Jacksonian Democracy in 1830
President Jackson’s Veto Messages in May 1830
Bentham’s Letter to Jackson in June 1830
Jackson’s Message in December 1830
On 29 December 1829 Connecticut Senator Samuel Foot
had introduced a bill to limit the sale of public lands,
which 65 speeches in the United States Senate would debate in the next five months.
On 18 January 1830 Missouri’s Senator Thomas Hart Benton
accused the northeastern states of trying to repress western growth.
The next day Senator Robert Y. Haynes of South Carolina began asserting
the importance of the states’ independence, hoping to gain westerners as allies.
At a cabinet meeting on 27 January 1830 Jackson said that
he would not remove Major Eaton from his cabinet and that
the others should be in harmony with him or withdraw.
Another petition was disseminated at a Boston meeting on February 22,
and Washington soon got many petitions from New England.
On January 26-27 Massachusetts Senator Daniel Webster had not accepted states
nullifying federal laws and replied that he supported the U. S. Constitution and the Union
because it is “the people’s government, made for the people,
made by the people, and answerable to the people.”
Haynes responded that the states had the right and power
to nullify acts of the federal government and even secede.
Then Webster concluded his speech affirming “sentiment dear to every true American heart:
liberty and union, now and forever, one and inseparable.”8
The other South Carolina Senator William Smith said he was ready to die for states’ rights
and warned that other nations had risen and fallen.
He suggested it was time for states to decide what their rights are and whether
they have the constitutional power to secede from the Union.
Louisiana’s Edward Livingston on March 9 warned against excessive party rage.
At the celebration of Jefferson’s birthday on April 13 the guests proposed 24 toasts.
Jackson’s was, “Our Union—it must be preserved.”
Vice President Calhoun then gave his toast,
The Union—next to our liberty most dear,
may we all remember that it can only be
preserved by respecting the rights of the States
and distributing equally the benefit of the Union.”1
Haynes spoke of “the glorious stand taken by Virginia
in regard to the alien and sedition laws.”
Van Buren offered a conciliatory toast,
Mutual forbearance and reciprocal concessions:
through their agency the Union was established—the patriotic
spirit from which they emanated will forever sustain it.2
After sending a commission to study Texas in 1828, on 6 April 1830 the Mexican
Congress prohibited any more American colonization or bringing of slaves into Mexico.
On May 29 Jacksonians passed the Preemption Act that protected settlers
by offering 160 acres for $200 after they had cultivated the public land for 12 months.
Because Donelson’s wife Emily snubbed Mrs. Eaton, Jackson made Eaton’s
brother-in-law William Lewis his private secretary.
In the spring rumors indicated that Vice President Calhoun
wanted to run for President in 1832.
William H. Crawford gave Lewis evidence that Calhoun had proposed that
Jackson be punished for his takeover of Florida,
and the President turned from Calhoun to Van Buren.
On 23 March 1830 Pennsylvanian Joseph Hemphill in the House had proposed
a 1,500-mile road from Buffalo, New York to Washington
and New Orleans funded by federal tariffs.
Rep. James K. Polk of Tennessee criticized the bill for keeping public land prices high
to discourage emigration west so that easterners could pay factory workers low wages.
On April 14 the bill was defeated 88-111.
President Jackson supported preemption buying for the West.
A bill had been introduced on 23 December 1829, and the United States Senate
approved it on 13 January 1830 followed by the House of Representatives on May 29.
On that day Jackson signed the bill into law.
Also on 27 May 1830 Jackson approved funds for the interstate Cumberland Road
that would go to Illinois and a land survey law,
and his administration more than doubled the previous spending.
Congress upheld states’ rights by turning over completed parts
of the road to the states and adjourned on May 31.
Jackson complained the bills would cost $1 million, and he vetoed three other bills.
The first six U. S. Presidents had vetoed only nine bills.
Congress had approved a 6-mile road in Kentucky from Maysville to Lexington;
but Van Buren persuaded Jackson to veto it on 27 May 1830
because it was not an interstate project.
Yet it would have connected the Ohio and Tennessee river systems.
On that day President Jackson sent to the
House of Representatives these “Veto Messages:”
Gentlemen: I have maturely considered the bill proposing
to authorize “a subscription of stock in the Maysville,
Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company,”
and now return the same to the House of Representatives,
in which it originated, with my objections to its passage.
Sincerely friendly to the improvement of our country by
means of roads and canals, I regret that any difference of
opinion in the mode of contributing to it should exist between
us; and if in stating this difference I go beyond what the
occasion may be deemed to call for, I hope to find an
apology in the great importance of the subject, an unfeigned
respect for the high source from which this branch of it has
emanated, and an anxious wish to be correctly understood
by my constituents in the discharge of all my duties.
Diversity of sentiment among public functionaries
actuated by the same general motives, on the character
and tendency of particular measures, is an incident
common to all Governments, and the more to be expected
in one which, like ours, owes its existence to the freedom
of opinion, and must be upheld by the same influence.
Controlled as we thus are by a higher tribunal, before
which our respective acts will be canvassed with the
indulgence due to the imperfections of our nature,
and with that intelligence and unbiased judgment
which are the true correctives of error, all that our
responsibility demands is that the public good
should be the measure of our views, dictating alike
their frank expression and honest maintenance.
In the message which was presented to Congress at
the opening of its present session I endeavored to exhibit
briefly my views upon the important and highly interesting
subject to which our attention is now to be directed.
I was desirous of presenting to the representatives of
the several States in Congress assembled the inquiry
whether some mode could not be devised which would
reconcile the diversity of opinion concerning the
powers of this Government over the subject of internal
improvement, and the manner in which these powers,
if conferred by the Constitution, ought to be exercised.
The act which I am called upon to consider has,
therefore, been passed with a knowledge
of my views on this question, as these are
expressed in the message referred to.
In that document the following suggestions will be found:
After the extinction of the public debt it is not
probable that any adjustment of the tariff upon
principles satisfactory to the people of the Union will
until a remote period, if ever, leave the Government
without a considerable surplus in the Treasury
beyond what may be required for its current service.
As, then, the period approaches when the application
of the revenue to the payment of debt will cease,
the disposition of the surplus will present a subject
for the serious deliberation of Congress; and it may
be fortunate for the country that it is yet to be decided.
Considered in connection with the difficulties which
have heretofore attended appropriations for purposes of
internal improvement, and with those which this experience
tells us will certainly arise whenever power over such
subjects may be exercised by the General Government,
it is hoped that it may lead to the adoption of some
plan which will reconcile the diversified interests of
the States and strengthen the bonds which unite them.
Every member of the Union, in peace and in war,
will be benefited by the improvement of inland navigation
and the construction of highways in the several States.
Let us, then, endeavor to attain this benefit
in a mode which will be satisfactory to all.
That hitherto adopted has by many of our fellow-citizens
been deprecated as an infraction of the Constitution,
while by others it has been viewed as inexpedient.
All feel that it has been employed at the expense
of harmony in the legislative councils.
And adverting to the constitutional power of Congress
to make what I considered a proper disposition of the
surplus revenue, I subjoined the following remarks:
To avoid these evils it appears to me that the most safe,
just, and federal disposition which could be made of the
surplus revenue would be its apportionment among the
several States according to their ratio of representation,
and should this measure not be found warranted by
the Constitution that it would be expedient to propose
to the States an amendment authorizing it.
The constitutional power of the Federal Government
to construct or promote works of internal improvement
presents itself in two points of view—the first as bearing
upon the sovereignty of the States within whose limits
their execution is contemplated, if jurisdiction of the
territory which they may occupy be claimed as necessary
to their preservation and use; the second as asserting
the simple right to appropriate money from the National
Treasury in aid of such works when undertaken by
State authority, surrendering the claim of jurisdiction.
In the first view the question of power is an open one,
and can be decided without the embarrassments attending
the other, arising from the practice of the Government.
Although frequently and strenuously attempted,
the power to this extent has never been exercised
by the Government in a single instance.
It does not, in my opinion, possess it; and no bill,
therefore, which admits it can receive my official sanction.
But in the other view of the power
the question is differently situated.
The ground taken at an early period of the Government
was “that whenever money has been raised by the
general authority and is to be applied to a particular
measure, a question arises whether the particular measure
be within the enumerated authorities vested in Congress.
If it be, the money requisite for it may be applied to it;
if not, no such application can be made.”
The document in which this principle was first
advanced is of deservedly high authority, and should
be held in grateful remembrance for its immediate
agency in rescuing the country from much existing
abuse and for its conservative effect upon some of
the most valuable principles of the Constitution.
The symmetry and purity of the Government would
doubtless have been better preserved if this restriction
of the power of appropriation could have been maintained
without weakening its ability to fulfill the general objects
of its institution, an effect so likely to attend its admission,
notwithstanding its apparent fitness, that every subsequent
Administration of the Government, embracing a period
of thirty out of the forty-two years of its existence,
has adopted a more enlarged construction of the power.
It is not my purpose to detain you by a minute recital
of the acts which sustain this assertion, but it is
proper that I should notice some of the most
prominent in order that the reflections which
they suggest to my mind may be better understood.
In the Administration of Mr. Jefferson we have two
examples of the exercise of the right of appropriation,
which in the considerations that led to their adoption
and in their effects upon the public mind have
had a greater agency in marking the character
of the power than any subsequent events.
I allude to the payment of $15,000,000 for
the purchase of Louisiana and to the original
appropriation for the construction of the
Cumberland road, the latter act deriving
much weight from the acquiescence and
approbation of three of the most powerful
of the original members of the Confederacy,
expressed through their respective legislatures.
Although the circumstances of the latter case may
be such as to deprive so much of it as relates to the
actual construction of the road of the force of an
obligatory exposition of the Constitution, it must,
nevertheless, be admitted that so far as the
mere appropriation of money is concerned they
present the principle in its most imposing aspect.
No less than twenty-three different laws have been
passed, through all the forms of the Constitution,
appropriating upward of $2,500,000 out of the National
Treasury in support of that improvement, with the
approbation of every President of the United States,
including my predecessor, since its commencement.
Independently of the sanction given to appropriations
for the Cumberland and other roads and objects under
this power, the Administration of Mr. Madison was
characterized by an act which furnishes the
strongest evidence of his opinion of its extent.
A bill was passed through both Houses of Congress
and presented for his approval, “setting apart and
pledging certain funds for constructing roads and
canals and improving the navigation of water courses,
in order to facilitate, promote, and give security
to internal commerce among the several States
and to render more easy and less expensive the
means and provisions for the common defense.”
Regarding the bill as asserting a power in the Federal
Government to construct roads and canals within the
limits of the States in which they were made, he objected
to its passage on the ground of its unconstitutionality,
declaring that the assent of the respective States in
the mode provided by the bill could not confer the power
in question; that the only cases in which the consent
and cession of particular States can extend the power
of Congress are those specified and provided for in
the Constitution, and super-adding to these avowals
his opinion that “a restriction of the power ‘to provide
for the common defense and general welfare’ to cases
which are to be provided for by the expenditure of
money would still leave within the legislative power
of Congress all the great and most important measures
of Government, money being the ordinary and
necessary means of carrying them into execution.”
I have not been able to consider these declarations
in any other point of view than as a concession
that the right of appropriation is not limited by the
power to carry into effect the measure for which
the money is asked, as was formerly contended.
The views of Mr. Monroe upon this subject
were not left to inference.
During his Administration a bill was passed through
both Houses of Congress conferring the jurisdiction and
prescribing the mode by which the Federal Government
should exercise it in the case of the Cumberland road.
He returned it with objections to its passage, and in
assigning them took occasion to say that in the early
stages of the Government he had inclined to the
construction that it had no right to expend money except
in the performance of acts authorized by the other specific
grants of power, according to a strict construction of them,
but that on further reflection and observation his mind
had undergone a change; that his opinion then was “that
Congress have an unlimited power to raise money, and
that in its appropriation they have a discretionary power,
restricted only by the duty to appropriate it to purposes
of common defense, and of general, not local, national,
not State, benefit;” and this was avowed to be the governing
principle through the residue of his Administration.
The views of the last Administration are of such recent date
as to render a particular reference to them unnecessary.
It is well known that the appropriating power, to the utmost
extent which had been claimed for it, in relation to internal
improvements was fully recognized and exercised by it.
This brief reference to known facts will be sufficient to
show the difficulty, if not impracticability, of bringing back
the operations of the Government to the construction of
the Constitution set up in 1798, assuming that to be its
true reading in relation to the power under consideration,
thus giving an admonitory proof of the force of implication
and the necessity of guarding the Constitution with
sleepless vigilance against the authority of precedents
which have not the sanction of its most plainly defined
powers; for although it is the duty of all to look to that
sacred instrument instead of the statute book, to repudiate
at all times encroachments upon its spirit, which are too apt
to be effected by the conjuncture of peculiar and facilitating
circumstances, it is not less true that the public good and the
nature of our political institutions require that individual
differences should yield to a well-settled acquiescence
of the people and confederated authorities in particular
constructions of the Constitution on doubtful points.
Not to concede this much to the spirit of our
institutions would impair their stability and
defeat the objects of the Constitution itself.
The bill before me does not call for a more definite
opinion upon the particular circumstances which will
warrant appropriations of money by Congress to aid
works of internal improvement, for although the extension
of the power to apply money beyond that of carrying
into effect the object for which it is appropriated has,
as we have seen, been long claimed and exercised by
the Federal Government, yet such grants have always
been professedly under the control of the general
principle that the works which might be thus aided should
be “of a general, not local, national, not State,” character.
A disregard of this distinction would of necessity
lead to the subversion of the federal system.
That even this is an unsafe one, arbitrary in its nature,
and liable, consequently, to great abuses, is too
obvious to require the confirmation of experience.
It is, however, sufficiently definite and imperative to
my mind to forbid my approbation of any bill having
the character of the one under consideration.
I have given to its provisions all the reflection demanded
by a just regard for the interests of those of our fellow-
citizens who have desired its passage, and by the respect
which is due to a coordinate branch of the Government,
but I am not able to view it in any other light than as a
measure of purely local character; or, if it can be considered
national, that no further distinction between the appropriate
duties of the General and State Governments need be
attempted, for there can be no local interest that may
not with equal propriety be denominated national.
It has no connection with any established system of
improvements; is exclusively within the limits of a State,
starting at a point on the Ohio River and running out
60 miles to an interior town, and even as far as the State is
interested conferring partial instead of general advantages.
Considering the magnitude and importance of the power,
and the embarrassments to which, from the very nature
of the thing, its exercise must necessarily be subjected,
the real friends of internal improvement ought not
to be willing to confide it to accident and chance.
What is properly national in its character or otherwise
is an inquiry which is often extremely difficult of solution.
The appropriations of one year for an object
which is considered national may be rendered
nugatory by the refusal of a succeeding Congress
to continue the work on the ground that it is local.
No aid can be derived from the intervention of corporations.
The question regards the character of the work,
not that of those by whom it is to be accomplished.
Notwithstanding the union of the Government
with the corporation by whose immediate
agency any work of internal improvement
is carried on, the inquiry will still remain.
Is it national and conducive to the benefit
of the whole, or local and operating only to
the advantage of a portion of the Union?
But although I might not feel it to be my official
duty to interpose the Executive veto to the passage
of a bill appropriating money for the construction of
such works as are authorized by the States and are
national in their character, I do not wish to be
understood as expressing an opinion that it is
expedient at this time for the General Government
to embark in a system of this kind; and anxious that
my constituents should be possessed of my views on this
as well as on all other subjects which they have committed
to my discretion, I shall state them frankly and briefly.
Besides many minor considerations, there are two
prominent views of the subject which have made a
deep impression upon my mind, which, I think,
are well entitled to your serious attention, and
will, I hope, be maturely weighed by the people.
From the official communication submitted to you
it appears that if no adverse and unforeseen contingency
happens in our foreign relations and no unusual diversion
be made of the funds set apart for the payment of the
national debt we may look with confidence to its entire
extinguishment in the short period of four years.
The extent to which this pleasing anticipation is
dependent upon the policy which may be pursued
in relation to measures of the character of the one
now under consideration must be obvious to all,
and equally so that the events of the present session are
well calculated to awaken public solicitude upon the subject.
By the statement from the Treasury Department and those
from the clerks of the Senate and House of Representatives,
herewith submitted, it appears that the bills which have
passed into laws, and those which in all probability will
pass before the adjournment of Congress, anticipate
appropriations which, with the ordinary expenditures
for the support of Government, will exceed considerably
the amount in the Treasury for the year 1830.
Thus, while we are diminishing the revenue
by a reduction of the duties on tea, coffee, and
cocoa the appropriations for internal improvement are
increasing beyond the available means of the Treasury.
And if to this calculation be added the amounts contained
in bills which are pending before the two Houses, it may
be safely affirmed that $10,000,000 would not make up the
excess over the Treasury receipts, unless the payment of
the national debt be postponed and the means now pledged
to that object applied to those enumerated in these bills.
Without a well-regulated system of internal
improvement this exhausting mode of appropriation
is not likely to be avoided, and the plain
consequence must be either a continuance of
the national debt or a resort to additional taxes.
Although many of the States, with a laudable zeal
and under the influence of an enlightened policy,
are successfully applying their separate efforts to
works of this character, the desire to enlist the aid
of the General Government in the construction of
such as from their nature ought to devolve upon it,
and to which the means of the individual States are
inadequate, is both rational and patriotic, and if that desire
is not gratified now it does not follow that it never will be.
The general intelligence and public spirit of the
American people furnish a sure guaranty that at
the proper time this policy will be made to prevail
under circumstances more auspicious to its
successful prosecution than those which now exist.
But great as this object undoubtedly is, it is not
the only one which demands the
fostering care of the Government.
The preservation and success of the
republican principle rest with us.
To elevate its character and extend its influence rank
among our most important duties, and the best means to
accomplish this desirable end are those which will rivet the
attachment of our citizens to the Government of their choice
by the comparative lightness of their public burthens and by
the attraction which the superior success of its operations
will present to the admiration and respect of the world.
Through the favor of an overruling and indulgent
Providence our country is blessed with general prosperity
and our citizens exempted from the pressure of taxation,
which other less favored portions of the human family
are obliged to bear; yet it is true that many of the taxes
collected from our citizens through the medium of
imposts have for a considerable period been onerous.
In many particulars these taxes have borne severely upon
the laboring and less prosperous classes of the community,
being imposed on the necessaries of life, and this, too,
in cases where the burthen was not relieved by the
consciousness that it would ultimately contribute
to make us independent of foreign nations for
articles of prime necessity by the encouragement
of their growth and manufacture at home.
They have been cheerfully borne because
they were thought to be necessary to the
support of Government and the payment
of the debts unavoidably incurred in the acquisition
and maintenance of our national rights and liberties.
But have we a right to calculate on the same cheerful
acquiescence when it is known that the necessity for
their continuance would cease were it not for irregular,
improvident, and unequal appropriations of the public funds?
Will not the people demand, as they have a right to do,
such a prudent system of expenditure as will pay the
debts of the Union and authorize the reduction of
every tax to as low a point as the wise observance
of the necessity to protect that portion of our
manufactures and labor whose prosperity is essential
to our national safety and independence will allow?
When the national debt is paid, the duties upon
those articles which we do not raise may be
repealed with safety, and still leave, I trust,
without oppression to any section of the country, an
accumulating surplus fund, which may be beneficially
applied to some well-digested system of improvement.
Under this view the question as to the manner
in which the Federal Government can or ought to
embark in the construction of roads and canals,
and the extent to which it may impose burthens
on the people for these purposes, may be presented
on its own merits, free of all disguise and of
every embarrassment, except such as
may arise from the Constitution itself.
Assuming these suggestions to be correct,
will not our constituents require the observance
of a course by which they can be effected?
Ought they not to require it?
With the best disposition to aid, as far as I can
conscientiously, in furtherance of works of internal
improvement, my opinion is that the soundest views
of national policy at this time point to such a course.
Besides the avoidance of an evil influence upon the
local concerns of the country, how solid is the
advantage which the Government will reap
from it in the elevation of its character!
How gratifying the effect of presenting to the
world the sublime spectacle of a Republic of more
than 12,000,000 happy people, in the fifty-fourth year
of her existence, after having passed through two
protracted wars—the one for the acquisition and
the other for the maintenance of liberty—free from
debt and with all her immense resources unfettered!
What a salutary influence would not such an
exhibition exercise upon the cause of liberal principles
and free government throughout the world!
Would we not ourselves find in its effect an additional
guaranty that our political institutions will be transmitted
to the most remote posterity without decay?
A course of policy destined to witness events like
these cannot be benefited by a legislation which
tolerates a scramble for appropriations that have
no relation to any general system of improvement,
and whose good effects must of necessity be very limited.
In the best view of these appropriations,
the abuses to which they lead far exceed
the good which they are capable of promoting.
They may be resorted to as artful expedients
to shift upon the Government the losses of unsuccessful
private speculation, and thus, by ministering to personal
ambition and self-aggrandizement, tend to sap the
foundations of public virtue and taint the administration
of the Government with a demoralizing influence.
In the other view of the subject, and the only
remaining one which it is my intention to present
at this time, is involved the expediency of embarking
in a system of internal improvement without a previous
amendment of the Constitution explaining and defining
the precise powers of the Federal Government over it.
Assuming the right to appropriate money to aid in the
construction of national works to be warranted by
the cotemporaneous and continued exposition of
the Constitution, its insufficiency for the successful
prosecution of them must be admitted by all candid minds.
If we look to usage to define the extent of the right,
that will be found so variant and embracing so much
that has been overruled as to involve the whole
subject in great uncertainty and to render the
execution of our respective duties in relation
to it replete with difficulty and embarrassment.
It is in regard to such works and the acquisition of
additional territory that the practice obtained its first footing.
In most, if not all, other disputed questions of appropriation
the construction of the Constitution may be regarded
as unsettled if the right to apply money in the
enumerated cases is placed on the ground of usage.
This subject has been one of much,
and, I may add, painful, reflection to me.
It has bearings that are well calculated to exert a
powerful influence upon our hitherto prosperous system
of government, and which, on some accounts, may even
excite despondency in the breast of an American citizen.
I will not detain you with professions of zeal
in the cause of internal improvements.
If to be their friend is a virtue which deserves
commendation, our country is blessed with an
abundance of it, for I do not suppose there is an
intelligent citizen who does not wish to see them flourish.
But though all are their friends, but few, I trust, are
unmindful of the means by which they should be promoted;
none certainly are so degenerate as to desire their success
at the cost of that sacred instrument with the preservation
of which is indissolubly bound our country's hopes.
If different impressions are entertained in any quarter;
if it is expected that the people of this country,
reckless of their constitutional obligations, will prefer
their local interest to the principles of the Union,
such expectations will in the end be disappointed;
or if it be not so, then indeed has the world but little
to hope from the example of free government.
When an honest observance of constitutional compacts
cannot be obtained from communities like ours,
it need not be anticipated elsewhere, and the cause
in which there has been so much martyrdom,
and from which so much was expected by the friends
of liberty, may be abandoned, and the degrading truth
that man is unfit for self-government admitted.
And this will be the case if expediency be made
a rule of construction in interpreting the Constitution.
Power in no government could desire a better shield
for the insidious advances which it is ever ready to make
upon the checks that are designed to restrain its action.
But I do not entertain such gloomy apprehensions.
If it be the wish of the people that the construction of roads
and canals should be conducted by the Federal Government,
it is not only highly expedient, but indispensably necessary,
that a previous amendment of the Constitution,
delegating the necessary power and defining
and restricting its exercise with reference
to the sovereignty of the States, should be made.
Without it nothing extensively useful can be effected.
The right to exercise as much jurisdiction as is necessary
to preserve the works and to raise funds by the collection
of tolls to keep them in repair cannot be dispensed with.
The Cumberland road should be an instructive admonition
of the consequences of acting without this right.
Year after year contests are witnessed, growing
out of efforts to obtain the necessary appropriations
for completing and repairing this useful work.
While one Congress may claim and exercise the power,
a succeeding one may deny it; and this fluctuation of
opinion must be unavoidably fatal to any scheme
which from its extent would promote the interests
and elevate the character of the country.
The experience of the past has shown that the
opinion of Congress is subject to such fluctuations.
If it be the desire of the people that the agency
of the Federal Government should be confined to
the appropriation of money in aid of such undertakings,
in virtue of State authorities, then the occasion,
the manner, and the extent of the appropriations
should be made the subject of constitutional regulation.
This is the more necessary in order that they may
be equitable among the several States, promote
harmony between different sections of the Union
and their representatives, preserve other parts of
the Constitution from being undermined by the
exercise of doubtful powers or the too great extension
of those which are not so, and protect the whole subject
against the deleterious influence of combinations
to carry by concert measures which, considered
by themselves, might meet but little countenance.
That a constitutional adjustment of this power
upon equitable principles is in the highest degree
desirable can scarcely be doubted, nor can it
fail to be promoted by every sincere friend
to the success of our political institutions.
In no government are appeals to the source of power
in cases of real doubt more suitable than in ours.
No good motive can be assigned for the exercise
of power by the constituted authorities, while those
for whose benefit it is to be exercised have not
conferred it and may not be willing to confer it.
It would seem to me that an honest application
of the conceded powers of the General Government
to the advancement of the common weal present
a sufficient scope to satisfy a reasonable ambition.
The difficulty and supposed impracticability of obtaining
an amendment of the Constitution in this respect is,
I firmly believe, in a great degree unfounded.
The time has never yet been when the patriotism
and intelligence of the American people were not
fully equal to the greatest exigency, and it never
will when the subject calling forth their
interposition is plainly presented to them.
To do so with the questions involved in this bill,
and to urge them to an early, zealous, and full
consideration of their deep importance, is,
in my estimation, among the highest of our duties.
A supposed connection between appropriations for
internal improvement and the system of protecting duties,
growing out of the anxieties of those more immediately
interested in their success, has given rise to suggestions
which it is proper I should notice on this occasion.
My opinions on these subjects have never been
concealed from those who had a right to know them.
Those which I have entertained on the latter have
frequently placed me in opposition to individuals
as well as communities whose claims upon my
friendship and gratitude are of the strongest character,
but I trust there has been nothing in my public life
which has exposed me to the suspicion of being thought
capable of sacrificing my views of duty to private
considerations, however strong they may have been
or deep the regrets which they are capable of exciting.
As long as the encouragement of domestic
manufactures is directed to national ends it shall
receive from me a temperate but steady support.
There is no necessary connection between it
and the system of appropriations.
On the contrary, it appears to me that the
supposition of their dependence upon each other
is calculated to excite the prejudices
of the public against both.
The former is sustained on the grounds of its consistency
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, of its origin
being traced to the assent of all the parties to the original
compact, and of its having the support and approbation
of a majority of the people, on which account
it is at least entitled to a fair experiment.
The suggestions to which I have alluded refer
to a forced continuance of the national debt
by means of large appropriations as a substitute
for the security which the system derives from
the principles on which it has hitherto been sustained.
Such a course would certainly indicate either
an unreasonable distrust of the people or a
consciousness that the system does not
possess sufficient soundness for its support
if left to their voluntary choice and its own merits.
Those who suppose that any policy thus founded
can be long upheld in this country have looked upon
its history with eyes very different from mine.
This policy, like every other, must abide the will of the
people, who will not be likely to allow any device,
however specious, to conceal its character and tendency.
In presenting these opinions I have spoken with
the freedom and candor which I thought the occasion
for their expression called for, and now respectfully
return the bill which has been under consideration
for your further deliberation and judgment.3
Also on 27 May 1830 Jackson approved funds for the interstate
Cumberland Road that would go to Illinois and a land survey law,
and his administration more than doubled the previous spending.
Congress upheld states’ rights by turning over completed parts
of the road to the states and adjourned on May 31.
Jackson complained the bills would cost $1 million,
and he vetoed three other bills.
The first six U. S. Presidents had vetoed only nine bills.
On 14 June 1830 the philosopher Jeremy Bentham from London
wrote this letter to President Jackson:
When your last predecessor in your high office was in
this country in the character of Minister Plenipotentiary,
toward the close of his residence here it happened to me
to commence with him an acquaintance which ripened into
an intimacy which, in my capacity of legislative draughtsman
for any political community which should feel inclined to
accept my services, was of very essential service to me.
Besides some concerns of a private nature he condescended
to take charge and become the bearer of a packet of
circular letters to the several Governors of the
United States as then constituted, from several of
whom I had the honor of receiving favorable answers.
By candid and authentic information on several topics
of high importance he was of use to me in various
more ways than you have time to read of or I to write.
Days more than one in a week he used to call on me
at my Hermitage as above, and to accompany me
to the Royal Gardens at Kensington in my neighborhood,
where after a walk of two or three hours he used
to return to a tête-à-tête dinner with me.
What gave occasion to our first meeting was a letter to me
of which he was the bearer from the President Madison.
A letter of introduction which I took the liberty of addressing
to him (Mr. Adams) in favor of an intellectual character,
a relation of my friend Joseph Hume, M. P.
(of which last mentioned friend of mine the reputation
cannot be altogether unknown to you) experienced
that reception which I could not but anticipate.
These things considered, you will not be at a loss,
Sir, to conceive what must have been my disappointment
upon my learning of his failing to receive the
customary addition to his term of service.
Judge, Sir, of the consolation—the more than consolation—
which I experienced when, upon reading your Inaugural
Message, I found that upon the whole your sentiments
were not only as fully in accordance with mine as his
had been (and in politics and legislation I do not think
there was a single topic on which we appeared to differ)
but that they were so, and I trust remain so, in a still
more extensive degree—embracing several topics which
between him & me had never been touched upon.
With Mr. Rush I was also upon such a footing that
in a letter of his which I still have, written some
months before his departure, he had the kindness
to offer himself to me as my “Agent and Fac Totum”
(those are his words) upon his return to the United States.
Notwithstanding which, several months before his
departure, from some cause which I never heard
nor can form so much as the slightest guess at,
he dropped my acquaintance and took his departure
without so much as a farewell Message.
Since his retreat from Office, I have however
been favored by him with the copy of a
pamphlet of his without further explanation.
I might mention in like manner my friendship
with Mr. Lawrence, late Chargé d’Affaires from
your country to this, and Mr. Wheaton Minister
to Denmark to whom I have been obliged for
various important and, to me, honorable services.
But of this more (you will say) than enough.
I now look back to a letter I had begun
dictating between 3 & 4 months ago.
Cause of the long interval, however deservedly
regretted by me, not worth troubling you with.
What now follows had been completely forgotten when
what you have seen above was commenced, this oblivion
years of age more than 82 render but too natural.
I have this moment finished the hearing of your Message:
I say the hearing; for at my age (as above mentioned)
I am reduced to read mostly by my ears.
Intense is the admiration it has excited in me:
Correspondent the sentiments of all around me.
‘Tis not without a mixture of surprise and pleasure
that I observe the coincidence between your
ideas and my own on the field of legislation.
The coincidence of mine with those of Dr. Livingston,
the Louisiana Senator, are perhaps not unknown to you.
The flattering manner in which he is pleased
to speak of my labors in that field is in the
highest degree encouraging to me.
The herewith-transmitted publication entitled
“Codification Proposal” may serve to bring it to view.
These circumstances combined concur in flattering
me with the hope that the present communication
will not be altogether unacceptable to you.
Annexed is a list of some of my works
which solicit the honor of your acceptance.
Here follows a few observations which I take
the liberty of submitting to you, on some of the topics
touched upon in your above-mentioned Message.
1st. Navy Board—In this subdepartment of the Defensive
Force Department you find I perceive many-seatedness
established:—by you I see single-seatedness is preferred—
so is it by me:—for this preference your reason is,
responsibility—so is it for mine.
But in my account, though the principal reason,
it is but one among several.
This may be seen in the accompanying copy of
the first part of my Constitutional Code Ch. IX § 3.
2nd. After that you come to the Judiciary.
If I do not misrecollect, in your superior
Judicatories the bench is single-seated.
In my leading Chapter on the Judiciary, to all the reasons
which apply to the Administrative department in all its
subdepartments (twelve or thirteen in number)
several which are peculiar to the Judiciary are added.
3rd. Utter inaptitude of Common Law for its
professed purpose— guidance of human action.
Places in which you may find this topic worked—
1. Papers on Codification etc. 2. Codification Proposal.
3. Petition for Justice in the Vol. of “Petitions.”
4th. Superfluous functionaries.
In that number my researches have led me
to reckon the whole of your Senate.
Not merely is the whole expense thrown away,
but the whole authority much worse than useless.
Responsibility in greatest part destroyed by a single
functionary, what must it be by a multitude so numerous.
Functions legislative and administrative
thus united in the same body: thus the
same men are judges over themselves.
In my view of the matter the administrative and the
judiciary are two authorities employed to give execution
and effect to the will of the Legislative, in which accordingly
ought to be in the instance of every member of each at all
times distinct—the legislative being by means of the power
of location & dislocation, though not by that of imperation,
subordinate to the people at large—the constitutive.
Knowing nothing of the facts, my theory leads me to
expect to find that the sort of relation that has place
between the President & the Senate is—that each of
these functionaries—the President included, locates
within his field of patronage a protégé of his own
without any check from the authority of the rest.
This is nothing more than a faint, imperfect, and
inaccurate outline drawn momentarily by a broken
memory from the recollection of a short paper written
several years ago: should it afford any prospect of being
of any use, and you will favor me with a line to let me
know as much, I will get it copied & transmitted to you:
possibly I may not even wait for such your commands.
It occurs to me that should our opinions agree on this
subject there might be a use in the idea’s being delivered
as coming from me or anybody rather than yourself: seeing
the wound from the opposition it would be sure to meet with
from those who are satisfied with things as they are, the
wound such an opposition might give to your popularity,
which is as much as to say the interests of the State.
5th. Defensive Force—by sea & land—its organization.
Tactics (of course) neither in land nor water service am I,
who know nothing of the matter, absurd enough to have
comprised in it; but the part that I have undertaken has
undergone the minute examination & received the
considerate approbation of leading minds of the first order
distinguished not only by talent, but by experience &
splendid success: and who, indeed, though without having
published on the subject had in great part anticipated me.
An intelligent man, who is in the confidence of the
Duke of Orleans, and bears the whimsical name of
Le Dieu has been here in London for some time
publishing a periodical in French under the name
of “Le Représentant des Peuples.”
He is thought to be the author of an address to
the French army that after having been written
here and either printed or lithographized has been
transmitted to and circulated in France: it has for
its object the engaging the army, should matters
come to a crisis, to act not against but for the people.
The above-mentioned periodical
I have not had time to look into.
I am told it advocates Monarchy; which
considering the connection of the author
with the family so near to the throne as the
Duke of Orleans is, he could not choose but do.
Thinking you might possibly have the curiosity
to look into it, I send you a copy of such
of the numbers of it as have appeared.
La Fayette is dear friend and occasional correspondent
of mine: but unless it be for some special purpose
we have neither of us any time to write.
Forgive the liberty I take of suggesting the idea
of your putting in for a copy of our House of Commons
Votes & Proceedings—the annual sum I pay for them
is between 16 and 17£, included in which is
a copy of our Acts of Parliament.
Infinite is the variety of the political information
which they afford: for scarcely any document
that is asked for is ever refused.
As to the price scarcely would six or eight or ten times
(I believe I might go further) the money procure the
same quantity of letterpress from the booksellers.
Trash relatively speaking, of course, is by far the greatest
part; but if in the bushel of chaff a grain of wheat were
to be found, the above-mentioned price you will
perhaps think not ill bestowed in the purchase of it.
Dr. Livingston, if either of the packets I have endeavored
to transmit to him through the same official channel
have reached their destination, will be able to show
you a few articles of the above-mentioned stock.
If I do not misconceive you, you are embarked or
about to embark on a civil enterprise in which
Cromwell notwithstanding all his military power failed.
I mean the delivery of the people from the thralldom
in which everywhere from the earliest recorded days
of Rome they have been held by the harpies of the law.
Having yourself officiated in the character of a Judge,
you are in possession of an appropriate experience,
which in his instance had no place.
But will you be able to resist their influence over the people?
In opposition to you, so long as you are engaged or
believed to be engaged in any such design, it were
blindness not to look to see their utmost influence employed.
The interest of the lawyers and that of their
fellow citizens in the character of clients
(need it be said?) is utterly irreconcilable.
You cannot assuage the torments of the client, but
you diminish in proportion the comforts of the lawyers.
If this be really of the number of your generous designs,
I cannot but flatter myself with the prospect of being
for that purpose an instrument in your hands: the
contents of the accompanying packet will insofar as you
have time to look at them show you on what grounds.4
James Madison in August wrote a letter to Edward Everett
that was published in the North American Review in October.
He defended the United States against the nullification ideas of southerners, noting,
(1) that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land;
(2) that the judges of every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution and laws of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding;
(3) that the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising
under the Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made under their authority, etc.5
Diplomacy led to Jackson announcing on October 5 that American ports
were now open to British ships coming from the British West Indies.
Francis Preston Blair had written to Duff Green in October
asking about starting another newspaper in Washington.
Kendall and Van Buren approved, and Blair began the Globe on December 7.
Green was concerned that with Jackson’s poor health
Van Buren might be the next president.
President Jackson asked Congress to merge Biddle’s Bank into the
U. .S Treasury and prohibit it from loaning money or buying property.
By 1830 the United States had 330 state banks circulating $61 million
in bank notes including $13 million by the United States Bank.
Banking helped increase the sale of public land to nearly two million acres per year.
The 1830 census counted 12,866,020 Americans including 500,000 Methodists
and 150,000 more immigrants in the previous ten years.
After 1831 immigration into the United States would never be under 30,000 a year.
Population in the states west of the Appalachian Mountains increased from 7% to 28%
while those on the Atlantic coast decreased.
In 1830 Niles’ Register reported that 76 of 321 steamships had been lost
because of accidents such as explosions.
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana
would retain property and tax-payer qualifications for voting in the 1830s and beyond.
In 1830 President Jackson vetoed four internal-improvement bills.
Yet he signed the two that would be the most important—
the survey bill and extending the National Road.
Jackson did accept less expensive bills to build a road in the Michigan Territory
and to improve a creek from Pennsylvania into Ohio.
In his two terms as President, Jackson spent $10 million on internal improvements,
and that was double what the previous six administrations had spent in thirty years.
On 6 December 1830 President Jackson presented
his Second Annual Message to Congress.
This is the entire text:
The pleasure I have in congratulating you upon
your return to your constitutional duties is much
heightened by the satisfaction which the condition
of our beloved country at this period justly inspires.
The beneficent Author of All Good has granted to us
during the present year health, peace, and plenty,
and numerous causes for joy in the wonderful success
which attends the progress of our free institutions.
With a population unparalleled in its increase,
and possessing a character which combines the hardihood
of enterprise with the considerateness of wisdom, we see
in every section of our happy country a steady improvement
in the means of social intercourse, and correspondent
effects upon the genius and laws of our extended Republic.
The apparent exceptions to the harmony of the prospect
are to be referred rather to inevitable diversities in the
various interests which enter into the composition of so
extensive a whole than to any want of attachment to
the Union—interests whose collisions serve only in
the end to foster the spirit of conciliation and patriotism
so essential to the preservation of that Union which
I most devoutly hope is destined to prove imperishable.
In the midst of these blessings we have recently
witnessed changes in the condition of other nations
which may in their consequences call for the utmost
vigilance, wisdom, and unanimity in our councils, and the
exercise of all the moderation and patriotism of our people.
The important modifications of their Government,
effected with so much courage and wisdom by the
people of France, afford a happy presage of their
future course, and have naturally elicited from the
kindred feelings of this nation that spontaneous and
universal burst of applause in which you have participated.
In congratulating you, my fellow-citizens, upon an event
so auspicious to the dearest interests of mankind I do
no more than respond to the voice of my country, without
transcending in the slightest degree that salutary maxim of
the illustrious Washington which enjoins an abstinence from
all interference with the internal affairs of other nations.
From a people exercising in the most unlimited degree the
right of self-government, and enjoying, as derived from
this proud characteristic, under the favor of Heaven,
much of the happiness with which they are blessed;
a people who can point in triumph to their free institutions
and challenge comparison with the fruits they bear,
as well as with the moderation, intelligence, and energy
with which they are administered—from such a people
the deepest sympathy was to be expected in a struggle
for the sacred principles of liberty, conducted in a spirit
every way worthy of the cause, and crowned by a heroic
moderation which has disarmed revolution of its terrors.
Notwithstanding the strong assurances which the man
whom we so sincerely love and justly admire has given
to the world of the high character of the present King of
the French, and which if sustained to the end will secure
to him the proud appellation of Patriot King, it is not in
his success, but in that of the great principle which has
borne him to the throne—the paramount authority of
the public will—that the American people rejoice.
I am happy to inform you that the anticipations
which were indulged at the date of my last
communication on the subject of our foreign affairs
have been fully realized in several important particulars.
An arrangement has been effected with Great Britain
in relation to the trade between the United States and her
West India and North American colonies which has settled
a question that has for years afforded matter for contention
and almost uninterrupted discussion, and has been the
subject of no less than six negotiations, in a manner
which promises results highly favorable to the parties.
The abstract right of Great Britain to monopolize the
trade with her colonies or to exclude us from a participation
therein has never been denied by the United States.
But we have contended and with reason, that if at
any time Great Britain may desire the productions of
this country as necessary to her colonies they must be
received upon principles of just reciprocity, and further,
that it is making an invidious and unfriendly distinction
to open her colonial ports to the vessels of other nations
and close them against those of the United States.
Antecedently to 1794 a portion of our productions
was admitted into the colonial islands of Great Britain
by particular concessions, limited to the term
of one year, but renewed from year to year.
In the transportation of these productions,
however, our vessels were not allowed to engage,
this being a privilege reserved to British shipping,
by which alone our produce could be taken to
the islands and theirs brought to us in return.
From Newfoundland and her continental possessions
all our productions, as well as our vessels, were excluded,
with occasional relaxations, by which, in seasons of
distress, the former were admitted in British bottoms.
By the treaty of 1794 she offered to concede
to us for a limited time the right of carrying to her
West India possessions in our vessels not exceeding
70 tons burden, and upon the same terms as
British vessels, any productions of the United States
which British vessels might import therefrom.
But this privilege was coupled with conditions which
are supposed to have led to its rejection by the Senate;
that is, that American vessels should land their return
cargoes in the United States only, and moreover,
that they should during the continuance of the privilege
be precluded from carrying molasses, sugar, coffee,
cocoa, or cotton either from those islands or from
the United States to any other part of the world.
Great Britain readily consented to expunge this article
from the treaty, and subsequent attempts to arrange
the terms of the trade either by treaty stipulations
or concerted legislation having failed, it has been
successively suspended and allowed according
to the varying legislation of the parties.
The following are the prominent points which
have in later years separated the two Governments.
Besides a restriction whereby all importations into her
colonies in American vessels are confined to our own
products carried hence, a restriction to which it does
not appear that we have ever objected, a leading object
on the part of Great Britain has been to prevent us
from becoming the carriers of British West India
commodities to any other country than our own.
On the part of the United States it has been contended,
first, that the subject should be regulated by treaty
stipulation in preference to separate legislation;
second, that our productions, when imported
into the colonies in question, should not be subject
to higher duties than the productions of the mother
country or of her other colonial possessions, and,
third, that our vessels should be allowed to participate
in the circuitous trade between the United States
and different parts of the British dominions.
The first point, after having been for a long time
strenuously insisted upon by Great Britain, was
given up by the act of Parliament of July, 1825,
all vessels suffered to trade with the colonies being
permitted to clear from thence with any articles which
British vessels might export and proceed to any part of the
world, Great Britain and her dependencies alone excepted.
On our part each of the above points had in succession
been explicitly abandoned in negotiations preceding
that of which the result is now announced.
This arrangement secures to the United States
every advantage asked by them, and which the
state of the negotiation allowed us to insist upon.
The trade will be placed upon a footing decidedly
more favorable to this country than any on which
it ever stood, and our commerce and navigation
will enjoy in the colonial ports of Great Britain
every privilege allowed to other nations.
That the prosperity of the country so far as
it depends on this trade will be greatly promoted
by the new arrangement, there can be no doubt.
Independently of the more obvious advantages of
an open and direct intercourse, its establishment will
be attended with other consequences of a higher value.
That which has been carried on since the mutual interdict
under all the expense and inconvenience unavoidably
incident to it would have been insupportably onerous
had it not been in a great degree lightened by concerted
evasions in the mode of making the trans-shipments
at what are called the neutral ports.
These indirections are inconsistent with the dignity of
nations that have so many motives not only to cherish
feelings of mutual friendship, but to maintain such
relations as will stimulate their respective citizens
and subjects to efforts of direct, open, and honorable
competition only, and preserve them from the
influence of seductive and vitiating circumstances.
When your preliminary interposition was asked
at the close of the last session, a copy of the instructions
under which Mr. McLane has acted, together with the
communications which had at that time passed between
him and the British Government, was laid before you.
Although there has not been anything in the acts of the
two Governments which requires secrecy, it was thought
most proper in the then state of the negotiation
to make that communication a confidential one.
So soon, however, as the evidence of execution on
the part of Great Britain is received, the whole matter
shall be laid before you, when it will be seen that the
apprehension which appears to have suggested one
of the provisions of the act passed at your last session,
that the restoration of the trade in question might
be connected with other subjects and was sought
to be obtained at the sacrifice of the public interest
in other particulars, was wholly unfounded, and
that the change which has taken place in the
views of the British Government has been
induced by considerations as honorable to both
parties as I trust the result will prove beneficial.
This desirable result was, it will be seen, greatly promoted
by the liberal and confiding provisions of the act of Congress
of the last session, by which our ports were upon the
reception and annunciation by the President of the required
assurance on the part of Great Britain forthwith opened to
her vessels before the arrangement could be carried into
effect on her part, pursuing in this act of prospective
legislation a similar course to that adopted by Great Britain
in abolishing by her act of Parliament in 1825 a restriction
then existing and permitting our vessels to clear from the
colonies on their return voyages for any foreign country
whatever before British vessels had been relieved from
the restriction imposed by our law of returning directly
from the United States to the colonies, a restriction
which she required and expected that we should abolish.
Upon each occasion a limited and temporary advantage
has been given to the opposite party, but an advantage
of no importance in comparison with the restoration
of mutual confidence and good feeling, and the
ultimate establishment of the trade upon fair principles.
It gives me unfeigned pleasure to assure you that this
negotiation has been throughout characterized by the
most frank and friendly spirit on the part of Great Britain,
and concluded in a manner strongly indicative of a sincere
desire to cultivate the best relations with the United States.
To reciprocate this disposition to the
fullest extent of my ability is a duty which
I shall deem it a privilege to discharge.
Although the result is itself the best commentary on
the services rendered to his country by our minister
at the Court of St. James, it would be doing violence
to my feelings were I to dismiss the subject without
expressing the very high sense I entertain of the talent and
exertion which have been displayed by him on the occasion.
The injury to the commerce of the United States
resulting from the exclusion of our vessels from the
Black Sea and the previous footing of mere sufferance
upon which even the limited trade enjoyed by us
with Turkey has hitherto been placed have for a
long time been a source of much solicitude to this
Government, and several endeavors have been
made to obtain a better state of things.
Sensible of the importance of the object, I felt it
my duty to leave no proper means unemployed
to acquire for our flag the same privileges that
are enjoyed by the principal powers of Europe.
Commissioners were consequently appointed
to open a negotiation with the Sublime Porte.
Not long after the member of the commission who went
directly from the United States had sailed, the account of
the treaty of Adrianople, by which one of the objects in
view was supposed to be secured, reached this country.
The Black Sea was understood to be opened to us.
Under the supposition that this was the case,
the additional facilities to be derived from the
establishment of commercial regulations with the Porte
were deemed of sufficient importance to require a
prosecution of the negotiation as originally contemplated.
It was therefore persevered in, and resulted in a treaty,
which will be forthwith laid before the Senate.
By its provisions a free passage is secured,
without limitation of time, to the vessels of the
United States to and from the Black Sea, including
the navigation thereof, and our trade with Turkey
is placed on the footing of the most favored nation.
The latter is an arrangement wholly independent
of the treaty of Adrianople, and the former derives
much value, not only from the increased security
which under any circumstances it would give to
the right in question, but from the fact, ascertained
in the course of the negotiation, that by the
construction put upon that treaty by Turkey
the article relating to the passage of the Bosphorus
is confined to nations having treaties with the Porte.
The most friendly feelings appear to be entertained
by the Sultan, and an enlightened disposition is
evinced by him to foster the intercourse between
the two countries by the most liberal arrangements.
This disposition it will be our duty and interest to cherish.
Our relations with Russia are of the most stable character.
Respect for that Empire and confidence in its friendship
toward the United States have been so long entertained
on our part and so carefully cherished by the present
Emperor and his illustrious predecessor as to have become
incorporated with the public sentiment of the United States.
No means will be left unemployed on my part to promote
these salutary feelings and those improvements of which
the commercial intercourse between the two countries
is susceptible, and which have derived increased
importance from our treaty with the Sublime Porte.
I sincerely regret to inform you that our minister lately
commissioned to that Court, on whose distinguished talents
and great experience in public affairs I place great reliance,
has been compelled by extreme indisposition to exercise
a privilege which, in consideration of the extent to which
his constitution had been impaired in the public service,
was committed to his discretion—of leaving temporarily
his post for the advantage of a more genial climate.
If, as it is to be hoped, the improvement of his
health should be such as to justify him in doing so,
he will repair to St. Petersburg and resume
the discharge of his official duties.
I have received the most satisfactory assurances
that in the meantime the public interest in that
quarter will be preserved from prejudice by the
intercourse which he will continue through the
secretary of legation with the Russian cabinet.
You are apprised, although the fact has not yet been
officially announced to the House of Representatives,
that a treaty was in the month of March last
concluded between the United States and Denmark,
by which $650,000 are secured to our citizens
as an indemnity for spoliations upon their commerce
in the years 1808, 1809, 1810, and 1811.
This treaty was sanctioned by the Senate at the
close of its last session, and it now becomes the
duty of Congress to pass the necessary laws for
the organization of the board of commissioners
to distribute the indemnity among the claimants.
It is an agreeable circumstance in this adjustment that the
terms are in conformity with the previously ascertained
views of the claimants themselves, thus removing all
pretense for a future agitation of the subject in any form.
The negotiations in regard to such points in our
foreign relations as remain to be adjusted have
been actively prosecuted during the recess.
Material advances have been made, which are
of a character to promise favorable results.
Our country, by the blessing of God,
is not in a situation to invite aggression,
and it will be our fault if she ever becomes so.
Sincerely desirous to cultivate the most liberal
and friendly relations with all; ever ready to
fulfill our engagements with scrupulous fidelity;
limiting our demands upon others to mere justice;
holding ourselves ever ready to do unto them
as we would wish to be done by,
and avoiding even the appearance of undue partiality
to any nation, it appears to me impossible that a simple
and sincere application of our principles to our
foreign relations can fail to place them ultimately
upon the footing on which it is our wish they should rest.
Of the points referred to, the most prominent are
our claims upon France for spoliations upon our commerce;
similar claims upon Spain, together with embarrassments
in the commercial intercourse between the two countries
which ought to be removed; the conclusion of the treaty
of commerce and navigation with Mexico, which has been
so long in suspense, as well as the final settlement of limits
between ourselves and that Republic, and, finally,
the arbitrament of the question between the United States
and Great Britain in regard to the northeastern boundary.
The negotiation with France has been conducted
by our minister with zeal and ability,
and in all respects to my entire satisfaction.
Although the prospect of a favorable termination
was occasionally dimmed by counter pretensions
to which the United States could not assent,
he yet had strong hopes of being able to arrive at
a satisfactory settlement with the late Government.
The negotiation has been renewed with the
present authorities, and sensible of the
general and lively confidence of our citizens
in the justice and magnanimity of regenerated France,
I regret the more not to have it in my power yet
to announce the result so confidently anticipated.
No ground, however, inconsistent with this
expectation has yet been taken, and I do not allow
myself to doubt that justice will soon be done us.
The amount of the claims, the length of time
they have remained unsatisfied, and their
incontrovertible justice make an earnest prosecution
of them by this Government an urgent duty.
The illegality of the seizures and confiscations
out of which they have arisen is not disputed,
and whatever distinctions may have heretofore
been set up in regard to the liability of the
existing Government it is quite clear that
such considerations cannot now be interposed.
The commercial intercourse between the two countries
is susceptible of highly advantageous improvements,
but the sense of this injury has had, and must continue
to have, a very unfavorable influence upon them.
From its satisfactory adjustment not only a firm and
cordial friendship, but a progressive development
of all their relations, may be expected.
It is, therefore, my earnest hope that this old and
vexatious subject of difference may be speedily removed.
I feel that my confidence in our appeal to the motives
which should govern a just and magnanimous nation
is alike warranted by the character of the French people
and by the high voucher we possess for the enlarged
views and pure integrity of the Monarch who now presides
over their councils, and nothing shall be wanting on my part
to meet any manifestation of the spirit we anticipate
in one of corresponding frankness and liberality.
The subjects of difference with Spain have been
brought to the view of that Government by our
minister there with much force and propriety,
and the strongest assurances have been received
of their early and favorable consideration.
The steps which remained to place the matter in
controversy between Great Britain and the United States
fairly before the arbitrator have all been taken
in the same liberal and friendly spirit which
characterized those before announced.
Recent events have doubtless served to delay the decision,
but our minister at the Court of the distinguished
arbitrator has been assured that it will be made
within the time contemplated by the treaty.
I am particularly gratified in being able to state
that a decidedly favorable, and, as I hope, lasting,
change has been effected in our relations
with the neighboring Republic of Mexico.
The unfortunate and unfounded suspicions in regard
to our disposition which it became my painful duty to
advert to on a former occasion have been, I believe,
entirely removed, and the Government of Mexico
has been made to understand the real character of
the wishes and views of this in regard to that country.
The consequence is the establishment
of friendship and mutual confidence.
Such are the assurances I have received,
and I see no cause to doubt their sincerity.
I had reason to expect the conclusion of
a commercial treaty with Mexico in season
for communication on the present occasion.
Circumstances which are not explained, but which
I am persuaded are not the result of an indisposition
on her part to enter into it, have produced the delay.
There was reason to fear in the course of the last summer
that the harmony of our relations might be disturbed by the
acts of certain claimants, under Mexican grants, of territory
which had hitherto been under our jurisdiction.
The cooperation of the representative of Mexico
near this Government was asked
on the occasion and was readily afforded.
Instructions and advice have been given to the
governor of Arkansas and the officers in command
in the adjoining Mexican State by which it is hoped
the quiet of that frontier will be preserved
until a final settlement of the dividing line
shall have removed all ground of controversy.
The exchange of ratifications of the treaty concluded
last year with Austria has not yet taken place.
The delay has been occasioned by the nonarrival
of the ratification of that Government
within the time prescribed by the treaty.
Renewed authority has been asked for by the representative
of Austria, and in the meantime the rapidly increasing trade
and navigation between the two countries have been placed
upon the most liberal footing of our navigation acts.
Several alleged depredations have been
recently committed on our commerce
by the national vessels of Portugal.
They have been made the subject of
immediate remonstrance and reclamation.
I am not yet possessed of sufficient information
to express a definitive opinion of their character,
but expect soon to receive it.
No proper means shall be omitted to obtain for our citizens
all the redress to which they may appear to be entitled.
Almost at the moment of the adjournment
of your last session two bills—the one entitled
“An act for making appropriations for building light-houses,
light-boats, beacons, and monuments, placing buoys,
and for improving harbors and directing surveys,”
and the other An act to authorize a subscription
for stock in the Louisville and Portland Canal Company”
were submitted for my approval.
It was not possible within the time allowed me before the
close of the session to give to these bills the consideration
which was due to their character and importance,
and I was compelled to retain them for that purpose.
I now avail myself of this early opportunity to return them
to the Houses in which they respectively originated
with the reasons which, after mature deliberation,
compel me to withhold my approval.
The practice of defraying out of the Treasury of the
United States the expenses incurred by the establishment
and support of light-houses, beacons, buoys, and
public piers within the bays, inlets, harbors, and ports
of the United States, to render the navigation thereof safe
and easy, is coeval with the adoption of the Constitution,
and has been continued without interruption or dispute.
As our foreign commerce increased and was extended into
the interior of the country by the establishment of ports of
entry and delivery upon our navigable rivers, the sphere of
those expenditures received a corresponding enlargement.
Light-houses, beacons, buoys, public piers, and the
removal of sand bars, sawyers, and other partial or
temporary impediments in the navigable rivers and harbors
which were embraced in the revenue districts from time
to time established by law were authorized upon the same
principle and the expense defrayed in the same manner.
That these expenses have at times been extravagant
and disproportionate is very probable.
The circumstances under which they are incurred
are well calculated to lead to such a result unless
their application is subjected to the closest scrutiny.
The local advantages arising from the disbursement
of public money too frequently, it is to be feared,
invite appropriations for objects of this character
that are neither necessary nor useful.
The number of light-house keepers is already
very large, and the bill before me proposes to
add to it fifty-one more of various descriptions.
From representations upon the subject which are
understood to be entitled to respect, I am induced
to believe that there has not only been great improvidence
in the past expenditures of the Government upon these
objects, but that the security of navigation has in some
instances been diminished by the multiplication of
light-houses and consequent change of lights upon the coast.
It is in this as in other respects our duty to avoid all
unnecessary expense, as well as every increase of
patronage not called for by the public service.
But in the discharge of that duty in this particular
it must not be forgotten that in relation to our foreign
commerce the burden and benefit of protecting
and accommodating it necessarily go together,
and must do so as long as the public revenue
is drawn from the people through the custom-house.
It is indisputable that whatever gives facility and security
to navigation cheapens imports, and all who consume
them are alike interested in whatever produces this effect.
If they consume, they ought, as they now do,
to pay; otherwise they do not pay.
The consumer in the most inland State derives
the same advantage from every necessary and
prudent expenditure for the facility and security
of our foreign commerce and navigation that
he does who resides in a maritime State.
Local expenditures have not of themselves
a corresponding operation.
From a bill making direct appropriations for
such objects I should not have withheld my assent.
The one now returned does so in several particulars,
but it also contains appropriations for surveys
of a local character, which I cannot approve.
It gives me satisfaction to find that no serious
inconvenience has arisen from withholding my approval
from this bill; nor will it, I trust, because of regret that an
opportunity will be thereby afforded for Congress to review
its provisions under circumstances better calculated for
full investigation than those under which it was passed.
In speaking of direct appropriations I mean
not to include a practice which has obtained to
some extent, and to which I have in one instance,
in a different capacity, given my assent—
that of subscribing to the stock of private associations.
Positive experience and a more thorough consideration
of the subject have convinced me of the impropriety
as well as inexpediency of such investments.
All improvements effected by the funds of the nation
for general use should be open to the enjoyment
of all our fellow-citizens, exempt from the payment
of tolls or any imposition of that character.
The practice of thus mingling the concerns
of the Government with those of the States
or of individuals is inconsistent with the
object of its institution and highly impolitic.
The successful operation of the federal system can
only be preserved by confining it to the few and simple,
but yet important, objects for which it was designed.
A different practice, if allowed to progress,
would ultimately change the character of this
Government by consolidating into one the
General and State Governments, which
were intended to be kept forever distinct.
I cannot perceive how bills authorizing such
subscriptions can be otherwise regarded than
as bills for revenue, and consequently subject to
the rule in that respect prescribed by the Constitution.
If the interest of the Government in private companies
is subordinate to that of individuals, the management
and control of a portion of the public funds is delegated
to an authority unknown to the Constitution and beyond
the supervision of our constituents; if superior,
its officers and agents will be constantly exposed
to imputations of favoritism and oppression.
Direct prejudice to the public interest or an alienation
of the affections and respect of portions of the people
may, therefore, in addition to the general discredit
resulting to the Government from embarking with
its constituents in pecuniary stipulations, be looked
for as the probable fruit of such associations.
It is no answer to this objection to say that the
extent of consequences like these cannot be great
from a limited and small number of investments,
because experience in other matters teaches us—
and we are not at liberty to disregard its admonitions—
that unless an entire stop be put to them it will soon be
impossible to prevent their accumulation until they are
spread over the whole country and made to embrace many
of the private and appropriate concerns of individuals.
The power which the General Government would
acquire within the several States by becoming the
principal stockholder in corporations, controlling
every canal and each 60 or 100 miles of every
important road, and giving a proportionate vote
in all their elections, is almost inconceivable,
and in my view dangerous to the liberties of the people.
This mode of aiding such works is also in its nature
deceptive, and in many cases conducive to improvidence
in the administration of the national funds.
Appropriations will be obtained with much greater
facility and granted with less security to the public
interest when the measure is thus disguised than when
definite and direct expenditures of money are asked for.
The interests of the nation would doubtless
be better served by avoiding all such indirect
modes of aiding particular objects.
In a government like ours more especially should all
public acts be, as far as practicable, simple, undisguised,
and intelligible, that they may become fit subjects
for the approbation or animadversion of the people.
The bill authorizing a subscription to the Louisville
and Portland Canal affords a striking illustration
of the difficulty of withholding additional appropriations
for the same object when the first erroneous step
has been taken by instituting a partnership
between the Government and private companies.
It proposes a third subscription on the part of the
United States, when each preceding one was
at the time regarded as the extent of the aid
which Government was to render to that work;
and the accompanying bill for light-houses, etc.,
contains an appropriation for a survey of the bed
of the river, with a view to its improvement by removing
the obstruction which the canal is designed to avoid.
This improvement, if successful, would afford a free
passage of the river and render the canal entirely useless.
To such improvidence is the course of legislation subject
in relation to internal improvements on local matters,
even with the best intentions on the part of Congress.
Although the motives which have influenced me
in this matter may be already sufficiently stated,
I am nevertheless induced by its importance to
add a few observations of a general character.
In my objections to the bills authorizing subscriptions
to the Maysville and Rockville road companies
I expressed my views fully in regard to the power of
Congress to construct roads and canals within a State or to
appropriate money for improvements of a local character.
I at the same time intimated my belief that the right to
make appropriations for such as were of a national
character had been so generally acted upon and so long
acquiesced in by the Federal and State Governments
and the constituents of each as to justify its exercise on
the ground of continued and uninterrupted usage, but that
it was, nevertheless, highly expedient that appropriations
even of that character should, with the exception made
at the time, be deferred until the national debt is paid,
and that in the meanwhile some general rule for the action
of the Government in that respect ought to be established.
These suggestions were not necessary to the decision
of the question then before me, and were, I readily admit,
intended to awake the attention and draw forth the
opinions and observations of our constituents upon a
subject of the highest importance to their interests,
and one destined to exert a powerful influence
upon the future operations of our political system.
I know of no tribunal to which a public man in this country,
in a case of doubt and difficulty, can appeal with
greater advantage or more propriety than the
judgment of the people; and although I must
necessarily in the discharge of my official duties
be governed by the dictates of my own judgment,
I have no desire to conceal my anxious wish to conform
as far as I can to the views of those for whom I act.
All irregular expressions of public opinion are of necessity
attended with some doubt as to their accuracy,
but making full allowances on that account I cannot,
I think, deceive myself in believing that the acts
referred to, as well as the suggestions which
I allowed myself to make in relation to their bearing
upon the future operations of the Government,
have been approved by the great body of the people.
That those whose immediate pecuniary interests are
to be affected by proposed expenditures should shrink
from the application of a rule which prefers their
more general and remote interests to those which
are personal and immediate is to be expected.
But even such objections must from the nature
of our population be but temporary in their duration,
and if it were otherwise our course should be the same,
for the time is yet, I hope, far distant when those entrusted
with power to be exercised for the good of the whole
will consider it either honest or wise to purchase local
favors at the sacrifice of principle and general good.
So understanding public sentiment, and thoroughly
satisfied that the best interests of our common
country imperiously require that the course
which I have recommended in this regard
should be adopted, I have, upon the most
mature consideration, determined to pursue it.
It is due to candor, as well as to my own feelings,
that I should express the reluctance and anxiety
which I must at all times experience in exercising the
undoubted right of the Executive to withhold his assent
from bills on other grounds than their constitutionality.
That this right should not be exercised
on slight occasions all will admit.
It is only in matters of deep interest, when the principle
involved may be justly regarded as next in importance to
infractions of the Constitution itself, that such a step can
be expected to meet with the approbation of the people.
Such an occasion do I conscientiously
believe the present to be.
In the discharge of this delicate and highly responsible
duty I am sustained by the reflection that the exercise
of this power has been deemed consistent with the
obligation of official duty by several of my predecessors,
and by the persuasion, too, that whatever liberal institutions
may have to fear from the encroachments of Executive
power, which has been everywhere the cause of so
much strife and bloody contention, but little danger
is to be apprehended from a precedent by which that
authority denies to itself the exercise of powers that
bring in their train influence and patronage of great extent,
and thus excludes the operation of personal interests,
everywhere the bane of official trust.
I derive, too, no small degree of satisfaction from the
reflection that if I have mistaken the interests and
wishes of the people the Constitution, affords the
means of soon redressing the error by selecting
for the place their favor has bestowed upon me
a citizen whose opinions may accord with their own.
I trust, in the meantime, the interests of the nation
will be saved from prejudice by a rigid application
of that portion of the public funds which might otherwise
be applied to different objects to that highest of all
our obligations, the payment of the public debt,
and an opportunity be afforded for the adoption of some
better rule for the operations of the Government in this
matter than any which has hitherto been acted upon.
Profoundly impressed with the importance of the subject,
not merely as relates to the general prosperity
of the country, but to the safety of the federal system,
I cannot avoid repeating my earnest hope that all
good citizens who take a proper interest in the success
and harmony of our admirable political institutions,
and who are incapable of desiring to convert an opposite
state of things into means for the gratification of
personal ambition, will, laying aside minor considerations
and discarding local prejudices, unite their honest
exertions to establish some fixed general principle which
shall be calculated to effect the greatest extent of public
good in regard to the subject of internal improvement,
and afford the least ground for sectional discontent.
The general grounds of my objection to local
appropriations have been heretofore expressed,
and I shall endeavor to avoid a repetition of what
has been already urged—the importance of sustaining
the State sovereignties as far as is consistent with the
rightful action of the Federal Government, and of
preserving the greatest attainable harmony between them.
I will now only add an expression of my conviction—
a conviction which every day's experience serves to
confirm—that the political creed which inculcates the
pursuit of those great objects as a paramount duty
is the true faith, and one to which we are mainly
indebted for the present success of the entire system,
and to which we must alone look for its future stability.
That there are diversities in the interests
of the different States which compose this
extensive Confederacy must be admitted.
Those diversities arising from situation, climate, population,
and pursuits are doubtless, as it is natural they should be,
greatly exaggerated by jealousies and that spirit of
rivalry so inseparable from neighboring communities.
These circumstances make it the duty of those who are
entrusted with the management of its affairs to neutralize
their effects as far as practicable by making the beneficial
operation of the Federal Government as equal and
equitable among the several States as can be done
consistently with the great ends of its institution.
It is only necessary to refer to undoubted facts to see
how far the past acts of the Government upon the subject
under consideration have fallen short of this object.
The expenditures heretofore made for internal
improvements amount to upward of $5,000,000,
and have been distributed in very unequal
proportions amongst the States.
The estimated expense of works of which surveys have
been made, together with that of others projected and
partially surveyed, amounts to more than $96,000,000.
That such improvements, on account of particular
circumstances, may be more advantageously and
beneficially made in some States than in others is
doubtless true, but that they are of a character which
should prevent an equitable distribution of the funds
amongst the several States is not to be conceded.
The want of this equitable distribution cannot fail
to prove a prolific source of irritation among the States.
We have it constantly before our eyes that professions
of superior zeal in the cause of internal improvement
and a disposition to lavish the public funds upon
objects of this character are daily and earnestly
put forth by aspirants to power as constituting the
highest claims to the confidence of the people.
Would it be strange, under such circumstances,
and in times of great excitement, that grants of
this description should find their motives in objects
which may not accord with the public good?
Those who have not had occasion to see and regret
the indication of a sinister influence in these matters
in past times have been more fortunate than myself
in their observation of the course of public affairs.
If to these evils be added the combinations and angry
contentions to which such a course of things gives rise,
with their baleful influences upon the legislation of Congress
touching the leading and appropriate duties of the Federal
Government, it was but doing justice to the character of our
people to expect the severe condemnation of the past which
the recent exhibitions of public sentiment has evinced.
Nothing short of a radical change in the action
of the Government upon the subject can,
in my opinion, remedy the evil.
If, as it would be natural to expect, the States which have
been least favored in past appropriations should insist on
being redressed in those hereafter to be made, at the
expense of the States which have so largely and
disproportionately participated, we have, as matters now
stand, but little security that the attempt would do more
than change the inequality from one quarter to another.
Thus viewing the subject, I have heretofore felt it
my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan
for the distribution of the surplus funds, which may
at any time remain in the Treasury after the national
debt shall have been paid, among the States,
in proportion to the number of their Representatives,
to be applied by them to objects of internal improvement.
Although this plan has met with favor in
some portions of the Union, it has also elicited
objections which merit deliberate consideration.
A brief notice of these objections here will not,
therefore, I trust, be regarded as out of place.
They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge,
on the following grounds:
First, an objection to the ratio of distribution;
second, an apprehension that the existence of
such a regulation would produce improvident and
oppressive taxation to raise the funds for distribution;
third, that the mode proposed would lead to the
construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion
of such as are general and as would consequently be
of a more useful character; and, last, that it would
create a discreditable and injurious dependence on the
part of the State governments upon the Federal power.
Of those who object to the ratio of representation
as the basis of distribution, some insist that the
importations of the respective States would constitute
one that would be more equitable; and others again,
that the extent of their respective territories
would furnish a standard which would be
more expedient and sufficiently equitable.
The ratio of representation presented itself to my mind,
and it still does, as one of obvious equity,
because of its being the ratio of contribution,
whether the funds to be distributed be derived
from the customs or from direct taxation.
It does not follow, however, that its adoption is
indispensable to the establishment of the system proposed.
There may be considerations appertaining to
the subject which would render a departure,
to some extent, from the rule of contribution proper.
Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis
of distribution be confined to one ground.
It may, if in the judgment of those whose right
it is to fix it, be deemed politic and just to
give it that character, have regard to several.
In my first message I stated it to be my opinion that
“it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff upon
principles satisfactory to the people of the Union will until
a remote period, if ever, leave the Government without
a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond what
may be required for its current service.”
I have had no cause to change that opinion,
but much to confirm it.
Should these expectations be realized, a suitable fund would
thus be produced for the plan under consideration to operate
upon, and if there be no such fund its adoption will, in my
opinion, work no injury to any interest; for I cannot assent
to the justness of the apprehension that the establishment
of the proposed system would tend to the encouragement
of improvident legislation of the character supposed.
Whatever the proper authority in the exercise of
constitutional power shall at any time hereafter decide
to be for the general good will in that as in other respects
deserve and receive the acquiescence and support of the
whole country, and we have ample security that every
abuse of power in that regard by agents of the people will
receive a speedy and effectual corrective at their hands.
The views which I take of the future, founded on the
obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our
fellow-citizens in intelligence and in public and private virtue,
leave me without much apprehension on that head.
I do not doubt that those who come after us will
be as much alive as we are to the obligation upon
all the trustees of political power to exempt those
for whom they act from all unnecessary burdens,
and as sensible of the great truth that the resources
of the nation beyond those required for immediate
and necessary purposes of Government can nowhere
be so well deposited as in the pockets of the people.
It may sometimes happen that the interests of particular
States would not be deemed to coincide with the general
interest in relation to improvements within such States.
But if the danger to be apprehended from this source
is sufficient to require it, a discretion might be reserved
to Congress to direct to such improvements of a general
character as the States concerned might not be disposed
to unite in, the application of the quotas of those States,
under the restriction of confining to each State
the expenditure of its appropriate quota.
It may, however, be assumed as a safe general rule
that such improvements as serve to increase the
prosperity of the respective States in which they
are made, by giving new facilities to trade, and
thereby augmenting the wealth and comfort of their
inhabitants, constitute the surest mode of conferring
permanent and substantial advantages upon the whole.
The strength as well as the true glory of the
Confederacy is founded on the prosperity and
power of the several independent sovereignties
of which it is composed and the certainty with
which they can be brought into successful active
cooperation through the agency of the Federal Government.
It is, moreover, within the knowledge of such
as are at all conversant with public affairs that
schemes of internal improvement have from
time to time been proposed which, from their
extent and seeming magnificence, were readily
regarded as of national concernment, but which
upon fuller consideration and further experience
would now be rejected with great unanimity.
That the plan under consideration would derive important
advantages from its certainty, and that the moneys set
apart for these purposes would be more judiciously
applied and economically expended under the direction of
the State legislatures, in which every part of each State
is immediately represented, cannot, I think, be doubted.
In the new States particularly, where a comparatively
small population is scattered over an extensive surface,
and the representation in Congress consequently very
limited, it is natural to expect that the appropriations made
by the Federal Government would be more likely to be
expended in the vicinity of those members through whose
immediate agency they were obtained than if the funds
were placed under the control of the legislature, in which
every county of the State has its own representative.
This supposition does not necessarily impugn the motives
of such Congressional representatives, nor is it so intended.
We are all sensible of the bias to which the strongest minds
and purest hearts are, under such circumstances, liable.
In respect to the last objection—its probable effect upon
the dignity and independence of State governments—
it appears to me only necessary to state the case as it is,
and as it would be if the measure proposed were adopted,
to show that the operation is most likely to be the
very reverse of that which the objection supposes.
In the one case the State would receive its quota of
the national revenue for domestic use upon a fixed
principle as a matter of right, and from a fund to the
creation of which it had itself contributed its fair proportion.
Surely there could be nothing derogatory in that.
As matters now stand the States themselves, in their
sovereign character, are not unfrequently petitioners
at the bar of the Federal Legislature for such allowances
out of the National Treasury as it may comport with
their pleasure or sense of duty to bestow upon them.
It cannot require argument to prove which of the
two courses is most compatible with the efficiency
or respectability of the State governments.
But all these are matters for discussion
and dispassionate consideration.
That the desired adjustment would be attended with
difficulty affords no reason why it should not be attempted.
The effective operation of such motives would have
prevented the adoption of the Constitution under which
we have so long lived and under the benign influence
of which our beloved country has so signally prospered.
The framers of that sacred instrument had greater
difficulties to overcome, and they did overcome them.
The patriotism of the people, directed by a deep
conviction of the importance of the Union, produced
mutual concession and reciprocal forbearance.
Strict right was merged in a spirit of compromise,
and the result has consecrated their
disinterested devotion to the general weal.
Unless the American people have degenerated,
the same result can be again effected whenever
experience points out the necessity of a resort to the same
means to uphold the fabric which their fathers have reared.
It is beyond the power of man to make a system of
government like ours or any other operate with precise
equality upon States situated like those which compose
this Confederacy; nor is inequality always injustice.
Every State cannot expect to shape the measures of the
General Government to suit its own particular interests.
The causes which prevent it are seated
in the nature of things, and cannot be
entirely counteracted by human means.
Mutual forbearance becomes, therefore,
a duty obligatory upon all, and we may,
I am confident, count upon a cheerful compliance
with this high injunction on the part of our constituents.
It is not to be supposed that they will object
to make such comparatively inconsiderable
sacrifices for the preservation of rights and privileges
which other less favored portions of the world have
in vain waded through seas of blood to acquire.
Our course is a safe one if it be but faithfully adhered to.
Acquiescence in the constitutionally expressed will of
the majority, and the exercise of that will in a spirit of
moderation, justice, and brotherly kindness, will constitute
a cement which would forever preserve our Union.
Those who cherish and inculcate sentiments
like these render a most essential service to
their country, while those who seek to weaken
their influence are, however conscientious and
praiseworthy their intentions, in effect its worst enemies.
If the intelligence and influence of the country,
instead of laboring to foment sectional prejudices,
to be made subservient to party warfare, were
in good faith applied to the eradication of causes
of local discontent, by the improvement of our institutions
and by facilitating their adaptation to the condition of
the times, this task would prove one of less difficulty.
May we not hope that the obvious interests of our common
country and the dictates of an enlightened patriotism
will in the end lead the public mind in that direction?
After all, the nature of the subject does not
admit of a plan wholly free from objection.
That which has for some time been in operation is,
perhaps, the worst that could exist, and every advance
that can be made in its improvement is a matter
eminently worthy of your most deliberate attention.
It is very possible that one better calculated
to effect the objects in view may yet be devised.
If so, it is to be hoped that those who disapprove the past
and dissent from what is proposed for the future will feel
it their duty to direct their attention to it, as they must be
sensible that unless some fixed rule for the action of the
Federal Government in this respect is established the course
now attempted to be arrested will be again resorted to.
Any mode which is calculated to give the greatest degree
of effect and harmony to our legislation upon the subject,
which shall best serve to keep the movements of the
Federal Government within the sphere intended by those
who modeled and those who adopted it, which shall lead to
the extinguishment of the national debt in the shortest period
and impose the lightest burdens upon our constituents,
shall receive from me a cordial and firm support.
Among the objects of great national concern
I cannot omit to press again upon your attention
that part of the Constitution which regulates the
election of President and Vice-President.
The necessity for its amendment is made so clear
to my mind by observation of its evils and by the
many able discussions which they have elicited
on the floor of Congress and elsewhere that
I should be wanting to my duty were I to withhold
another expression of my deep solicitude on the subject.
Our system fortunately contemplates a recurrence
to first principles, differing in this respect from all
that have preceded it, and securing it, I trust,
equally against the decay and the commotions which
have marked the progress of other governments.
Our fellow-citizens, too, who in proportion to their love
of liberty keep a steady eye upon the means of
sustaining it, do not require to be reminded of the
duty they owe to themselves to remedy all
essential defects in so vital a part of their system.
While they are sensible that every evil attendant upon its
operation is not necessarily indicative of a bad organization,
but may proceed from temporary causes, yet the
habitual presence, or even a single instance,
of evils which can be clearly traced to an organic
defect will not, I trust, be overlooked through a too
scrupulous veneration for the work of their ancestors.
The Constitution was an experiment committed to the
virtue and intelligence of the great mass of our countrymen,
in whose ranks the framers of it themselves were to
perform the part of patriotic observation and scrutiny,
and if they have passed from the stage of existence with
an increased confidence in its general adaptation to our
condition we should learn from authority so high the duty
of fortifying the points in it which time proves to be exposed
rather than be deterred from approaching them by the
suggestions of fear or the dictates of misplaced reverence.
A provision which does not secure to the people a
direct choice of their Chief Magistrate, but has a
tendency to defeat their will, presented to my mind such an
inconsistency with the general spirit of our institutions that I
was induced to suggest for your consideration the substitute
which appeared to me at the same time the most likely to
correct the evil and to meet the views of our constituents.
The most mature reflection since has added strength to
the belief that the best interests of our country require the
speedy adoption of some plan calculated to effect this end.
A contingency which sometimes places it in the power
of a single member of the House of Representatives to
decide an election of so high and solemn a character is
unjust to the people, and becomes when it occurs a source
of embarrassment to the individuals thus brought into
power and a cause of distrust of the representative body.
Liable as the Confederacy is, from its great extent,
to parties founded upon sectional interests, and to
a corresponding multiplication of candidates for the
Presidency, the tendency of the constitutional reference
to the House of Representatives is to devolve the election
upon that body in almost every instance, and, whatever
choice may then be made among the candidates thus
presented to them, to swell the influence of particular
interests to a degree inconsistent with the general good.
The consequences of this feature of the Constitution appear
far more threatening to the peace and integrity of the Union
than any which I can conceive as likely to result from
the simple legislative action of the Federal Government.
It was a leading object with the framers of the
Constitution to keep as separate as possible the action of
the legislative and executive branches of the Government.
To secure this object nothing is more essential than to
preserve the former from all temptations of private interest,
and therefore so to direct the patronage of the latter
as not to permit such temptations to be offered.
Experience abundantly demonstrates that every precaution
in this respect is a valuable safeguard of liberty,
and one which my reflections upon the tendencies of our
system incline me to think should be made still stronger.
It was for this reason that, in connection with an
amendment of the Constitution removing all
intermediate agency in the choice of the President,
I recommended some restrictions upon the re-eligibility
of that officer and upon the tenure of offices generally.
The reason still exists, and I renew the recommendation
with an increased confidence that its adoption will
strengthen those checks by which the Constitution
designed to secure the independence of each department
of the Government and promote the healthful and equitable
administration of all the trusts which it has created.
The agent most likely to contravene this design
of the Constitution is the Chief Magistrate.
In order, particularly, that his appointment may as far
as possible be placed beyond the reach of any improper
influences; in order that he may approach the solemn
responsibilities of the highest office in the gift of a free
people uncommitted to any other course than the strict
line of constitutional duty, and that the securities for this
independence may be rendered as strong as the nature
of power and the weakness of its possessor will admit,
I cannot too earnestly invite your attention to the propriety
of promoting such an amendment of the Constitution
as will render him ineligible after one term of service.
It gives me pleasure to announce to Congress
that the benevolent policy of the Government,
steadily pursued for nearly thirty years, in relation
to the removal of the Indians beyond the white
settlements is approaching to a happy consummation.
Two important tribes have accepted the provision made
for their removal at the last session of Congress,
and it is believed that their example will induce the
remaining tribes also to seek the same obvious advantages.
The consequences of a speedy removal
will be important to the United States,
to individual States, and to the Indians themselves.
The pecuniary advantages which it promises to the
Government are the least of its recommendations.
It puts an end to all possible danger of collision
between the authorities of the General and
State Governments on account of the Indians.
It will place a dense and civilized population in large tracts
of country now occupied by a few savage hunters.
By opening the whole territory between Tennessee
on the north and Louisiana on the south to the settlement
of the whites it will incalculably strengthen the southwestern
frontier and render the adjacent States strong enough
to repel future invasions without remote aid.
It will relieve the whole State of Mississippi and the western
part of Alabama of Indian occupancy, and enable those
States to advance rapidly in population, wealth, and power.
It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with
settlements of whites; free them from the power of the
States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own
way and under their own rude institutions; will retard
the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers,
and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of
the Government and through the influence of good counsels,
to cast off their savage habits and become
an interesting, civilized, and Christian community.
These consequences, some of them so certain
and the rest so probable, make the complete
execution of the plan sanctioned by Congress
at their last session an object of much solicitude.
Toward the aborigines of the country no one can
indulge a more friendly feeling than myself, or would go
further in attempting to reclaim them from their wandering
habits and make them a happy, prosperous people.
I have endeavored to impress upon them my own
solemn convictions of the duties and powers of the
General Government in relation to the State authorities.
For the justice of the laws passed by the States
within the scope of their reserved powers
they are not responsible to this Government.
As individuals we may entertain and express our opinions
of their acts, but as a Government we have as little right to
control them as we have to prescribe laws for other nations.
With a full understanding of the subject,
the Choctaw and the Chickasaw tribes have with great
unanimity determined to avail themselves of the liberal
offers presented by the act of Congress, and have
agreed to remove beyond the Mississippi River.
Treaties have been made with them, which
in due season will be submitted for consideration.
In negotiating these treaties they were made to understand
their true condition, and they have preferred maintaining
their independence in the Western forests to submitting
to the laws of the States in which they now reside.
These treaties, being probably the last which
will ever be made with them, are characterized
by great liberality on the part of the Government.
They give the Indians a liberal sum in consideration
of their removal, and comfortable subsistence
on their arrival at their new homes.
If it be their real interest to maintain a separate existence,
they will there be at liberty to do so without the
inconveniences and vexations to which they would
unavoidably have been subject in Alabama and Mississippi.
Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines
of this country, and Philanthropy has been long busily
employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress
has never for a moment been arrested, and one by one
have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth.
To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to tread on
the graves of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections.
But true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these
vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of
one generation to make room for another.
In the monuments and fortresses of an unknown people,
spread over the extensive regions of the West,
we behold the memorials of a once powerful race,
which was exterminated or has disappeared
to make room for the existing savage tribes.
Nor is there anything in this which, upon a
comprehensive view of the general interests
of the human race, is to be regretted.
Philanthropy could not wish to see this continent restored
to the condition in which it was found by our forefathers.
What good man would prefer a country covered with forests
and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive
Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms,
embellished with all the improvements which art can devise
or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000
happy people, and filled with all the
blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?
The present policy of the Government is but a continuation
of the same progressive change by a milder process.
The tribes which occupied the countries now constituting
the Eastern States were annihilated or
have melted away to make room for the whites.
The waves of population and civilization are rolling
to the westward, and we now propose to acquire
the countries occupied by the red men of the South
and West by a fair exchange, and, at the expense
of the United States, to send them to a land where their
existence may be prolonged and perhaps made perpetual.
Doubtless it will be painful to leave the graves
of their fathers; but what do they more than our
ancestors did or than our children are now doing?
To better their condition in an unknown land our
forefathers left all that was dear in earthly objects.
Our children by thousands yearly leave the land
of their birth to seek new homes in distant regions.
Does Humanity weep at these painful separations
from everything, animate and inanimate,
with which the young heart has become entwined?
Far from it.
It is rather a source of joy that our country affords
scope where our young population may range
unconstrained in body or in mind, developing the
power and faculties of man in their highest perfection.
These remove hundreds and almost thousands of miles
at their own expense, purchase the lands they occupy,
and support themselves at their new homes
from the moment of their arrival.
Can it be cruel in this Government when, by events
which it cannot control, the Indian is made discontented
in his ancient home to purchase his lands, to give him
a new and extensive territory, to pay the expense of
his removal, and support him a year in his new abode?
How many thousands of our own people
would gladly embrace the opportunity of
removing to the West on such condition!
If the offers made to the Indians were extended to them,
they would be hailed with gratitude and joy.
And is it supposed that the wandering savage
has a stronger attachment to his home
than the settled, civilized Christian?
Is it more afflicting to him to leave the graves
of his fathers than it is to our brothers and children?
Rightly considered, the policy of the General Government
toward the red man is not only liberal, but generous.
He is unwilling to submit to the laws of the States
and mingle with their population.
To save him from this alternative, or perhaps utter
annihilation, the General Government kindly offers
him a new home, and proposes to pay the
whole expense of his removal and settlement.
In the consummation of a policy originating
at an early period, and steadily pursued by every
Administration within the present century—
so just to the States and so generous to the Indians—
the Executive feels it has a right to expect the cooperation
of Congress and of all good and disinterested men.
The States, moreover, have a right to demand it.
It was substantially a part of the compact
which made them members of our Confederacy.
With Georgia there is an express contract;
with the new States an implied one of equal obligation.
Why, in authorizing Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri,
Mississippi, and Alabama to form constitutions and
become separate States, did Congress include within
their limits extensive tracts of Indian lands, and,
in some instances, powerful Indian tribes?
Was it not understood by both parties that the power
of the States was to be coextensive with their limits, and
that with all convenient dispatch the General Government
should extinguish the Indian title and remove
every obstruction to the complete jurisdiction
of the State governments over the soil?
Probably not one of those States would have accepted
a separate existence—certainly it would never
have been granted by Congress—had it been
understood that they were to be confined forever
to those small portions of their nominal territory
the Indian title to which had at the time been extinguished.
It is, therefore, a duty which this Government
owes to the new States to extinguish as soon as
possible the Indian title to all lands which Congress
themselves have included within their limits.
When this is done the duties of the General Government
in relation to the States and the Indians
within their limits are at an end.
The Indians may leave the State or not, as they choose.
The purchase of their lands does not alter in the least
their personal relations with the State government.
No act of the General Government has ever been
deemed necessary to give the States jurisdiction
over the persons of the Indians.
That they possess by virtue of their sovereign power
within their own limits in as full a manner before
as after the purchase of the Indian lands;
nor can this Government add to or diminish it.
May we not hope, therefore, that all good citizens,
and none more zealously than those who think the
Indians oppressed by subjection to the laws of the States,
will unite in attempting to open the eyes of those children
of the forest to their true condition, and by a speedy
removal to relieve them from all the evils,
real or imaginary, present or prospective,
with which they may be supposed to be threatened.
Among the numerous causes of congratulation the
condition of our impost revenue deserves special mention,
inasmuch as it promises the means of extinguishing the
public debt sooner than was anticipated, and furnishes
a strong illustration of the practical effects of the
present tariff upon our commercial interests.
The object of the tariff is objected to by some
as unconstitutional, and it is considered by
almost all as defective in many of its parts.
The power to impose duties on imports
originally belonged to the several States.
The right to adjust those duties with a view to the
encouragement of domestic branches of industry is so
completely incidental to that power that it is difficult
to suppose the existence of the one without the other.
The States have delegated their whole authority over
imports to the General Government without limitation
or restriction, saving the very inconsiderable
reservation relating to their inspection laws.
This authority having thus entirely passed from the States,
the right to exercise it for the purpose of protection
does not exist in them, and consequently if it be not
possessed by the General Government it must be extinct.
Our political system would thus present the anomaly
of a people stripped of the right to foster their own
industry and to counteract the most selfish and destructive
policy which might be adopted by foreign nations.
This surely cannot be the case.
This indispensable power thus surrendered by the
States must be within the scope of the authority
on the subject expressly delegated to Congress.
In this conclusion I am confirmed as well by the opinions
of Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe,
who have each repeatedly recommended the exercise
of this right under the Constitution, as by the uniform
practice of Congress, the continued acquiescence of
the States, and the general understanding of the people.
The difficulties of a more expedient adjustment
of the present tariff, although great,
are far from being insurmountable.
Some are unwilling to improve any of its parts
because they would destroy the whole;
others fear to touch the objectionable parts
lest those they approve should be jeoparded.
I am persuaded that the advocates of these
conflicting views do injustice to the American
people and to their representatives.
The general interest is the interest of each, and my
confidence is entire that to insure the adoption of such
modifications of the tariff as the general interest requires
it is only necessary that that interest should be understood.
It is an infirmity of our nature to mingle our interests
and prejudices with the operation of our reasoning powers,
and attribute to the objects of our likes and dislikes qualities
they do not possess and effects they cannot produce.
The effects of the present tariff are doubtless overrated,
both in its evils and in its advantages.
By one class of reasoners the reduced price of cotton and
other agricultural products is ascribed wholly to its influence,
and by another the reduced price of manufactured articles.
The probability is that neither opinion approaches the truth,
and that both are induced by that influence of interests
and prejudices to which I have referred.
The decrease of prices extends throughout the
commercial world, embracing not only the raw material
and the manufactured article, but provisions and lands.
The cause must therefore be deeper and more
pervading than the tariff of the United States.
It may in a measure be attributable to the increased value
of the precious metals, produced by a diminution of the
supply and an increase in the demand, while commerce
has rapidly extended itself and population has augmented.
The supply of gold and silver, the general medium of
exchange, has been greatly interrupted by civil convulsions
in the countries from which they are principally drawn.
A part of the effect, too, is doubtless owing to an
increase of operatives and improvements in machinery.
But on the whole it is questionable whether the reduction
in the price of lands, produce, and manufactures has been
greater than the appreciation of the standard of value.
While the chief object of duties should be revenue,
they may be so adjusted as to encourage manufactures.
In this adjustment, however, it is the duty of the
Government to be guided by the general good.
Objects of national importance alone ought to be protected.
Of these the productions of our soil,
our mines, and our workshops, essential
to national defense, occupy the first rank.
Whatever other species of domestic industry,
having the importance to which I have referred,
may be expected, after temporary protection,
to compete with foreign labor on equal terms
merit the same attention in a subordinate degree.
The present tariff taxes some of the comforts of life
unnecessarily high; it undertakes to protect interests
too local and minute to justify a general exaction,
and it also attempts to force some kinds of manufactures
for which the country is not ripe.
Much relief will be derived in some of these respects
from the measures of your last session.
The best as well as fairest mode of determining
whether from any just considerations a particular
interest ought to receive protection would be
to submit the question singly for deliberation.
If after due examination of its merits, unconnected
with extraneous considerations—such as a desire
to sustain a general system or to purchase support
for a different interest—it should enlist in its favor
a majority of the representatives of the people,
there can be little danger of wrong or injury in
adjusting the tariff with reference to its protective effect.
If this obviously just principle were honestly adhered to,
the branches of industry which deserve protection would
be saved from the prejudice excited against them when
that protection forms part of a system by which portions of
the country feel or conceive themselves to be oppressed.
What is incalculably more important, the vital principle
of our system—that principle which requires acquiescence
in the will of the majority—would be secure from the
discredit and danger to which it is exposed by the acts
of majorities founded not on identity of conviction,
but on combinations of small minorities entered into
for the purpose of mutual assistance in measures which,
resting solely on their own merits, could never be carried.
I am well aware that this is a subject of so much delicacy,
on account of the extended interests it involves, as to
require that it should be touched with the utmost caution,
and that while an abandonment of the policy in which
it originated—a policy coeval with our Government,
and pursued through successive Administrations—
is neither to be expected or desired;
the people have a right to demand,
and have demanded, that it be so modified
as to correct abuses and obviate injustice.
That our deliberations on this interesting subject should
be uninfluenced by those partisan conflicts that are
incident to free institutions is the fervent wish of my heart.
To make this great question, which unhappily so much
divides and excites the public mind, subservient to the
short sighted views of faction must destroy all hope of
settling it satisfactorily to the great body
of the people and for the general interest.
I cannot, therefore, in taking leave of the subject, too
earnestly for my own feelings or the common good warn
you against the blighting consequences of such a course.
According to the estimates at the Treasury Department,
the receipts in the Treasury during the present year
will amount to $24,161,018, which will exceed by
about $300,000 the estimate presented in the
last annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury.
The total expenditure during the year, exclusive of public
debt, is estimated at $13,742,311, and the payment
on account of public debt for the same period will have
been $11,354,630, leaving a balance in the Treasury
on the 1st of January, 1831 of $4,819,781.
In connection with the condition of our finances,
it affords me pleasure to remark that judicious and efficient
arrangements have been made by the Treasury Department
for securing the pecuniary responsibility of the public officers
and the more punctual payment of the public dues.
The Revenue-Cutter Service has been organized
and placed on a good footing, and aided by an increase
of inspectors at exposed points, and regulations
adopted under the act of May, 1830, for the inspection
and appraisement of merchandise, has produced much
improvement in the execution of the laws and more
security against the commission of frauds upon the revenue.
Abuses in the allowances for fishing bounties have
also been corrected, and a material saving in
that branch of the service thereby effected.
In addition to these improvements the system of
expenditure for sick seamen belonging to the merchant
service has been revised, and being rendered uniform
and economical the benefits of the fund applicable
to this object have been usefully extended.
The prosperity of our country is also further evinced
by the increased revenue arising from the sale of
public lands, as will appear from the report of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office
and the documents accompanying it,
which are herewith transmitted.
I beg leave to draw your attention to this report,
and to the propriety of making early
appropriations for the objects which it specifies.
Your attention is again invited to the subjects connected
with that portion of the public interests
entrusted to the War Department.
Some of them were referred to in my former message,
and they are presented in detail in the report
of the Secretary of War herewith submitted.
I refer you also to the report of that officer for
a knowledge of the state of the Army, fortifications,
arsenals, and Indian affairs, all of which it will be perceived
have been guarded with zealous attention and care.
It is worthy of your consideration whether the armaments
necessary for the fortifications on our maritime frontier
which are now or shortly will be completed should not be
in readiness sooner than the customary appropriations
will enable the Department to provide them.
This precaution seems to be due to the general system
of fortification which has been sanctioned by Congress,
and is recommended by that maxim of wisdom
which tells us in peace to prepare for war.
I refer you to the report of the Secretary of the Navy
for a highly satisfactory account of the manner
in which the concerns of that Department
have been conducted during the present year.
Our position in relation to the most powerful nations
of the earth, and the present condition of Europe,
admonish us to cherish this arm of our
national defense with peculiar care.
Separated by wide seas from all those Governments
whose power we might have reason to dread,
we have nothing to apprehend from attempts at conquest.
It is chiefly attacks upon our commerce and harassing
inroads upon our coast against which we have to guard.
A naval force adequate to the protection of our commerce,
always afloat with an accumulation of the means to give it
a rapid extension in case of need, furnishes the power by
which all such aggressions may be prevented or repelled.
The attention of the Government has therefore been
recently directed more to preserving the public vessels
already built and providing materials to be placed
in depot for future use than to increasing their number.
With the aid of Congress, in a few years the
Government will be prepared in case of emergency
to put afloat a powerful navy of new ships
almost as soon as old ones could be repaired.
The modifications in this part of the service suggested
in my last annual message, which are noticed more
in detail in the report of the Secretary of the Navy,
are again recommended to your serious attention.
The report of the Postmaster-General in like manner
exhibits a satisfactory view of the important
branch of the Government under his charge.
In addition to the benefits already secured by the
operations of the Post-Office Department, considerable
improvements within the present year have been made
by an increase in the accommodation afforded by
stage-coaches, and in the frequency and celerity of the mail
between some of the most important points of the Union.
Under the late contracts improvements have been
provided for the southern section of the country, and at the
same time an annual saving made of upward of $72,000.
Notwithstanding the excess of expenditure beyond the
current receipts for a few years past, necessarily incurred
in the fulfillment of existing contracts and in the additional
expenses between the periods of contracting to meet the
demands created by the rapid growth and extension of
our nourishing country, yet the satisfactory assurance
is given that the future revenue of the Department
will be sufficient to meet its extensive engagements.
The system recently introduced that subjects
its receipts and disbursements to strict regulation
has entirely fulfilled its designs.
It gives full assurance of the punctual transmission,
as well as the security of the funds of the Department.
The efficiency and industry of its officers and the
ability and energy of contractors justify an
increased confidence in its continued prosperity.
The attention of Congress was called on a former occasion
to the necessity of such a modification in the office of
Attorney-General of the United States as would render it
more adequate to the wants of the public service.
This resulted in the establishment of the office of Solicitor
of the Treasury, and the earliest measures were taken to
give effect to the provisions of the law which authorized
the appointment of that officer and defined his duties.
But it is not believed that this provision, however useful in
itself, is calculated to supersede the necessity of extending
the duties and powers of the Attorney-General’s Office.
On the contrary, I am convinced that the public interest
would be greatly promoted by giving to that officer the
general superintendence of the various law agents of
the Government, and of all law proceedings, whether
civil or criminal, in which the United States may be
interested, allowing him at the same time such a
compensation as would enable him to devote
his undivided attention to the public business.
I think such a provision is alike
due to the public and to the officer.
Occasions of reference from the different Executive
Departments to the Attorney-General are of frequent
occurrence, and the prompt decision of the questions
so referred tends much to facilitate the
dispatch of business in those Departments.
The report of the Secretary of the Treasury hereto
appended shows also a branch of the public service
not specifically entrusted to any officer which might
be advantageously committed to the Attorney-General.
But independently of those considerations
this office is now one of daily duty.
It was originally organized and its compensation fixed
with a view to occasional service, leaving to the incumbent
time for the exercise of his profession in private practice.
The state of things which warranted
such an organization no longer exists.
The frequent claims upon the services of this officer
would render his absence from the seat of Government
in professional attendance upon the courts injurious to
the public service, and the interests of the Government
could not fail to be promoted by charging him with
the general superintendence of all its legal concerns.
Under a strong conviction of the justness of these
suggestions, I recommend it to Congress to make
the necessary provisions for giving effect to them,
and to place the Attorney-General in regard to
compensation on the same footing with the
heads of the several Executive Departments.
To this officer might also be entrusted a cognizance
of the cases of insolvency in public debtors,
especially if the views which I submitted on this subject
last year should meet the approbation of Congress—
to which I again solicit your attention.
Your attention is respectfully invited
to the situation of the District of Columbia.
Placed by the Constitution under the exclusive
jurisdiction and control of Congress, this District
is certainly entitled to a much greater share
of its consideration than it has yet received.
There is a want of uniformity in its laws,
particularly in those of a penal character,
which increases the expense of their administration and
subjects the people to all the inconveniences which result
from the operation of different codes in so small a territory.
On different sides of the Potomac the same offense is
punishable in unequal degrees, and the peculiarities of many
of the early laws of Maryland and Virginia remain in force,
notwithstanding their repugnance in some cases to the
improvements which have superseded them in those States.
Besides a remedy for these evils, which is loudly
called for, it is respectfully submitted whether a provision
authorizing the election of a delegate to represent the wants
of the citizens of this District on the floor of Congress is
not due to them and to the character of our Government.
No portion of our citizens should be without a practical
enjoyment of the principles of freedom, and there is
none more important than that which cultivates a proper
relation between the governors and the governed.
Imperfect as this must be in this case, yet it is believed
that it would be greatly improved by a representation
in Congress with the same privileges that are allowed
to the other Territories of the United States.
The penitentiary is ready for the reception of convicts,
and only awaits the necessary legislation to put it into
operation, as one object of which I beg leave to recall
your attention to the propriety of providing suitable
compensation for the officers charged with its inspection.
The importance of the principles involved in the
inquiry whether it will be proper to re-charter the
Bank of the United States requires that I should
again call the attention of Congress to the subject.
Nothing has occurred to lessen in any degree
the dangers which many of our citizens apprehend
from that institution as at present organized.
In the spirit of improvement and compromise which
distinguishes our country and its institutions it becomes us to
inquire whether it be not possible to secure the advantages
afforded by the present bank through the agency of a
Bank of the United States so modified in its principles and
structure as to obviate constitutional and other objections.
It is thought practicable to organize such a bank with the
necessary officers as a branch of the Treasury Department,
based on the public and individual deposits, without power
to make loans or purchase property, which shall remit the
funds of the Government, and the expense of which may be
paid, if thought advisable, by allowing its officers to sell bills
of exchange to private individuals at a moderate premium.
Not being a corporate body, having no stockholders,
debtors, or property, and but few officers, it would not
be obnoxious to the constitutional objections which are
urged against the present bank; and having no means
to operate on the hopes, fears, or interests of large
masses of the community, it would be shorn of
the influence which makes that bank formidable.
The States would be strengthened by having in their hands
the means of furnishing the local paper currency through
their own banks, while the Bank of the United States,
though issuing no paper, would check the issues of the
State banks by taking their notes in deposit
and for exchange only so long as they
continue to be redeemed with specie.
In times of public emergency the capacities of such an
institution might be enlarged by legislative provisions.
These suggestions are made not so much
as a recommendation as with a view of calling the
attention of Congress to the possible modifications
of a system which cannot continue to exist in its
present form without occasional collisions with the
local authorities and perpetual apprehensions and
discontent on the part of the States and the people.
In conclusion, fellow-citizens, allow me to invoke
in behalf of your deliberations that spirit of conciliation
and disinterestedness which is the gift of patriotism.
Under an overruling and merciful Providence
the agency of this spirit has thus far been signalized
in the prosperity and glory of our beloved country.
May its influence be eternal.5
Navy Secretary Levi Woodbury became Treasury Secretary on July 1,
and he served until the end of Van Buren’s presidency.
He used deposits to regulate their pet banks.
The gold to silver ratio had been established at 15 to 1 by the first Coinage Act in 1792,
but the commercial rate had become 15.5 to 1.
The Coinage Act that passed on June 28 changed the ratio to 16 to 1.
Biddle’s reducing loans added up to $4 million more than
the pet bank withdrawals and weakened the economy in the summer of 1834.
After complaints from the Journal of Commerce and financiers
in New York and Boston, Biddle restored Bank loans in September.
Although the U. S. Bank reduced its loans by 25%,
by September it had increased its specie reserves to $15 million.
Notes
1. Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, p. 415-16 quoted in American Lion
by Jon Meacham, p. 135-36.
2. American Lion by Jon Meacham, p. 142.
3. The Annals of America, Volume 5, p. 400.
4. Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908, Volume II,
ed. James D. Richardson, p. 590.
5. Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908, Volume II, p. 500-529.
Andrew Jackson to 1812
Andrew Jackson & Wars 1813-15
Andrew Jackson & Indian Wars 1816-20
Andrew Jackson 1821-24
Andrew Jackson 1825-28
President Jackson in 1829
President Jackson & Indians 1829-36
President Jackson in 1830
President Jackson in 1831
Jackson’s Veto & Banks in 1832
President Jackson in 1833
President Jackson in 1834
President Jackson in 1835
President Jackson in 1836
Andrew Jackson 1837-45
Andrew Jackson Summary & Evaluation
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