On 3 January 1792 Thomas Jefferson nominated
William Short to be Minister Resident to The Hague,
Thomas Pinckney as Minister Plenipotentiary to London,
and Gouverneur Morris the Minister Plenipotentiary to France.
President Washington made the appointments,
and the US Senate confirmed Morris on January 12,
then Short and Pinckney on the 16th.
The United States Congress adjourned on March 3.
On 18 March 1792 Secretary of State Jefferson completed
his comprehensive “Report on Negotiation with Spain.”
Here is the entire text:
The appointment of Mr. Carmichael and Mr. Short as
Commissioners to negotiate with the court of Spain a treaty
or convention relative to the navigation of the Mississippi,
and which perhaps may be extended to other interests,
rendering it necessary that the subjects to be treated of
should be developed, and the conditions of arrangement
explained, the Secretary of state Reports to the President
of the United States the following Observations on the
subjects of negotiation between the U.S. of America
and the court of Spain, to be communicated by way of
instruction to the Commissioners of the U.S. appointed
as before-mentioned to manage that negotiation.
These subjects are
I. Boundary.
II. The Navigation of the Mississippi.
III. Commerce.
I. As to Boundary, that between Georgia and Florida,
is the only one which will need any explanation.
Spain sets up a claim to possessions within the
state of Georgia, founded on her having rescued them
by force from the British, during the late war.
The following view of that subject seems to admit no reply.
The several states, now composing the U.S. of America,
were from their first establishment separate and distinct societies
dependent on no other society of men whatever.
They continued at the head of their respective governments
the executive magistrate who presided over the one
they had left, and thereby secured in effect
a constant amity with that nation.
In this stage of their government their several boundaries
were fixed, and particularly the Southern boundary of Georgia,
the only one now in question, was established
at the 31st degree of latitude from the Apalachicola
Westwardly; and the Western boundary,
originally the Pacific ocean, was by the treaty of Paris
reduced to the middle of the Mississippi.
The part which our chief magistrate took in a war waged
against us by the nation among whom he resided, obliged
us to discontinue him and to name one within every state.
In the course of this war we were joined by France
as an ally and by Spain and Holland as associates
having a common enemy.
Each sought that common enemy
wherever they could find him.
France on our invitation landed a large army
within our territories, continued it with us two years,
and aided us in recovering sundry places from the
possession of the enemy, but she did not pretend
to keep possession of the places rescued.
Spain entered into the remote Western part of our territory,
dislodged the common enemy from several posts they held
therein to the annoyance of Spain, and perhaps
thought it necessary to remain in some of them,
as the only means of preventing their return.
We in like manner dislodged them from several posts
in the same Western territory, to wit Vincennes, Cahokia,
Kaskaskia &c., rescued the inhabitants, and retained
constantly afterwards both them and the territory
under our possession and government.
At the conclusion of the war Great Britain on the
30th of November 1782 by treaty acknowledged our
independence and our boundary, to wit, the Mississippi to the West,
and the completion of the 31st degree &c. to the South.
In her treaty with Spain concluded seven weeks afterwards,
to wit, January 20, 1783 she ceded to her the two Floridas,
which had been defined in the Proclamation of 1763
and Minorca: and by the 8th article of the treaty,
Spain agreed to restore without compensation all the
territories conquered by her, and not included in the treaty
either under the head of cessions or restitutions,
that is to say, all except Minorca and the Floridas.
According to this stipulation, Spain was expressly bound
to have delivered up the possessions she had taken
within the limits of Georgia to Great Britain if they were
conquests on Great Britain, who was to deliver them over
to the U.S. or rather she should have delivered them
to the U.S. themselves as standing, quod hoc, in the place of
Great Britain: and she was bound by natural right to deliver
them to the same U.S. on a much stronger ground,
as the real and only proprietors of those places which she
had taken possession of in a moment of danger without
having had any cause of war with the U.S.
to whom they belonged, and without having declared any:
but on the contrary, conducting herself in other respects
as a friend and associate. Vattel. L. 3. 122.
It is an established principle that Conquest gives only
an inchoate right, which does not become perfect till
confirmed by the treaty of peace, and by a renunciation
or abandonment by the former proprietor.
Had Great Britain been that former proprietor, she was so
far from confirming to Spain the right to the territory
of Georgia invaded by Spain that she expressly relinquished
to the U.S. any right that might remain in her,
and afterwards completed that relinquishment by procuring
and consolidating with it the agreement of Spain herself
to restore such territory without compensation.
It is still more palpable that a war existing between
two nations, as Spain and Great Britain, could give to
neither the right to seize and appropriate the territory
of a third, which is even neutral, much less which is
an associate in the war, as the U.S. were with Spain.
See on this subject Grotius L. 3. c. 6. §.26.
Pufendorf. L. 8. c. 6. §.17. 23. Vattel L. 3. §.197. 198.
On the conclusion of the general peace, the U.S. lost no
time in requiring from Spain an evacuation of their territory.
This has been hitherto delayed by means which we need
not explain to that court, but which have been equally
contrary to our right and to our consent.
Should Spain pretend, as has been intimated,
that there was a secret article of treaty between
the U.S. and Great Britain, agreeing if, at the close of the
war the latter should retain the Floridas, that then the
Southern boundary of Georgia should be the completion
of the 32d. degree of North latitude, the Commissioners
may safely deny all knowledge of the fact
and refuse conference on any such postulatum (demand).
Or should they find it necessary to enter into argument
on the subject, they will of course do it hypothetically;
and in that way may justly say on the part of the U.S.
“suppose that the U.S. exhausted by a bloody
and expensive war with Great Britain might have been
willing to have purchased peace by relinquishing,
under a particular contingency a small part of their territory,
it does not follow that the same U.S. recruited and better
organized, must relinquish the same territory
to Spain without striking a blow.
The U.S. too have irrevocably put it out of their power
to do it by a new constitution, which guarantees
every state against the invasion of its territory.
A disastrous war indeed might by necessity supersede
this stipulation, (as necessity is above all law)
and oblige them to abandon a part of a state.
But nothing short of this can justify
or obtain such an abandonment.”
The Southern limits of Georgia depend chiefly on
1. the Charter of Carolina to the Lords proprietors in 1663
extending Southwardly to the river Matheo, now called St. John’s,
supposed in the charter to be in Lat. 31° and so West
in a direct line as far as the South Sea.
See the charter in 4. Memoires de l’Amerique. 554.
2. on the Proclamation of the British king in 1763
establishing the boundary between Georgia and the two
Floridas, to begin on the Mississippi in 31° of latitude North
of the equator and running Eastwardly to the Apalachicola;
thence along the sd. river to the mouth of the Flint,
thence in a direct line to the source of St. Mary’s river,
and down the same to the ocean.
This Proclamation will be found in Postlethwayte,
voce ‘British America.’
3. on the treaties between the U.S. and Great Britain
of November 30, 1782 and September 3, 1783
repeating and confirming these ancient boundaries.
There was an intermediate transaction, to wit,
a Convention concluded at the Pardo in 1739 whereby
it was agreed that Ministers plenipotentiary should
be immediately appointed by Spain and Great Britain
for settling the limits of Florida and Carolina.
The Convention is to be found in the collections of treaties:
but the proceedings of the Plenipotentiaries
are unknown here.
Qu. if it was on that occasion that the Southern boundary
of Carolina was transferred from the latitude of Matheo
or St. John’s river further North to the St. Mary’s?
or was it the Proclamation of 1763
which first removed this boundary?
If the Commissioners can procure in Spain, a copy of
whatever was agreed on in consequence of the Convention
of the Pardo, it is a desirable state-paper here.
To this demonstration of our rights,
may be added the explicit declaration of the court
of Spain that she would accede to them.
This took place in conversations and correspondence
thereon between Mr. Jay, M. P. for the U.S.
at the court of Madrid, the Marquis de la Fayette,
and the count de Florida Blanca.
Monsr. de la Fayette in his letter of February 19, 1783
to the Count de Florida Blanca states the result
of their conversations on limits in these words.
“With respect to limits his Catholic majesty has adopted
those that are determined by the preliminaries of the 30th
of November between the U.S. and the court of London.”
The Count de Florida Blanca in his answer of February 22
to M. de la Fayette, says, “Although it is his Majesty’s
intentions to abide for the present by the limits
established by the treaty of the 30th of November 1782
between the English and the Americans,
the king intends to inform himself particularly
whether it can be in any ways inconvenient or
prejudicial to settle that affair amicably with the U.S.”
And M. de la Fayette in his letter of the same day
to Mr. Jay, wherein he had inserted the preceding, says,
“on receiving the answer of the Count de Florida Blanca
(to wit, his answer beforementioned to M. de la Fayette)
I desired an explanation respecting the addition
that relates to the limits.
I was answered that it was a fixed principle to abide by the
limits established by the treaty between the English and the
Americans: that his remark related only to mere
unimportant details, which he wished to receive from the
Spanish Commandants, which would be amicably regulated,
and would by no means oppose the general principle.
I asked him before the Ambassador of France
M. de Montmorin whether he would give me
his word of honor for it?
He assured me he would,
and that I might engage it to the U.S.”
See the report sent herewith.
The Navigation of the Mississippi.
Our right to navigate that river from its source to where
our Southern boundary strikes it is not questioned.
It is from that point downwards only that the exclusive
navigation is claimed by Spain; that is to say,
where she holds the country on both sides, to wit,
Louisiana on the West and Florida on the East.
Our right to participate in the navigation of that
part of the river also, is to be considered under
1. the Treaty of Paris of 1763.
2. the Revolution treaty of 1782. 3.
3. the law of Nature and Nations.
1. The war of 1755-1763 was carried on jointly by
Great Britain and the 13 colonies, now the U.S. of America,
against France and Spain.
At the peace which was negotiated by our common
magistrate, a right was secured to “the subjects of Great
Britain (the common designation of all those under his
government) to navigate the Mississippi, in its whole
breadth and length from its source to the sea; and expressly
that part which is between the island of New Orleans,
and the right bank of that river; as well as the passage
both in and out of its mouth; and that the vessels
should not be stopped, visited or subjected
to the payment of any duty whatsoever.”
These are the words of the treaty Article VII.
Florida was at the same time ceded by Spain,
and its extent Westwardly was fixed to the lakes
Pontchartrain and Maurepas, and the river Mississippi:
and Spain received soon after from France a cession
of the island of New Orleans and all the country she held
Westward of the Mississippi: subject of course to
our right of navigating between that country
and the island previously granted to us by France.
This right was not parceled out to us in severalty,
that is to say, to each the exclusive navigation of so much
of the river as was adjacent to our several shores,
in which way it would have been useless to all;
but it was placed on that footing, on which alone
it could be worth anything, to wit, as a right to all
to navigate the whole length of the river in common.
The import of the terms, and the reason of the thing prove
it was a right of common in the whole, and
not a several right to each of a particular part.
To which may be added the evidence of the stipulation
itself, that we should navigate between New Orleans and
the Western bank, which being adjacent to none of our
states could be held by us only as a right of common.
Such was the nature of our right to navigate the Mississippi,
as far as established by the treaty of Paris.
2. In the course of the Revolution-war in which
the thirteen colonies, Spain and France were
opposed to Great Britain, Spain took possession
of several posts held by the British in Florida.
It is unnecessary to enquire whether the possession of
half a dozen posts scattered through a country of
seven or eight hundred miles extent, could be considered
as the possession and conquest of that country.
If it was, it gave still but an inchoate right,
as was before explained, which could not be perfected
but by the relinquishment of the former
possessor at the close of the war.
But certainly it could not be considered as a conquest
of the river, even against Great Britain since the possession
of the shores, to wit of the island of New Orleans
on the one side, and Louisiana on the other, having
undergone no change, the right in the water would remain
the same, if considered only in its relation to them:
and if considered as a distinct right, independent
of the shores, then no naval victories obtained by Spain
over Great Britain in the course of the war,
gave her the color of conquest over any water
which the British fleet could enter.
Still less can she be considered as having conquered
the river as against the U.S. with whom she was not at war.
We had a common right of navigation in the part
of the river between Florida, the island of New Orleans
and the Western bank, and nothing which passed
between Spain and Great Britain, either during the war,
or its conclusion, could lessen that right.
Accordingly at the treaty of November 1782 Great Britain
confirmed the rights of the U.S. to the navigation of the
river, from its source to its mouth, and in January 1783
completed the right of Spain to the territory of Florida,
by an absolute relinquishment of all her rights in it.
This relinquishment could not include the navigation held
by the U.S. in their own right, because this right existed
in themselves only and was not in Great Britain.
If it added anything to the rights of Spain respecting
the river between the Eastern and Western banks,
it could only be that portion of right which Great Britain
had retained to herself in the treaty with the U.S.
held seven weeks before, to wit,
a right of using it in common with the U.S.
So that as by the treaty of 1763 the U.S. had obtained
a common right of navigating the whole river from
its source to its mouth; so by the treaty of 1782
that common right was confirmed to them
by the only power who could pretend claims
against them founded on the state of war.
Nor has that common right been transferred
to Spain by either conquest or cession.
But our right is built on ground still broader,
and more unquestionable, to wit,
3. on the law of Nature and Nations.
If we appeal to this, as we feel it written in the heart
of man, what sentiment is written in deeper characters,
than that the Ocean is free to all men,
and the Rivers to all their inhabitants?
Is there a man, savage or civilized, unbiassed by habit,
who does not feel and attest this truth?
Accordingly, in all tracts of country united under the
same political society, we find this natural right
universally acknowledged and protected by laying
the navigable rivers open to all their inhabitants.
When their rivers enter the limits of another society,
if the right of the upper inhabitants to descend the stream
is in any case obstructed, it is an act of force
by a stronger society against a weaker,
condemned by the judgment of mankind.
The late case of Antwerp and the Scheld was a striking
proof of a general union of sentiment on this point:
as it is believed that Amsterdam had
scarcely an advocate out of Holland.
And even there its pretensions were advocated
on the ground of treaties and not of natural right.
The Commissioners would do well to examine
thoroughly what was written on this occasion.
The Commissioners will be able perhaps
to find either in the practice or the pretensions
of Spain as to the Douro, Tagus and Guadiana,
some acknowledgements of this principle
on the part of that nation.
This sentiment of right in favor of the upper inhabitants
must become stronger in the proportion which
their extent of country bears to the lower.
The U.S. hold 600,000 square miles of habitable territory
on the Mississippi and its branches; and this river and its
branches affords many thousands of miles of navigable
waters, penetrating this territory in all its parts.
The inhabitable grounds of Spain below our boundary,
and bordering on the river, which alone can pretend
any fear of being incommoded by our use of the river,
are not the thousandth part of that extent.
This vast portion of the territory of the U.S.
has no other outlet for its productions, and
these productions are of the bulkiest kind.
And in truth their passage down the river, may not only be
innocent as to the Spanish subjects on the river, but cannot
fail to enrich them far beyond their present condition.
The real interests then of all the inhabitants,
upper and lower, concur in fact with their rights.
If we appeal to the law of nature and nations,
as expressed by writers on the subject, it is agreed
by them that, were the river where it passes
between Florida and Louisiana, the exclusive right
of Spain, still an innocent passage along it is
a natural right in those inhabiting its borders above.
It would indeed be what those writers call an
imperfect right, because the modification of its exercise
depends in considerable degree on the convenience
of the nation through which they are to pass.
But it is still a right as real as any other right
however well defined: and were it to be refused,
or to be so shackled by regulations not necessary
for the peace or safety of its inhabitants, as to render
its use impracticable to us, it would then be an injury,
of which we should be entitled to demand redress.
The right of the upper inhabitants to use this navigation
is the counterpart to that of those possessing
the shores below, and founded in the same natural relations
with the soil and water, and the line at which their rights
meet is to be advanced or withdrawn,
so as to equalize the inconveniencies resulting
to each party from the exercise of the right by the other.
This estimate is to be fairly made with a mutual disposition
to make equal sacrifices, and the numbers on each side
are to have their due weight in the estimate.
Spain holds so very small a tract of habitable land
on either side below our boundary, that it may
in fact be considered as a strait of the sea.
For though it is 80 leagues from our boundary
to the mouth of the river, yet it is only here and there,
in spots and slips, that the land rises above the level
of the water in times of inundation.
There are then and ever must be so few inhabitants
on her part of the river, that the freest use of its navigation
may be admitted to us without their annoyance.
For authorities on this subject see
Grotius ch. 12. c. 2. §.11. 12. 13. c. 3. §.7. 9. 12.
Pufendorf. L. 3. c. 3. §.3. 4. 5. 6.
Wolff’s inst. §.310. 311. 312.
Vattel L. 1. §.292. L. 2. §.123. to 139.
It is essential to the interests of both parties that
the navigation of the river be free to both,
on the footing on which it was defined by
the treaty of Paris, viz. through its whole breadth.
The channel of the Mississippi is remarkably winding,
crossing and recrossing perpetually from one side
to the other of the general bed of the river.
Within the elbows thus made by the channel,
there is generally an eddy setting upwards,
and it is by taking advantage of these eddies
and constantly crossing from one to another of them,
that boats are enabled to ascend the river.
Without this right, the whole river would be
impracticable both to the Americans and the Spaniards.
It is a principle that the right to a thing gives a right
to the means without which it could not be used:
that is to say, that the means follow their end.
Thus a right to navigate a river draws to it a right
to moor vessels to its shores, to land on them
in cases of distress, or for other necessary purposes &c.
This principle is founded in natural reason,
is evidenced by the common sense of mankind,
and declared by the writers before quoted.
See Grot. L. 2. c. 2. §.15.
Pufendorf. L. 3. c. 3. §.8.
Vattel L. 2. §.129.
The Roman law, which, like other Municipal laws, placed
the navigation of their rivers on the footing of nature,
as to their own citizens, by declaring them public (“flumina
publica sunt, hoc est, populi Romani.” Inst. 2. T. 1. §.2.)
declared also that the right to the use of the shores
was incident to that of the water. Ib. §.1. 3. 4. 5.
The laws of every country probably do the same.
This must have been so understood between France and
Great Britain at the treaty of Paris, when a right was ceded
to British subjects to navigate the whole river, and expressly
that part between the island of New Orleans
and the Western bank without stipulating a word about
the use of the shores, though both of them belonged then
to France, and were to belong immediately to Spain.
Had not the use of the shores been considered
as incident to that of the water, it would have been
expressly stipulated; since it’s necessity was
too obvious to have escaped either party.
Accordingly all British subjects used the shores habitually
for the purposes necessary to the navigation of the river:
and when a Spanish governor undertook,
at one time to forbid this, and even cut loose
the vessels fastening to the shores, a British frigate went
immediately, moored itself to the shore opposite the town
of New Orleans, and set out guards with orders to fire
on such as might attempt to disturb her moorings.
The Governor acquiesced; the right was constantly
exercised afterwards, and no interruption ever offered.
This incidental right extends even beyond the shores
when circumstances render it necessary to the exercise
of the principal right, as in the case of a vessel damaged,
where the mere shore would not be a safe deposit
for her cargo till she could be repaired;
she may remove it into safe ground off the river.
The Roman law shall be quoted here too, because it gives
a good idea of the extent and the limitations of this right.
Inst. L. 2. T. 1. §.4. “riparum quoque usus publicus est,
ut volunt jura gentium, sicut et ipsius fluminis usus publicus
est. Itaque et navigium ad ripas appellere, et funes de
arboribus ibi natis religare, et navis onera in his locis
reponere, liberum cuique est: sicuti nec per flumen ipsum
navigare quisquam prohibetur.”
And again §.5. “litorum quoque usus publicus,
sive juris gentium, est, ut et ipsius maris:
et ob id data est facultas volentibus, casas ibi sibi
componere, in quas se recipere possint &c.”
Again §.1. “Nemo igitur ad litora maris accedere prohibetur:
veluti deambulare, aut navem appellere, sic tamen ut a
villis, id est domiciliis, monumentisque ibi positis, et ab
aedificiis abstineat, nec iis damnum inferat.”
Among incidental rights are those of having pilots,
buoys, beacons, landmarks, lighthouses, &c.
to guide the navigators.
The establishment of these at joint expense and under joint
regulations may be the subject of a future convention.
In the meantime both should be free to have their own
and refuse those of the other both as to use and expense.
Very peculiar circumstances attending the river Mississippi
require that the incidental right of accommodation on the shore,
which needs only occasional exercise on other rivers,
should be habitual and constant on this.
Sea vessels cannot navigate that river,
nor the river vessels go to sea.
The navigation would be useless then, without an entrepot
where these vessels might safely deposit their own cargoes,
and take those left by the others, and where
warehouses and keepers might be constantly
established for the safeguard of the cargoes.
It is admitted indeed that the incidental right thus
extended into the territory of the bordering inhabitants,
is liable to stricter modifications, in proportion
as it interferes with their territorial right.
But the inconvenience of both parties are still
to have their weight, and reason and moderation
on both sides are to draw the line between them.
As to this, we count much on the liberality of Spain,
on her concurrence in opinion with us that it is
for the interest of both parties to remove completely
this germ of discord from between us, and draw our
friendship as close as circumstances proclaim that
it should be, and on the considerations which make
it palpable that a convenient spot placed under our exclusive
occupation, and exempted from the jurisdiction and police
of their government, is far more likely to preserve peace,
than a mere freeport, where eternal altercations
would keep us in eternal ill humor with each other.
The policy of this measure, and indeed of a much
larger concession, having been formerly sketched
in a paper of July 12, 1790 sent to the Commissioners
severally, they are now referred to that.
If this be agreed to, the manner of fixing on that
extra-territorial spot, becomes highly interesting.
The most desirable to us would be a permission to send
Commissioners to choose such spot, below the town
of New Orleans, as they should find most convenient.
If this be refused, it would be better now to fix on the spot.
Our information is that the whole country below the town
and for 60 miles above it on the Western shore is low,
marshy, and subject to such deep inundation,
for many miles from the river, that if capable of being
reclaimed at all by banking, it would still never afford
an entrepot sufficiently safe: that on the Eastern side,
the only lands below the town, not subject to inundation,
are at the Detour aux Anglois, or English turn,
the highest part of which is that whereon
the fort Ste. Marie formerly stood.
Even this is said to have been raised by art,
and to be very little above the level of the inundations.
This spot then is what we would fix on,
if obliged now to decide with from one to as many
square miles of the circumjacent lands as can be obtained,
and comprehending expressly the shores above
and below the site of the fort as far as possible.
But as to the spot itself, the limits, and even whether
it shall be extra-territorial or only a freeport, and what
regulations it shall be laid under, the convenience of that
government is entitled to so much respect and attention,
on our part that the arrangement must be left to the
management of the Commissioners, who will doubtless
use their best efforts to obtain all they can for us.
The worst footing on which the determination of the
ground could be placed would be a reference to
joint Commissioners: because their disagreement,
a very probable, nay a certain event, would undo the
whole convention and leave us exactly where we now are.
Unless indeed they will engage to us in case of such
disagreement the highest grounds at the
Detour aux Anglois, of convenient extent,
including the landings and harbor thereto adjacent.
This would ensure us that ground, unless better could be
found, and mutually preferred; and close the delay of right
under which we have so long labored for peace sake.
It will probably be urged, because it was urged
on the former occasion, that if Spain grants to us
the right of navigating the Mississippi, other nations
will become entitled to it by virtue of treaties
giving them the rights of the most favored nation.
Two answers may be given to this.
1. When those treaties were made, no nations could be
under contemplation but those then existing, or those
at most who might exist under similar circumstances.
America did not then exist as a nation:
and the circumstances of her position and commerce
are so totally dissimilar to everything then known,
that the treaties of that day
were not adapted to any such being.
They would better fit even China than America;
because as a manufacturing nation
China resembles Europe more.
When we solicited France to admit our whale oils
into her ports, though she had excluded all foreign
whale oils, her minister made the objection now under
consideration, and the foregoing answer was given.
It was found to be solid, and the whale oils of the U.S.
are in consequence admitted, though those of Portugal and
the Hanse towns and of all other nations are excluded.
Again, when France and England were negotiating their late
treaty of commerce, the great dissimilitude of our
commerce, (which furnishes raw materials to employ the
industry of others in exchange for articles whereon industry
has been exhausted) from the commerce of the European
nations (which furnishes things ready wrought only) was
suggested to the attention of both negotiators, and that
they should keep their nations free to make particular
arrangements with ours, by communicating to each other
only the rights of the most favored European nation.
Each was separately sensible of the importance
of the distinction: and as soon as it was proposed
by the one, it was acceded to by the other,
and the word European was inserted in their treaty.
It may fairly be considered then as the rational and received
interpretation of the diplomatic term ‘”gentis amicissimae”
that it has not in view a nation, unknown in many cases at
the time of using the term, and so dissimilar in all cases, as
to furnish no ground of just reclamation to any other nation.
2. But the decisive answer is that Spain
does not grant us the navigation of the river.
We have an inherent right to it:
and she may repel the demand of any other nation
by candidly stating her act to have been,
what in truth it is a recognition only and not a grant.
If Spain apprehends that other nations may claim access
to our ports in the Mississippi under their treaties with us,
giving them a right to come and trade in all our ports,
though we would not choose to insert an express stipulation
against them; yet we shall think ourselves justified
to acquiesce in fact under any regulations, Spain may
from time to time establish against their admission.
Should Spain renew another objection which she relied
much on before, that the English at the revolution treaty
could not cede to us what Spain had taken from them
by conquest, and what of course they did not possess
themselves; the preceding Observations
furnish sufficient matter for refutation.
To conclude the subjects of boundary and navigation,
each of the following conditions is to be considered
by the Commissioners as a sine quâ non.
1. That our Southern boundary remains established at
the completion of 31 degrees of latitude on the Mississippi
and so on to the Ocean as has been before described,
and our Western one along the Middle of the channel
of the Mississippi, however that channel may vary,
as it is constantly varying, and that Spain cease to occupy
or to exercise jurisdiction in any part Northward
or Eastward of these boundaries.
2. That our right be acknowledged of navigating the
Mississippi, “in its whole breadth and length, from its source
to the sea,” as established by the treaty of 1763.
3. That neither “vessels,” cargoes, or the persons
on board “be stopped, visited or subjected
to the payment of any duty whatsoever.”
Or if a visit must be permitted, that it be under such
restrictions as to produce the least possible inconvenience.
But it should be altogether avoided if possible
as the parent of perpetual broils.
4. That such conveniences be allowed us ashore,
as may render our right of navigation practicable,
and under such regulations as may bonâ fide respect the
preservation of peace and order alone, and may not have in
object to embarrass our navigation, or raise a revenue on it.
While the substance of this article is made a sine quâ non,
the modifications of it are left altogether to the discretion
and management of the Commissioners.
We might add, as a 5th sine quâ non, that no phrase
should be admitted in the treaty, which would
express or imply that we take the navigation
of the Mississippi as a grant from Spain.
But however disagreeable it would be to subscribe
to such a sentiment, yet were the conclusion of a treaty
to hang on that single objection, it would be expedient
to wave it and to meet at a future day the consequences
of any resumption they may pretend to make,
rather than at present those of a separation
without coming to any agreement.
We know not whether Spain has it in idea to ask
a compensation for the ascertainment of our right.
1. In the first place, she cannot in reason ask
a compensation for yielding what we have a right to,
that is to say, the navigation of the river and
the conveniences incident to it of natural right.
2. In the second place we have a claim on Spain
for indemnification for nine years exclusion from that
navigation and a reimbursement of the heavy duties
(not less for the most part than 15 percent on
extravagant valuations) levied on the commodities
she has permitted to pass to New Orleans.
The relinquishment of this will be no unworthy equivalent
for any accommodations she may indulge us with
beyond the line of our strict right:
and this claim is to be brought into view
in proper time and manner merely to be
abandoned in consideration of such accommodations.
We have nothing else to give in exchange.
For as to territory, we have neither the right
nor the disposition to alienate an inch of what
belongs to any member of our union.
Such a proposition therefore is totally inadmissible,
and not to be treated of for a moment.
III. On the former conferences on the navigation
of the Mississippi, Spain chose to blend with it the subject
of Commerce, and accordingly specific propositions
thereon passed between the negotiators.
Her object then was to obtain our renunciation of the
navigation and to hold out commercial arrangements,
perhaps as a lure to us; perhaps however
she might then and may now really set
a value on commercial arrangements with us,
and may receive them as a consideration for
accommodating us in the navigation or may wish for them
to have the appearance of receiving a consideration.
Commercial arrangements, if acceptable in themselves,
will not be the less so, if coupled with those
relating to navigation and boundary.
We have only to take care that
they be acceptable in themselves.
There are two principles which may be proposed
as the basis of a commercial treaty.
1. that of exchanging the privileges of native citizens.
Or 2. those of the most favored nation.
1. With the nations holding important possessions
in America we are ready to exchange the rights
of native citizens; provided they be extended
through the whole possessions of both parties.
But the propositions of Spain, made on the former occasion,
(a copy of which accompanies this) were that we should give
their merchants, vessels, and productions the privilege
of native merchants, vessels and productions
through the whole of our possessions; and they give
the same to ours, only in Spain and the Canaries.
This is inadmissible because unequal:
and as we believe that Spain is not ripe for an equal
exchange on this basis, we avoid proposing it.
2. Though treaties, which merely exchange the rights of the
most favored nations, are not without all inconvenience;
yet they have their conveniences also.
It is an important one, that they leave each party free
to make what internal regulations they please
and to give what preferences they find expedient
to native merchants, vessels and productions.
And as we already have treaties on this basis with France,
Holland, Sweden and Prussia, the two former of which
are perpetual, it will be but small additional
embarrassment to extend it to Spain.
On the contrary we are sensible it is right to place
that nation on the most favored footing, whether
we have a treaty with them or not: and it can do us
no harm to secure by treaty a reciprocation of the right.
Of the four treaties beforementioned, either the French
or the Prussian might be taken as a model.
But it would be useless to propose the Prussian
because we have already supposed that Spain
would never consent to those articles which give
to each party access to all the dominions of the other:
and without this equivalent we would not agree to tie
our own hands so materially in war as would be done
by the 23d article, which renounces the right of
fitting out privateers or of capturing merchant vessels.
The French treaty therefore is proposed as the model.
In this however the following changes are to be made.
We should be admitted to all the dominions of Spain,
to which any other foreign nation is or may be admitted.
Art. 5. being an exemption from a particular duty in France,
will of course be omitted as inapplicable to Spain.
Art. 8. to be omitted as unnecessary with Morocco
and inefficacious and little honorable
with any of the Barbary powers.
But it may furnish occasion to sound Spain on the project of
a Convention of the powers at war with the Barbary states,
to keep up by rotation a constant cruise of a given force
on their coasts till they shall be compelled to renounce
forever and against all nations their predatory practices.
Perhaps the infidelities of the Algerines to their treaty
of peace with Spain, though the latter does not choose
to break openly, may induce her to subsidize us
to cruise against them with a given force.
Art. 9. and 10. concerning fisheries
to be omitted as inapplicable.
Art. 11. The first paragraph of this article
respecting the Droit d’Aubaine to be omitted:
that law being supposed peculiar to France.
Art. 17. Giving asylum in the ports of either to the armed
vessels of the other with the prizes taken from the enemies
of that other must be qualified as it is in the 19th art. of the
Prussian treaty; as the stipulation in the latter part of the
article “that no shelter or refuge shall be given in the ports
of the one, to such as shall have made prize on the subjects
of the other of the parties” would forbid us in case of a war
between France and Spain to give shelter in our ports to
prizes made by the latter on the former, while the first part
of the article would oblige us to shelter those made by the
former on the latter; a very dangerous covenant and
which ought never to be repeated in any other instance.
Art. 29. Consuls should be received at all the ports
at which the vessels of either party may be received.
Art. 30. concerning Freeports in Europe and America.
Freeports in the Spanish possessions in America and
particularly at the Havana, San Domingo
in the island of that name, and St. John of Porto Rico,
are more to be desired than expected.
It can therefore only be recommended to the best
endeavors of the Commissioners to obtain them.
It will be something to obtain for our vessels, flour &ca.
admission to those ports, during their pleasure.
In like manner, if they could be prevailed on to reestablish
our right of cutting logwood in the bay of Campeche
on the footing on which it stood before the treaty of 1763,
it would be desirable and not endanger to us any contest
with the English, who by the revolution treaty are
restrained to the South Eastern parts of Yucatan.
Art. 31. The act of ratification on our part may require
a twelve-month from the date of the treaty, as the Senate
meets regularly but once a year, and to return it to Madrid
for exchange may require four months more.
It would be better indeed if Spain would send her ratification
to be exchanged by her representative here.
The treaty must not exceed 12 or 15 years duration,
except the clauses relating to boundary and the navigation
of the Mississippi, which must be perpetual and final.
Indeed these two subjects had better
be in a separate instrument.
There might have been mentioned a Third species of
arrangement, that of making special agreements, on every
special subject of commerce and of settling a tariff of duty
to be paid on each side on every particular article.
But this would require in our Commissioners a very minute
knowledge of our commerce; as it is impossible to foresee
every proposition of this kind, which might be brought
into discussion and to prepare them for it
by information and instruction from hence.
Our commerce too is as yet rather in a course of
experiment, and the channels in which it will ultimately flow
are not sufficiently known to enable us to provide for it by
special agreement: nor have the exigencies of our new
government as yet so far developed themselves,
as that we can tell to what degree we may or must have
recourse to Commerce for the purposes of revenue.
No common consideration therefore ought to induce us,
as yet to arrangements of this kind.
Perhaps nothing should do it with any nation
short of the privileges of natives in
all their possessions, foreign and domestic.
It were to be wished indeed that some positively favorable
stipulations respecting our grain, flour, and fish could be
obtained, even on our giving reciprocal advantages to some
other commodities of Spain, say her wines and brandies.
But 1. if we quit the ground of the most favored nation,
as to certain articles for our convenience, Spain may insist
on doing the same for other articles for her convenience;
and thus our Commissioners will get themselves
on the ground of a treaty of detail,
for which they will not be prepared.
2. if we grant favor to the wines and brandies of Spain,
then Portugal and France will demand the same:
and in order to create an equivalent,
Portugal may lay a duty on our fish and grain,
and France a prohibition on our whale oils,
the removal of which will be proposed as an equivalent.
Thus much however as to grain and flour
may be attempted.
There has not long since been a considerable duty
laid on them in Spain.
This was while a treaty on the subject of commerce
was pending between us and Spain,
as that court considers the matter.
It is not generally thought right to change the state
of things, pending a treaty concerning them.
On this consideration and on the motive of cultivating
our friendship, perhaps the Commissioners may induce
them to restore this commodity to the footing
on which it was on opening the conferences
with Mr. Gardoqui on the 26th day of July 1785.
If Spain says, “do the same by your tonnage on our
vessels,” the answer may be that our foreign tonnage
affects Spain very little and other nations very much:
whereas the duty on flour in Spain affects us very much
and other nations very little.
Consequently there would be no equality in reciprocal
relinquishment, as there had been none in the reciprocal
innovation: and Spain by insisting on this would in fact only
be aiding the interests of her rival nations, to whom
we should be forced to extend the same indulgence.
At the time of opening the conferences too
we had as yet not erected any system,
our government itself being not yet erected.
Innovation then was unavoidable on our part,
if it be innovation to establish a system.
We did it on fair and general ground:
on ground favorable to Spain.
But they had a system, and therefore
innovation was avoidable on their part.”
It is known to the Commissioners that we found it
expedient to ask the interposition of France
lately to bring on this settlement of our boundary
and the navigation of the Mississippi.
How far that interposition has contributed
to produce it is uncertain.
But we have reason to believe that her further interference
would not produce an agreeable effect on Spain.
The Commissioners therefore are to avoid all further
communications on the subject with the
Ministers of France giving to them such explanations
as may preserve their good dispositions.
But if ultimately they shall find themselves unable to bring
Spain to agreement on the subjects of navigation and
boundary, the interposition of France, as a mutual friend,
and the guarantee of our limits, is then to be asked
in whatever light Spain may choose to consider it.
Should the Negotiations on the subject of navigation
and boundary assume at any time an unhopeful aspect,
it may be proper that Spain should be given to understand
that if they are discontinued without coming
to any agreement, the government of the U.S.
cannot be responsible for the longer
forbearance of their Western inhabitants.
At the same time the abandonment of the negotiation
should be so managed as that, without engaging us
to a further suspension of the exercise of our rights,
we may not be committed to resume them in the instant.
The present turbid situation of Europe cannot leave us
long without a safe occasion of resuming our territory and
navigation, and of carving for ourselves those conveniences
on the shores which may facilitate and
protect the latter effectually and permanently.
We had a right to expect that, pending a negotiation,
all things would have remained in status quo,
and that Spain would not have proceeded
to possess herself of other parts of our territory.
But she has lately taken and fortified a new post
at the Walnut hills above the mouth of the Yazoo river
and far above the 31st degree.
This garrison ought to have been instantly dislodged,
but for our wish to be in friendship with Spain
and our confidence in her assurances “to abide by the limits
established in our treaty with England.”
Complaints of this unfriendly and uncandid procedure,
may be brought forward or not,
as the Commissioners shall see expedient.1
On 23 May 1792 Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson,
leader of the Republican Party, wrote this letter to
President George Washington, leader of the Federalist Party,
urging him not to retire but stay on to be re-elected for a second term:
I have determined to make the subject of a letter
what for some time past has been a subject of
inquietude to my mind without having found a good
occasion of disburthening itself to you in conversation,
during the busy scenes which occupied you here.
Perhaps too you may be able, in your present
situation, or on the road, to give it more time
and reflection than you could do here at any moment.
When you first mentioned to me your purpose of retiring
from the government, though I felt all the magnitude
of the event, I was in a considerable degree silent.
I knew that to such a mind as yours persuasion was idle
and impertinent: that before forming your decision,
you had weighed all the reasons for and against the
measure, had made up your mind on full view of them,
and that there could be little hope of changing the result.
Pursuing my reflections too I knew we were some day to
try to walk alone, and if the essay should be made while
you should be alive and looking on, we should derive
confidence from that circumstance, and resource if it failed.
The public mind too was then calm and confident, and
therefore in a favorable state for making the experiment.
Had no change of circumstances supervened, I should not
with any hope of success have now ventured
to propose to you a change of purpose.
But the public mind is no longer so confident and serene;
and that from causes in which you are
no ways personally mixed.
Though these causes have been hackneyed in the public
papers in detail, it may not be amiss in order to calculate
the effect they are capable of producing to take a view
of them in the mass giving to each the form real or
imaginary under which they have been presented.
It has been urged then that a public debt, greater than
we can possibly pay before other causes of adding new
debt to it will occur, has been artificially created by adding
together the whole amount of the debtor and creditor
sides of accounts instead of taking only their balances
which could have been paid off in a short time:
That this accumulation of debt has taken forever out of our
power those easy sources of revenue, which applied to
the ordinary necessities and exigencies of government,
would have answered them habitually and covered us
from habitual murmurings against taxes and tax-gatherers,
reserving extraordinary calls for those extraordinary
occasions which would animate the people to meet them:
That though the calls for money have been no greater
than we must generally expect for the same or equivalent
exigencies, yet we are already obliged to strain the impost
till it produces clamor and will produce evasion and war
on our own citizens to collect it: and even to resort to
an Excise law of odious character with the people,
partial in its operation, unproductive unless enforced
by arbitrary and vexatious means, and committing
the authority of the government in parts where
resistance is most probable and coercion least practicable.
They cite propositions in Congress and suspect other
projects on foot still to increase the mass of debt.
They say that by borrowing at ⅔ of the interest,
we might have paid off the principal in ⅔ of the time:
but that from this we are precluded by its being made
irredeemable but in small portions and long terms:
That this irredeemable quality was given it for the avowed
purpose of inviting its transfer to foreign countries.
They predict that this transfer of the principal,
when completed, will occasion an exportation of 3 millions
of dollars annually for the interest, a drain of coin,
of which as there has been no example, no calculation
can be made of its consequences:
That the banishment of our coin will be completed
by the creation of 10 millions of paper money,
in the form of bank bills, now issuing into circulation.
They think the 10 or 12 percent annual profit paid
to the lenders of this paper medium are taken out
of the pockets of the people who would have had
without interest the coin it is banishing:
That all the capital employed in paper speculation
is barren and useless, producing like that on a
gaming table no accession to itself and is withdrawn
from commerce and agriculture where it would
have produced addition to the common mass:
That it nourishes in our citizens habits of vice
and idleness instead of industry and morality:
That it has furnished effectual means of corrupting
such a portion of the legislature, as turns the balance
between the honest voters whichever way it is directed:
That this corrupt squadron, deciding the voice of the
legislature, have manifested their disposition
to get rid of the limitations imposed by the Constitution
on the general legislature, limitations, on the faith
of which the states acceded to that instrument:
That the ultimate object of all this is to prepare
the way for a change, from the present republican
form of government to that of a monarchy,
of which the English constitution is to be the model.
That this was contemplated in the Convention is no secret
because its partisans have made none of it.
To effect it then was impracticable; but they are
still eager after their object and are predisposing
everything for its ultimate attainment.
So many of them have got into the legislature that,
aided by the corrupt squadron of paper dealers, who
are at their devotion; they make a majority in both houses.
The republican party, who wish to preserve the
government in its present form are fewer in number.
They are fewer even when joined by the two, three, or half
dozen anti-federalists who, though they dare not avow it,
are still opposed to any general government: but being less
so to a republican than a monarchical one, they naturally
join those whom they think pursuing the lesser evil.
Of all the mischiefs objected to the system of measures
beforementioned, none is so afflicting and fatal to every
honest hope, as the corruption of the legislature.
As it was the earliest of these measures, it became the
instrument for producing the rest, and will be the instrument
for producing in future a king, lords and commons, or
whatever else those who direct it may choose.
Withdrawn such a distance from the eye of their
constituents, and these so dispersed as to be
inaccessible to public information and particularly
to that of the conduct of their own representatives,
they will form the most corrupt government on earth,
if the means of their corruption be not prevented.
The only hope of safety hangs now on the numerous
representation which is to come forward the ensuing year.
Some of the new members will probably be either
in principle or interest with the present majority.
But it is expected that the great mass will form
an accession to the Republican Party.
They will not be able to undo all which the two
preceding legislatures and especially the first have done.
Public faith and right will oppose this.
But some parts of the system may be rightfully reformed;
a liberation from the rest unremittingly pursued as fast
as right will permit, and the door shut in future
against similar commitments of the nation.
Should the next legislature take this course, it will draw
upon them the whole monarchical and paper interest.
But the latter I think will not go all lengths with the former,
because creditors will never of their own accord
fly off entirely from their debtors.
Therefore this is the alternative least likely
to produce convulsion.
But should the majority of the new members be still in the
same principles with the present and show that we have
nothing to expect but a continuance of the same practices,
it is not easy to conjecture what would be the result, nor
what means would be resorted to for correction of the evil.
True wisdom would direct that
they should be temperate and peaceable.
But the division of sentiment and interest happens
unfortunately to be so geographical, that no mortal
can say that what is most wise and temperate
would prevail against what is more easy and obvious?
I can scarcely contemplate a more incalculable evil
than the breaking of the union into two or more parts.
Yet when we review the mass which opposed the original
coalescence, when we consider that it lay chiefly in the
Southern quarter, that the legislature have availed
themselves of no occasion of allaying it, but on the contrary
whenever Northern and Southern prejudices have come
into conflict, the latter have been sacrificed and the former
soothed; that the owers of the debt are in the Southern
and the holders of it in the Northern division;
that the Antifederal champions are now strengthened
in argument by the fulfilment of their predictions;
that this has been brought about by the Monarchical
federalists themselves who, having been for the new
government merely as a stepping stone to monarchy,
have themselves adopted the very constructions of the
Constitution of which, when advocating its acceptance
before the tribunal of the people, they declared it
insusceptible; that the republican Federalists, who espoused
the same government for its intrinsic merits, are disarmed
of their weapons, that which they denied as prophecy being
now become true history: who can be sure that these things
may not proselyte the small number which was wanting
to place the majority on the other side?
And this is the event at which I tremble, and to prevent
which I consider your continuance at the head
of affairs as of the last importance.
The confidence of the whole union is centered in you.
Your being at the helm will be more than an answer
to every argument which can be used to alarm and
lead the people in any quarter into violence or secession.
North and South will hang together, if they have you
to hang on: and if the first corrective of a numerous
representation should fail in its effect, your presence
will give time for trying others not inconsistent
with the union and peace of the states.
I am perfectly aware of the oppression under which
your present office lays your mind and of the ardor
with which you pant for retirement to domestic life.
But there is sometimes an eminence of character on which
society have such peculiar claims as to control the
predilection of the individual for a particular walk of
happiness, and restrain him to that alone arising from
the present and future benedictions of mankind.
This seems to be your condition, and the law imposed on
you by providence in forming your character and fashioning
the events on which it was to operate: and it is to motives
like these, and not to personal anxieties of mine or others
who have no right to call on you for sacrifices, that
I appeal from your former determination and urge a
revisal of it on the ground of change in the aspect of things.
Should an honest majority result from the new and enlarged
representation; should those acquiesce whose principles
or interests they may control, your wishes for retirement
would be gratified with less danger, as soon as that
shall be manifest without awaiting the completion
of the second period of four years.
One or two sessions will determine the crisis:
and I cannot but hope that you can resolve
to add one or two more to the many years
you have already sacrificed to the good of mankind.
The fear of suspicion that any selfish motive of
continuance in office may enter into this solicitation on
my part obliges me to declare that no such motive exists.
It is a thing of mere indifference to the public whether
I retain or relinquish my purpose of closing my tour
with the first periodical renovation of the government.
I know my own measure too well to suppose
that my services contribute anything to the
public confidence or the public utility.
Multitudes can fill the office in which you have been pleased
to place me, as much to their advantage and satisfaction.
I, therefore, have no motive to consult but my own
inclination, which is bent irresistibly on the tranquil
enjoyment of my family, my farm, and my books.
I should repose among them it is true,
in far greater security, if I were to know that
you remained at the watch, and I hope it will be so.
To the inducements urged from a view of our
domestic affairs, I will add a bare mention, of what indeed
need only be mentioned, that weighty motives for
your continuance are to be found in our foreign affairs.
I think it probable that both the Spanish and English
negotiations, if not completed before your purpose
is known, will be suspended from the moment
it is known; and that the latter nation will then
use double diligence in fomenting the Indian war.
With my wishes for the future I shall at the same time
express my gratitude for the past, at least my portion in it;
and beg permission to follow you whether in public
or private life with those sentiments of sincere attachment
& respect with which I am unalterably, Dear Sir,
Your affectionate friend & humble servant.2
On 16 June 1792 Jefferson wrote this letter to the Marquis de Lafayette:
Behold you then, my dear friend, at the head
of a great army, establishing the liberties
of your country against a foreign enemy.
May heaven favor your cause and make you
the channel through which it may pour its favors.
While you are exterminating the monster aristocracy,
and pulling out the teeth and fangs of its associate
monarchy, a contrary tendency is discovered in some here.
A sect has shown itself among us, who declare they
espoused our new Constitution, not as a good and sufficient
thing itself, but only as a step to an English constitution,
the only thing good and sufficient in itself, in their eye.
It is happy for us that these are preachers
without followers, and that our people are firm
and constant in their republican purity.
You will wonder to be told that it is from the Eastward
chiefly that these champions for a king,
lords and commons come.
They get some important associates from New York,
and are puffed off by a tribe of Agioteurs which
have been hatched in a bed of corruption
made up after the model of their beloved England.
Too many of these stock-jobbers and King-jobbers have
come into our legislature, or rather too many of our
legislature have become stock-jobbers and king-jobbers.
However the voice of the people is beginning
to make itself heard, and will probably cleanse
their seats at the ensuing election.
The machinations of our old enemies are such as
to keep us still at bay with our Indian neighbors.
What are you doing for your colonies?
They will be lost if not more effectually succored.
Indeed no future efforts you can make will ever
be able to reduce the blacks.
All that can be done in my opinion will be to compound
with them as has been done formerly in Jamaica.
We have been less zealous in aiding them lest your
government should feel any jealousy on our account.
But in truth we as sincerely wish their restoration
and their connection with you, as you do yourselves.
We are satisfied that neither your justice nor their distresses
will ever again permit their being forced to seek at dear
and distant markets those first necessaries of life which
they may have at cheaper markets placed by nature
at their door and formed by her for their support:
What is become of Mde. de Tessy and Mde. de Tott?
I have not heard of them since they went to Switzerland.
I think they would have done better to have come
and reposed under the Poplars of Virginia.
Pour into their bosoms the warmest effusions
of my friendship and tell them they will be
warm and constant unto death.
Accept of them also for Mde. de la Fayette and
your dear children—but I am forgetting that you are
in the fields of war and they I hope in those of peace.
Adieu my dear friend! God bless you all.3
Thomas Paine published the two parts of his Rights of Man
in London in March 1791 and February 1792.
Jefferson wrote this short letter to Paine on 19 June 1792:
I received with great pleasure the present of your
pamphlets, as well for the thing itself as that it was a
testimony of your recollection.
Would you believe it possible that in this country there
should be high and important characters who need your
lessons in republicanism, and who do not heed them?
It is but too true that we have a sect preaching up
and panting after an English constitution of king,
lords, and commons, and whose heads are itching
for crowns, coronets and mitres.
But our people, my good friend, are firm and unanimous
in their principles of republicanism, and there is
no better proof of it than that they love
what you write and read it with delight.
The printers season every newspaper with extracts
from your last, as they did before from
your first part of the Rights of Man.
They have both served here to separate the wheat
from the chaff and to prove that though the latter
appears on the surface, it is on the surface only.
The bulk below is sound and pure.
Go on then in doing with your pen what in other times
was done with the sword; show that reformation
is more practicable by operating on the mind than
on the body of man, and be assured that it has not
a more sincere votary, nor you a more ardent
well-wisher than, Dear Sir, Your friend & servant.4
During the first season of a re-election of a United States President,
Secretary of State Jefferson on September 9 wrote this long letter to
President Washington about his concerns regarding
the Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton:
I received on the 2nd. inst. the letter of August 23
which you did me the honor to write me;
but the immediate return of our post, contrary to his
custom, prevented my answer by that occasion.
The proceedings of Spain mentioned in your letter
are really of a complexion to excite uneasiness,
and a suspicion that their friendly overtures about
the Mississippi have been merely to lull us while
they should be strengthening their holds on that river.
Mr. Carmichael’s silence has been long my astonishment:
and however it might have justified something very
different from a new appointment, yet the public interest
certainly called for his junction with Mr. Short as it is
impossible but that his knowledge of the ground of
negotiation of persons and characters, must be useful
and even necessary to the success of the mission.
That Spain and Great Britain may understand one another
on our frontiers is very possible; for however opposite
their interests or dispositions may be in the affairs
of Europe, yet while these do not call them into
opposite action, they may concur as against us.
I consider their keeping an agent in the Indian country
as a circumstance which requires serious interference
on our part: and I submit to your decision whether
it does not furnish a proper occasion to us to send
an additional instruction to Messrs. Carmichael and Short
to insist on a mutual and formal stipulation to forbear
employing agents or pensioning any persons within each
other’s limits: and if this be refused, to propose the contrary
stipulation, to wit, that each party may freely keep agents
within the Indian territories of the other, in which case
we might soon sicken them of the license.
I now take the liberty of proceeding to that part of
your letter wherein you notice the internal dissentions
which have taken place within our government,
and their disagreeable effect on its movements.
That such dissentions have taken place is certain, and even
among those who are nearest to you in the administration.
To no one have they given deeper concern than myself; to
no one equal mortification at being myself a part of them.
Though I take to myself no more than my share of the
general observations of your letter, yet I am so desirous
ever that you should know the whole truth, and believe
no more than the truth, that I am glad to seize every
occasion of developing to you whatever I do or think
relative to the government; and shall therefore ask
permission to be more lengthy now than the occasion
particularly calls for, or would otherwise perhaps justify.
When I embarked in the government, it was with a
determination to intermeddle not at all with the legislature,
and as little as possible with my co-departments.
The first and only instance of variance from the former
part of my resolution, I was duped into by the Secretary
of the Treasury and made a tool for forwarding his
schemes, not then sufficiently understood by me;
and of all the errors of my political life,
this has occasioned me the deepest regret.
It has ever been my purpose to explain this to you,
when from being actors on the scene we shall have
become uninterested spectators only.
The second part of my resolution has been religiously
observed with the war department; and as to that
of the Treasury has never been farther swerved from
than by the mere enunciation of my sentiments in
conversation and chiefly among those who,
expressing the same sentiments, drew mine from me.
If it has been supposed that I have ever intrigued among
the members of the legislature to defeat the plans of the
Secretary of the Treasury, it is contrary to all truth.
As I never had the desire to influence the members,
so neither had I any other means than my friendships,
which I valued too highly to risk by usurpations
on their freedom of judgment, and the conscientious
pursuit of their own sense of duty.
That I have utterly in my private conversations
disapproved of the system of the Secretary of
the Treasury, I acknowledge and avow:
and this was not merely a speculative difference.
His system flowed from principles adverse to liberty
and was calculated to undermine and demolish
the republic by creating an influence of his
department over the members of the legislature.
I saw this influence actually produced, and its first fruits
to be the establishment of the great outlines of his project
by the votes of the very persons who, having swallowed
his bait were laying themselves out to profit by his plans:
and that had these persons withdrawn, as those interested
in a question ever should, the vote of the disinterested
majority was clearly the reverse of what they made it.
These were no longer the votes then of the representatives
of the people, but of deserters from the rights and
interests of the people: and it was impossible
to consider their decisions which had nothing in view
but to enrich themselves as the measures of the
fair majority which ought always to be respected.
If what was actually doing begat uneasiness in those who
wished for virtuous government, what was further proposed
was not less threatening to the friends of the Constitution.
For in a Report on the subject of manufactures,
(still to be acted on) it was expressly assumed that
the general government has a right to exercise
all powers which may be for the general welfare,
that is to say, all the legitimate powers of government:
since no government has a legitimate right to do
what is not for the welfare of the governed.
There was indeed a sham-limitation of the universality
of this power to cases where money is to be employed.
But about what is it that money cannot be employed?
Thus the object of these plans taken together is to draw
all the powers of government into the hands of the general
legislature to establish means for corrupting a sufficient
corps in that legislature to divide the honest votes and
preponderate by their own the scale which suited,
and to have that corps under the command of the
Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of
subverting step by step the principles of the
Constitution which he has so often declared to be
a thing of nothing which must be changed.
Such views might have justified something more
than mere expressions of dissent, beyond which,
nevertheless, I never went.
Has abstinence from the department committed to me
been equally observed by him?
To say nothing of other interferences equally known,
in the case of the two nations with which we have
the most intimate connections, France and England,
my system was to give some satisfactory distinctions
to the former of little cost to us in return for the solid
advantages yielded us by them; and to have met
the English with some restrictions which might induce
them to abate their severities against our commerce.
I have always supposed this coincided with your sentiments.
Yet the Secretary of the treasury by his cabals
with members of the legislature and by high-toned
declamation on other occasions, has forced down
his own system which was exactly the reverse.
He undertook of his own authority the conferences
with the ministers of these two nations, and was
on every consultation provided with some report
of a conversation with the one or the other of them,
adapted to his views.
These views thus made to prevail, their execution fell
of course to me; and I can safely appeal to you who
have seen all my letters and proceedings, whether
I have not carried them into execution as sincerely as if
they had been my own, though I ever considered them
as inconsistent with the honor and interest of our country.
That they have been inconsistent with our interest
is but too fatally proved by the stab to our navigation
given by the French.
So that if the question be By whose fault is it
that Col. Hamilton and myself have not drawn together?
The answer will depend on that to two other questions.
Whose principles of administration best justify
by their purity conscientious adherence?
And which of us has notwithstanding stepped farthest
into the control of the department of the other?
To this justification of opinions expressed in the way
of conversation against the views of Col. Hamilton,
I beg leave to add some notice of his late charges
against me in Fenno’s Gazette: for neither the style,
matter, nor venom of the pieces alluded to
can leave a doubt of their author.
Spelling my name and character at full length to the public
while he conceals his own under the signature of
“an American” he charges me
1. with having written letters from Europe to my friends
to oppose the present Constitution while depending.
2. with a desire of not paying the public debt.
3. with setting up a paper to decry
and slander the government.
1. The first charge is most false.
No man in the U.S., I suppose, approved of every tittle
in the constitution: no one I believe approved more of it
than I did: and more of it was certainly disapproved by
my accuser than by me and of its parts most vitally republican.
Of this the few letters I wrote on the subject
(not half a dozen I believe) will be a proof:
and for my own satisfaction and justification I must tax you
with the reading of them when I return to where they are.
You will there see that my objection to the Constitution was
that it wanted a bill of rights securing freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, freedom from standing armies,
trial by jury, and a constant Habeas corpus act.
Col. Hamilton’s was that it wanted
a king and house of lords.
The sense of America has approved my objection
and added the bill of rights, not the king and lords.
I also thought a longer term of service, insusceptible of
renewal, would have made a President more independent.
My country has thought otherwise,
and I have acquiesced implicitly.
He wished the general government should have power
to make laws binding the states in all cases whatsoever.
Our country has thought otherwise: has he acquiesced?
Notwithstanding my wish for a bill of rights, my letters
strongly urged the adoption of the constitution,
by nine states at least to secure the good it contained.
I at first thought that the best method of securing
the bill of rights would be for four states to hold off
till such a bill should be agreed to.
But the moment I saw Mr. Hancock’s proposition to pass the
Constitution as it stood and give perpetual instructions to
the representatives of every state to insist on a bill of rights,
I acknowledged the superiority of his plan
and advocated universal adoption.
2. The second charge is equally untrue.
My whole correspondence while in France, and every word,
letter, and act on the subject since my return, prove that
no man is more ardently intent to see the public debt
soon and sacredly paid off than I am.
This exactly marks the difference between Col. Hamilton’s
views and mine, that I would wish the debt paid tomorrow;
he wishes it never to be paid, but always to be a thing
wherewith to corrupt and manage the legislature.
3. I have never inquired what number of sons, relations and
friends of Senators, representatives, printers or other useful
partisans Col. Hamilton has provided for among the hundred
clerks of his department, the thousand excisemen,
customhouse officers, loan officers &c. &c. &c. appointed
by him, or at his nod, and spread over the Union;
nor could ever have imagined that the man who has the
shuffling of millions backwards and forwards from paper
into money and money into paper from Europe to America,
and America to Europe, the dealing out of Treasury-secrets
among his friends in what time and measure he pleases,
and who never slips an occasion of making friends
with his means, that such a one I say would have
brought forward a charge against me for having
appointed the poet Freneau translating clerk to
my office with a salary of 250 dollars a year.
That fact stands thus.
While the government was at New York I was applied to
on behalf of Freneau to know if there was any place
within my department to which he could be appointed.
I answered there were but four clerkships, all of which
I found full and continued without any change.
When we removed to Philadelphia, Mr. Pintard, the
translating clerk, did not choose to remove with us.
His office then became vacant.
I was again applied to there for Freneau, and had no
hesitation to promise the clerkship for him.
I cannot recollect whether it was at the same time
or afterwards that I was told he had a thought of
setting up a newspaper there.
But whether then or afterwards, I considered it as a
circumstance of some value, as it might enable me to do
what I had long wished to have done, that is,
to have the material parts of the Leyden Gazette brought
under your eye and that of the public in order to possess
yourself and them of a juster view of the affairs of Europe
than could be obtained from any other public source.
This I had ineffectually attempted through the press
of Mr. Fenno while in New York, selecting and translating
passages myself at first, then having it done
by Mr. Pintard the translating clerk.
But they found their way too slowly into Mr. Fenno’s papers.
Mr. Bache essayed it for me in Philadelphia; but his being a
daily paper, did not circulate sufficiently in the other states.
He even tried at my request, the plan of a weekly paper
of recapitulation from his daily paper, in hopes that
that might go into the other states, but in this too we failed.
Freneau, as translating clerk, and the printer of a periodical
paper likely to circulate through the states
(uniting in one person the parts of Pintard and Fenno)
revived my hopes that the thing could at length be affected.
On the establishment of his paper therefore, I furnished
him with the Leyden Gazettes, with an expression of my
wish that he would always translate and publish the material
intelligence they contained; and have continued to furnish
them from time to time, as regularly as I received them.
But as to any other direction or indication of my wish
how his press should be conducted, what sort of
intelligence he should give, what essays encourage,
I can protest in the presence of heaven that I never
did by myself or any other directly or indirectly say
a syllable, nor attempt any kind of influence.
I can further protest in the same awful presence that
I never did by myself or any other directly or indirectly
write, dictate or procure any one sentence or sentiment
to be inserted in his or any other gazette to which
my name was not affixed or that of my office.
I surely need not except here a thing so foreign to the
present subject as a little paragraph about our Algerine
captives which I put once into Fenno’s paper.
Freneau’s proposition to publish a paper, having been about
the time that the writings of Publicola and the discourses
on Davila had a good deal excited the public attention,
I took for granted from Freneau’s character, which had
been marked as that of a good whig, that he would give
free place to pieces written against the aristocratical and
monarchical principles these papers had inculcated.
This having been in my mind, it is likely enough
I may have expressed it in conversation with others;
though I do not recollect that I did.
To Freneau I think I could not, because I had still
seen him but once, and that was at a public table
at breakfast, at Mrs. Elsworth’s,
as I passed through New York the last year.
And I can safely declare that my expectations looked
only to the chastisement of the aristocratical and
monarchical writers and not to any criticisms
on the proceedings of the government.
Col. Hamilton can see no motive for any appointment
but that of making a convenient partisan.
But you Sir, who have received from me recommendations
of a Rittenhouse, Barlow, Paine, will believe that talents and
science are sufficient motives with me in appointments to
which they are fitted: and that Freneau, as a man of genius,
might find a preference in my eye to be a translating clerk,
and make good title moreover to the little aids I could give
him as the editor of a gazette by procuring subscriptions to
his paper, as I did, some before it appeared, and as I have
with pleasure done for the labors of other men of genius.
I hold it to be one of the distinguishing excellencies of
elective over hereditary successions that the talents,
which nature has provided in sufficient proportion,
should be selected by the society for the government
of their affairs, rather than that this should be transmitted
through the loins of knaves and fools passing from
the debauches of the table to those of the bed.
Col. Hamilton, alias “Plain facts,” says that Freneau’s
salary began before he resided in Philadelphia.
I do not know what quibble he may have in reserve
on the word “residence.”
He may mean to include under that idea the removal
of his family; for I believe he removed himself,
before his family did, to Philadelphia.
But no act of mine gave commencement to his salary
before he so far took up his abode in Philadelphia as
to be sufficiently in readiness for the duties of the office.
As to the merits or demerits of his paper,
they certainly concern me not.
He and Fenno are rivals for the public favor.
The one courts them by flattery, the other by censure:
and I believe it will be admitted that the one
has been as servile as the other severe.
But is not the dignity and even decency of government
committed, when one of its principal ministers
enlists himself as an anonymous writer or paragraphist,
for either the one or the other of them?
No government ought to be without censors:
and where the press is free, no one ever will.
If virtuous, it need not fear the fair operation
of attack and defense.
Nature has given to man no other means of
sifting out the truth either in religion, law, or politics.
I think it as honorable to the government neither
to know nor notice it’s sycophants or censors,
as it would be undignified and criminal to pamper
the former and persecute the latter.
So much for the past.
A word now of the future.
When I came into this office, it was with a resolution
to retire from it as soon as I could with decency.
It pretty early appeared to me that the proper moment
would be the first of those epochs at which the
Constitution seems to have contemplated
a periodical change or renewal of the public servants.
In this I was confirmed by your resolution respecting
the same period; from which however I am happy
in hoping you have departed.
I look to that period with the longing of a wave-worn
mariner who has at length the land in view, and shall
count the days and hours which still lie between me and it.
In the meanwhile my main object will be to
wind up the business of my office avoiding
as much as possible all new enterprise.
With the affairs of the legislature, as I never did intermeddle,
so I certainly shall not now begin.
I am more desirous to predispose everything for the repose
to which I am withdrawing, than expose it
to be disturbed by newspaper contests.
If these however cannot be avoided altogether,
yet a regard for your quiet will be a sufficient motive
for deferring it till I become merely a private citizen,
when the propriety or impropriety of what
I may say or do may fall on myself alone.
I may then too avoid the charge of misapplying
that time which now belonging to those who employ me,
should be wholly devoted to their service.
If my own justification or the interests of the republic shall
require it, I reserve to myself the right of then appealing to
my country, subscribing my name to whatever I write, and
using with freedom and truth the facts and names necessary
to place the cause in its just form before that tribunal.
To a thorough disregard of the honors and emoluments
of office, I join as great a value for the esteem of my
countrymen; and conscious of having merited it by an
integrity which cannot be reproached and by an
enthusiastic devotion to their rights and liberty,
I will not suffer my retirement to be clouded by the slanders
of a man whose history from the moment at which history
can stoop to notice him is a tissue of machinations against
the liberty of the country which has not only received and
given him bread, but heaped its honors on his head.
Still however I repeat the hope that it will
not be necessary to make such an appeal.
Though little known to the people of America, I believe that,
as far as I am known, it is not as an enemy to the Republic,
nor an intriguer against it, nor a waster of its revenue,
nor prostitutor of it to the purposes of corruption,
as the American represents me: and I confide that yourself
are satisfied that as to dissensions in the newspapers not a
syllable of them has ever proceeded from me;
and that no cabals or intrigues of mine have produced
those in the legislature; and I hope I may promise,
both to you and myself, that none will receive aliment
from me during the short space I have to remain in office,
which will find ample employment in closing
the present business of the department.
Observing that letters written at Mount-Vernon on the
Monday and arriving at Richmond on the Wednesday reach
me on Saturday, I have now the honor to mention
that the 22d instant will be the last of our post-days
that I shall be here, and consequently that
no letter from you after the 17th will find me here.
Soon after that I shall have the honor of receiving at Mount
Vernon your orders for Philadelphia, and of there also
delivering you the little matter which occurs to me as proper
for the opening of Congress, exclusive of what has been
recommended in former speeches and not yet acted on.5
In 1792 Hamilton had been able to block Jefferson’s plan to persuade
the British
to remove their troops from the Great Lakes area by using commercial means.
Jefferson wrote this “Opinion on Offenses against
the Law of Nations”on December 3:
Complaint has been made by the Representatives of Spain
that certain individuals of Georgia entered the State of
Florida, and without any application to the Government,
seized and carried into Georgia certain persons,
whom they claimed to be their slaves.
This aggression was thought the more of, as there
exists a convention between that Government and
the United States against receiving fugitive slaves.
The minister of France has complained that the master
of an American vessel, while lying within a harbor
of St. Domingo, having enticed some negroes
on board his vessel, under pretext of employment,
brought them off and sold them in Georgia as slaves.
1st. Has the General Government
cognizance of these offences?
2d. If it has, is any law already provided
for trying and punishing them?
1st. The constitution says, “Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States.”
I do not consider this clause as reaching the point.
I suppose its meaning to be that Congress may collect
taxes for the purpose of providing for the General welfare,
in those cases wherein the Constitution empowers
them to act for the General welfare.
To suppose that it was meant to give them a distinct
and substantive power to do any act which might tend
to the General welfare is to render all the enumerations
useless and to make their powers unlimited.
We must seek the power therefore
in some other clause of the Constitution.
It says further that Congress shall have power “to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offences against the law of nations,” these
offenses were not committed on the high seas, and
consequently not within that branch of the clause.
Are they against the law of nations, taken as
it may be in its whole extent, as founded,
1st. in nature 2. usage. 3. convention?
So much may be said in the affirmative, that the Legislators
ought to send the case before the judiciary for discussion;
and the rather when it is considered, that
unless the offenders can be punished under this clause,
there is no other which goes directly to their case,
and consequently our peace with foreign nations
will be constantly at the discretion of individuals.
2d. Have the Legislators sent this question
before the Courts by any law already provided.
The act of 1789, c. 20 §.9, says the district Courts
“shall have cognizance concurrent with the Courts of the
several States or the Circuit Courts of all causes, where an
alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the law of nations,”
but what if there be no alien, whose interest is
such as to support an action for the tort?
which is precisely the case of the aggression on Florida.
If the act in describing the jurisdiction of the Courts,
had given them cognizance of proceedings
by way of indictment or information against offenders
under the law of nations, for the public wrong,
and on the public behalf, as well as to an individual
for the special tort, it would have been the thing desired.
The same act §.13, says, the Supreme Court “shall have
exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings
against ambassadors or other public ministers or their
domestics or domestic servants, as a Court of Law can
have or exercise consistently with the Law of nations.”
Still this is not the case,
no ambassador being concerned here.
I find nothing else in the law applicable to this question,
and therefore presume the case is still to be provided for,
and that this may be done by enlarging the
jurisdiction of the Courts, so that they may sustain
indictments and information on the public behalf,
for offences against the law of nations.6
Also on December 3 Jefferson wrote to Thomas Pinckney how
the Republican Party had made gains in elections for Congress.
I take the liberty of troubling you to forward
the enclosed letters to Mr. Cathalan and Fenwick;
and as you may very possibly be applied to in the
course of the business, I send them open that
you may be acquainted with the train into which it is put.
When you shall have read them,
be so good as to seal and forward them.
Knowing the interest you take in the success of this essay, it
would be presumptuous in me to solicit your attentions to it.
My retirement will render mine useless: and I shall
be happy in knowing that though your position
is not the most favorable for superintending it,
yet it will be much within your reach and encouragement.
A line from you to Cathalan, assuring him that you look
towards it with interest, will have a good effect on him.
I do not write you a public letter by the packet
because there is really no subject for it.
The elections for Congress have produced a decided
majority in favor of the republican interest.
They complain, you know, that the influence
and patronage of the Executive is become
so great as to govern the legislature.
They endeavored a few days ago to take away
one means of influence by condemning references
to the heads of department.
They failed by a majority of 5 votes.
They were more successful in their endeavor to
prevent the introduction of a new means of influence,
that of admitting the heads of departments
to deliberate occasionally in the house in
explanation of their measures.
The proposition for their admission was rejected
by a pretty general vote.
I think we may consider the tide of this government
as now at the fullest, and that it will from the
commencement of the next session of Congress retire
and subside into the true principles of the Constitution.
An alarm has been endeavored to be sounded
as if the republican interest was indisposed
to the payment of the public debt.
Besides the general object of this calumny,
it was meant to answer the special one of electioneering.
Its falsehood was so notorious that it produced little effect.
They endeavored with as little success
to conjure up the ghost of anti-federalism,
and to have it believed that this and republicanism
were the same, and that both were Jacobinism.
But those who felt themselves republicans
and federalists too were little moved by this artifice;
so that the result of the election has been promising.
The occasion of electing a Vice President has been
seized as a proper one for expressing the public
sense on the doctrines of the Monocrats.
There will be a strong vote against Mr. Adams,
but the strength of his personal worth and his services
will I think prevail over the demerit of his political creed.7
On December 30 Secretary of State Jefferson wrote this letter
to Gouverneur Morris, the United States Minister to France:
I am apprehensive that your situation must have
been difficult during the transition from the late form of
government to the re-establishment of some other
legitimate authority, and that you may have been at
a loss to determine with whom business might be done.
Nevertheless when principles are well understood
their application is less embarrassing.
We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon
our own government is founded, that every one may
govern itself under whatever forms it pleases, and change
these forms at its own will, and that it may transact its
business with foreign nations through whatever organ
it thinks proper whether king, convention, assembly,
committee, President, or whatever else it may choose.
The will of the nation is the only thing
essential to be regarded.
On the dissolution of the late constitution in France, by
removing so integral a part of it as the king, the National
assembly, to whom a part only of the public authority had
been delegated, sensible of the incompetence of their
powers to transact the affairs of the nation legitimately,
invited their fellow citizens to appoint a national convention.
During this defective state of the national authority,
duty to our constituents required that we should suspend
the payment of the monies yet unpaid of our debt to that
country, because there was no person or persons
substantially authorized by the nation of France
to receive the monies and give us a good acquittal.
On this ground my last letter desired you to suspend
payments till further orders, with an assurance,
if necessary, that the suspension should not be continued
a moment longer than should be necessary for us to see
the reestablishment of some person or body of persons
with authority to receive and give us a good acquittal.
Since that we learn that a Convention is assembled,
invested with full powers by the nation
to transact its affairs.
Though we know from the public papers only, instead of
waiting for a formal annunciation of it, we hasten to act
upon it by authorizing you, if the fact be true, to consider
the suspension of payment, directed in my last letter,
as now taken off, and to proceed as if it had never been
imposed; considering the Convention, or the government
they shall have established as the lawful representatives
of the nation and authorized to act for them.
Neither the honor nor inclination of our country
would justify our withholding our payment
under a scrupulous attention to forms.
On the contrary they lent us that money when
we were under their circumstances, and it seems
providential that we can not only repay them
the sum, but under the same circumstances.
Indeed we wish to omit no opportunity of convincing them
how cordially we desire the closest union with them.
Mutual good offices, mutual affection and similar
principles of government seem to have destined
the two people for the most intimate communion,
and even for a complete exchange of citizenship
among the individuals composing them.
During the fluctuating state of the Assignats of France,
I must ask the favor of you to inform me in every letter
of the rate of exchange between them and coin, this being
necessary for the regulation of our customhouses.
We are continuing our supplies to the island of St. Domingo
at the request of the Minister of France here.
We could wish however to receive a more formal sanction
from the government of France than has yet been given.
Indeed we know of none but a vote of the late national
assembly for 4 millions of livres of our debt, sent to the
government of St. Domingo, communicated by them
to the minister here, and by him to us: and this was in
terms not properly applicable to the form of our advances.
We wish therefore for a full sanction of the past and a
complete expression of the desires of their
government as to future supplies to their colonies.
Besides what we have furnished publicly, individual
merchants of the U.S. have carried considerable supplies
to the island of St. Domingo, which have been sometimes
purchased, sometimes taken by force, and bills given
by the administration of the colony on the minister here,
which have been protested for want of funds.
We have no doubt that justice will be done to these.8
Notes
1. Report on Negotiations with Spain, 18 March 1792 (online)
2. Thomas Jefferson Writings, p. 985-990.
3. Ibid., p. 990-991.
4. Ibid., p. 991-992.
5. Ibid., p. 992-1001.
6. Opinion on Offenses against the Law of Nations, 3 December 1792 (Online)
7. The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Volume VII ed. Paul Leicester Ford,
p. 191-192.
8. Thomas Jefferson Writings, p. 1001-1003.
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