door on British industry.
By reviving the feelings of the revolutionary war, which
too many evil acts since have not suffered to expire,
a systematic, permanent hostility would take place
between our countries which would be deeply
felt hereafter in many ways by Great Britain.
Your government has never estimated correctly
the means which this country possesses in
case of actual war of annoying Great Britain.
The activity, boldness, and enterprise of this free
& injured people would be felt in your commerce
and resources in every quarter of the world.
Reflect that the United States are, as it were,
in your rear, and that while your face is turned
towards your enemy on the Continent, & every nerve
exerted, it may exceed your utmost means to repel
an attack made from this quarter on your commerce
in the East, the West Indies, & with South America.
You wish to shake the continental system & to
make use of the United States against their will,
because against principle & against the will
of France in accomplishing that object.
Shift the ground, show respect for our rights,
repeal your orders, institute & maintain lawful
blockade only, & what may not this lead to?
Friendship with America; free trade with this whole
Western hemisphere; security to your trade from us
in the Eastern hemisphere; good wishes to your general
commerce with the Continent & good offices in promoting
it in all lawful ways; a profit in the industry and the
enterprise of the American people; in the productions
of their soil & in general commerce with the Continent.
Is there cause to hesitate which
course ought to be preferred?
I see none.
I most earnestly hope that the friends of both countries,
who are the friends of peace and human rights, will be able
to avert the dangers which impend over them at this time.
Instead of the insults & injuries which are so constantly
offered to the United States & to their government by
your government, and those acting under its authority,
treat us as a nation having rights, possessing power,
and much sensibility to national honor, & the
result could not fail to be satisfactory.15
Notes
1. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816 ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton,
p. 86-87.
2. Ibid., p. 90-92.
3. From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 28 January 1809 (Online).
4. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 98-100.
5. Ibid., p. 110, 114-115.
6. Ibid., p. 122-126.
7. Ibid., p. 158-160.
8. From James Madison to James Monroe, 20 March 1811 (Online).
9. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 181-183.
10. Ibid., p. 183-184.
11. Ibid., p. 186-187.
12. James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity by Harry Ammon, p. 294.
13. Ibid., p. 297.
6. The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation’s Call to Greatness
by Harlow Giles Unger, p. 208.
7. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 122-126.
8. Ibid., p. 158-160.
9. From James Madison to James Monroe, 20 March 1811 (Online).
10. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 181-183.
11. Ibid., p. 183-184.
12. Ibid., p. 186-187.
13. James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity by Harry Ammon, p. 294.
14. Ibid., p. 297.
15. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 5 1807-1816, p. 191-194.