Jefferson & Monroe January-March 1803
Monroe’s Mission in Paris in April 1803
Monroe’s Letters to Madison in June 1803
Monroe’s Diplomacy July-November 1803
Monroe in France November-December 1804
President Thomas Jefferson in his Second Annual Message
to Congress had expressed on 15 December 1802,
The cession of the Spanish Province of Louisiana to
France, which took place in the course of the late war,
will, if carried into effect, make a change in the
aspect of our foreign relations which will doubtless
have just weight in any deliberations of the
Legislature connected with that subject….
To cultivate peace and maintain commerce
and navigation in all their lawful enterprises;
to foster our fisheries as nurseries of navigation
and for the nurture of man, and protect the
manufactures adapted to our circumstances;
to preserve the faith of the nation by an exact discharge
of its debts and contracts, expend the public money with
the same care and economy we would practice with our
own, and impose on our citizens no unnecessary burdens;
to keep in all things within the pale of our constitutional
powers and cherish the federal union as the only rock
of safety—these, fellow citizens, are the land-marks
by which we are to guide ourselves in all proceedings.
By continuing to make these the rule of our action we shall
endear to our countrymen the true principles of their
Constitution and promote a union of sentiment and
of action equally auspicious to their happiness and safety.
On my part, you may count on a cordial concurrence
in every measure for the public good and on all
the information I possess which may enable you
to discharge to advantage the high functions
with which you are invested by your country.1
Monroe completed his third one-year term as
Governor of Virginia on 1 December 1802.
A most detailed description of James Monroe’s role in negotiating the
Louisiana Purchase from France can be found in chapter 5 of his
third-person account in his Autobiography which begins,
As soon as Mr. Monroe had terminated his service
in the office of Chief Magistrate of the State,
he resumed his station at the bar with intention to
devote himself to the profession until he should
place his affairs in an independent state.
In that office he had done little to retrieve himself
from the debts contracted in his mission to France.
He took a house in Richmond, gave notice in the
gazette of his intention, and had business to
some amount immediately committed to him.
At this moment an incident occurred which
deeply affected the interest of the western
states and roused the indignation of the union.
By the treaty of San Ildefonso between France and
Spain which was concluded on October 1st 1800 the
latter had ceded to the former the province of Louisiana
and had suppressed at the instance of the former,
as was inferred, our right to deposit at New Orleans
which was secured by our treaty with Spain of 1795.
The act justified war to whichever government it
might be imputed, and many were prepared to
risk it by removing the obstruction by force.
The President preferred a different policy.
He resolved to make the experiment of a special mission,
and with that view nominated and appointed him in that
character to both France and Spain without consulting him.
Mr. Monroe had in repeated instances before
given strong proofs of the interest which he
took in favor of the free navigation of that river.
He had evinced this disposition by his opposition
to a projected treaty between our Secretary of
Foreign Affairs and Mr. Gardoqui, the representative
of Spain in 1786 by which it was proposed to
suspend our right to the free use of that river
for a certain time, that of twenty-five years.
It was known that he drew the paper which was
presented by the delegates of the state against that
project which was presented by the delegates of the
state against that project, and which had since been
published from the Secret Journals of Congress.
He had evinced a like disposition in his mission
to France by a note which represented to the
Committee of Public Safety in 1795 the
details of which have already been noticed.
Full confidence was therefore entertained
throughout the union in the zeal which
he would carry with him in the negotiation.
It was equally presumable that he would be well received
in France regarding incidents of his former mission,
the revolutionary party still being in power, and among
them many of those with whom he had been closely
connected and in great confidence during that mission.
Other considerations operated with peculiar force.
The intimate and cordial friendship and great harmony
in political life which he had so long enjoyed with the
President and Secretary of State with his highest
respect for their talents and merit, rendered it impossible
for him to decline a cooperation with them in support
of this great cause in which they were engaged.
Under these circumstances Mr. Monroe did not hesitate
to accept the appointment, although he knew that his
relinquishment of the bar and absence from the country
would increase the debts then existing and feared that
the new mission, however short it might be, would
subject him to still further difficulties, especially as he
was informed that no outfit would be allowed to him.
He repaired immediately to the city and sailed as
soon afterwards as his instructions were prepared.
His departure from the state being sudden, he
gave to Colonel James Lewis, a neighbor in whom
he had confidence, a power to sell his tract of land
above Charlottesville of 950 acres, and a large
tract in Kentucky, should any exigency require it.
As his new mission would commence with France, where
the debts which had not been paid of his former mission
were due for the house, which he was confident would be in
his favor, he should derive considerable aid; and that by his
presence with those to whom he was indebted, with whom
he held a friendly relation, be the decision as it might, he
should be able to prevent any pressure from that quarter….
He sailed from New York with his family on the
8th of March, 1803, and arrived at Havre de Grace
in France on the 8th of April following.
Colonel John Mercer of Fredericksburg, the son of
General Hugh Mercer, who fell at Provincetown in our
Revolutionary War, accompanied him as a friend, and
with intention to afford him all the aid in his power.
Mr. Monroe was not allowed a secretary.
Colonel Mercer was a young man
of talents and great worth….
On landing at Havre de Grace, he was saluted from
the battery, and as soon as he reached the hotel to which
he was conducted, a guard with an officer and 50 men
were sent to his quarters as a further tribute of respect.
To have sent back the whole guard might have
wounded the feelings of the commanding general.
Two sentinels only were retained, and by the
officer who commanded and led back the others
an acknowledgment was made to the General for
his kind attention with an assurance that by permitting
two only to remain the sensibility would be increased….
Mr. Monroe advised Mr. Livingston of his arrival
on the 8th, the day on which he reached Havre, and
the government was advised of it, as he understood,
on the same day by (mechanical) telegraph….
Between his first and second missions
six years had elapsed.
During his absence from France an important change
had been made in the government: that the Directory
and her Councils had been overthrown and the
Consular government established in its stead.
The latter was founded likewise on the sovereignty
of the people, but their agency in it and their
power in that character was essentially impaired.
Those in the latter government had supported
the Revolution and were all revolutionary
characters, but with different views, as was
inferred from those who had been put down.
Mr. Monroe had held a friendly relation in his first
mission with almost all who were in office, and with
many of those who had been removed by the change.
Between the parties he was aware that serious hostility
must exist, and that any intercourse on his part with
those opposed to the government would be noticed by
and diminish its confidence in him, which might operate
to the injury of his mission and of his country.
He considered it his duty therefore to adopt a rule
as to his intercourse with society, before he
reached Paris, which would prevent that effect.
The government of the country, acquiesced in by the
people, is the legitimate government for foreign powers to
treaty with and is entitled to the respect of their ministers.
In internal changes they should take no part,
the society alone having the right to make them.
In his first mission he treated the government while
in the hands of the Convention, and those of the
Directory and two Councils with equal respect.
A like respect was now due to the Consular
government, which he was resolved to show it.
In the former instances the sovereignty was
in the people unimpaired, to which principle
it was known that he was devoted.
Should any radical change be now contemplated,
his conduct would be more attended to and his
intercourse with those opposed to it more injurious.
He therefore considered himself bound, however
painfully, to designate those at variance with the existing
government whom it would be improper for him to see.
He did so, and of whom he made a list which he
gave to his principal servant with instruction should
any of them call, not to admit them, always giving
some excuse which should not be offensive.2
On 10 January 1803 President Thomas Jefferson
wrote this short letter to James Monroe:
I have but a moment to inform you that the fever into
which the Western mind is thrown by the affair at New
Orleans stimulated by the mercantile, & generally the
federal interest, threatens to overbear our peace.
In this situation we are obliged to call on you for a
temporary sacrifice of yourself, to prevent this greatest
of evils in the present prosperous tide of our affairs.
I shall tomorrow nominate you to the Senate for an
extraordinary mission to France, & the circumstances
are such as to render it impossible to decline;
because the whole public hope will be rested on you.
I wish you to be either in Richmond or Albemarle till you
receive another letter from me, which will be written
two days hence if the Senate decide immediately, or
later according to the time they will take to decide.
In the meantime pray work night & day to arrange your
affairs for a temporary absence, perhaps for a long one.3
On January 11 President Jefferson sent this message to the United States Senate:
The cession of the Spanish Province of Louisiana
to France, and perhaps of the Floridas, and the late
suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans
are events of primary interest to the United States.
On both occasions such measures were promptly taken
as were thought most likely amicably to remove the
present and to prevent future causes of inquietude.
The objects of these measures were to obtain the territory
on the left bank of the Mississippi and eastward of that, if
practicable, on conditions to which the proper authorities of
our country would agree, or at least to prevent any changes
which might lessen the secure exercise of our rights.
While my confidence in our minister plenipotentiary at Paris
is entire and undiminished, I still think that these objects
might be promoted by joining with him a person sent from
hence directly, carrying with him the feelings and sentiments
of the nation excited on the late occurrence, impressed by
full communications of all the views we entertain on this
interesting subject, and thus prepared to meet and to
improve to an useful result the counter propositions
of the other contracting party, whatsoever form
their interests may give to them, and to secure
to us the ultimate accomplishment of our object.
I therefore nominate Robert R. Livingston to be
minister plenipotentiary and James Monroe to be
minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary with full
powers to both jointly or to either on the death of the
other to enter into a treaty or convention with the First
Consul of France for the purpose of enlarging and more
effectually securing our rights and interests in the river
Mississippi and in the Territories eastward thereof.
But as the possession of these provinces is still in Spain,
and the course of events may retard or prevent the
cession to France being carried into effect, to secure
our object it will be expedient to address equal
powers to the Government of Spain also, to be
used only in the event of its being necessary.
I therefore nominate Charles Pinckney to be minister
plenipotentiary, and James Monroe, of Virginia, to be
minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary, with full
powers to both jointly, or to either on the death of the
other, to enter into a treaty or convention with His
Catholic Majesty for the purpose of enlarging and more
effectually securing our rights and interests in the river
Mississippi and in the Territories eastward thereof.4
Monroe was nominated as an envoy to France and Spain.
Also on January 11 the Charleston Courier wrote, “We would be justified to ourselves
and to the world in taking possession of the port in question and
reclaiming,
by force of arms, the advantages of which we have been unjustly deprived.”5
On that day President Thomas Jefferson nominated
his good friend Monroe as a minister to France.
Although the Federalists opposed Monroe for having favored the French,
the Republicans in the Senate gave him a 15-12 approval for his appointment.
Congress also approved $2 million to purchase New Orleans
and West Florida and East Florida.
Jefferson wrote this letter to Monroe on January 13:
I dropped you a line on the 10th informing
you of a nomination I had made of you to the
Senate, and yesterday I enclosed you their
approbation not then having time to write.
The agitation of the public mind on occasion
of the late suspension of our right of
deposit at New Orleans is extreme.
In the Western country it is natural
and grounded on honest motives.
In the seaports it proceeds from a desire for war
which increases the mercantile lottery; in the
federalists generally & especially those of Congress
the object is to force us into war if possible,
in order to derange our finances, or if this cannot
be done, to attach the Western country to them,
as their best friends, and thus get again into power.
Remonstrances, memorials &c. are now circulating
through the whole of the Western country & signing
by the body of the people the measures we have
been pursuing being invisible, do not satisfy their minds.
Something sensible therefore has become necessary;
and indeed our object of purchasing New Orleans
& the Floridas is a measure liable to assume so many
shapes, that no instructions could be squared to fit them.
It was essential then to send a Minister extraordinary
to be joined with the ordinary one, with discretionary
powers, first however well impressed with all our views
and therefore qualified to meet and modify to these every
form of proposition which could come from the other party.
This could be done only in full &
frequent oral communications.
Having determined on this, there could not be
two opinions among the republicans as to the person.
You possessed the unlimited confidence of the
administration & of the Western people; & generally
of the republicans everywhere; and were you to refuse
to go, no other man can be found who does this.
The measure has already silenced the feds here.
Congress will no longer be agitated by them:
and the country will become calm as
fast as the information extends over it.
All eyes, all hopes are now fixed on you;
and were you to decline, the chagrin would be
universal and would shake under your feet the
high ground on which you stand with the public.
Indeed I know nothing which would produce
such a shock, for on the event of this mission
depends the future destinies of this republic.
If we cannot by a purchase of the country ensure to
ourselves a course of perpetual peace & friendship
with all nations, then as war cannot be distant, it
behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course,
without however hastening it, and it may be necessary
(on your failure on the continent) to cross the channel.
We shall get entangled in European politics, and
figuring more, be much less happy & prosperous.
This can only be prevented by a successful
issue to your present mission.
I am sensible after the measures you have taken for
getting into a different line of business, that it will be
a great sacrifice on your part and presents from the
season & other circumstances serious difficulties.
But some men are born for the public nature by
fitting them for the service of the human race
on a broad scale, has stamped them with the
evidences of her destination & their duty.
But I am particularly concerned that in the present
case you have more than one sacrifice to make.
To reform the prodigalities of our predecessors is
understood to be peculiarly our duty & to bring the
government to a simple & economical course.
They, in order to increase expense, debt, taxation &
Patronage, tried always how much they could give.
The outfit given to ministers resident to enable them to
furnish their house, but given by no nation to a temporary
minister, who is never expected to take a house or to
entertain, but considered on the footing of a voyager,
they gave to their extraordinary missionaries by wholesale.
In the beginning of our administration, among other
articles of reformation in expense, it was determined
not to give an outfit to missionaries extraordinary,
and not to incur the expense with any minister of
sending a frigate to carry him or bring him.
The Boston happened to be going to the Mediterranean,
& was permitted therefore to take up Mr. Livingston
and touch in a port of France.
A frigate was denied to Charles Pinckney & has
been refused to Mr. Rufus King for his return.
Mr. Madison’s friendship & mine to you being so well known
the public will have eagle eyes to watch if we grant you any
indulgencies out of the general rule; and on the other hand,
the example set in your case will be more cogent on future
ones, and produce greater approbation to our conduct.
The allowance therefore will be in this & all similar cases,
all the expenses of your journey and voyage, taking a ship’s
cabin to yourself, 9,000 Dollars a year from your leaving
home till the proceedings of your mission are terminated, &
then the quarter’s salary for the expenses of your return as
prescribed by law—as to the time of your going, you cannot
too much hasten it, as the moment in France is critical.
St. Domingo delays their taking possession of Louisiana, and
they are in the last distress for money for current purposes.
You should arrange your affairs for an absence
of a year at least, perhaps for a long one.
It will be necessary for you to stay here
some days on your way to New York you
will receive here what advance you choose.6
Jefferson told Monroe that if the French rejected a deal and occupied New Orleans,
he could go to England and negotiate an alliance with them.
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were good friends and trusted each other.
On January 18 President Jefferson sent a longer message to Congress
about trade with Indian tribes and proposed,
An intelligent officer with ten or twelve chosen men fit for
the enterprise and willing to undertake it taken from our
posts where they may be spared without inconvenience,
might explore the whole line even to the Western Ocean,
have conferences with the natives on the subject of
commercial intercourse, get admission among them for
our traders as others are admitted, agree on convenient
deposits for an interchange of articles, and return with
the information acquired in the course of two summers.
Their arms and accouterments, some instruments of
observation, and light and cheap presents for the Indians
would be all the apparatus they could carry, and with
an expectation of a soldier’s portion of land on their
return would constitute the whole expense.7
On January 28 William Coleman published in the New York Evening Post:
It belongs of right to the United States to
regulate the future destiny of North America.
The country is ours; ours is the right to its rivers and to
all the sources of future opulence, power and happiness.8
On January 31 Secretary of State James Madison in a letter to Monroe and
Livingston confirmed, “I return to you Monroe’s instructions which are entirely right,”
and he also directed them:
to treat with the Government of the French Republic on
the subject of the Mississippi, and the territories eastward
thereof, and without the limits of the United States.
The object in view is to procure by just and satisfactory
arrangements a cession to the United States of New Orleans
and of West and East Florida or as much thereof as the
actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with.9
Monroe in New York wrote this letter to
Secretary of State James Madison on February 22:
I arrived here on Saturday so much overcome
with the fatigue of the journey that I kept my bed
yesterday & was attended by a physician.
Today I am better though confined to my room.
In a day or two I shall be well.
A ship was engaged for me, the cabin prepared,
& she detained sometime at my expense, & finally
sailed on account of the great expense of her
detention and the uncertainty of my movements.
A ship called the Richmond is here & will sail in about 10
or 12 days bound to Hamburg but will land me in Havre.
In her I shall take a passage.
In my next I will be more particular.
I heard with regret the Senate would
discuss the appropriation with open door.
I trust this will not be the case.
It is said that a new constitution is formed or forming
in France whereby Bonaparte is Emperor of the Gauls.
A report, said to be sanctioned from some person
by letter from Paris, is the foundation of this.10
President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison also made Monroe
an extraordinary and plenipotentiary minister to France and to Spain.
Congress approved $2 million and told Monroe he could offer as much as
$9 million for New Orleans and West Florida.
On 7 March 1803 James Monroe wrote this letter to his good friend President Jefferson:
I received yours of the 25 ultimo with one to
Mr. de Cepede, this morning, when I also received my
instructions from the department of State, with all the other
documents connected with my mission to France & Spain.
The ship, Richmond, of about 400 tons burden whose
cabin I have taken, cleared at the custom house on
Saturday, my baggage was put on board, in expectation
of sailing yesterday as Mr. Madison informed me my
instructions ought to arrive by 6 in the morning;
but it being Sunday, they were delayed till today.
We are now detained by a snow storm and contrary wind,
but shall sail as soon as it clears up, & the wind shifts.
The resolutions of Mr. Ross prove that the
federal party will stick at nothing to embarrass
the administration, and recover its lost power.
They nevertheless produce a great effect on the public mind
and I presume more especially in the western country.
The unanimity in the public councils respecting our right
to the free navigation of the river, and its importance
to every part of the United States, the dissatisfaction
at the interference of Spain which will not be appeased
while the power of a similar one exists, was calculated
to inspire the hope of a result which may put us
at ease forever on those points.
If the negotiation secures all the objects sought, or a
deposit with the sovereignty over it, the federalists will
be overwhelmed completely: the union of the western
with the Eastern people will be consolidated, republican
principles confirmed, and a fair prospect of permanent
peace and happiness presented to our country.
But if the negotiation compromises short of that, and
leaves the management of our great concerns in that river,
which comprise everything appertaining to the western
parts of the United States, in the hands of a foreign power,
may we not expect that the public will be disappointed
and disapprove of the result?
So far as I can judge, I think much would be
hazarded by any adjustment which did not
put us in complete security for the future.
It is doubtful whether an adjustment short of that
would be approved in any part of the union; I am
thoroughly persuaded it would not to the westward.
If they were discontented, there would grow up a
union of councils and measures between them and
the Eastern people which might lead to other
measures & be perverted to bad purposes.
The Eastern towns, which govern the country wish war
for the sake of privateering: the western would not
dislike it especially if they were withheld from a just right,
or the enjoyment of a privilege necessary to their welfare,
the pursuit of which by force would create a vast
expenditure of money among them.
Their confidence is now reposed in the administration
from the best of motives a knowledge that it is sincerely
friendly to their interests: it is strengthened by a distrust
of these new friends; but an inquietude has been created
by the late event, an inquiry has taken place which has
shown that every part of the union especially the Eastern
is deeply interested in opening the river; that the attempt
to occlude it on a former occasion was a base perhaps
a corrupt intrigue of a few; their hopes and expectations
have been raised, and it is probable they expect from
the mission by a peaceful course everything which
their enemies promised by war.
The consequences of a disappointment
are not easily calculated.
If it restored the federal party to power and
involved us in war, the result might be fatal.
It therefore highly merits consideration whether
we should not take that ground as the ultimatum
in the negotiation which must in every possible event
preserve the confidence & affection of the western people.
While we stand well with them, we shall prosper.
We shall be most apt to avoid war, taking ten years
ensuing together; and if we are driven by necessity
into it, it is much better that it be under the auspices
of a republican than a monarchic administration.
These ideas are expressed in haste for your consideration
for I have not time to give them method or form.
I shall most certainly labor to obtain the best
terms possible, but it is for you to say, what
are the least favorable we must accept.
You will have time to weigh the subject & feel the public
pulse on it before anything conclusive may be done.
I hope the French government will have wisdom enough
to see that we will never suffer France or any other
power to tamper with our interior; if that is not the
object there can be no reason for declining an
accommodation to the whole of our demands.
I accepted my appointment with gratitude and enter
on its duties with an ardent zeal to accomplish its objects.
I derive much satisfaction from a knowledge that I am in the
hands of those whose views are sound, are attached to
justice, and will view my conduct with candor and liberality.
Under these circumstances I embark with confidence &
am fearless of the result as it respects myself personally.
I shall take the liberty to write you occasionally
and shall at all times be most happy to hear
from you and receive your commands.11
On March 8 Monroe and his family embarked for France,
and they reached Le Havre on April 8.
They arrived at Paris on 11 April 1803 were met by the Finance Minister Barbé-Marbois.
On April 11 Talleyrand sent a letter to Robert Livingston
asking if the US wanted all of Louisiana.
Livingston replied no; they only wanted New Orleans and the Floridas.
According to Henry Adams, the historian of the Jefferson Administration,
Livingston and Monroe wanted the President to
seize West Florida and negotiate for East Florida.
Jefferson preferred to negotiate for West Florida
and to leave East Florida alone for the time.12
On 13 April 1803 Monroe wrote this letter to Robert R. Livingston:
I think you intimated your intention to present me
this evening to the minister of foreign affairs, which
I presume must be at his house informally at a party.
On this consideration I beg to suggest whether it
would not be better for you to write him a note
informing him of my arrival in town & requesting
him to appoint an hour for you to present me to him.
My anxiety for you to make this communication
without delay is the motive for my writing to you
to that effect before I have the pleasure to see you
today at 11 o’clock, at which hour I am to call on you.
The idea is however only submitted to your judgment.13
Monroe found that Livingston, who was 15 years older, was trying to control
the negotiation so that he could claim the credit.
Monroe wrote a letter complaining to Secretary of State Madison on April 15,
I informed you from Havre on the 9th
of my arrival there the day before, and that
I should set out the day after for Paris.
On the 12th I arrived here, and on the 13th was
announced by Mr. Livingston to the Minister of
Foreign Relations, who received me yesterday
in a Manner which was perfectly satisfactory.
He said that the first Consul was much gratified by the
disposition which our Government had shown, in the
Circumstances which produced the present Mission,
and had also expressed himself in Terms very
favorable to my Colleague and myself:
he promised to see him that Evening and endeavor
to fix the Time when I should be presented to him.
No Minister has yet been presented except
at public audiences, which are monthly.
If I am held to that Rule, it will not
take place ’till the 5th of next month.
He observed however that a person would
be designated to treat with us, with whom
we might communicate before I was presented.
I heard on my arrival that General Bernadotte
who had been appointed sometime before Minister
to the United States, had been ordered on
the 10th to set out immediately on his Mission.
As my arrival at Havre was known here on the 9th, it might
be inferred that this order was given in consequence of it.
In this I was confirmed by General La Fayette who informed
me that he had apprised General Bernadotte of my Arrival
at Havre—that I was expected here on that day;
and that he had entreated him to wait until I came.
So peremptory, however, were the orders for his departure,
that although he expressed a desire to see me, and knew
that I had actually arrived before he left Paris, he
could not delay it a few hours only for that purpose.
I was inclined to suspect that this measure proceeded
from a desire to evade a negotiation here, since it
might be said, when we pressed the Government
to enter into one, that General Bernadotte was
sent on that Business to the United States.
The menacing aspect of a war with Britain made this
the more presumable, since if they were not disposed
to meet our views, it might furnish a motive for
seeking a plausible pretext for procrastination.
General Bernadotte it is said considers himself sent
with power to adjust this affair with us, which Idea
is countenanced by a communication from the
Minister of Foreign Relations to Mr. Livingston,
of which you have doubtless a Copy, in which he
states that the first Consul had resolved to send a
Minister to the United States to obtain Information
relative to all points connected with Louisiana.
It has since been represented to me that General
Bernadotte is unfriendly to the present order of
things here, and that his Mission, whatever may
be the light in which it appears to him, is
nevertheless nothing more than an honorable Exile.
Mr. Petree, his Secretary is, I understand,
still here waiting, I presume, his final Instructions.
It is said that this Government has resolved
to offer us by sale the whole of Louisiana.
This was intimated by Mr. Marbois to Mr. Livingston
the day after my arrival, and to me since through
another Channel, as that the decision was formed
at St. Cloud, the day on which General Bernadotte
was ordered to set out for the United States.
It was intimated by the former that the first Consul
estimated the Territory at about 120 Millions of
Livres, 20 of which or near that Sum being due
our Citizens, would of course be paid to them.
On being urged to state the lowest terms they would
probably take, he said, they might possibly be brought to
accept 60—with the payment of the debt due our Citizens.
As this communication took place between Mr. Livingston
and Mr. Marbois the day after my arrival here,
it was doubtless produced by the decision
at St. Cloud already mentioned.
I am sorry to say that it is still impossible
for me to ascertain with any Certainty the
views of this Government towards us.
By the above facts, some of which are of doubtful aspect,
you will be able to form some estimate of them.
It may be its Intention to amuse us while
the crisis with England is suspended.
My Colleague has been strongly impressed with this opinion,
and has urged as a Motive for his holding communications
with Marbois before I was presented, a fact which was
important, that the decision of France relative to the
question with England most probably depended,
on the return of a Courier from Petersburg,
who had been sent to obtain the decision of the
Russian Cabinet on some important point,
and who was expected back in about a fortnight.
If it is their Intention to meet us fairly, the door is
open and it may be soon done: if they mean to
amuse us, that intention will soon be seen through,
of which you shall be informed in due time.
Much light will be thrown on the Subject by the arrival of
General Bernadotte, since the Extent of his Powers and the
object of his Mission will be immediately unfolded to you.
If the Intention of this Government remains equivocal for
any length of time, it will rest with the President to decide
the part it belongs to him to take in such a Conjuncture.
I shall endeavor to act in such a manner as while I give
full force to the tone which the State of things in America,
and the views of the Government impose on my Mission,
will cause no offense and afford no pretext to our Enemies,
if we have any; to impute an unfavorable result,
should it occur, either to the Government or myself.14
Monroe wrote in his Autobiography:
On Mr. Monroe’s arrival at his quarters in Paris a message
was delivered to him from his estimable friend, General
Lafayette, requesting that he would call on him as soon as
convenient at his aunt’s, Madame de Tascher, where he
lodged, and with whose address he was apprised.
He was informed by Mr. Skipwith that Lafayette was
confined to his bed in consequence of a fall on the ice
in the winter by which his hip joint had been dislocated,
and that he could not rise or change his position.
Mr. Monroe called on him the next day
and found him in the state described.
Their interview was affecting by a recollection of
the incidents which had occurred between them and
those relating to Madame Lafayette on Mr. Monroe’s
first mission when the General was confined at Olmutz.
The President, Mr. Jefferson, had committed to Mr. Monroe
the act of Congress which allowed to the General land and
commutation which officers of his rank were entitled to
for their service in our Revolutionary war, and to which
he had set up no claims, preferring to bear his own
expenses, and to render his service gratuitously.
Mr. Jefferson had likewise committed to Mr. Monroe
a letter for the General explanatory of the motive
which led to the act with a renewed assurance
of his own undiminished attachment….
In the morning of the day which ensued Mr. Monroe’s
arrival he was called upon by a confidential friend who
informed him that on the Sunday preceding (April 10)
the First Consul (Napoleon) had held a cabinet council
at St. Cloud in which he apprised his Ministers of his
decision to cede to the United States the province
of Louisiana, and that he should commit the
arrangement of the negotiation to Mr. Marbois.
This friend enjoyed likewise the confidence
of the two great Houses of Hope and Baring.
He stated that the object of Mr. Monroe’s mission
was known to those Houses, as it was, that he
might and probably would require the loan of a
considerable sum of money to accomplish it.
He assured Monroe that he was authorized by
Houses to inform him that they would make
the loan for any sum he might require.
Mr. Monroe asked to what amount and
on what conditions would they make it?
For ten millions should you desire that sum,
and on the terms your government will
approve at six percent per annum.
Mr. Monroe replied that he did not expect to
have occasion for anything like that sum but
that it was important and gratifying to him to
know that he might obtain it if necessary.
As this communication was confidential and differed so
entirely from the opinion entertained by Mr. Livingston as
expressed in his letter to Mr. Monroe of the 8th, and in the
interview which took place at his own house on the evening
of Mr. Monroe’s arrival, no notice was taken of it when
he called in the morning to peruse his correspondence
with the French government according to appointment….
An interview took place at this period with Joseph
Bonaparte, which it is likewise proper to notice.
Mr. Monroe took a letter to him from Mr. Pichon,
the chargé d’ affaires of France in the United States, which
he left at his house in Paris immediately after his arrival.
Mr. Bonaparte was then in the country.
As soon as he received the letter, he sent a message
to Mr. Monroe with a request that he would call at his
house in the city at an appointed hour, which he did,
and was received in a very friendly manner.
The object of the mission was adverted to in the interview,
and to which Mr. Bonaparte expressed a desire that it
might succeed, as he thought we had a just claim to
our demands, and that an amicable arrangement
would be advantageous to both countries.
Mr. Monroe believed that he held the same language
to his brother and on very disinterested motives….
Mr. Monroe dined with Mr. Livingston the day after his
arrival on the 13th accompanied by his friends Mr. Skipwith
and Colonel Mercer, and while at dinner they were
informed that Mr. Marbois had arrived and wished to see
Mr. Livingston, but being apprised that they had not left
the table, he amused himself by a walk in the garden.
On retiring from the table, Mr. Marbois had a private
interview with Mr. Livingston in which he informed
him that the First Consul (Napoleon) had decided on
the 10th to make to the United States the cession
above stated and had entrusted to him the negotiation.
An interview between Mr. Livingston and Mr. Marbois at
the house of the latter at eleven o’clock that night was
agreed on between them, and which took place accordingly.
From this period no doubt was entertained of the
decision of the First Consul to cede the province.
The points to be adjusted respected the extent to
which the cession should be carried and the
conditions on which it might be obtained.
Mr. Monroe was presented to Mr. Talleyrand,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Mr. Livingston
immediately after his arrival, who received
him in kindness and attention.
He assured them that the First Consul was much
gratified by the disposition which had been
manifested by our government in adopting the
mission and had expressed himself in very
favorable terms of the Minister employed in it.
He promised to see him that evening and would endeavor
to fix the time when Mr. Monroe should be presented to him.
He observed that no Minister had been presented except
at private audiences, but that a person would be appointed
to treat with him and with whom they might proceed in
the same manner as if he had been already presented.
On the next audience day he was presented to the
First Consul, and his reception corresponded with the
communication which had been made to Mr. Livingston
and himself by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
when he was presented to him.
“You have been here before,” said he to Mr. Monroe, who
replied that he had been, and at a very interesting epoch.
The diplomatic corps, which was very numerous,
being present, the remarks which the First Consul
made were of general nature, but of a character
very friendly to our government and country.
The diplomatic corps dined with the First Consul on that day.
On retiring to the drawing room after dining, he advanced
to Mr. Monroe and communicated more freely with him.
He made inquiries respecting our President, Mr. Jefferson,
of whom he spoke in very favorable terms.
He asked where he resided in the recess of
Congress, whether in the city or on his own estate.
He adverted to our relations with other powers
and to the state of our interior with apparent interest.
The conference being in some measure private,
it attracted the attention of the ministers and
particularly of Lord Whitworth from England,
and in consequence it was not long continued.
In compliance with the assurance which had been
given to our Minister by Mr. Talleyrand when Mr. Monroe
was presented to him, that a minister would be appointed
to treat with them, a notification was immediately
afterwards sent to them that the appointment had
been conferred on Mr. Marbois, and from whom an
intimation was received that he would commence the
negotiation as soon as it might be convenient to them.
They were unwilling to lose a day.
The negotiation immediately commenced and terminated
with a treaty and two conventions bearing date on the
30th of April by which the whole province of Louisiana
was ceded to the United States and provision made for
the payment of the sum stipulated to be given for it.
Our government contemplated only the acquisition
of the Island of New Orleans and the territory
eastward of the river, for which our Ministers
were authorized to give ten million dollars.
It was ascertained in the first conference that the First
Consul would cede no part of the province if he did not
cede the whole, and on a comparison of the value and
the condition on which they were able to obtain it with
that of the part sought and the sum they were authorized
to give for it, our Ministers did not hesitate between
the alternatives thus presented to them….
Eighty millions of livres were stipulated to be given for it,
of which sixty were to be paid to France and twenty to
our citizens in discharge of the debts to them by France.
The sum to be paid to France, equal to eleven
million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars,
was to be paid in stock with a credit of fifteen
years on the payment of six percent annually.
At the expiration of that term the principal
was to be discharged by installments by
the payment of three millions per year.
Cash instead of stock was asked for the sum
to be paid to France, and a perpetual exemption
of French vessels from foreign duties, instead
of one for twelve years, which was agreed on.
The negotiation was conducted by the Ministers
on each side in a spirit of great candor and liberality.
They had been long and intimately acquainted
and had great confidence in each other.
This very important transaction being thus concluded,
the agent of the two Houses of Hope and Baring, who
had communicated with Mr. Monroe on his arrival,
requested our Ministers to place them on the same
ground with the French government which they had
held with them, which they readily undertook and
for which an opportunity was immediately afforded.
It being the object of the French government to convert the
stock into cash, Mr. Marbois asked our Ministers to whom it
might be disposed of with most advantage to both nations.
They designated to him those two great Houses with an
assurance that they thought them competent in Europe,
and that they would act with great candor and liberality.
They had had occasion to mention them in
the course of the negotiation, to show the
estimation in which our stock was held.
In the present instance they were more full and explicit.
A contract was formed by the French government
with these Houses; by this the stock was sold to
them at a fair price, and who fulfilled their
engagement with great punctuality and credit….
The war with England was anticipated from the debates
in the British Parliament and particularly from the speeches
of Lord Grenville and Mr. Canning, as early as the 23rd of
November, 1802, and it is obvious from the communication
of the First Consul to the Corps Legislative of the 20th of
February following in which he proposed that 500,000 men
should be raised to defend and revenge the Republic in
that war, that he then deemed it inevitable….
That the approaching war with England contributed
to the cession there can be no doubt, but that it was
his sole motive is not to be believed.15
Madison had written letters to Monroe and Livingston on 18 April 1803
and another to Monroe two days later, and those letters arrived in June.
Monroe on April 19 sent this report to Secretary of State Madison:
I dined yesterday with the Minister of foreign relations
in Company with my colleague, Mr. Marbois and others.
After dinner Mr. Marbois and myself had much
conversation on the Subject of my Mission in
which he declared with frankness an earnest desire
to adjust every possible cause of variance with us.
He assured me that the first Consul had decided to offer
us the whole of Louisiana for 100 Millions of Livres, and
the assumption on our part of the debt they owe to our
Citizens which is estimated at about 20 more: that he
authorized him to make that proposal to us and to
engage his support of our Claim to the Floridas with Spain:
that he did believe he might be prevailed on to accept 60,
with the payment of the Debt as above, but not less,
and he was fearful from the peremptory tone of the
consul’s Character, if we did not meet him on the ground
proposed he might dismiss the subject from his Mind
and with difficulty be brought to take it up again.
Mr. Livingston and myself having previously resolved
to offer 50 Millions, out of which that debt was to be paid,
I adhered to that ground; adding that what had passed
ought to be considered as a manifestation of the liberal
and confidential spirit with which we were disposed to
treat with the first Consul, in a negotiation committed
to him, since he Mr. Marbois having produced no powers,
and I not being recognized or rather presented
to the first Consul, we had dispensed with form.
He admitted the liberality of our Conduct, but observed that
as he was a Minister of his Government, and I had been
received by the Minister of foreign affairs, by order of
the Consul, the proceeding was not altogether irregular.
It was agreed however by him that we ought
not to proceed further till he produced powers.
I shall see him today by appointment and
go further into the affair with him.16
On April 27 Monroe wrote in his journal a detailed account of his meetings
with Livingston and Marbois, and he wrote some more on May 1 and 2.
Napoleon knew that Talleyrand’s negotiations with the Americans
had led to the Quasi-War between the United States and France.
Napoleon needed money for another war, and he told Barbé-Marbois
to sell all of the Louisiana Territory to the United States.
This surprised the other American diplomat Robert Livingston.
Monroe wrote six letters to Madison in June and one with Livingston.
Livingston was outranked by Monroe and resented that, and he had
slowed down the process of getting Monroe’s credentials approved.
Livingston wanted West Florida included with the Louisiana Territory,
and Monroe and Jefferson accepted that position.
Livingston persuaded Barbé-Marbois to lower the price to 60 million livres.
Napoleon said that he would handle the selling of Louisiana himself.
Barbé-Marbois told the two Americans that
Napoleon would accept their offer of $15 million.
Napoleon praised the American victory over the British,
and he predicted they would do that again.
The United States did not have enough money, and Monroe arranged for a loan
from the Houses of Hope and Baring, and he assured
Barbé-Marbois that they could convert stock into cash.
The three ministers signed a treaty on May 2 and backdated it to April 30,
and it did not mention West Florida.
The Louisiana Territory sold was estimated at 828,000 square miles, which was about
the current size of the United States, and the cost was about three cents an acre.
The U. S. was selling unsettled land for $2 an acre.
Napoleon told Monroe that he was selling the Louisiana Territory in order to
preserve the friendship between the two republics.
Monroe also wrote in his Autobiography:
The object of the mission with France being thus
accomplished, and the treaty and conventions forwarded
to the government, Mr. Monroe had to decide whether
he would remain in Paris until he should receive the order
of the government on a view of those documents, as to
the course he should pursue, or proceed directly to
Madrid and endeavor to settle the boundaries of Louisiana
and to acquire that portion of the territory which still
belonged to Spain on the eastern side of the river.
His opinion was that it would be advisable to proceed
immediately to Madrid under the impression that the
cession which had been made by France would be felt by
the government of Spain and induce it to make like cession.
He was persuaded that all the considerations which
applied to one power were equally applicable to the
other: a desire to accommodate the United States
and the danger of a war with England.
He thought also that as the remaining territory of Spain
in that quarter would be included within our limits, it
would be of little value to her, since her government must
know that at no distant period we should acquire it, the
United States being a rising and Spain a declining power.
Under this impression he addressed a letter on the 19th
of May 1803 to Mr. Talleyrand communicating his decision
and requesting the good offices of his government which
had been promised under Marbois in the late negotiation
in support of that contemplated with Spain.
Several days elapsed and no answer was received.
Mr. Monroe had an engagement at this period
with the Consul Cambacérès, and attended
at his house at the hour appointed.
The party, consisting of civil and military officers,
was numerous and very respectable.
The Consul was absent and did not return till a late hour.
His secretary, Mr. Monvil, informed Mr. Monroe
that he had gone to St. Cloud to attend the
First Consul in a cabinet council, and that
interesting concerns must have detained him.
As soon as he entered, he advanced to Mr. Monroe and
said to him, in a low voice, there being many present, that
there being many present, that he must not go to Madrid.
Mr. Monroe asked the reason, observing that he had
nothing to do in Paris, and thought that the
present was the most favorable moment.
He repeated the advice several times without explaining
the motive for it, and finally referred him to Mr. Marbois,
the Secretary of the Treasury, who, he said,
would give the explanation desired.
He immediately left the Consul and called at the
house of the Secretary that evening, well knowing
that he would act with the utmost candor and
withhold nothing from him which he could with
propriety communicate, but did not find him at home.
In this state of suspense, dispatches were received
from Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State, of the 18th
and 20th of April, authorizing Mr. Monroe, provided
our affairs with France should have been satisfactorily
adjusted to proceed to England, Mr. King having retired,
no chargé d’affaires having been appointed,
and war menacing between England and France.
Mr. Monroe did not hesitate to adopt that measure and
of which he immediately apprised the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in an interview which he obtained for the purpose.
In this interview the Minister expected that a pressure
would be made by Mr. Monroe for an answer to
his letter calling on the French government for its
aid in his negotiation with Spain, which had been
promised in that with France by Mr. Marbois.
He soon relieved him from all anxiety on that subject
by informing him that he had just received a dispatch
from the government to that effect, and by a full and
frank explanation of the motives which led to it and
of the contingency on which it was made to depend.
The Minister was gratified by the communication, which he
considered a new proof of the good faith of our government
in its conduct with his and of its sincere desire to preserve
peace and friendship between the United States and France.
In adverting to what had passed in the late negotiation,
he declared that nothing short of the course which had
been pursued by our government would have obtained
the result which had attended it, Mr. Monroe requested
the Minister to communicate to the First Consul the
information which he had given to him, with his
intention to depart at an early day and his desire to be
favored with a private audience, to take leave of him,
before his departure, which he readily undertook.
He expressed, however, a doubt, as the Consul intended
to commence his tour of the Belgic in a few days and
was pre-engaged by appointments for the whole interval,
whether it would be in his power to comply with the request.
A few days after the conference with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Monroe received a note from him
requesting his attendance at St. Cloud at one o’clock
the next day, when he would present him to the
First Consul, which was accordingly done.
The interview was interesting.
Mr. Monroe made to him, in substance, the same
communication which he had made to the Minister,
to which he added that he was instructed by the
President to assure him, before his departure, of his
high respect for him personally and of his earnest
desire to preserve peace and friendship with France.
The First Consul reciprocated the sentiment
in favor of the President and the United States
in terms that were strong and explicit.
He said that he considered the President an
enlightened man, a friend to liberty, who understood
and pursued with zeal the interest of his country.
No on wished, he observed, more than he did the
preservation of friendship between the two republics.
He had ceded to the United States Louisiana,
not so much on account of the sum
obtained for it, as to preserve that relation.
He had seen that we entertained a jealousy of their
possession of that province which threatened to force
us into measures which might prove equally injurious
to both nations, and which he wished to prevent by
an act which should remove all cause for anxiety on
that point and leave us at liberty to pursue the
course which interest and feeling might dictate.
Mr. Monroe assured him that he viewed the
cession in the light in which he had placed it,
as an act of enlightened policy which had for
its object the great result which he had stated.
The First Consul observed that there was no rivalship or
conflict of interest between the United States and France,
their relation being principally commercial, and each
requiring what the other had to spare, but that we
must be careful not to give the protection of
our flag to the commerce of England.
Mr. Monroe suggested that in the latter remark he touched
an interest, which would merit his most mature deliberation
and might, in the consequences incident to the existing war,
form an appeal to his candor.
If he admitted that free ships made free goods, as he
understood that he did, no difficulty could arise on that head.
He acknowledged that it was one not free from difficulty,
and to which due attention should be paid.
He then observed that the present was not the proper
time to treat with Spain for Florida; that she complained
much of the cession which he had made to us of Louisiana
and that he must have time to reconcile her to it.
Mr. Monroe remarked that as Florida would be within our
limits, she had better cede it to us than retain it, since we
could not fail ultimately to acquire it, and it would be more
admirable for her to cede it by amicable negotiation at a fair
equivalent at once, than risk the consequences of a rupture.
He persisted in the idea that that was not the proper time
to treat for it, but left Mr. Monroe under the impression
that at some future time he would afford the aid
which had been pledged, and thus they parted.
The First Consul set out on the evening of that day
on his tour along the coast bordering on the Channel
with intention to menace a descent on England.17
Monroe had carefully avoided meeting with those favoring some sort of return
to more democratic government in France without taking sides on the issue.
He was for democracy and realized that it was not his role to involve himself in
this conflict in France during his negotiations on Louisiana and the Floridas.
This enabled him to make agreements with the ruling
First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte that were beneficial to both nations.
Yet in his Autobiography he described the politics in that French conflict
without being involved in that process, and that took up the remainder of his Chapter 5.
On April 27 and May 1 Monroe had written eight pages in his
“Journal or Memoranda—Louisiana” describing meetings he had with Mr. Marbois.
Monroe wrote to Livingston on May 5 and 6, and he proposed a
“Draft of Convention” that does not mention the Floridas
and suggests a price of about 20 million francs.
Monroe wrote letters to Madison and President Jefferson on May 18,
and he recognized the Floridas as “an important object of our government.”
On May 25 he enclosed a private letter to three Virginia Senators
with another letter to Madison.
In his History of Louisiana Barbé-Marbois quoted Napoleon as saying,
This accession of territory strengthens forever the power
of the United States; and I have just given to England a
maritime rival, that will sooner or later humble her pride.18
On 18 May 1803 James Monroe in Paris wrote
this letter to Secretary of State James Madison:
Since the conclusion of the treaty with France
for the purchase of Louisiana, which was forwarded
to you on the 13 by Mr. Hughes, with a joint letter
from my colleague and myself, I feel much at a
loss what part to take respecting the Floridas.
There are some considerations in favor of an
immediate pursuit of that object with Spain
which have great weight on my mind.
The cession of Louisiana by France to the United States
must lessen the value of the Floridas to Spain, and she
will be apt to feel that effect more sensibly immediately
after she hears it than at any other time.
France too, who has promised her aid in the negotiation
with Spain, would probably take more interest in it at
this moment, while the obligation to yield it is in a
manner personal, than she might do hereafter.
At this crisis of affairs between France and England,
which comprises Spain in equal degree, there is
reason to believe that we should derive much
aid from a pressure on Spain from that cause.
It is equally presumable that England even in case of war,
would not interfere with our pursuit much less
break with us for obtaining the Floridas.
The exclusion of her manufactures from the continent
of Europe, is a principal cause of her present
unquiet & distressed situation.
It is her interest to cherish the United States & Russia,
as her best markets; a policy which I believe
she understands and pursues with sincerity.
To be involved in a war with us at this epoch
would prove a great calamity to her.
I have no doubt that at this time she is rather
indifferent respecting our acquisition of Louisiana,
& that which we propose to make of the Floridas,
or in no situation to oppose it.
Indeed it is not improbable that she may wish it,
as it weakens those powers in that quarter &
promises to open new markets to her manufactures.
Should we not however acquire this territory of Spain at this
period, there is danger of its falling into the hands of some
other power hereafter, a circumstance which might give us
much trouble, as it commands the mouths of several of our
rivers, and gives a right to the navigation of the Mississippi.
There are also considerations against my pursuing
the object at present of great weight.
We have already stipulated for a much greater
sum, than it was contemplated we should
give for the object of my mission.
To go further might embarrass our Treasury.
It may be advisable to exchange a portion of
Louisiana next Mexico for the Floridas, and
I have no power to make such an arrangement.
I have weighed these considerations with the attention
they merit, and the result is that I am of opinion that
it is more in conformity to the spirit of my instructions,
& the interest of my country that I should proceed
immediately to Madrid to endeavor to obtain the
Floridas, than remain inactive and suffer the
favorable occasion which is now presented to be lost.
The acquisition of the Floridas is an important object with
our government, as is sufficiently shown by our instructions.
The purchase of the whole of Louisiana though not
contemplated, is nevertheless a measure founded
on the principles and justified by the policy of our
instructions, provided it is thought a good bargain.
The only difference between the acquisition we have made,
& that which we were instructed to make in that respect,
is that a favorable occasion presenting itself, which indeed
was anticipated by the administration in the measures
which led to that event & indeed laid the foundation for it,
we have gone further than we were instructed to do.
But the extent of that acquisition does not
destroy the motive which existed before of
acquiring the Floridas, nor essentially diminish it.
In our instructions the idea entertained by the
President of the value of that country is defined.
It is to be presumed that under existing
circumstances it may be had at a cheaper rate,
since its importance to Spain is much diminished.
And although the sum to be paid for Louisiana is
considerable, yet the period at which that portion, which
is applicable to the government of France, is to be paid,
is so remote, and such delays are incident to that which
will be received by our citizens, that it is to be presumed,
the payment of what it would be proper to stipulate for the
Floridas, would subject our Treasury to no embarrassment.
I am the more confident in this opinion from the belief
that it would be easy to raise on the land alone,
retaining to our government the jurisdiction, a sum
which would be sufficient to discharge the greater
part of what it is probable Spain would ask for it.
The bias of my mind therefore is to pursue this object
by repairing immediately to Madrid, and endeavoring
to obtain by treaty the territory in question, thereby
extirpating the last remaining source of controversy
or indeed of jealousy with these powers.
If I proceed, it will be in a week from this time within
which term every arrangement incident to the treaty
& conventions we have formed with this republic will
probably be completed; and the little provision
necessary for my journey to Spain likewise made.
On this subject I shall write you again soon,
let the decision which I take be what it may.
In case I go I shall leave my family at St. Germaine till
my return which I shall expect to do in a few months.19
Monroe and Livingston wrote this private letter to Madison on June 7:
I enclose you a view which I have taken of the
question whether West Florida is comprised in the
cession lately made to the United States by France of
Louisiana, in which I am led to conclude that it is.
Indeed I think that the doctrine
is too clear to admit of any doubt.
The bargain is proportionally a
more advantageous one to us.
You will see by our joint letter the propriety of an early
decision on and compliance with the stipulations in the treaty
& conventions, to which I have only to add that nothing
has occurred to diminish the force of what is there urged.
I most earnestly hope that our dispatches will reach you
in good time and that you will hasten to perform every
act which is provided for on the part of the United States.
I have still great difficulty in deciding whether I ought to
proceed immediately to Spain or remain here
till I hear from you after you have become acquainted
with what has been concluded with France.
The arguments for either course have weight.
I shall however certainly not go, if at all, till I see that
everything is adjusted here in the fullest manner possible.20
Monroe wrote two letters to Madison on June 8, the first this private letter:
In our public communications we have been
so full that little is left to be added here.
I enclose you a letter open addressed to General Mason,
W. C. Nicholas & Mr. Breckinridge containing a statement
of facts relative to what has occurred here which
I have thought it proper to put under your control.
You may either deliver or retain it to be
returned to me when I get back to America.
Circumstances may occur to make a knowledge of
those facts necessary, in which case it is possible
there may be an advantage in their being known
without its being supposed they came from you.
Of this you will judge and dispose of the enclosed
as you think best.
You will readily conceive how much to be avoided
everything like a discussion of the kind referred to is to be.
I sincerely wish my colleague to derive all the advantage
& credit which his good exertions & intentions entitle him to,
but the transaction ought to rest on its true ground,
as a memorable incident in our history tending to prove
the wisdom of the measures of the last session.
I am of opinion that it imports the credit of the
administration to treat him with kindness & attention.
Having sufficiently explained myself in my private letter—
by Mr. Hughes I say nothing on this occasion
other than to refer you to that.
I shall enclose to your care a letter to Mr. Jones & probably
others to be sent after Mr. Jay to Havre; having no time
to write them at present or even to enlarge in this.21
The other longer letter on June 8 to Madison was entirely in cipher
and was about Monroe’s negotiation with Marbois.
Since my letter of yesterday I have had an interesting
communication with the minister of foreign affairs.
Our letter had been restored to Mr. Livingston by
Mr. Marbois in a casual interview who also showed
him the order to Mr. Pichon which was substituted to it.
To see that order and receive one to him for the
surrender of the country to the United States
I called yesterday evening by appointment on
the minister where I found Mr. Marbois also.
They had expected Mr. Livingston and myself together
but on my observing that we had not so understood
it he having already seen the paper the minister
read the order to me and asked how I liked it.
I replied that it was not for us to say it being the act of
his government only, but says he comparatively which
do you prefer this mode of proceeding or the other;
I replied this without doubt he said it was on the idea
it would be more agreeable to us and our government
that it was adopted since suppressing our letters it
became as it ought to be entirely the act of government
and in his opinion strictly a justifiable one the consul
having a right to annex a condition to the ratification in
the spirit of the treaty at any time before the exchange.
I told him that having discussed the subject already,
I had only to repeat that I preferred much this mode
to the other; he added that he hoped no difficulty would
take place hereafter that we had sufficient time to perform
what we had stipulated and that he sincerely wished we
might do it in due time as his government and himself
had much at heart the future harmony of the two nations.
I replied that similar sentiments animated the government
of the United States that I was persuaded the treaties would
be ratified that even before the creation of the stock,
I was confident that the president, far from delaying the
payment of what was stipulated, would if his power after the
ratification promote aids which might be useful to them in
the United States to evince his desire of a prompt execution
of the treaty that on our part and on our own responsibility
if it was desired, we would prevail on the house of Baring
and Hope to advance the first payment that is six millions
of livres before we heard from our government in
confidence that our conduct would be approved.
I told him I thought my colleague would unite in this
sentiment; he expressed himself highly gratified with the
communication, which he considered as a strong proof of
the friendship of the government of the United States for
the nation and government of France, declared that as it
was made after everything was concluded it was the more
honorable to us and would affect in a greater degree the
sensibility of the first consul to whom he would make it
known, though he knew that he would accept nothing
but as it became due in strict conformity to the treaties.
I should deem it fortunate for the United States if
this payment was made as being an act of liberality
on our part, and in the degree a prompt execution
of the treaty it would bind this government more
completely to the execution of it on its part.
I am happy however that the offer was refused since
while it cannot fail to produce a good effect, it avoids all
responsibility on our part or that of the president, though
indeed in the payment here the responsibility would be
entirely on us; it is proper to inform you that the treaty
and conventions bear date from the period when they
were agreed on the thirtieth of April; but as it required time
to reduce them to writing, the treaty was signed on the
second of May, and the convention concerning the claims
of our citizens the ninth or tenth which will explain
why they were not sooner dispatched from Paris.22
Monroe wrote this letter to Secretary of State Madison on June 19:
We have received your communications of the 18
and 20 of April & after due consideration deem it most
advisable that I should proceed immediately to England.
The departure of Mr. King from that country at the
commencement of a war between it & France,
without nominating a chargé des affaires may expose
our commercial concerns to much embarrassment
if there is no one there soon to take charge of them.
The arrangement however proposed by the President
will probably obviate any inconvenience since the
place will be occupied in a fortnight from this date.
I am happy to have it in my power to add that
the state in which our affairs are here admits
a compliance with this arrangement without
inconvenience to any interest of a public nature.
Since the dispatch of the ratifications of the treaty &c,
there is nothing to be done here till the question is decided
by our government; nor even then in case of ratification,
as the instruments will be given by you to the minister
of France to be forwarded to his government here.
It is only in case of difficulty from some cause or other,
that the commission will have to act again in this affair,
& then it will be in your power, if a joint agency is
deemed necessary to avail yourself of it, by suitable
instructions to the members who compose it.
In regard to Spain it is not likely that any
injury can now result from the delay which
becomes inevitable by this measure.
It was never a very clear point that
I ought to pursue the object with that power,
after what was done here, until I heard from you.
The motive which inclined me to it at first diminished
daily by my detention here, so that your late instructions
arrived in good time to relieve me from further suspense.
My visit to England will not I think be attributed
by this government to an improper motive.
It seems to have a just view of the policy of our
government in regard to both powers, which is to cultivate
their friendship by fair & honorable means while it pays a
scrupulous attention & maintains with firmness the respect
which is due to our national character rights & interests.
My position in England will not prevent my attention
in due time to the object with Spain, if the President
should be of opinion that it might be useful.
I have suggested to this government the possibility of my
being instructed by him to pursue that object with that
power, after the decision on our treaty &c with France,
in which case I informed the minister that I should,
according to the promise made to Mr. Livingston &
myself by Mr. Marbois, expect the good offices of
his government with its ally, and of which he gave
me the most positive & satisfactory assurance.
On this subject as on what concerns us more
generally I shall write you hereafter more fully.
I shall only add at present that in the communications
which have passed between this government & myself
since my last, to which this incident has in part given
the occasion, much has occurred to inspire me with
confidence in its friendly disposition towards our
government & country and in a mode that would
not otherwise than be peculiarly grateful to me.23
Monroe followed his instruction to go to Spain, and he left Paris on June 24.
Madison wrote to Monroe this letter on June 25:
Your several letters to April 19 have been received.
The dawn of your negotiations has given
much pleasure and much expectation.
We wait with anxiety your next dispatches,
which will probably disclose the precise
prospect if not the result in form.
The crisis as seen here has been auspicious,
and I am persuaded that you will have
seized and pushed its advantages.
The purchase of the country beyond the Mississippi
was not contemplated in your powers because it was
not deemed at this time within the pale of probability.
The disposition to the measure must have grown out
of the difficulty found by France in getting the Floridas
whose ports are essential and out of the
obstacles dreaded from an English war.
It is presumed that the defect will not be permitted
either by yourself or by the French government to
embarrass much less could suspend your negotiations
on the enlarged scale and on that calculation
with the momently hope of further information
from you, no additional powers are forwarded.
As the French Government can feel no real doubt that
your engagements for western Louisiana though not
expressly authorized would be confirmed hesitations
on that ground will be an evidence of evasive or
dilatory purposes, and doubtless be so treated by you.
It is not impossible that in the spirit of indiscriminate
objection to public measures the acquisition
may produce criticism and censure.
In some views it may even be a subject of disquietude.
But the important uses to which it may be turned
will amply justify the arrangement and
ultimately silence the voice of faction.
Should the proposition you had concluded to make
be accepted, your fund will be exhausted and the
question will arise as to the Floridas and a trip to Madrid.
The President concurs in the opinion that it will
be best to take time for deciding this question.
The Floridas can easily be acquired
especially in case of a war, and perhaps by
arrangements involving little or no money.
Another consideration is the importance of having a Minister
both at London & Paris in the present state of things.
The late public letter on this subject with the verbal
explanations you carried with you leave nothing to be
here added but a wish that we may soon hear from you
and Mr. Livingston, and that your respective inclinations
may coincide with the wants of the public service.
According to our latest accounts from England,
the match was ready to be put to the train laid for war.
Some of the communications from Mr. King are
proofs that the complaisance of that country also
toward this is stimulated by the approach of war.
The deposit at New Orleans was reestablished within
an hour after the arrival of the orders from Spain.
Aided by the hope from your negotiations,
it will give general & lively satisfaction.
It appears that in your Commission, though not in your
letter of Credence, you are styled Envoy Extraordinary.
This was a mistake of the Clerk who wrote the Commission.
Vattel indeed puts the two titles on the same grade; but the
usage in France is said to make a distinction which might
render that of Envoy Extraordinary inconvenient to yourself.
I take for granted that you will have adjusted yourself
to the same character as is held by your Colleague.
The course of our internal affairs
continues to be favorable.
For ordinary details I refer to newspapers going herewith.
Mr. Olsen the Danish Resident who is so good as
to be the bearer may perhaps make additions
which will be acceptable to your curiosity.
He leaves this Country under good impressions and joins
that with the ordinary claims on your polite attentions.24
Monroe wrote to Madison on July 11, 19, 20 and 26.
On August 15 Monroe wrote this letter to Secretary of State Madison:
I wrote you lately by Mr. Baring since which nothing
material has occurred here, except that I was called on
yesterday by Sr. Stephen Cotterel & notified that I
should be presented to the King on Wednesday next.
After the presentation I shall give you the result.
The enclosed which I received last night from Paris
by an American gentleman, containing important
information, is therefore transmitted to you.
I intimated to you by Mr. Baring that the power
over the two millions of dollars subjected to our
disposition by the act of Congress & order of the
President, would so far as depended on me, be
applied to a guaranty of the stipulations of the treaty.
This measure is nothing more than a faithful performance
of what was promised in the course of the negotiation,
& throughout the early stages of the business,
or in other words, than a guaranty to the extent,
in obedience to powers committed to us for the
purpose of the execution of the treaty itself.
I flatter myself that Mr. Livingston will concur with
me in the object, since I am persuaded that he must
see the importance of it in the present state of affairs.
I shall give you a more correct view
of this business in my next.
I consider the present moment an all important one
in our history, and that much perhaps everything depends
on what is done by our government in its several branches.
If the treaty is ratified, so that the President is left free
to carry it into effect, the most prompt and decisive
measures appear to me to be necessary on his part.
My advice is that he order the troops down
immediately to take post at New Orleans.
In a mild and friendly manner the Spaniards should see
that he expects they will surrender the territory promptly.
Perhaps they will give it up without delay or equivocation.
If they do not, and our government does
not take an imposing attitude the favorable
moment may pass & everything be lost.
If the affair is whiled away by negotiation,
France may assume the character of mediation
between us, and a year hence a bargain be
made up by compromise much to our injury.
But if the President pushes the affair with decision
& promptitude, the first consul will find himself bound
by honor & interest to take a part in it which must be
in the present juncture in favor of the United States.
He must interpose so as to compel Spain to
yield & put us in possession of the territory
we have bought of & paid France for.
Should the Spaniards delay, the incident may
probably furnish another occasion for the President
to give a new proof of the energy of his character,
& the happy effects of his administration.
I am persuaded that a tone of decision should the occasion
require it, would give great effect to the proposed
negotiation with Spain for Florida & the debts, while it made
immediately a very favorable impression with the powers in
this quarter, which would probably increase their respect
for our flag and give additional security to our commerce.
I would not hesitate on the arrival of the troops at
New Orleans to consider the jurisdiction of Spain as
terminated, to open the port under the authority of the
United States & exercise all the rights of sovereignty.
By giving them time to remove the troops
according to the treaty, or rather longer if
necessary, every accommodation will be
given them that they have a right to expect,
and the interest & character of the United States
at the present crisis will permit.25
President Jefferson in a proclamation on July 16 summoned the Congress to meet
on October 17, and in his annual message on that day he called for ratifying
the Louisiana Purchase Treaty that needed to be completed by October 30.
The diplomat James Monroe left Paris on 12 July 1803
and arrived in London on July 18.
In his Autobiography he wrote,
An incident occurred shortly after Mr. Monroe’s
arrival in England, relating to the treaties
with France, which gave him great concern.
By the joint letter of Mr. Livingston and himself to the
Secretary of State of the 7th of June it was shown that
after the treaties had been concluded and were ratified
by the First Consul, a difficulty occurred by a claim on
his part to annex a condition, as to the execution by the
United States, which might defeat the whole arrangement.
This difficulty related to the payment of the sixty millions
of francs to France, the first installment of which it was
stipulated by the 2nd article of the first convention,
should be made within three months after the
ratifications should be exchanged and possession
of the territory be delivered to the United States.
The motive assigned for the proposed condition to the
ratification of the treaties was to secure the payment
by the United States of the sum stipulated within the
terms specified, although the possession of the territory
might not be delivered to them within that term.
Mr. Marbois’s note stated this to be the object, and which
was explicitly declared by Mr. Talleyrand in a conference
which our Ministers had with him on the subject.
In every view they deemed the annexation of the
proposed condition unreasonable and improper,
because there was a reciprocity in the stipulation
which would be defeated if the payment should be
required before the territory was surrendered.
The anxiety of our Ministers was increased by intimations
that were given them by persons in whom they confided,
that if the treaties had not been concluded, the negotiation
would fail, the First Consul having declared that he
considered the compact very disadvantageous to France.
These persons thought it probable that the measure
proposed was intended as an expedient to extricate himself
from the compact in the expectation that our government
would furnish him with a justifiable pretext for it.
Mr. Talleyrand in his explanation
gave a different view of the motive.
He stated contingencies over which the
First Consul could have no control, which
might create delay in the delivery of the territory.
Spain might fail to surrender it within the term
specified, or the British might seize it, and
which were probably the real cause.
But such was the excitement of the moment at Paris, the
war with England pressing and important changes in the
government in contemplation, and so inflexible was known
to be the character of the First Consul in any measure of
compromitment which he had adopted, that our Ministers
felt it incumbent on them to avert, so far as they might be
able, such a result to an arrangement which they
deemed of such high importance to their country.
On full consideration they gave an answer to
Mr. Marbois’s letter which was satisfactory, and under
which impression his letter was recalled and that of our
Ministers restored, and an instruction given to Mr. Pichon,
chargé d’affaires of France, substituted for them.
The instruction to Mr. Pichon was read by Mr. Marbois
to Mr. Livingston in an interview between them with
which Mr. Livingston was satisfied, and through him
a message was sent to Mr. Monroe to request his
attendance at Mr. Talleyrand’s office, that it might
be shown to him and with which he complied.
Of the communication between Mr. Talleyrand
and Mr. Monroe in the presence of Mr. Marbois
full notice has already been taken.
It is therefore necessary to advert here to that part only
which relates to the intimation which Mr. Monroe then gave,
that so far as the Ministers had any power to promote the
payment, and which he thought extended to the first
installment, such was his confidence in the good faith of
the French government that he would, under a conviction
that the treaties would be ratified by his government,
give his sanction to the advance in that amount by
the two great houses who had bought the stock,
even before the treaties were ratified, and in
which he thought that his colleague would unite.
Although the presumption was strong from the
communication of Mr. Talleyrand and likewise
from the letter of Mr. Marbois, that the command
of the money independent of any contingency
was the sole object and had produced the difficulty,
yet other impressions were not entirely effaced.
As however, that only was assigned, it might fairly be
concluded, if it was removed by the payment of a small
portion only, that none other could ever be urged, and
that although a delay might occur in the ratification of the
treaties and creation of the stock by our government, the
First Consul would be so completely bound in honor,
as well as good faith, to carry the treaties into effect,
that no further difficulty could ever be raised on his part.
It was on this principle that Mr. Monroe gave the intimation
which has been stated in his interview with Mr. Talleyrand
and Mr. Marbois, in full confidence that the treaties would
be ratified and his conduct approved by his government.
In any event such was his anxiety to relieve his government
from the embarrassment to which the suppression of the
deposit at New Orleans had subjected it, and to relieve
likewise his fellow citizens to the west from the losses
incident thereto by a comprehensive and permanent
arrangement in the spirit of his instructions, that he did not
hesitate to take the responsibility of the measure on himself.
It was at this period and under these circumstances
that an application was made to Mr. Monroe by the
Houses of Hope and Baring to guarantee to them ten
millions of francs, which they had engaged to pay at
that time to the French government, on account of the
stock stipulated by the late treaties, to be paid to France
by the United States for the purchase of Louisiana,
and which those houses had bought of that government.
Their application was supported by a letter from
Mr. Marbois, who adverted to the offer which
Mr. Monroe had made, to sanction an advance to
that amount before the treaties were ratified by his
government under the power which he thought had
been given to our Ministers by their original instructions.
Mr. Monroe did not hesitate to comply with this application
under the belief that the Ministers had the power,
and that by the exercise of it they would promote
most essentially the best interests of their country.
He considered himself bound also, after what had passed,
to act with promptitude and to invite the cooperation of his
colleague with him, by urging in the strongest manner that
he was able the reasons by which he was governed.
It was not the responsibility which he thereby incurred
which gave him inquietude, considering it his duty to do it,
be the consequences as to himself what they might.
He fearlessly met that danger.
It was a difference of opinion on that very important
point with his colleague which gave him concern.
Mr. Livingston thought they had no power over the
two millions of dollars which were voted by Congress
and subject to their control, after the treaties were
formed, and that the application or pledge of any
portion of the money thus appropriated for the
purpose and in the mode suggested was not only
unauthorized, but could produce no good effect.
Their correspondence on the subject
was voluminous and interesting.
Mr. Marbois, in his pressure for the guarantee,
acted with great delicacy toward both our Ministers.
The two houses at length agreed to take the word of
Mr. Monroe alone, which they assured him would
accomplish their object, and which he promptly gave.
The instrument being then presented to Mr. Livingston
he signed it, but with reluctance.
As they had agreed in the extent of the acquisition and in
the consideration to be given to it, and in the subsequent
measures relating to it, this incident gave to Mr. Monroe
pain, especially as the difference of opinion was
with a person with whom he had long harmonized
in political sentiments, and a friendly relation existed.
A copy of the correspondence between our Ministers,
and likewise of that between Mr. Monroe and
Mr. Marbois on the interesting subject, was
transmitted by Mr. Monroe to our government.
To the danger, which the execution of the treaties and
accomplishment of the great object provided for by them
was exposed by France and Spain, Mr. Monroe’s attention
was increasingly drawn, and respecting which with
the means of averting it, he communicated fully his
sentiments in several letters to the Secretary of State.
His position afforded him opportunities of acquiring
information which he thought might be useful,
and which he hastened to communicate to
his government in the most minute detail.
He was satisfied that the British government was
gratified that France had ceded the territory.
That government must have heard of the project which was
entertained by the Directory, of acquiring and connecting it
with Canada, and have apprehended that the acquisition
of it by the First Consul was a part of the same system.
By ceding it to the United States that danger ceased, and
no new one was added in reference to the latter power.
On the contrary there was good cause to presume
that an extension of territory to the south would
diminish the motive for it to the north.
Free governments, even of the confederate kind,
are incapable of an extension beyond certain limits.
He knew that Spain was dissatisfied with and had
complained to the French government of the cession,
and he was apprehensive that she would not surrender
it within the term stipulated, whereby she would
create embarrassments of a very serious character.
The First Consul had intimated to Mr. Monroe in the
audience he gave him on taking leave, that Spain had
complained of the cession, which he urged as a reason
for his declining his visit to Madrid at that period.
For the dissatisfaction of the Spanish
government there were obvious reasons.
While France retained the province, the power of that
great nation formed a barrier against the United States
in favor of all the Spanish provinces to the south of it.
By the cession that barrier was removed, and the people
approaching and having intercourse with each other, and the
spirit of liberty extending, it was probable that the power of
Spain would be immediately shaken, and the whole territory
be soon wrested from her by the people themselves.
He was decidedly of the opinion that it would be advisable
for his government to move, in taking possession of the
province after the ratifications were exchanged as if an
objection on the part of Spain was not even suspected.
The territory had belonged to France by a fair title.
She had ceded it to us, and we had a
right to the prompt possession of it.
By acting on that principle she would be forced to
acquiesce, since by a different course she would not
only assume a hostile attitude towards the United States,
but likewise against France, who would be bound by
good faith and honor to compel her to acquiesce,
especially as the French government was in the receipt
of the consideration stipulated for it, a part of which
had already been paid before the treaties were ratified.
Mr. Monroe was persuaded that his government
would take the course suggested without any
intimation from him, but he deemed it incumbent
on him to share with it the responsibility, in case
it should, and any injury result from it.
For the war in which Great Britain and France were
engaged, it is believed that no justifiable cause can be
assigned by either party when tested by sound principles.
The pretext on the part of France was the refusal of the
British government to give up the Island of Malta,
which she was bound to do by the treaty of Amiens.
That on the part of England was the aggrandizement
of France on the continent, and particularly in Italy.
Neither complained of a direct or positive injury to itself.
Rivalry and passion contributed
much to that result on both sides.
The discussion which took place in the two houses
of Parliament in the session of 1802-3 which
excited in so high a degree the resentment of the
First Consul, gave the first ostensible spring to it.
Incidents afterwards occurred which
increased the irritation on each side.
His abrupt and harsh notice of the unfriendly temper
manifested by the British government in his address
to Lord Whitworth, the British Ambassador at a public
audience in presence of the whole diplomatic corps
excited great indignation on the other side of the Channel.
War followed immediately afterwards.
So far as any reasonable cause can be assigned on
the part of England, it was the dread of the maritime
aggrandizement of France under the auspices of the
soldier then at her head, and a desire to prevent it.
France had by her revolutionary efforts gained in a
great measure the ascendancy on the continent, and
to which in the latter stages he had much contributed.
Leave her in a state of peace for a long time, and
he might elevate her naval force to a height to
compete with Great Britain for the dominion of the seas,
and in which if he succeeded, he might reduce her
to a subaltern grade among nations.
On the part of France no motive
could be assigned of a public nature.
The height to which she was already raised left her nothing
to ask of the powers on the continent, and by temperate
councils, cherishing peace rather than provoking war,
she might form such an augmentation of her navy as would
put her on the other element on equal ground with her rival.
If any motive could be traced,
it was a personal rather than a public one.
A change in the government was intended, and a state of
war especially with Great Britain might favor that object.
The First Consul held essentially all the power of the nation,
and as the passions of the whole community would be
raised and embarked on his side in support of such a war,
the opportunity would be favorable for the
confirmation of it in him and his descendants.
Those were, we presume, strong motives on each side.
To tranquilize the United States by a friendly
accommodation of all differences with them had
doubtless its weight for the reasons stated in the cession
made by the First Consul of Louisiana to the United States.
To prevent the aggrandizement of France on this continent
and the control it would give her over the colonies with the
means of augmenting her naval force, it cannot be doubted,
were the motives which reconciled the British government
to the cession and induced it, before apprised of it,
to make the offer through Mr. King to take New Orleans
and cede it to the United States at the peace.
With the cause or motives to the war
the United States had no concern.
It was their duty and their object to maintain their rights
and to preserve friendly relations with each power
so far as might be done on just and honorable conditions.
While the danger of invasion menaced Great Britain, her
government cultivated the friendship of the United States.
While the advancement of Bonaparte to the Imperial
dignity was depending, he pursued the same policy.
Warned by the example of the preceding war of the
aggressions which had been committed on the rights of
the United States and of the injuries they had suffered by
spoliations on their commerce and impressment of their
seamen, Mr. Monroe was instructed in the commencement
of his mission to England to use his best efforts to prevent
the commission of like injuries in the existing war.
The apprehension of such aggressions had been a strong
motive with the President in appointing him to England
on the resignation of Mr. King to take effect provided
the affair with France should have been adjusted.
In the first interview with Lord Hawkesbury the subject
was adverted to by his Lordship in a conciliatory manner,
which was met in a like spirit by Mr. Monroe.
In several subsequent interviews their conversation was
resumed on the subject generally in which his Lordship
invariably manifested a disposition to accommodate.
By agreement between them Mr. Monroe presented on
the 29th of November a note on impressment founded
on a report of Mr. Erving, who was then our Consul
for the City of London and agent for the protection
of our seamen, a citizen of merit, who was
afterwards appointed our Minister to Spain.
This aggression was more simple in its nature, was pressed
by practice, and therefore demanded immediate attention.
The object was to arrest this practice and to prepare by
friendly communication the British government for an
arrangement which should extend to every aggression,
as exemplified by the practice of the proceeding war,
as soon as he should receive from his government
its views on each point in a digested plan.
In that stage of the war no invasion had been made
of our neutral rights by blockades and spoliations on
our commerce, and it was hoped that none would be.
It was the duty of Mr. Monroe under the power, which
he possessed, to complain of abuses when committed,
to prevent the repetition of them, and to use his best
efforts to protect our citizens in full employment of all
their rights—by treaty if authorized to make one.26
Monroe left London on 8 October 1804 and went to Rotterdam.
Then he returned to Paris on October 20.
In his Autobiography Monroe described what
Livingston told him on the night he arrived in Paris:
Mr. Livingston informed him on the night of his arrival that
the prospect of success in the mission to Spain had of late
become unfavorable: that Admiral Gravina, the Spanish
Ambassador at Paris, had presented a memorial to the
French government in which he had protested a memorial
to the French government in which he had protested against
our claim to West Florida and insisted that the province was
restricted to a very limited boundary on the western side
of the Mississippi, and that the French government had
answered or prepared an answer to it, by which it was
admitted that pretensions of Spain were well founded.
Mr. Livingston stated also to Mr. Monroe that he
had written a note to Mr. Talleyrand on the subject,
to which he understood he had prepared an unfavorable
answer, but which he begged him not to send to him,
as his successor, General Armstrong, had arrived
at the port and was daily expected in Paris.
He stated also to Mr. Monroe that he had a plan for
the settlement of our differences with Spain, which
was that she should create a stock of seventy millions
of livres and lend them to Spain, reimbursable in
seven years, in equal annual installments with
a provision that the boundary should be settled
in the interval by amicable negotiation.
To this plan Mr. Monroe objected.
He remarked that it was not authorized by their
instructions and might terminate in our paying
twice for the same territory, especially as it
did not comprise East Florida, the only
portion to which we had not a just claim.
Mr. Livingston added that that might
likewise be provided for.
The mission to Spain had three objects in view:
the first, the settlement of the boundaries of Louisiana;
the second, the acquisition of the territory remaining to
Spain eastward of the Mississippi; the third, the indemnity
for injuries by spoliation on our commerce and by the
suppression of the deposit at New Orleans.27
On 8 November 1804 Monroe wrote a letter asking M. Talleyrand to cooperate with
the negotiations with Spain on the boundaries of Louisiana, Spanish privateering, the
closing of the Mississippi River, diplomacy toward Spain, and the cession of West Florida.
On November 27 Monroe wrote this letter to Secretary of State James Madison:
I left England on my way to Madrid on the 8th ultimo
& passing through Holland arrived here on the 24th.
It is probable that I might have obtained permission
of both governments to take a more direct route
by crossing the channel, but as that required a
special indulgence, I thought it better not to ask it.
I was the more inclined to prefer the former route,
as it placed me at a distance from their fleets and armies,
and exempted the movement from the slightest suspicion,
of having any connection with the concerns,
of either of the powers at war.
I flattered myself that I should have been able to have
proceeded on my journey before this, but I have been
detained by considerations of a very imperious nature.
These still exist in a certain degree, though there is
ground to hope that I may get off in ten or twelve days.
You may be assured that I shall not delay my departure
one moment longer than the necessary attention due to the
objects which brought me here may indispensably require.
I wish it was in my power to give you any satisfactory
information on that subject, or of the probable result
of the mission to Madrid, but unfortunately
it is utterly impossible for me so to do.
I will possess you, to the best of my knowledge,
of the actual state of things, by which you will be
able to form as correct a judgment on those points,
as it is practicable to do in the present stage.
The day before I left England I received two letters
from Mr. Livingston of August 23rd & September 15th
by the same conveyance, which showed the embarrassing
dilemma into which Mr. Pinckney had got with the
Spanish government, and that the government of
France was endeavoring to convince him, Mr. Livingston,
that West Florida was not comprised in the cession
made by it of Louisiana to the United States.
I was much concerned at this intelligence especially
the latter circumstance, since it diminished the hope
we had before entertained with great confidence of
the support of this government in our negotiation with Spain.
Nevertheless, although my instructions intimated the
propriety of making my departure from England for Madrid,
dependent in a certain degree on the prospect of aid to be
derived from France in that negotiation, I considered it
my duty not to retard my journey in consequence
of the communication I had just received.
I had been advised repeatedly before by Mr. Livingston,
that the French government was disposed to favor that
negotiation; the necessary arrangements for my departure,
on the ground of that information, were already made;
I had sometime before apprized the British government,
that I was entrusted with a mission to Spain by the
President & was soon to set out in discharge of it, and a
passport was then actually granted me for the purpose.
These circumstances made it difficult for me to withdraw
from the measure, had other considerations admonished
me so to do; but every other consideration which
presented itself to my mind urged the propriety of my
pursuing the course in which I had so far embarked.
The crisis which had occurred between the United States
and Spain seemed to admit of no longer delay;
the recent and of course growing indisposition of France to
give us the aid we had expected of her in the negotiation;
the menace of a war between Great Britain and Spain,
were strong arguments for making the experiment
in the manner designated by the President without
delay to adjust our differences with Spain.
I therefore did not hesitate to set out the
day after the receipt of Mr. Livingston’s letters,
(every necessary preparation being made for the purpose)
and to hasten forward here with as much
dispatch as it was in my power to make.
On my arrival in Paris Mr. Livingston confirmed the
information contained in his letters above mentioned
of the indisposition of this government to aid us in
the proposed negotiation and added some facts
which were still more explicit on that point.
He informed me that Admiral Gravina the Spanish
Ambassador had presented a note to the minister
of foreign affairs, remonstrating in very strong terms
against our right to West Florida under the late treaty
with France and claiming to restrict us to a very narrow
strip of land on the western side of the Mississippi,
to which note the minister had either answered or
prepared an answer, which admitted that the pretentions
of Spain appeared to the Emperor to be reasonable.
Mr. Livingston informed me also that he had written a note
to Mr. Talleyrand, the object of which was to counteract that
of the Spanish Ambassador, which had not been answered,
& to which he had been desirous to prevent any answer
being given, until he should be certain that it would be
a favorable one, which had not yet been the case.
This information subjected me, as you will readily
conceive, to the greatest embarrassment.
On mature reflection however there seemed
to be no alternative left; that it was my duty
to pursue in a direct course the objects of
the mission till it was finally concluded.
But the negotiation had already been opened here with the
French government by the Spanish minister on such points
as grew out of the cession made by it to the United States.
That fact admitted the influence which France was likely to
have in the negotiation, and the others already mentioned,
furnished sufficient proof of her disposition to make use of it.
It seemed therefore to be equally proper, indeed
indispensable for us, to make an attempt to produce a
change in the disposition of this government in the points
above adverted to, which in truth embraced essentially
all the objects of the proposed negotiation at Madrid;
and I was persuaded that my arrival here on my
way to Madrid to partake in that negotiation
furnished a suitable occasion to make the attempt.
As Mr. Livingston had declined any important act on account
of the arrival of General Armstrong in France, as the general
had not yet reached Paris, and much time might elapse
before his presentation to the Emperor, it being usual
to make such presentations only at public audiences,
and as I was extremely anxious to proceed to Spain
as soon as possible, I committed to paper such a
view of our differences with that power, as I wished
to be presented to the French government on the subject.
Mr. Livingston was so good as to send that note to the
minister of foreign affairs with one from himself,
copies of which as also of a letter from him to me
respecting the measure are herewith enclosed.
It gives me pleasure to add that the note after receiving
some corrections that were suggested by Mr. Livingston
& General Armstrong (the latter having arrived before it
was sent to the minister) was approved by both of them;
that the measure itself was also approved by the latter.
I endeavored to advert in the above mentioned note,
to every circumstance on which it might
be proper to touch in the present juncture.
I noticed the faithful execution of the treaty between the
United States and France for the cession of Louisiana
in its great points by both nations; the promise made by the
French government, when that treaty was formed, to give
us its good offices with that of Spain, in a negotiation for
the acquisition of Florida; the delay in commencing such
a negotiation for the purpose of harmonizing with the
views of France in adopting a more suitable moment;
the interest which France has in promoting an amicable
adjustment of our differences with Spain, and the interest
of Spain herself in the same event: I then proceeded to
state the essential objects of the proposed negotiation,
and to prove by the aid of the documents received from
you, that West Florida already belonged to the United States
by the cession of Louisiana and was so considered by the
President & Congress who had passed a law on that
principle; and that Spain owed us so much for
spoliations and other injuries, as after allowing her
a suitable equivalent for East Florida must leave her,
in case of a fair adjustment, considerably in our debt.
It seemed to be due to candor, in an attempt to settle with
Spain the boundaries of the territory which we had acquired
of France, to show to the French government that we
sought nothing that was unreasonable or unjust, that was
not sanctioned by a fair construction of the instrument itself.
Such a communication it was presumed could not be
considered otherwise than as an act of friendly attention,
especially as by the terms of cession and spirit of the
transaction the arbitrage of France is precluded,
and we are left completely at liberty
to judge in that respect for ourselves.
It was also presumable that the view which it presented,
of the solidity and justice of our pretensions,
might restrain the French government, should it
be thus disposed, from interposing its good
offices in favor of Spain to our prejudice.
It was equally proper from many considerations
to show that no payment in cash could
possibly result from the transaction.
I was aware that this measure was not free from
objection, but in difficult situations all that can be done
is to balance the probable good and evil incident to any
measure which is proposed, and to decide with integrity
according to your judgment the course to be pursued,
which has not been omitted in the present case.
It may draw from the French government a formal
declaration of those sentiments in favor of Spain, which
were I presume informally communicated to Mr. Livingston.
But would that essentially alter the state of things?
While the French government entertains those sentiments,
can it be doubted that its policy will be governed by them?
that they were for example made known to General
Bournonville at Madrid & he instructed to conform thereto?
A contrary idea supposes that this government acts without
rule or system, that one doctrine is held on the same
subject here and another at Madrid, and that measures
founded in opposite principles, compromising it to both
parties, are taken by it at the same time.
This is not presumable, nor is it
justified by the facts above stated.
If the French government had resolved to adopt the
cause and support the interest of Spain, it was fair
to conclude that it would do so, although it made
no formal declaration of such decision at this time.
The effect would be felt at Madrid
as soon as the negotiation commenced.
Thus after much time was lost we should probably have
had to commence the same proceeding here that we have
now done, under circumstances which must have committed
the result more completely to the control of France.
The state of Europe might be less favorable to our views,
and by appealing to her, after a fruitless effort with Spain,
it must be done with less dignity and of course less effect.
At present the proceeding is in its
natural order, and of course in rule.
The communication was invited by the
actual state of things, by the object in view;
the past and present relation of the parties to it.
The epoch is important to the three powers:
it is evidently so to the United States & Spain;
it is likewise so to France who had begun to act a part in it.
By making then the communication full & direct to the
object, we answer every claim which her government has
on our candor & our friendship; and by spurning everything
like intrigue, we invite it to follow the example; while by
giving a just view of our rights and of the crisis which has
occurred we enable her, while she may do it with credit, to
take that part in it which her honor and interest may dictate.
I was therefore of opinion that the measure was
proper in all the lights in which I could contemplate it.
To France it gives an unequivocal proof of our sincere
desire to preserve forever the friendship which now subsists
between the two nations, while it makes her responsible for
any change which may take place of an opposite character,
not sanctioned by the strictest principles of justice.
And with respect to the United States while it is not likely
to expose them to any injury and may produce some
advantage by procuring from France the aid which
they have a right to expect in the proposed negotiation,
it may, by probing the affair to the bottom and making
known the true state of things, enable the President
with greater satisfaction to himself & advantage to
his country to discharge all the duties which may
be required of him at the present juncture.28
On 16 December 1804 Monroe at Bordeaux
sent a 20-page letter to James Madison.
He noted at first that he would be traveling to Madrid by mules.
He reviewed the information given him by Livingston in Paris in
regard to the Floridas and his own discussion with Talleyrand.
General Armstrong had arrived as the new ambassador.
Monroe looked forward to working with Mr. Pinckney in Spain,
and he concluded his letter with this paragraph:
I have had as you will see by the above
details much vexation and trouble in this affair.
So far as it respects Mr. Livingston, it is at an end.
We had no rupture though some warm discussion.
We parted as heretofore.
In respect to this government, I have had to press
things very disagreeable to some in power, the effect
of which I thought I felt in my relation to them.
To balance between evils without the hope of any
profit to France, it has not been used to, & it takes
it ill of anyone to expose it to that dilemma.
Should the President deem it proper to make a
provisional arrangement to meet all possible
contingencies the communication ought to be
forwarded by a special messenger without delay.
I hope however that the existing one will prove adequate.
I shall endeavor all in my power to make it so.29
Monroe while at Bayonne on 21 December 1804
wrote this letter to President Jefferson:
I am so far on my way to Madrid and on the
point of recommencing my journey this morning.
My letters to Mr. Madison have been so full that it is
unnecessary to enter into the same topics here even
had I time, though I have not as I set out in an hour.
It is possible that your attention may be directed to the
fortification of our ports, since the establishment of
certain fortifications on the coast as places of security
for our vessels to retreat toward in wars to which we
are not a party, independent of the great object of
protecting our cities from the insult of cruisers &ca
may make it advisable to take the subject up.
My mind has been long made up on that point,
& that an attention to the object, as soon as others were
arranged would add much to the credit of our government.
My attention however has been drawn to it at this moment
by meeting here a most able & respectable Engineer
Col. Vincent who made some important … New York,
& was introduced to me when formerly in France
by a letter from Governor Clinton.
It was Col. Vincent who assisted (or rather did it himself)
in procuring that most valuable library which
I sent to the department of war, which was most
unfortunately destroyed at Washington by fire.
I do presume that the aid of some very skillful engineers
would be found useful in such a business when undertaken
and that these must be procured from abroad.
It is not improbable that this gentleman might be
prevailed on to engage in this service, as he is
very much attached to our government & country.
He is a Colonel of long service in France of
great experience and of the fairest character.
If he was engaged, he might take others with him, three
or four and who would not only accomplish the great
object proposed but lay the foundation of a military school.
It is not impossible that Carnot,
who is his friend, might accompany him.
I only give you these hints for consideration.
Should you wish anything of the kind,
an authority to me or General Armstrong,
mentioning these men would be necessary.
The approbation of their government might
easily be obtained & would be indispensable.30
Notes
1. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908
ed. James D. Richardson, Volume 1, p, 343, 346.
2. The Autobiography of James Monroe, p. 178-181, 181-182.
3. From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 10 January 1803 (Online).
4. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908, Volume 1,
p, 350-351.
5. Quoted in This Affair of Louisiana by Alexander DeConde, p. 121.
6. Writings by Thomas Jefferson, p. 1111-1113.
7. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908, Volume 1,
p, 353-354.
8. Quoted in This Affair of Louisiana by Alexander DeConde, p. 127.
9. James Madison: Secretary of State 1800-1809 by Irving Brant, p. 107 and note 17.
10. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806 ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton,
p. 2-3.
11. Ibid., p. 4-7.
12. History of the United States of America during the Administration of Thomas
Jefferson by Henry Adams, p. 469.
13. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 8.
14. To James Madison from James Monroe, 15 April 1803 (Online).
15. The Autobiography of James Monroe, p. 185-186, 187-188, 188, 189-192,
193-194, 194.
16. To James Madison from James Monroe, 19 April 1803 (Online).
17. The Autobiography of James Monroe, p. 199-202.
18. Quoted in This Affair of Louisiana by Alexander DeConde, p. 173.
19. The Political Writings of James Monroe ed. James P. Lucier, 360-362.
20. To James Madison from James Monroe, 7 June 1803 (Online).
21. To James Madison from James Monroe, 8 June 1803 (Online).
22. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 34-36.
23. Ibid., p. 36-38.
24. From James Madison to James Monroe, 25 June 1803 (Online).
25. To James Madison from James Monroe, 15 August 1803 (Online).
26. The Autobiography of James Monroe, p. 217-224.
27. The Autobiography of James Monroe, p. 235-236.
28. To James Madison from James Monroe, 27 November 1804 (Online).
29. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806, p. 297.
30. Ibid., p. 297-299.