Monroe in Europe January-July 1805
Monroe in England October 1805
Monroe in England November 1805
Monroe in England January-February 1806
Monroe in England March-July 1806
James Monroe reached Madrid on 2 January 1805.
He added acquiring East Florida as their fourth objective.
On April 12 Secretary of State James Madison
sent these instructions to James Monroe:
The papers herewith enclosed explain
particularly the case of the Brig Aurora.
The sum of the case is, that while Spain was at War with
Great Britain, this vessel, owned by a citizen of the United
States, brought a cargo of Spanish produce purchased at the
Havana from that place to Charleston, where the cargo was
landed, except an insignificant portion of it, and the duties
paid or secured according to law, in like manner as they
are required to be paid or secured, on a like cargo from
whatever port, meant for home consumption; that the cargo
remained on land about three weeks when it was reshipped
for Barcelona in Old Spain, and the duties drawn back,
with a deduction of three and a half percent as is permitted
to imported articles in all cases, at any time within one year
under certain regulations which were pursued in this case;
that the vessel was taken on her voyage by a British
cruiser and sent for trial to Newfoundland where the
cargo was condemned by the Court of Vice Admiralty;
and that the cause was carried thence by appeal to
Great Britain where it was apprehended that the
sentence below would not be reversed.
The ground of this sentence was, and that of its confirmation
if such be the result, must be, that the trade in which the
vessel was engaged was unlawful, and this unlawfulness
must rest, first on the general principle assumed by Great
Britain, that a trade from a Colony to its parent Country,
being a trade not permitted to other nations in time of
peace, cannot be made lawful to them in time of war;
Secondly, on the allegation that the continuity of the voyage
from the Havana to Barcelona was not broken by landing
the cargo in the United States paying the duties thereon
and thus fulfilling the legal pre-requisites to a home
consumption, and therefore that the cargo was subject
to condemnation, even under the British regulation of
January 1798 which so far relaxes the general principle
as to allow a direct trade between a belligerent Colony
and a neutral Country carrying on such a trade.
With respect to the general principle which disallows
to neutral nations in time of War, a trade not allowed
to them in time of peace, it may be observed:
First, that the principle is of modern date, that it is
maintained, as is believed by no other nation but
Great Britain; and that it was assumed by her under
the auspices of a maritime ascendency, which rendered
such a principle subservient to her particular interest.
The History of her regulations on this subject
shows that they have been constantly modified
under the influence of that consideration.
The course of these modifications will be seen in an
appendix to the 4th volume of Robinson’s Admiralty Reports.
Secondly, that the principle is manifestly contrary to the
general interest of commercial Nations, as well as to the law
of Nations settled by the most approved authorities, which
recognizes no restraints on the trade of nations not at war,
with nations at War, other than that it shall be impartial
between the latter, that it shall not extend to certain military
articles, nor to the transportation of persons in military
service, nor to places actually blockaded or besieged.
Thirdly, that the principle is the more contrary to reason
and to right, inasmuch as the admission of neutrals into a
Colonial Trade shut against them in times of peace, may,
and often does result from considerations which open to
neutrals direct channels of trade with the parent state
shut to them, in times of peace, the legality of which latter
relaxation is not known to have been contested; and
inasmuch as a commerce may be, and frequently is opened
in time of war, between a Colony and other Countries,
from considerations which are not incident to the war, and
which would produce the same effect in a time of peace;
such, for example as a failure or diminution of the
ordinary sources of necessary supplies, or new
turns in the course of profitable interchanges.
Fourthly, That it is not only contrary to the
principles and practice of other Nations;
but to the practice of Great Britain herself.
It is well known to be her invariable practice in time of war,
by relaxations in her navigation laws, to admit neutrals to
trade in channels forbidden to them in times of peace;
and particularly to open her Colonial trade both to Neutral
vessels and supplies, to which it is shut in times of peace;
and that one at least of her objects, in these relaxations is
to give to her trade an immunity from capture, to which
in her own hands it would be subjected by the war.
Fifthly, the practice, which has prevailed in the British
dominions, sanctioned by orders of Council and an Act of
Parliament (39 G.3 C.98) authorizing for British subjects a
direct trade with the enemy, still further diminishes the force
of her pretensions for depriving us of the Colonial trade.
Thus we see in Robinson’s Admiralty reports passim,
that during the last War a licensed Commercial intercourse
prevailed between Great Britain and her enemies,
France, Spain & Holland, because it comprehended
articles necessary for her manufactures and agriculture,
notwithstanding the effect it had in opening a
vent to the surplus productions of the others.
In this manner she assumes to suspend the war itself as to
particular objects of trade beneficial to herself, while she
denies the right of the other belligerents to suspend their
accustomed commercial restrictions in favor of Neutrals.
But the injustice and inconsistency of her attempt to press
a strict rule on neutrals is more forcibly displayed by the
nature of the trade which is openly carried on between
the Colonies of Great Britain and Spain in the West Indies.
The mode of it is detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter
from a Mr. Billings, wherein it will be seen that American
vessels and cargoes, after being condemned in British
Courts under pretense of illicit commerce, are sent on
British account to the enemies of Great Britain,
if not to the very port of the destination
interrupted when they were American property.
What respect can be claimed from others to a
doctrine not only of so recent an origin and
enforced with so little uniformity, but which is so
conspicuously disregarded in practice by the Nation
itself, which stands alone in contending for it?
Sixthly—It is particularly worthy of attention that the
Board of Commissioners jointly constituted by the British
and American Governments under the 7th article of the
Treaty of 1794, by reversing condemnations of the
British Courts founded on the British instructions of
November 1793, condemned the principle, that a
trade forbidden to neutrals in time of peace, could
not be opened to them in time of war; on which
precise principle these instructions were founded.
And as the reversal could be justified by no other
authority than the law of Nations, by which they were
to be guided, the law of Nations according to that joint
Tribunal, condemns the principle here combatted.
Whether the British Commissioners concurred in these
reversals, does not appear: but whether they did, or did not,
the decision was equally binding, and affords a precedent
which could not be disrespected by a like succeeding
tribunal, and ought not to be without great weight with
both Nations in like questions recurring between them.
On these grounds the United States may justly regard
the British captures and condemnations of neutral trade
with Colonies of the enemies of Great Britain as violations
of right; and if reason, consistency or that sound policy
which cannot be at variance with either, be allowed the
weight which they ought to have, the British Government
will feel sufficient motives to repair the wrongs done
in such cases by its cruisers and Courts.
But apart from this general view of the subject, a refusal to
indemnify the sufferers in the particular case of the Aurora,
is destitute of every pretext, because in the second place
the continuity of her voyage was clearly and palpably
broken, and the trade converted into a new character.
It has been already noted that the British regulation of
1798 admits a direct trade in time of War, between a
belligerent Colony and a neutral Country carrying on
the trade; and admits consequently the legality of the
importation by the Aurora from the Havana to Charleston.
Nor has it ever been pretended that a neutral Nation has
not a right to reexport to any belligerent Country whatever
foreign productions, not contraband of war, which may
have been duly incorporated and naturalized, as a part
of the Commercial stock of the Country re-exporting it.
The question then to be decided under the British regulation
itself, is whether in landing the cargo, paying the duties,
and thus as effectually qualifying the articles for the
legal consumption of the Country, as if they had been
its native productions, they were not at the same
time equally qualified with native productions
for exportation to a foreign Market.
That such ought to be the decision results
irresistibly from the following considerations:
1st. From the respect which is due to the internal
regulations of every Country, where they cannot be charged
with a temporizing partiality towards particular belligerent
parties, or with fraudulent views towards all of them.
The regulations of the United States on this subject,
must be free from every possible imputation,
being not only fair in their appearance, but just in
their principles, and having continued the same during
the periods of war, as they were in those of peace.
It may be added that they probably correspond,
in every essential feature relating to re-exportations,
with the laws of other Commercial Countries,
and particularly with those of Great Britain.
The annexed outline of them by the Secretary
of the Treasury, will at once explain their character,
and show that in the case of the Aurora every
legal requisite was duly complied with.
2nd. From the impossibility of substituting any other
admissible criterion, than that of landing the articles,
and otherwise qualifying them for the use of the Country.
If this regular and customary proceeding,
be not a barrier against further enquiries,
where it may be asked are the enquiries to stop?
By what evidence are particular articles to be
identified on the high seas or before a foreign Tribunal?
If identified, how is it to be ascertained, whether they
were imported with a view to the market at home,
or to a foreign Market, or as ought always to be presumed
to the one or the other as it should happen to invite;
or if to a foreign Market, whether to one forbidden
or permitted by the British regulations; for it is to be
recollected, that among the modifications which her policy
has given to the general principle asserted by her, a direct
trade is permitted to a neutral carrier, from a belligerent
Colony to her ports as well as to those of his own Country.
If, again, the landing of the goods, and the payment of
the duties be not sufficient to break the continuity of the
voyage, what it may be asked, is the degree of internal
change or alienation, which will have that effect?
May not a claim be set up to trace the articles from hand to
hand, from ship to ship in the same port, and even from one
port to another port, as long as they remain in the Country?
In a word in departing from the simple criterion provided
by the Country itself, for its own legitimate and permanent
objects, it is obvious, that besides the defalcations which
might be committed on our carrying trade, pretexts will
be given to cruisers for endless vexations on our
commerce at large, and that a latitude and delays
will accrue in the distant proceedings of Admiralty
Courts, still more ruinous and intolerable:
3rd From the decision in the British high Court of
Admiralty itself, given in the case of the Polly, Lasky,
Master, by a Judge deservedly celebrated for a profound
judgment, which cannot be suspected of leaning toward
doctrines unjust or injurious to the rights of his own Country.
On that occasion he expressly declares “It is not my
business to say what is universally the test of a
bona fide importation: it is argued, that it would
not be sufficient that the duties should be paid
and that the cargo should be landed.
If these criteria are not to be resorted to, I should
be at a loss to know what should be the test;
and I am strongly disposed to hold, that it would
be sufficient, that the goods should be landed
and the duties paid.” 2 Rob. Reports P: 368-9.
The President has thought it proper that you
should be furnished with such a view of the subject,
as is here sketched; that you may make the
use of it best suited to the occasion.
If the trial of the Aurora should not be over,
it is questionable whether the Government
will interfere with its Courts.
Should the trial be over and the sentence of the Vice
Admiralty Court at St. John’s have been confirmed,
you are to lose no time in presenting to the British
Government a representation corresponding with the
scope of these observations; and in urging that redress
in the case, which is equally due to private justice,
to the reasonable expectation of the United States,
and to that confidence and harmony which
ought to be cherished between the two Nations.
The effect of the doctrine involved in the
sentence of the Court in Newfoundland, on
our carrying trade, will at once be seen by you.
The average amount of our re-exportations for three
years ending 30th Sept 1803 has been 32,003,921 dollars.
Besides the mercantile and Navigation profits, the
average revenue from drawbacks on goods
re-exported for three years ending 31st December 1803
is 184,271 dollars; to which is to be added an uncertain
but considerable sum consisting of duties paid on
articles reexported after having lost through neglect
or lapse of time, the privilege of drawback.
A very considerable portion of this branch of trade with all
its advantages, will be cut off, if the formalities heretofore
respected, are not to protect our re-exportations.
Indeed it is difficult to see the extent to which the
apprehended innovation may be carried in theory; or to
estimate the mischief which it may produce in practice.
If Great Britain disregarding the precepts of Justice,
suffers herself to calculate the interest she has in
spoliating or abridging our commerce by the value of it
to the United States, she ought certainly not to forget
that the United States must in that case, calculate by the
same standard the measures which the stake will afford,
for counteracting her unjust and unfriendly policy.1
While in Spain the diplomat Charles Pinckney and Monroe worked together
and wrote this letter to Secretary of State Madison on 25 May 1805:
The subject in which we have been engaged is so fully
before you in our public communications, that there remains
only one point for us to make any remarks on to you in a
private one; that is, what will be best for our government
to do in the present unexpected and disagreeable business.
We do presume that it will be impossible
to leave it in its present state.
The injuries which our people have received, and the insults
offered to our government by that of Spain seem to forbid it.
Besides it is presumable that the course the
affairs may take, considering all circumstances,
does not leave it altogether to our option whether
we will leave it in its present state or not.
If we showed a willingness to submit to these injuries
and insults it may be inferred that the combination
against us may gain strength, and its pretentions
in all the objects to which they extend increase.
What the object of Spain is is sufficiently seen.
It is most certain that she never will pay one farthing of
cash on any account whatever, however just, that she can
avoid, as it likewise is that she never will cede one foot of
territory otherwise than by compulsion, or relinquish any
of her pretentions to that which we are justly entitled.
It is in our opinion equally certain that France will be
indifferent to the quarrel, and even foment it on the part
of Spain while she entertains a hope of profiting by it.
To the commencement of this negotiation or about
that time, her hope of deriving some advantage
from the controversy was sanguine; even at
the present time it is far from being otherwise.
Whether a pecuniary advantage is the only
object of France in the business we cannot say.
Some think otherwise and attribute to the person at
the head of that government schemes of much greater
extent and danger towards our government and country,
to which this controversy will be made hereafter
the pretext, in case other things succeed with him.
Our opinion is that her object so far is a financial one.
What it may be hereafter may depend on circumstances.
We also think that she has been drawn into
the business at the instigation of Spain.
But in all cases in which these powers act in
concert, although they respect the concerns
of Spain alone, France becomes immediately
the principal and Spain a secondary party.
Of course the interests of Spain become secondary, those
of France primary, in all questions involved in the business.
Be the policy of France either of the one or other
character above described, in this affair, the course
which it appears proper for us to pursue is the same.
In either case we are decidedly of opinion that
the most decisive measures should be taken.
If a deep policy is at the bottom of her measures,
which harbors the design and waits the opportunity
of doing us great injury, the most decisive
we are, the better the prospect of defeating it.
If it is an inferior financial object only, the more
certain the abandonment of it will be, when it
is seen clearly that it is not likely to succeed.
So that in either view the more bold and decisive
the measures to be taken the better; as the project
was deliberately undertaken, and of course in
the hope and belief of success, it will be pursued
with equal system while any hope remains.
The foundation of that hope was in our opinion a
confidence entertained by that government that
we would yield to the pressure from France;
that we would rather pay money and a
considerable Sum than hazard our pacific
system, the profits of our neutrality &c.
Estimating everything by the standard of military glory,
they know of none other, and for that and many other
reasons despise and hate the principles and career
of our government, and those who administer it.
But what are the measures which ought to be pursued?
There are two modes of acting, one which shuns the ground
on which France has stood, indeed gives it up to her, the
other which covers the whole ground which belongs to us.
If the first is pursued, we abandon of course & forever
French spoliations, and the injuries from the suppression
of the deposit, we give up to her West Florida, and allow
her to fix her price, in case of sale, on it and East Florida.
In that case we are to counteract these pretensions by
taking possession of the territory on the Rio Bravo
or some other on that side to menace Mexico.
No other mode occurs by which we can counteract
the policy in question, and we are inclined to think that
this would prove a less effectual one, and by shrinking
before France and inviting her pressure be apt to draw
her on into greater compromitment, and produce
worse consequences to the United States.
We are therefore of opinion that it will be best to adopt
the latter course, to take possession of both the Floridas;
and of the whole country west of the Mississippi
to the Rio Bravo; unless it should be thought
better to rest at the Colorado; though we think
the broader the ground taken the better.
In this view all the Spanish ports should
be broken up within those limits.
On that ground we might negotiate.
The refusal to pay for the suppression of the deposit,
and for Spanish spoliations would justify
taking possession of East Florida.
The refusal to compromise the affair of the western
limits of French spoliations and West Florida, gives
us a fair right at least to take what belongs to us.
France ought to be satisfied with the high respect
shown to her in the negotiation by our last propositions.
It enables her to withdraw from the controversy,
if she is so disposed, with honor; since when our
government acts on the failure of the negotiation,
incurs new and heavy expenses, the state of
things is changed, and new demands arise.
If our conduct in those propositions is approved,
or even should it be thought that we had conceded
too much, still they form a basis, and a wider
one in the latter view to prove our moderation
to Spain and respectful attention to France.
The pretentions of the latter may be considered
as completely Satisfied by the offer made and
refusal of it on the distinction above taken.
These are concisely our sentiments on this
subject, for we have not time to enlarge on it.
To give complete effect to such a plan the
boldest and most decisive councils should
appear in the measures which we take.
Nothing like a spirit of compromise or apprehension
of the consequences should be seen.
The destiny of the new World is in our hands;
it is so considered by Europe, and in marking any limits
to our course in such a movement it should appear to
proceed in a consciousness of that fact from a spirit of
moderation, of justice, and love of peace, not from the
dread of any power and in any view of the consequences.
Such a course of proceeding we think more likely
to succeed than any other; and should it succeed,
it will not fail to produce its effect in our relation with
all the possessions of European powers in our quarter.
The measures which have been heretofore taken in
emergencies will doubtless be suitable in the present one,
such as the submission of a great body of troops, and a
considerable sum of money to the disposition of the
President, especially in the quarters most imposing on Spain.
However it is not necessary for us to go into such details,
Securing the cause of free government and Mankind
by placing at the head and in the chief command
men who are ardent in it, the more party distinctions
are lost sight of in so great an exertion, the better
the effect will probably be at home and abroad.
It is to be hoped and even presumed, that a decisive policy,
like the above, would terminate the business without war,
without an increase of regular force, and without much
or even any expense, for it has been repeated to us by
authority deserving much attention, that the tone and
conduct of this government on this occasion is founded
on representations from Mr. Yrujo, which are constantly
repeated that they risk nothing by denying all our claims.
We know that copies of his letters have
been sent to the French government.
We send you a copy of a letter which we have just
received from General Armstrong which contains
some very interesting remarks on this Subject.2
While Monroe was in Paris, he used much cipher writing in this letter
to Secretary of State Madison on 6 July 1805:
Since my letter of the 30th ultimo some
facts have come to my knowledge which
it may be of advantage to you to know.
I have been told that mister Talleyrand has replied when
pressed to aid the negotiation at Madrid that it could not
be expected of him as a project of a very different character
countenanced by our agent meaning mister Livingston
was before our government—this fact is unquestionable,
as I have it from authority too direct and deserving
of confidence in every view to be doubted.
Thus it appears by the clearest demonstration,
that the failure of the negotiation is entirely owing to
facts go to prove that the many acts of his misconduct
while here are not attributable to folly alone.
I have heretofore thought him entitled to that apology,
but I am far from thinking so at present;
indeed there is much reason to suspect him of the
grossest iniquity I give you this hint to put you on your
guard be assured that he will poison what he touches.
His object is to obtain some appointment
of the president to England if possible.
Counting on it he has proposed a change to General
Armstrong here to get back to this place to pursue
the same game that he has heretofore done.
I should not be surprised if this government on seeing
the stand made here and at Madrid against the project
submitted by him to our government apprehending
its failure in that extent had charged him with some
other more reasonable in the hope of better success.
If he is admitted in the least degree into confidence,
or if cause is given him to infer that sacrifices would
be made for peace or that our councils’ balance, and
are not decided, he will communicate the same here.
In short he is the man of all others whom you should
avoid as deserving the execrations of his Country.
These ideas were never expressed before
because some of the facts which inspire them
were not known even when I wrote you last.
I write you in haste to take advantage
of a private conveyance to Bordeaux.
General Armstrong and myself have united in a letter
to Mr. Pinckney for Mr. Bowdoin, to advise that he
decline treating with the government of Spain, should
his powers authorize it (which however we presume
cannot be the case) till he hears from you, after the
receipt of the result of the negotiation at Madrid.
I shall leave this on Wednesday next,
by the way of Antwerp for London.
The above is of course confidential, being intended
solely for the purpose of putting you on your guard.3
On 6 August 1805 Monroe in London wrote to Madison:
I left Madrid on the 26 of May & arrived here
on the 23rd ultimo by the route of Paris & Holland.
I reached Paris on the 20th June & left it on the 11th of July.
I should have remained there longer had I seen reasonable
cause to presume that any advantage might have been
derived from it in respect to our business with Spain.
But none such occurred, & of course there was
no motive for delaying longer my journey here.
The French government had been invited as I passed
through Paris to aid our negotiation with Spain according
to its Engagement on a former occasion; it was apprised
in the progress of what occurred in it, knew the time of
its conclusion & that I should return through Paris,
so that had it been disposed even in that stage to
interpose its good offices to promote an adjustment
of our differences with that power on such terms
as we could accept, it might have done it with Effect.
I had flattered myself that it would have interposed
at that period, & with a view to draw its attention
in an especial manner to the object, had made such a
communication to General Bournonville its ambassador
at Madrid, as seemed most likely to Secure it.
Of this & all other documents relative to the subject
a copy was sent you from Madrid by Captain Dulton.
It is proper to add that when I delivered that communication
to General Bournonville which I did in person, I intimated
to him verbally that as I should take Paris on my return,
the opportunity for such friendly interference on the part
of his government would again be presented to it:
that I had a power to act singly & if a like one
should be given to the Spanish Ambassador there,
we might renew the business & conclude it.
General Bournonville transmitted immediately this
communication to his government then at Milan by
a courier, so that it must have been received in a
week after I left Madrid, & as I was more than three
weeks on the route from Madrid to Paris the French
government had sufficient time to make an arrangement
for the purpose even before my arrival at Paris.
While there I was attentive to Every circumstance
from which any inference could be drawn of the
disposition of the French government on that head,
& as I was frequently in society with some of the
members of the government who were left behind,
especially the arch-chancellor who is considered as
its head in the absence of the Emperor, the opportunity
to make a correct Estimate was a very favorable one.
But nothing occurred to authorize an inference that it
intended to make me any proposition on the subject.
On the contrary I had sufficient reason to believe that
the French government still indulged the Expectation
that the proposition which Mr. Livingston had
submitted to you before I set out from this
country to Spain would finally be accepted.
As this fact had been avowed by the Minister
of foreign affairs it could not be questioned.
Having done everything in my power to Expose the
fallacy of this expectation in obedience to my instructions
while at Paris in my way to Spain; & in Spain I was
surprised that the idea should still be Entertained & the more
so as General Armstrong had Equally labored to remove it.
Under these circumstances it seemed highly
improper for me to repeat again my application to
the French government for its aid in that business.
It was sure to fail of success & therefore to be avoided.
But that was not the only objection to it.
It seemed likely by weakening the force of the
part which had been taken at Madrid to diminish
the good effect which we flattered ourselves
might reasonably been expected from it.
It was even probable in relation to what had passed,
that it might be considered as betraying a want of
just sensibility to what was due to the character of our
government & country, & lessen the effect of such
measures as our government might think proper to adopt
on a view of the result & whole proceedings at Madrid.
On full consideration therefore of all circumstances
I deemed it most consistent with the public honor & interest,
after waiting about three weeks at Paris & furnishing the
opportunity & drawing the conclusions above stated of
the indisposition of the French government to interfere
in a suitable manner in our business with Spain,
to proceed on my journey here without making
any application for it, which I did accordingly.
I send you herewith a copy of Mr. Livingston’s
letter to me of November 12 & of my answer of
13th which have reference to what occurred in
that stage of this interesting concern at Paris.
They were mentioned in mine to you of the
27th but by accident not then forwarded.
Some days after my return here
Mr. Bowdoin arrived also.
He has I understand Explained to you
fully the motives of this measure.
In a political view I consider it a judicious one.
Had he proceeded to Madrid from the port where he landed,
he could not in the present state of affairs have been able to
render any service in the great object depending with Spain,
while his arrival there at that moment being attributed
to improper motives might have done harm in the
view which has been already Explained.
I shall avail myself of the opportunity it
affords to give him all the light in my possession
relative to our concerns with that power.
I am persuaded that Mr. Pinkney will hold the
ground ’till his successor relieves him, though
he is desirous of withdrawing from it.
It is not yet decided whether it will be most
advisable for Mr. Erving to proceed to Madrid
or wait with Mr. Bowdoin farther orders from you.
Should he adopt the former course he will probably
proceed through Paris to confer with General
Armstrong on the general subject & ascertain
whether any change has taken place in the
disposition of the French government respecting it.
When I left Paris I intimated to General Armstrong
who was then in the Country by letter, that I should
be willing while here to return to Holland on a
suitable inducement to conclude the business.
I did so not in a presumption that there was any prospect
of such an event, but as a measure of precaution to be
taken advantage of in Case an opportunity offered.
While at Paris I received your letter of May 4th
and since my return that of June 21st.
On the subject of the first I have to observe that under the
discouraging circumstances in which we commenced the
negotiation with Spain we thought it best to adhere as
closely as possible to the convention of August 11, 1802
which had at one time been approved by her government.
We flattered ourselves that if that government could be
induced to take a right course in the great points,
it might be possible to prevail on it afterwards to
accede to the modification suggested in the letter.
We should have been attentive to the
subject had the occasion favored.
Our reason for not entering more fully into some points,
& among others that mentioned in the Extract of
your letter to General Armstrong of June 6th in our
correspondence with Mr. Cervallos was explained
in Mr. Pinkney’s & my joint letter from Madrid.
In addition to which it may be observed that much
was said in conversation in reply to his subsequent
notes which the contents of the first had not permitted.
On the day of my return here one of our vessels,
the Enoch under circumstances precisely similar to those in
the case of the Aurora was condemned by the admiralty.
Several others have since been brought in on the same
principle whose cases are now before the court.
I have taken the subject up in connection with the other
topics that were depending before I set out for Spain.
I send you a copy of my letter to
Lord Mulgrave & of his answer to it.
I beg to assure you that I shall push this business
with promptitude and decision to some result,
to place before the President a correct view of the
policy of this government towards the United States.4
James Monroe returned to London, and on 6 October 1805 he described
the diplomatic issues in Europe in this letter to President Jefferson:
I wrote you lately by Col. Mercer, by whom I
intended to have forwarded Carey’s letter respecting
the documents which you had committed to him
relative to the war in our southern states.
By accident it was left behind but is now forwarded.
I hope the same which he states to be necessary to
redeem the papers will be made up & furnished him.
In that case the person to whom it is entrusted here
ought to be instructed to see not only that it is applied
to the proper object, but produces its effect.
I have no doubt that what he states is true.
I will most cheerfully be among the subscribers
& do anything else, while I remain in my power.
In my letters to Mr. Madison from Spain, I took the liberty
to mention that I should sail for the United States soon
after my arrival here; and I most certainly should have
done so, had I not been detained by the late seizure of
our vessels by this government, as you have seen by my
public letters, and that which I wrote you by Col. Mercer.
I conclude by my not hearing from Mr. Madison that I am
expected home, which increases my desire to set out.
But independent of the season, which furnishes a private
motive with my family, there are also public ones against it.
It does not appear to me to be a perfectly safe
step to leave the business with this government
in the present unsettled state.
Should it pursue a course of hostility towards us,
the policy might be attributed to that cause.
It might even attribute to my departure
the failure of an adjustment at this time.
These would be slight pretexts it is true, but
yet with the coloring they would have from their
partisans among us, they might impose on some.
The consideration that it is probable that our government
will act on this subject in such a manner as to lay the
foundation for new communications with this, which
may require the agency of a person already in some
measure acquainted with it, has more weight on my mind.
The public interest might be, in some degree exposed
to injury, in such an event in case I should withdraw.
With respect to our concerns on the Continent I am
not aware that it could produce any material effect.
The agency in those, will I presume be given
to General Armstrong & Mr. Bowdoin with the
governments where they respectively are.
There is only one case in which my presence
here could be material, which looks to an object
of a character different from that which marks
the present relations between the two powers.
This I think an improbable case &
therefore not entitled to much weight.
Still on a view of all circumstances I feel that there
is some hazard, and of course much responsibility
attending my departure at this time, & leverage my
country without a representative of its highest grade.
I am therefore rather inclined to think it best to keep
my ground for the winter & to adopt that course,
although it will accumulate additional debt on me,
and is otherwise utterly inconsistent with my
own & the views & interests of my family.
It may be well that my successor be appointed
during the present Session, so as to enable him
to arrive early in the Spring, provided it is
deemed material that I be here on his arrival.
Though I hope that you will have no objection to
my sailing at any time when the state of things
here permits, & a favorable opportunity offers.
By this I do not mean to imply that a few months
sooner or later in the Spring will be any object with me.
Certainly a delay for such a term will most readily
be accorded to if the public interest requires it.
It is easy to understand the conduct of this
government, or rather its policy, in regard
to us since the commencement of this war.
It evaded an adjustment on light pretexts toward
the time of my departure for Spain especially &
suffered our commerce to pass free to keep us quiet,
till it should form a coalition with Russia & Sweden.
Had she stirred the question at that time
it might have interfered with that project.
She now moves it, because she thinks those powers
are so completely embarked in the war against
France, that they cannot attend to this object;
much less give us any aid in it.
The correspondence between Mr. King & Lord Harrowby
and the treaty with Russia, Sweden & Denmark,
merit in many respects particular attention.
On the part of this country they form but one
transaction, as they breathe out one sentiment.
Mr. King’s note does not, as yours to Mr. Morris did, and as
mine to Mr. De La Croix afterwards did give countenance to
the principle that free ships make free goods, and insist that
it is preferable on many important considerations to neutral
nations and especially to the United States as a rule.
On the contrary it disclaims it as a modern gloss
and affirms that the opposite principle furnishes
a much more certain & otherwise better rule
between neutrals & belligerents.
That such a correspondence might have been turned
to account by Great Britain in her negotiation with
Russia at that time cannot be doubted; nor can it
be that she gained from it everything in her power.
Besides many circumstances satisfy me that she
did profit of it independent of those which appear
on the face of the transaction; a material one is that
Lord Mulgrave in explaining the cause of the reference
in the declaratory article to the United States said
that Russia insisted on it, because she knew that
negotiations were depending at the time here,
between the United States & Great Britain on that subject.
The anxiety of Russia to be placed on the favorable
footing of the United States was doubtless excited by
the zeal shown by Mr. King, as expressed in his note,
to push the interest of neutral powers, which had
been so much injured in the course of the war.
Thus I am persuaded that Great Britain made use of our
concession in the question of free ships making free goods
to obtain the abandonment of it by the northern powers;
and now that those powers are embarked in the war against
France and can give little support to us in the depending
question, that she seized the moment with intention to
push it to the greatest possible extent against us.
By placing Russia on the ground of the United States,
she might hereafter contend with some plausibility,
that any concession which was obtained of us, or even
tolerated by us, was binding also on the northern powers.
I am not disposed to carry my suspicions of a policy so
refined on the part of this government, as to merit the
character of chicane, but I cannot avoid observing in the
report of the advocate sent to Mr. King by Lord Harrowby,
the circumstance that it is stated, that the doctrine which
he lays down in favor of neutrals, had been settled by the
Court of Admiralty only, though he has no cause to suspect
that it will not be approved by the court of appeals.
The fact is that the late decision in the
case of the Essex was made by that court.
Is it presumable that the affair has been
so managed with a view to set up such a
flimsy pretext in defense of the measure?
The correspondence by Lord Harrowby with Mr. King
was the act of the government, and binding it; it formed
a kind of engagement in which the considerations were
reciprocal; can it be pretended that the court of appeals
has a right to control the government, a court of policy
consisting of some of the members of the Cabinet?
It seems singular that the measure should have been
ushered forth through that channel by mere accident.
If the whole was contrived, I can hardly think it probable,
now that they must see that the scheme is understood
& will be exposed, that this government will avow it.
If our concession was likely to be made subservient
to the interest of Great Britain with the northern
powers, at a time when our example could not fail
to produce a considerable effect, the opportunity was
a favorable one to settle by treaty, the consideration
which is supposed to have been given for it.
I think this government is bound by the act in its present
form, but no door for evasion should have been left open.
The affair stands on ground less solid than it would
have stood under a treaty; and it cannot be doubted
at that time that it would have been as easy
to have settled it by treaty as by correspondence.
Admitting that nothing more could be then obtained
than was, it is much to be regretted that Mr. King
suffered himself to be so far overreached
in that transaction by this government.
Unfortunately a temporary palliation was obtained only,
as appears by its present conduct, in a case where
a prominent provision was indispensable, especially
as there was no cause to presume that any
but the most formal act would be respected.
This is I think a fair and candid comment on that
transaction, which I make to place it in its true light.
It is not unlikely, that it may be brought into view
for party purposes & exhibited in a very different one.
I consider the whole affair, that is Mr. King’s letter, Lord
Harrowby’s answer, the report &c as having been arranged
in matter & form between them, or rather between the
former & Mr. H., and as I am concerned that the object
on the part of this government was to use it with Russia,
by pressing on her the example of America, it is to
be seriously regretted that so little precaution was
taken to secure the consideration which we were to
receive in return for the emphatic manner in which
a great principle was conceded or rather scouted.
The abandonment of that principle by Russia is
likely to produce the most serious consequences
in the one now depending, and every other of
a maritime nature in respect to neutral rights.
While she adhered to it, she covered
the present and every other one.
It was a broader ground in which Russia might
have some interest, and she was bound by her
honor to adhere to an existing positive engagement.
In the present one she may probably have no interest
whatever, & the reigning sovereign having consented
to forsake the example of his predecessors in the
great principle may become indifferent to inferior ones.
I am convinced that it was the serious determination of this
government to push its pretentions against us by means
of judicial construction to the greatest possible extent.
Lord Mulgrave sustained in conversation the principle
as exemplified in the order of November 6th, & seemed
to press with decision the resolution of the Cabinet
to confine our importation to the home consumption.
I pressed with equal earnestness and decision,
the complete right of the United States as illustrated
in my official letter to Mr. Madison by that to
Lord Mulgrave, to such commerce, uninterrupted
by Great Britain, as the parent country might permit.
I saw that, as the measure was intended as
an experiment on our government & country,
so the doctrine held by him was equally intended
as one on me, and I was prepared for it.
I exposed the unfairness of the proceeding under
the circumstances of an existing negotiation &ca.
Against that imputation he defended himself by saying
that no orders had been issued; to which I replied that
I could not discriminate between an order and a decree.
This conduct was personally civil, and his reputation
is that of a worthy man of good talents.
I hinted in a manner to be understood, that they must treat
us as a power & show us all the respect in every point
of contact or species of intercourse that they claim of us:
that we know our rights & should maintain them.
As I considered the attack on us in the light I have
represented it, in effect as an act of hostility, and
knew how idle it was to proceed as I had done before,
I went to Spain, since conciliation under existing
circumstances could lead to nothing but sacrifice,
I thought it incumbent on me to take a shorter
course and adapt the tone of my notes to
that of the measure they complained of.
In our first interview he assured me, in speaking on
the general topics depending between the two countries,
that every accommodation should be given us which the
principles of the government permitted, administratively;
and that in those cases where it could not thus be
given, and it appeared that there was a real
difference of interest, he hoped we should
meet in a spirit of mutual accommodation.
I assured him that such was my disposition &
that of my government as had been evident
by my conduct before I went to Spain.
Much was said on both sides of the advantage to each
nation from a friendly intercourse, and of the interest
in other respects which they had in making it perpetual.
In the second interview after I had read the reports of
the King’s advocate & Proctor & replied that they
gave no satisfaction on the great point in question,
when we came seriously to discuss the measure,
the tone changed as I have already stated.
It is certain that the business has been checked,
as well in the court as on the sea.
But few seizures are now made comparatively, and none
of our vessels are condemned when it can be avoided.
One material fact however lately
occurred which it is proper to note.
The day before the court of admiralty adjourned,
about the last of September, a new principle was
avowed, of greater extent than that complained of.
A vessel sailing from Holland for Canton charged
with a cargo of about 30,000 dollars in goods,
& 70,000 in specie was before it.
The Judge held up the case & with it the cargo,
for proof whether the Batavian government
permitted that trade in peace.
It was well known that it did not, & the condemnation
at the next term was expected of course.
The next morning the agent for the captors proposed
to the agent for the prize an accommodation by
offering to give up the cargo &ca. to him, on his paying
charges about £400, which was of course accepted.
It was understood that this accommodation was offered
& made at the instance of Sr. John Nicoll the King’s
advocate, who I am told hinted that he would quiet the
captors, this not being a proper time to push the business.
It is said that 10 or 12 other of our vessels engaged in
their trade are daily expected back from Canton, and
many suspect that this was a maneuver to entrap them.
It is a fact that my last letter to Lord Mulgrave
of the 23 ultimo was not delivered to him till
the 25th or 26th, as he was at Weymouth
when it was sent in & did not return till then.
It is affirmed by some who attended the court, that
on the night of the 27th, the day on which the decision
was given, the Judge had an interview with Messrs. Pitt
& Mulgrave, whence there is cause to infer that the
accommodation may be traced to that source.
I give you these details that you may see
precisely how the business stands, according to
my view of it, and the pivot on which it turns.
No answer is given me, and I think it probable that
none is intended to be given, if to be avoided.
A delay may be desirable to see how the war
succeeds on the continent, and what the effect
of the measure may be in the United States.
It may even be hoped to disgust me by their silence
& betray me into some act of intemperance,
which they might take advantage of.
I am convinced that they would prefer
treating the subject by conference.
But what end would that answer?
It has been often tried without effect; and nothing
is more true than that no accommodation will
ever be granted us in any respect in the great
interests depending, which they can avoid.
They will not be the dupes of cajoling; they will
yield nothing which their interest does not prompt,
and the appeal to that strong motive is better
made by an official correspondence, which is
preserved, may be published, and by getting
into their own papers & exposing the injustice
of their conduct, become a ground of attack
on the ministry by the opposition.
I have had communication on this subject
lately with the minister of Sweden.
He observed that so important a
subject had never made less noise.
The remark was just; I believe the
ministry have kept it to themselves.
This proves that they do not want the affair to become
public, one of the motives of which may be, that
they fear it would alarm Russia & the other northern
powers, & weaken their coalition, & bring from those
powers remonstrances against their pretentions.
He understands the affair and will give a hint
of it to his court so as to put it on its guard.
The Russian cannot be trusted.
He would communicate to this court
what I told him and not to his own.
The Dane is sound but indiscreet.5
Monroe wrote a lengthy letter to Secretary of State Madison
from London dated on 18 and 25 October 1805.
This is the last portion of that letter:
The late Seizure is probably an experiment on this
principle of what the United States will bear, and the
delay which is observed; in answering my letters only an
expedient to give the government time to see its effect.
If it Succeeds, they will I presume pursue the advantage
gained to the greatest extent in all the relations Subsisting
between the two countries, more especially in the
impressment of our Seamen, the prostration and pillage
of our commerce through the war, and in the more
elevated tone of the government in a future Negotiation.
If it fails, I am equally confident that their whole system
of conduct towards the United States will change,
and that it will then be easy to adjust our affairs
with this country, and place them on an equal
and a reciprocally advantageous footing.
Perhaps no time was ever more favorable for resisting
these unjust encroachments than the present one.
The conduct of our government is universally Known
to have been just, friendly and conciliating towards
Great Britain, while the attack by her government
on the United States is as universally Known
to be unjust, wanton and unprovoked.
The measure has wounded deeply the interests of
many of her own people, & is not a popular one.
The United States furnish them at all times one
of the best markets for their manufactures,
and at present almost the only one.
Her colonies are dependent on us.
Harassed as they already are with the war,
and the menaces of a powerful adversary,
a State of hostility with us, would probably
go far to throw this country into Confusion.
It is an event which the Ministry would find it
difficult to resist, and therefore cannot,
I presume, be willing to encounter.
But is it Safe for the United States to attempt
a vindication of their rights and interests in a decisive
manner with Spain and Britain at the same time?
Will it not unite them against us and
otherwise do us the most essential injury?
This is certainly a very important consideration and
will of course be maturely weighed by our government.
In my view of the Subject the cases do not interfere.
We probably never shall be able to Settle our
concerns with either power without pushing
our just claims on each with the greatest decision.
At present, though at war with each other, they
harmonize in a System of aggression against us,
as far as it is possible in Such a State.
Is it not presumable then that at peace their harmony
will be greater and its effect more injurious?
It seems to be a question Simply whether we will
resist their unjust pressure at this time or defer it
to some other opportunity, and Surely none can
be more favorable for us or less so for them.
They are now respectively much in our power.
We can wound both essentially, Should it be
necessary to push things to that extremity,
without receiving much comparative injury in return.
I am Strong in the opinion that a pressure on each at the
Same time would produce a good effect with the other.
Success with either could not well
fail to produce it with the other.
I am far from thinking that the incident with Britain;
Should change our conduct towards Spain, or that
the necessity we may be under to push our pretentions
with Spain should relax our exertions against Britain.
Some considerations indeed occur which make it
probable that the latter incident was a fortunate one.
By pressing both at the Same time France may find herself
relieved from a dilemma, in which a pressure on Spain
alone might place her in consideration of her conduct in
the late negotiation; and being desirous to encourage
our misunderstanding with England She may be prompted
to promote an adjustment of our differences with Spain,
to leave us free to push the object with England.
As these Subjects have been practically much under my
view in the trusts with which I have been honored by the
President, and have entirely engrossed my attention,
I have thought that it would be agreeable to you to
receive the result of my reflections on them.
I am, Sir, with great respect & esteem,
Your very obedient servant,
Jas. Monroe
P.S. October 25.
I have just had an interview with
Mr. Hammond in which I asked him when
I Should obtain an answer from Lord Mulgrave.
He assured me that the Subject was under the consideration
of the Cabinet, and that it was intended to give me as early
an answer as its own importance, and the other very
important Concerns of the government would permit:
that I Knew they were contending for their existence &c.
I told him that I was detained here by that business alone
and Should have Sailed long Since for the United States,
had his government placed our affairs on Such a
footing as to have enabled me: that we wanted
nothing but what was just and reasonable.
Nothing else material passed in the interview.
Mr. Bowdoin Sailed for the Continent about 10 days Since;
I have not heard of his arrival in Holland,
and fear as the winds have been unfavorable,
that he has had a bad passage.
Captain Tomkins will not sail ’till February, So that there
is no prospect of an immediate passage in his vessel.6
On 1 November 1805 James Monroe in London
wrote this letter to President Thomas Jefferson:
Yours of June 15th was received on my arrival here.
Mr. Gamble has not been here that I can learn.
Should he come while I am here, I shall most
certainly pay him the attention you desire.
I have conferred with Mr. Carey respecting the documents
concerning the war in our southern states which you
committed to him for publication, & send his apology in
a letter to me for not having answered your expectation.
I have no doubt that his explanation is correct, as he
appeared to be much concerned that his embarrassments
had driven him into such an expedient.
I hope the sum which he says is necessary
to redeem the papers will be furnished him.
I shall be among the subscribers & happy to do
everything in my power to promote the publication.
As I considered myself as having your permission to
return home when the negotiation with Spain should be
concluded, I took the liberty to intimate to Mr. Madison from
Madrid that I should do so, as soon after my arrival here
as the state of things with this government would permit.
The project however was interrupted as you have
seen by the seizure of our vessels which commenced
at that time and imposed on me a duty from
which I thought it improper to withdraw.
Had I sailed without remonstrating against the measure,
it seemed as if I should have given a sanction to it,
or at least exposed our government and myself to the
charge of great neglect in a very important public concern.
And had I sailed at any time since, and this
government had pursued a more hostile policy
towards us, it was to be apprehended that the
consequences would be attributed to my departure.
To have remonstrated in a milder tone,
I knew would have been perfectly idle.
In the way of conciliation & friendship everything had been
done, in return for which we had been requited at the first
favorable moment since the commencement of the war,
being that when their new coalition was formed, and
we were ill at ease with another power with the poniard.
At present the season is so far advanced that it may
be hazardous to sail till the spring, February or
March, when I propose to bring my family home.
Having fully explained myself to you heretofore on this
subject, I will not trouble you here with a repetition of
the reasons which force me into this measure; though
indeed under any circumstances, it would be far from
my wish to remain in such a situation any length of time.
Should you however be disposed on my return home
to attempt the formation of a commercial treaty
with this government and think my agency
in it material, I will cheerfully come back
for the purpose, leaving my family behind.
You will therefore be so good as to consider me as
having resigned, and appoint a successor to take the
ground as I leave it, or as returning to the United States
on leave of absence, as you may find most consistent
with the public interest & the credit of your administration.
As I could have no other motive to leave my family
again for so long a time, so I beg you to have
none other in your decision on the point.
By this opportunity I shall send several pamphlets
entitled “war in disguise” which are believed to have
been written under the auspices of those in power.
It is not doubted that the disposition exists to push
measures with us to the full extent of the doctrines
contained in that work, if circumstances favor.
Their jealousy of us in every subsisting
relation is as great as it can be.
On the former invasion of Holland a similar
publication was made, which was suppressed
on the failure of the expedition.
Mr. King I have reason to think knew the fact &
the contents of the work, of which I presume
he gave notice to the department of state at the time.
Of our affairs on the continent I have nothing new to add.
Mr. Bowdoin must have arrived at Paris before this,
as he left Rotterdam on the 20th ultimo on the route thither.
Of General Armstrong, Mr. Bowdoin & Mr. Erving you
will have full and correct information of those concerns.
The latter is before this at Madrid.
It is evident that we have no sincere friends anywhere:
that all the powers with whom we have the
most immediate relations are jealous of us
by some motives which are common to all.
The relation which we bear to their colonies
excites that sentiment in a peculiar degree with
Great Britain & Spain, though other motives mingle
with it on the part of the former which are fully
exposed in the pamphlet called “war in disguise.”
France feels less forcibly that sentiment in this respect
because she puts less value on her colonies, & being inferior
at sea finds it her interest to encourage our growth on that
element in the reason which prompts Britain to depress it.
But without an attitude of menace and an evident ability,
which will be judged of by the apparent means, and
determination to execute it if necessary, nothing will
be gained of any of them, not even of Spain the
most feeble and vulnerable of all powers.
The moral sentiment is weak with them all.
None will pay debts or do justice
in any form while they can avoid it.
All will insult us, encroach on our rights,
& plunder us if they can do it with impunity.
Should they conclude that they have nothing to fear from
us or to hope, be their conduct respectively what it may;
that we are not ready to resent injuries & to hazard much
in defense of our rights, honor & interests, it is fairly to
be presumed that they will all pursue that system of
policy towards us, which each may find its advantage in.
The effect would probably soon be seen in the war
by the pillage of our commerce, which beginning
here would be followed everywhere, and in peace
by a union of all in a system to depress us.
I know that the subject is an extremely difficult one:
that distant as we are from the theatre of action;
likely as the scene is to change with the powers who are
parties to it, it is possible that we might adopt a measure
which two months afterwards we might be sorry for.
I have fully weighed these considerations and
still thought that it was more safe to act where
the occasion required, as heretofore stated.
As the government is in the hands of those who are known
to be so friendly to its principles, it seems to me that by
assuming an occasional attitude of the kind adverted to even
under circumstances less urgent the prospect of success
in all its most important objects would be much increased.
The most staunch and enlightened friends of our country,
that I have met with in Europe think, that to preserve our
system, sustain our station & protect our commerce,
all our energies will be necessary & may be called
into action; that if the affair with Spain was adjusted,
and that also with this government, the same
preparations would be necessary which they require.
These do not go to an increase of the regular force,
which should never be made while to be avoided.
But that it will be proper to increase the naval and infuse
more strength into the militia system I have no doubt.
Accounts are just received that the French have
completely demolished the Austrian army under Prince
Ferdinand & General Mack; the former escaped by flight at
the head of a few horse, and the latter was taken prisoner
with the remainder of his army at Ulm & all his officers.
The Austrian Generals appear to have possessed not any
of the great qualifications necessary to their stations.
Being out maneuvered, they sunk under the pressure
which was made on them without making any great
exertion to extricate themselves from their embarrassments.
It seems probable that the combined Russian & Austrian
force which is approaching Bavaria by the Inn will
experience the same fate or at least be driven back.
The expedition from this country for the continent which
has been embarked some days, will sail the first fair wind,
under the command, as is reported, of the Duke of York.
It consists of about 20,000 men and
is destined for Hanover or Holland.
Prussia, who seemed disposed for a while to join
the coalition, will probably change her attitude.
If the movement of the allies was ever well combined,
the execution has been most wretched so far.
The prospect at present is as favorable to France
in every view, as those in power there could desire.
In respect to the aggressions made on our commerce
by this government or by its sanction, there will,
I am aware, be much difficulty in fixing on the precise
measure to produce the best effect here and elsewhere.
I am strong in the belief that something is
necessary to be done with a view to our
interest both here & on the continent.
Without some act of the kind alluded to,
the aggression will be renewed hereafter
& pushed further, if the opportunity favors;
it will also be useless to attempt the formation of a
commercial treaty, for the whole will go together, though
on this point the pamphlets sent give sufficient information.
Some such act may be equally necessary to
prevent France and the powers dependent on
her from following the example of Britain, to
counteract (as they will say) her policy.
Thus between them our commerce might
be entirely cut up & our merchants ruined.
It seems to me as if it would be proper for the Congress
to act on it, and declare its sense of the law of nations,
taking perhaps the ground of the Russian treaty & pledging
the representative body, that is both branches, to support
the Executive in the maintenance of those rights: as an
indemnity to those who may have suffered by a violation
of them, it may be advisable to impose a discriminating duty
on British manufactures of 15 or 25 percent in the spirit of
the resolutions presented by Mr. Madison in April 1793.
This would be a mild way of acting in regard to this country,
and yet would assume an attitude which might be useful
here ultimately & on the continent immediately.
The immediate effect which such a measure
might produce here cannot well be calculated.
I think it would depend on the state
of affairs on the continent.
Should this government succeed there, it is presumable
that the measures recommended by the pamphleteer
will be adopted, although no step was taken on our part.
If it does not, then I think such measures will not
be taken, although we took even a stronger one,
provided we left the door open to negotiation.
Indeed it seems probable that a continuation of bad
success with the coalition with an unfriendly attitude on
our part, supported by just reasons, urged in a spirit
of moderation would embarrass this ministry much.
In acting however we should consider the
whole subject likely to be taken up in a
commercial treaty as claiming attention.
If improper restraints are imposed on our commerce
with the West Indies or elsewhere, especially such as
did not exist under the treaty of 1794, will it not be
proper to give power to the Executive to counteract them?
When prohibitions are imposed, to authorize
him for example to lay embargoes or prohibit
the exportation of our produce &c in return?
This will bear hard on the colonies, but they must reproach
their own government alone with the consequences.
Such a proceeding would be likely to lay a good
foundation to negotiate a commercial treaty on.
It would show them that we were also a party to such
a transaction, that we know our rights & would support
them in the mode which was likely to be most effectual
because most embarrassing to them, although attended with
inconvenience to ourselves: it might produce a good effect
with the northern powers who could not be indifferent to a
pressure made on us in a point so interesting to themselves.
It would also I think produce a good effect with France,
as it would give her cause to hope that we would support
our rights in a case in which she was interested with effect,
or if we failed that, it would lead us to a still greater
compromitment with her enemy from which
she would derive still greater advantage.
The present is certainly a very favorable time to
push our just claims with both this country & Spain.
As their whole force is exerted in the existing war,
it is not likely that either would be able to resist
a pressure from us or willing to encounter it.
I really think that we have it much in our
power to obtain what is our due of them.
In respect to all colonial questions it seems
probable that whatever ground should be
gained of anyone would be yielded by the others.
In this view it may be particularly expedient to avail
ourselves of the occasion furnished by these powers
to improve our fortune with them in every line
in which it may be practicable.7
Monroe in London wrote letters to Secretary James Madison
on November 6, 9, 11, 16, 22 and 26 in 1805.
In the letter on November 22 he wrote this letter to Madison:
I wrote you on the 16th in haste by the “John Bulkley”
a letter in which I observed that in making the question
of right with this government it might perhaps be best
to take at this time the most moderate ground.
As those terms are indefinite and may be misunderstood,
some explanation may be necessary to convey
an idea of what I should consider in that light.
The seizure is a positive violation of right,
subjects to great loss & even ruin many of our people,
and is in effect an act of hostility to our country.
Under such circumstances what ought
to be considered as moderate ground?
Reprisals are unquestionably justifiable: but I would
not resort to that measure or to any other which broke
the relations subsisting between the two countries.
You will have seen my letter to a friend of ours
of the 1st. instant which touches this point.
The sentiment expressed in it was that which
I meant to convey in mine to you to which I refer.
I really think that the measures suggested in that
letter would be moderate & such as are eminently
called for by the injuries complained of.
Every day’s experience confirms me more fully in
this opinion, as in those which are communicated
in my public letter to you of the 16th ultimo.
I have no reason to presume that in the points in
question any accommodation can be obtained voluntarily;
am strong in the opinion that if they are successful in the
war & no measure of counteraction taken on our part at
this time, that they will push their aggressions still further
in comparison with the injury and think the prospect fair
that a suitable pressure on our part which would be
deemed moderate in comparison with the injury but
also firm and decisive would produce the desired effect.
Perhaps an embargo would be better, but I am aware
that the course to be pursued by our government in
this business is a question which depends on so many
circumstances, many of which are entirely domestic,
and of course out of my sight, that it is impossible
for me to give an opinion on it worthy much attention.
In what estimation is the commerce
held by the American people?
How is their sensibility affected
by the seizure of their vessels?
What injury have they sustained in the various
branches to which its influence extends?
What sacrifices are they willing to hazard &
even make to put our concerns in this & other
respects on a just footing with this government?
To form a safe opinion of the measures which the
present juncture may require, correct information should
be had on these & other points in which I am defective.
I can only venture to judge of the attitude it may be
proper for our government to take to support negotiation
here the facts relative to which are before me.8
James Monroe on 10 January 1806 wrote from
Bath in England to Secretary of State Madison:
I have just heard of the death of our
Estimable & venerable friend Mr. Jones.
This event has affected us in the manner it was
natural it should do, as he held the place & was
always regarded by my family as a parent.
We hoped to have found him in health on our return,
& it was a part of our common plan in which we
were greatly interested, that he should have
passed his declining years under our care.
It is consoling to know that he died in Fredericksburg
where he would receive all the aid and attention
which medical skill & friendship could furnish.
We feel much interested in the welfare of his son
by whom the loss will be most sensibly felt.
We hope that the event by calling to his mind
in the most forcible manner the virtues and
merit of his father may induce him to make
them the pattern of his own conduct.
He is a well disposed youth, & we shall endeavor in our
regard for him to show our remembrance of the good
offices, & our affection for that best of relatives & friends.
The President’s message, which I have
just received, is what I wished it to be.
It opens the question between the United States &
this country & also with Spain in a manner to show
that our government understands its rights & interests
& will vindicate them, while it makes it equally evident
that if a misunderstanding takes place between us &
either of them, it will be owing to such power & not to us.
It combines well moderation with firmness.
The accounts which I have from London, being from
Americans only but of heretofore different parties,
speak of it in terms of high approbation.
The idea however is that this government will suspend
its measures, either of accommodation or otherwise,
till it sees the part which Congress may take in the business.
There is an infatuation about these people with respect
to us, which makes them infidels to truths which with
the same light every other people would believe.
Events in Europe are certainly favorable to our just
pretensions, & be the fortune of their adversary
what it may, I do not think that the manly assertion
& support of them with both powers can otherwise
than produce a good effect with that adversary.
But measures on the part of our government must
form the basis of negotiation; without such as are
judiciously adapted to the occasion none will succeed.
If this position is true, it follows that the more
decisive & strong the measures are within
suitable limits, the better the effect will be.
If the ground of Russia is taken with respect
to this power, I think it will be salutary in
the effect here in the north & with France.
By suitable limits I mean such as public opinion with us
will justify & a due regard for transitory motives bear.
By taking that ground it will show to these perpetual
antagonists, that we are not a satellite to either
& will be forming a connection in a quarter
where interest has already formed one.
If this ministry is left to pursue its own measures
towards us, & we are to depend on its friendship,
we know what we have to expect.
Many think that this ministry will not be able to keep its
ground; be that as it may, we can expect nothing from it
or a change, unless we make a case with them & prove
that we can & will do them more harm than they can
expect advantage from adhering to their present course.
I suggested in one of my private letters to you that there
might be some delicacy in publishing my correspondence
with Lord Mulgrave in case the sequel
of the business was committed to me.
But in the present state of things that objection,
if it ever had any weight, of which I was
doubtful, seems to be done away.
The communication of the President to Congress
makes a case with this government which
that correspondence will tend to illustrate.
By publication I mean the communication of it
to Congress in the ordinary course of such a transaction.
I think it probable if a change took place in the ministry,
that the publication of it there would be
of service to me with the successors.
However on this point and indeed all others in which
I have any concern, I have no personal solicitude as to the
course to be taken, being well satisfied that the best for our
country will be that which will be sought & most probably
adopted, so far as human foresight at least can suggest.
Such were my duties in Spain that it was impossible for me
to revise the copies of our correspondence with the Spanish
minister &ca, so that it is presumable, from the extent
of the labor Mr. Bankhead had to perform in that
respect, that many errors were visible in it.
I trust that these have been corrected by you.
Indeed on a perusal at this time I see many inaccuracies
of style, not errors in the transcript, which ought to be
removed, and I hope are, as by so doing the sense
will not be changed but be made more obvious.
A question will naturally arise with our government
whether your ultimate measures, if not already
taken with this, ought to be suspended
till the answer promised me is given.
It cannot be doubted that the delay has been intentional,
that the mind of the government was made up at
the time of my second interview with Lord Mulgrave,
not to give ground if they could avoid it.
The subject is so well understood by them in
all its bearings, that in an hour at any time
the Cabinet might have decided on it.
If this is true, it follows that delay can only
be injurious to us for very obvious reasons.
The commerce inhibited to us by this country in time
of war takes off half at least of what we are entitled to,
are or rather have been in the enjoyment of &
will impair our growth & sovereignty in equal degree.
We must accommodate with their principles
& abandon it or support it with decision.
A decisive issue will I think produce the best effect with the
existing ministry, is still more likely to do it with that which
might succeed it, & cannot fail to do it with France,
& most probably with the northern powers, especially
if it is done in such a manner as to conciliate them.
The views & pretentions of this government in
These respects are unjust & ought to be opposed,
& no time was ever more favorable for it.
These remarks as all those I have heretofore made
of the kind are to be understood as furnishing only
the balance of my mind in favor of the course to be
pursued in circumstances of real difficulty on the
facts before me & the prospect of affairs remaining
in the same state, of which however there is
no certainty as the scene is moving & variable.
Due respect also is to be paid to public opinion at home,
since to unite our country in suitable measures we
should not only have right on our side but that
should be made evident to the whole community.
If this is done, I think it probable that the incident may be
one of the most fortunate kind in contributing to dissipate all
idle prejudice of which too much yet remains with some
among us, & putting an end to that party spirit which has
heretofore drawn too much nourishment from this source.
I intend to return to London next week to attend the
Queen’s birthday & the opening of the parliament.
While there, & I shall stay some time, I shall
make an experiment to obtain the answer
which has been promised me by Lord Mulgrave.
If your measures are not taken when you receive this,
it may perhaps be better that you
wait the result of this effort.
It will require a fortnight or rather more to make it.
After it is made the whole subject will be much simplified,
especially as the state of things on the continent will
then most likely have taken a more positive form;
I mean as to the effect which the armistice has on Russia &
Prussia & of course on the further prosecution of the war.
I have been requested by General Lyman to make known
to you the wishes of William Clark, the present consul at
Embden, to be transferred to a place in Holland in case
Mr. Alexander’s ill health should disqualify him from acting.
With respect to the latter I have no recent intelligence
to be relied on, as where there are many who want
his place, to whom perhaps reports may be traced,
though I do not know that to be the case in any
instance, they should be received with caution.
He is certainly an obliging, amiable & well informed
young man & if sound in his mind deserving of attention.
His father lately died here.
He was one of those distinguished royalists,
who having taken that side in the war, has
since lingered out a miserable existence here.
Of Mr. Clark I have no knowledge but from
General Lyman, who speaks of him in very
favorable terms, & a nearer acquaintance
with the General has tended much to confirm
the favorable impression which
I had taken of him some years back.
Mr. Clark is an American from Massachusetts,
I believe, so that you will easily be able
to obtain further information of him.
I have just heard that Captain Tomkins with whom
I had engaged a passage for my family to sail the last of
February for Norfolk, has chartered his ship for India
so that I am yet to look for a suitable conveyance.
It is not my wish to sail till April unless there appears to
be a public motive for it, growing out of our affairs here,
or on the continent, or the expectation of the President
that I should sooner come to give more full information
on them in conversation than can well be done thus.
The season of April is most favorable & the delicate
state of my family’s health especially Mrs. Monroe’s,
who has been much afflicted with the Rheumatism,
more than 12 months past, indeed since the fête of
the coronation at Paris which I thought it proper
for us to attend, makes it necessary that she
should be as little exposed as possible to moisture.
It is owing to her indisposition and that of my daughter
just before we left London (but who is now recovered) that
we passed some time at Cheltenham, whose waters are
compounded of salts & steel, & have now come here.
These waters are a compound of sulfur & steel,
and are said to be excellent in Rheumatic complaints.
I thought also that by leaving London for a while
some good effect might be produced with the ministry.
By being always on the ground inviting & expecting
an answer, which they were resolved not to give on
my pressure alone, they were kept in a kind of
feverish temper towards me, as I presume.
By moving into the interior it may probably abate.
In addition to these considerations I was desirous of seeing
something of the country & its society before we left it.
It is to my absence from London, the lateness of the
invitation, the real indisposition of my family on
coming here, & its unsettled state, that I could not
attend the funeral of Lord Nelson as I intended.9
Monroe sent a longer report to James Madison from London on February 2.
Then on 12 February 1806 Monroe wrote this letter to Secretary of State Madison:
The arrangement of the new ministry was
completed, & its members installed in their
respective offices in the course of the last week.
It makes, as you will find by the list, a thorough
change of character, as I hope it will of principle
in its measures at least in respect to us.
It is well known that the King yielded to this change with
extreme reluctance; that he offered to supply the chief
place which had become vacant by the death of Mr. Pitt,
by Lord Hawkesbury, who did not seem unwilling to
accept it, and in other respects to preserve the power
in the same hands with a view, as is to be inferred,
of pursuing the same system of measures.
But the other members of the late ministry seemed
disposed to retire, and as the opposition was not to be
broken and external causes pressed with great force,
the change could no longer be resisted.
The measure itself being resolved on, the King had
the prudence not to embarrass it with conditions
that were sure to be ill received or not accepted.
He assented at once to commit the administration to
the opposition and authorized Lord Grenville & Mr. Fox to
form and present to him an arrangement for the purpose.
The only obstacle which was understood to have
arisen afterwards respected the continuance of
the Duke of York in the command of the forces,
which was objected to by those gentlemen.
That obstacle however was finally removed by the
King’s asserting that the Duke might be assisted,
or perhaps controlled by a military council.
The new ministry is composed of characters who have till of
late, been opposed to each other; from which circumstance,
as from a knowledge that the king must retain a
strong prejudice against some of them, it is believed
by many that it will not remain long in power.
The presumption is not an unreasonable one, though there
are many considerations to authorize a different conclusion.
It is not likely that the causes which
formed the union will soon be done away.
It is more probable that they will acquire greater force.
From present appearances those which are external
cannot well fail to do it, and they must tend of course
to produce a correspondent effect internally.
If the war continues between this country and France,
or the present rivalry in peace, this government will
be compelled to preserve its independence, to arm the
whole nation, whence the people must unavoidably
have more influence in its measures.
Such a course of things would be apt not only to preserve
the union which already exists between many who have
been hitherto opposed to each other, but to strengthen it,
and even to increase the weight and consideration of those
who were viewed for many years past with most jealousy,
and now admitted into a participation of power with the
greatest reluctance, in the direction of public affairs.
As soon as Mr. Fox took possession of his
office he requested an interview with the
foreign ministers which took place yesterday.
We were introduced separately.
Mine lasted about half an hour.
He received me with great kindness and attention,
and in fact put me more at ease in that short term,
than I have ever felt with any person in office
since I have been in England.
I have made it a rule of conduct, which I have observed
with much strictness, here & on the continent, to look to
the government alone as the quarter where I was to hold
not official intercourse only, but principally the social one.
I very well knew that a communication on my part
with Mr. Fox and his friends would excite much
disgust with the court, & without benefiting
him might prove hurtful to my country.
I therefore cautiously avoided giving that handle to such as
might be disposed to lay hold of it, to turn to our prejudice.
I had hinted this long since to a friend of his,
who I presume had made it known to him.
He appeared to understand very distinctly the
cause which had hitherto kept us at a distance,
and it is not improbable that he also had acted on it.
As soon as the ceremony of the interview had passed,
I observed that I presumed he had been too short
a term in office to have made himself acquainted
with what had occurred between his predecessors
& myself, more especially the last one.
He said he had not had time to read the papers, though
he presumed he had a general idea on some of the topics.
In respect to the immediate question he asked whether
I had made to them or they to me any proposition?
I gave a short sketch of the part which our respective
governments had acted since the commencement
of the present war towards each other.
I told him that my government had been ready to form a
commercial treaty with his on the expiration of the late one;
that it had agreed to postpone it to accommodate his &
with a desire that the arrangements which might be formed,
being entered into at a time when each had sufficient leisure
to attend to the object, and founded on a liberal view of
their respective interests, might place their relations on such
a footing as to secure their friendship from interruption, at
least at an early day: that in the same spirit it had sought to
put out of the way certain causes of a transient nature which
might possibly create misunderstanding in the course of the
war, such as the impressment of our seamen, blockades by
proclamation &c according to a project which had been
presented to Lord Hawkesbury, & to both his successors:
that those gentlemen never gave any definitive answer to
that project, & urged as a cause of their delay, the other
& pressing engagements of their government with which
I was well acquainted, as also that its conduct towards
the United States in the course of the present war was
as consonant to their principles & wishes in the most
important points as they could desire it to be: that on
that ground I left the business when I went to Spain
in the expectation that no change in the existing relations
between the countries would be made in my absence.
I assured him that I was astonished to find on my return
that on the contrary those relations had experienced a
most essential change: that an attack had been made
on our commerce on a principle which had heretofore
been so completely settled between our governments,
& abandoned by his, as to have been a case for which
no provision was proposed in the project referred to.
I explained to him the ground of this remark & informed him
that I had written several notes to Lord Mulgrave on the
subject to which I had not been able to obtain an answer,
on the main question, though he seemed desirous by
keeping it open, in his short replies, that I should not
consider it, as decided against the United States.
I could not avoid intimating to him that the friendly
disposition, which our government had shown, had been
most ungenerously requited by his: that it seemed as if it
had pursued a just and friendly conduct towards the United
States till the moment that the new coalition was formed,
gave the present blow when the prospect was favorable
to success, and kept the business in suspense to see the
result of affairs on the continent and in the United States.
He heard me with much attention and apparent interest;
intimated that he had been accused of being too friendly
to America & when I spoke of the treaty with Russia,
he observed that he had thought that the arrangement
made by it was a good one, though I did not understand
him as pledging himself by the remark to its conditions.
I requested that he would make himself master as soon as
in his power of the correspondence between Lord Mulgrave
& myself & give me an interview which he promised.
I am happy to add, on a view of all circumstances
that I think the prospect of arranging our affairs
with this government, especially that one which
respects our trade with the colonies of its enemies
on satisfactory terms a very favorable one.
It is certain that nothing more favorable was
or could reasonably have been expected from
the first interview with the present minister.10
On 25 February 1806 Monroe sent a letter with papers to
Charles James Fox which included these unsettled concerns:
1st. The rights of neutral powers in certain specified cases;
2nd. The impressment of American
and desertion of British seamen; and
3rd. The Boundary between the United States
and the British possessions in America.
The papers referred to will I presume
sufficiently illustrate these topics.
I shall however be permitted to accompany them with
some remarks to explain the course which the business
has taken and the state in which you receive it….
I have thought it my duty to give you above a
sketch of the several topics depending between our
governments, which are submitted to your consideration.
They are all of a nature very interesting, as I am persuaded
you will find by a perusal of the documents referred to.
But the late seizure and condemnation of American
vessels are acts which have proved so highly
injurious to the United States, and have so essentially
changed the relations which subsisted between the
countries, that they will, I flatter myself, obtain from
you a more immediate and particular attention.
I beg you to be assured that I shall be happy to have it in
my power to transmit to my government without delay, such
communications on your part, which may serve not only to
heal the wound which has been thus unexpectedly received,
but to promote in other respects by suitable arrangements
the reciprocal and permanent interests of both nations and
the best understanding between their governments.11
Monroe in London wrote to the American diplomat General Armstrong
on March 11 and to the Marquis de La Fayette on March 16.
On that day Jefferson wrote this letter to Monroe:
I very much wish for an opportunity perfectly
confidential of writing to you, & I expect to
have such a one on the rising of Congress.
It is extremely interesting to you that you should have a
perfect knowledge of what is passing here lest you should
be misled by those who do not mean to mislead you,
but themselves mistake the line of conduct which would
be equally agreeable to your feelings as well as interests.
Some of your new friends are attacking your old ones out of
friendship to you, but in a way to render you great injury.
In a few weeks I shall be able to write less enigmatically.
In the meantime be cautious what & to whom
you write, that you may not be allied to
operations of which you are uninformed.
In what is to ensue my station prescribes to me a sacred
neutrality in which it is in entire unison with my friendships.
Mr. Nicholson’s resolutions will be passed this
week probably by a majority of 100 Republicans
against 15 Reps & 27 Federals.
When passed, I shall join Mr. Pinckney of Maryland as
your associate for settling our differences with Great Britain.
He will depart on a fortnight’s notice & will
be authorized to take your place whenever
you think yourself obliged to return.
It is desirable for your own as well as the public interest
that you should join in the settlement of this business,
and I am perfectly satisfied that if this can be
done so as to be here before the next meeting
of Congress it will be greatly for your benefit.
But I do not mean by this to overrule your
own determination, which measures to be
taken here will place in perfect freedom.12
Congress approved the Non-Importation Act, and President Jefferson made it law
on 18 April 1806 that banned all British imports starting on November 15.
Monroe wrote to Secretary of State Madison again
on April 29 and this letter on May 20:
I had supposed that it might be possible to have
some conversation with Mr. Fox last night at his
house on our affairs especially on his Note of the
16 instant; but in this I was mistaken.
The occasion was not a favorable one being an
assemblage of a vast crowd, and he apparently
indisposed, as he retired early in the evening.
I asked Sir Fras. Vincent the cause of the delay
to which our affairs were exposed?
He said it was not owing to Mr. Fox.
As he did not mention the interview which he had promised
to arrange for me, I concluded that he had not done it.
I made no direct enquiry on that point but took occasion
to remark that I presumed Mr. Fox was not desirous
of meeting me ’till he was prepared to act.
He replied that he was not authorized to say so,
but would confer freely with him on the
subject and inform me of the result.
Alluding to our non-importation bill and presuming
it had passed he said he thought it a strong measure.
I thought otherwise and flattered myself that the
distant period at which it was to commence would
be considered by his government as I was satisfied
it was intended by ours, as a strong proof of its
disposition to arrange the business amicably.
I told him that I was persuaded that if it had been
Known early in the session of Congress that the Ministry
had changed, no such measure would have been
resorted to, as our government would most probably
have deemed it unnecessary with the present Ministry,
whose disposition was believed by it to be
just and friendly towards the United States.
But as the subject had been taken up and acted on before
the change was Known it seemed to be impossible for the
Congress to dismiss it altogether, without incurring the
suspicion either that the object was deemed unimportant
by it, or that no effort would be made to support our rights:
that the strongest proof which our government could give
under existing circumstances of its friendly disposition
towards Great Britain and of its confidence in a similar one
in the present Ministry had been given by the late period
to which the commencement of the act was postponed.
He did not consider it as any
obstacle to an amicable arrangement.
I had much conversation with Lord Holland who told me
frankly that he viewed that proceeding pretty much in the
light that I did: that in fact there seemed to be no other
way of acting than “by letting the affair down easily”
after what had been done.
I mention these remarks of Lord Holland from the
circumstance of his being the near relative and confidential
friend of Mr. Fox and an influential Member of Parliament.
From what I could collect I have been strengthened in
the opinion which I communicated to you in my last
that Mr. Fox’s Note of the 16th was drawn with a
view to a principal question with the United States,
I mean that of the trade with enemies’ colonies.
It embraces it is true other objects, particularly
the commerce with Prussia and the North generally,
whose Ports it opens to neutral powers, under whose
flag British Manufactures will find a market there.
In this particular especially the measure promises to
be highly satisfactory to the commercial interest, and
it may have been the primary object of the government.
You will observe that I have not considered the Note as a
reply to mine, or as being any way connected with them.
It was not communicated to me as such and it was
evidently improper for me to consider it in that light.
In directing the publication of it I have
expressed no sentiment on the contents
but left them to the criticism of the public.
With respect to the delay to which I am exposed,
it is utterly out of my power to explain to you the cause.
I have no reason to change the opinion which I have
heretofore expressed of Mr. Fox’s disposition on the subject,
though I have had no late communication with him.
His present reserve is unfavorable, but it may be
otherwise accounted for and on principles which
are quite natural and therefore presumable.
He may have experienced more difficulties
in the Cabinet than he had expected.
Many of the Members may be indisposed to an
arrangement on such terms as can be accepted;
and most of them willing to postpone any decision
until the result of the proceedings in Congress is Known.
Under these circumstances he may find it most eligible to
avoid any further communication with me for the present.
It becomes therefore very difficult if not altogether
improper for me to press the business at this time.
It seems to be my duty to postpone such
pressure to the same epoch, that is, till
the final proceedings of Congress are Known.
I shall doubtless receive with them the instructions of the
President on the whole subject, which I beg to assure you
I shall use my utmost exertions to carry into effect.13
Monroe wrote “Notes Respecting Our Differences with Spain”
on May 28, but it was not published.
Monroe wrote this letter to Madison on 9 June 1806:
On the 31 ultimo accounts were received here from
the United States that the President and Senate had
adopted the measure of a special mission to this country
in which Mr. William Pinkney & myself were associated.
These accounts, which appeared to be well authenticated
at first, have been confirmed Since by letters to individuals,
so that the fact seems to be unquestionable.
I have not received official information
of it but expect it from you daily.
A Suspension of further proceeding in the business
in which I have been engaged, seemed to be the natural
consequence of this measure as Soon as it was Known.
It has accordingly already produced that effect,
and will probably preserve it in the
same state ’till Mr. Pinkney arrives.
I hope therefore that I shall Soon
have the pleasure of Seeing him.
My former letters, the last of which was of May 20th,
showed how this business Stood at that time.
I have Since Seen Mr. Fox twice,
on the 4th and again on the 7th instant.
The first interview was at his own house,
on the anniversary of the King’s birth in a
general rendezvous of the diplomatic corps.
In that we touched on some interesting
Subjects particularly the outrages lately
committed at New York by the British cruisers, our
non-importation act, and the affair of General Miranda.
But as we could not treat those Subjects with advantage
in a crowd, it was agreed to postpone the consideration
of them to the 6th: when I promised to attend him at
his office for the purpose of entering more fully into it.
The interview was afterwards deferred
by him to the 7th when it took place.
Although the object of this latter meeting was special,
yet it naturally brought into view the other topics
in which we had been engaged, and with them
that of the appointment above mentioned.
Mr. Fox asked me soon after we met
whether such an appointment was made?
I told him that I had no official information
of it, but I believed that it was.
He said that Mr. Merry had informed him in his
last letter that the measure was decided on
but had not been communicated to the Senate.
What effect added he, will it produce in our business?
It was evident that he thought it ought to Suspend it.
It was of course useless for me, had it even been proper,
and I of a different opinion, to express it.
My answer therefore corresponded with his expectation.
I availed myself of the opportunity to assure Mr. Fox
that Mr. Pinkney was every way well qualified for the trust,
and that I was persuaded he would
be well satisfied with the appointment.
The general Subject being thus disposed of,
we proceeded to those which had been
touched in our Conversation of the 4th.
I told Mr. Fox that the outrage in the case of the
unfortunate victim John Pierce, had been committed,
as appeared by the affidavits published,
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
I stated that the harbor of New York had been blocked
up by those frigates as if it were an enemy’s port:
that they did not appear to have taken their Station
there for hospitality or Shelter, but for invasion.
I told him of the outrages which had been committed
at the Same port in the autumn of 1804 by the Same
frigates, as of the conduct of his government in that
respect, recalling in the first instance the officer
who had given most offense, but finally promoting
him to the command of a Ship of the line.
Mr. Fox Said that he wanted information
respecting the late unfortunate event:
Should it appear that the officers had acted improperly,
due attention should be paid to the Subject.
He added that he had already written to Mr. Merry in
that sentiment and would also express it in a letter to me.
In speaking of the non-importation act,
he expressed his regret that it had passed.
He said that it had the air of a menace, & that
it was not agreeable to do things by compulsion.
I reminded him how long we had complained of injuries
which his government had not attempted to justify:
injuries which were not imaginary or prospective,
but real and Severe, which affected equally the
honor and the interest of the United States;
I added that under Such circumstances his government
had no right to complain of the act referred to.
I assured him however that I was of opinion, if the Ministry
had not changed, that a bill of a very different import would
have been adopted: that I had reason to believe that the
tone of our government and of the Congress had been
essentially moderated by the information which I had
given of his Assurances that our differences Should be
Settled amicably and on just principles: that the act which
had passed in consequence of that information was
little more than a declaration to the citizens of the
United States that the object would be duly attended to.
I observed that he must be sensible after the Subject had
been taken up by Congress, as it was before the change of
the Ministry was Known, that it was impossible for that body
to dismiss it without Some expression of its Sense of the
rights of the United States in the question in dispute without
exposing itself to the charge of having abandoned them.
He seemed finally to admit that the Congress could not
well have avoided doing something in the business,
and that the measure which had been adopted
ought to be considered as a moderate one.
I was glad to hear this sentiment from Mr. Fox, because
I had feared that he would urge the passage of the act,
as a discharge from the obligation, which his
communications with me had in a certain degree imposed on
him in respect to the conditions on which he was disposed
to make the Settlement, and in which in Some particular
and interesting points he was precise and explicit.
I then observed to Mr. Fox that I should be glad he would
state in the letter which he had promised his willingness
to resume the business when Mr. Pinkney Should arrive,
and with a view to conciliation and dispatch, objects
which merited attention at the present time, that he
would also advert in it to the Several Subjects which
we had had under consideration in the sentiments
which he had expressed in our conferences.
He seemed to be aware that the proposition
was a reasonable one, & promised without
hesitation to comply with it: but says he,
I am afraid that I cannot be very distinct in it.
I replied that I Should leave that to himself, but that
I presumed he could easily recollect what had passed
between us on each point: that in respect to the trade
with enemies’ colonies especially, I did Suppose that it
had been intended by the late order to place it on the
ground of the Russian treaty, and that he might go
with safety in his letter as far as the order went.
He neither admitted or denied the fact explicitly,
though he did not Seem willing to give his
Sanction to the inference I had drawn.
I criticized the order as well as I could from memory
to Show why I had made the inference without
however, expressing any approbation of the order.
He Said it was true, that the produce of enemies’ colonies
might under the exceptions Stated in the order find
admission in neutral vessels into the enemies’ ports,
but yet he did not Seem willing to admit that
that was the particular object of the order.
I did not press this point further
because I Saw no motive for it.
I concluded however from this conversation, as I had done
from what had occurred before, that this measure had been
taken to prevent the further Seizure and condemnation of
our vessels on the principle in discussion between our
governments, and that the acknowledgment of it, had
been withheld from a consideration mentioned by Mr. Fox
in one of our conferences, that Such acknowledgment
would be to give up the point in negotiation.
Several circumstances independent of
those alluded to Support this idea.
It is not necessary to State them, because
I trust that the business will ’ere long be
placed on a much more Solid footing.
Of General Miranda’s affair Mr. Fox
asked me on the 4th what I thought?
It appeared to me to acquire some
importance by late accounts.
He thought so.
What, said he, would be the consequence of his Success?
He presumed that Great Britain and the
United States would be the principal gainers.
I was of the same opinion.
On the 7th after he had had time to reflect on the Subject,
I asked him what part his government intended to take in it?
He said that it was a delicate business to interfere in.
By engaging in it, the difficulty of making a peace might
be increased, if the object was pursued;
and it would not be agreeable to abandon
the people after promising them Support.
Of peace however he added that there was not much
prospect at present; though in expressing that idea
I thought he did it with less force than on a former occasion.
I inferred from that circumstance that there
existed Some correspondence between this
government and that of France on the Subject.14
General Miranda was a South American general looking for support
for a revolution against Spain’s imperial rule.
James Monroe wrote to President Thomas Jefferson
on June 15 and again on the 20th.
He wrote this letter to his friend Jefferson on 8 July 1806:
Your favor of May 4th was presented
to me on the 24th ultimo by Mr. Pinkney.
That of March 16th has not yet reached me.
You are so good as to offer me either of the
governments of Louisiana & to intimate that
they shall be kept open sometime for my answer.
I should be very sorry if any injurious delay proceeded
from that cause; I hasten therefore to prevent it.
At one time I was inclined to think that it might suit me to
accept the appointment at New Orleans, for reasons which
I then took the liberty to mention to Mr. Madison & yourself.
To these the removal of some friends there
since to whom we are much attached,
has added another very interesting one.
But from the period of my answer to yours on that
subject in 1804 I relinquished all thoughts of it.
It is a duty which I owe to my family to
improve my establishment in Virginia, where
I mean to live & wish them to be established.
At present it is far from being a comfortable one,
& both time & labor are necessary to make it so.
I have also much to attend to of a private nature
in other respects, many interesting duties to
fulfill which have been too long neglected.
All these require my presence, personal agency
& industry, without which they will never be
executed & proportional injury be the consequence
to myself and those connected with me.
It is therefore utterly out of my power to
undertake the trust you are so kind as to offer me.
In communicating this decision I beg you to
accept my acknowledgment for the attention.
The danger to which a communication is exposed
at such a distance & time, prevents my entering on
the other delicate topics to which you allude; indeed
it is not necessary to do it as I trust that I shall be able
to get home this autumn, as I most earnestly wish to do.
The indisposition of Mr. Fox has happened
at a season very unfavorable for us.
His disorder is certainly dropsical,
but great hope is entertained of his speedy recovery.
You may be assured that I shall continue to exert
my best endeavors to bring our business with the
least possible delay to the most satisfactory conclusion,
as well from a sincere desire to promote the credit of
your administration as the interest of our country.15
Notes
1. From James Madison to James Monroe, 12 April 1805 (Online).
2. To James Madison from Charles Pinckney and James Monroe, 25 May 1805 (Online).
3. The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806 ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton,p. 302-303.
4.Ibid., p. 303-309.
5. Ibid., p. 338-348.
6. Ibid., p. 362-365.
7. To Thomas Jefferson from James Monroe, 1 November 1805 (Online).
8. Ibid., p. 371-372.
9. Ibid., p. 391-398.
10. Ibid., p. 409-414.
11. Ibid., p. 418, 423.
12. From Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 16 March 1806 (Online).
13.The Writings of Monroe, Volume 4 1803-1806 p. 434-437.
14. Ibid., p. 445-450.
15. Ibid., p. 477-478.