On 5 January John Quincy Adams wrote a letter to his father, John Adams,
and he mostly discussed the Christian religion and its relationship with war and peace.
I plainly perceive that you are not to be converted,
even by the eloquence of Massillon, to the Athanasian creed.
But when you recommend to me Carlostad and
Scheffmacher and Priestley and Waterland and
Clerk and Beausobre—Mercy! Mercy!
What can a blind man do to be saved by Unitarianism,
if he must read all this to understand his Bible?
I went last Christmas day to Ealing Church, and heard the
Reverend Colston Carr, the vicar, declare and pronounce,
among other things, that whosoever doth not keep the
catholic faith whole and undefiled;
without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.
And the catholic faith is THIS: That we worship one God
in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, etc.—in short the creed of
Saint Athanasius; which, as you know, the eighth article
of the English Church says, may be proved
by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.
Now I have had many doubts about the Athanasian Creed;
but if I read much more controversy about it,
I shall finish by faithfully believing it.
Mr. Channing says he does not believe,
because he cannot comprehend it.
Does he not comprehend how the omnipotent,
omnipresent, omniscient, infinite, eternal spirit,
can be the father of a mortal man,
conceived and born of a Virgin?
Does he comprehend his own meaning when he
speaks of God as the Father, and Christ as the Son?
Does he comprehend the possibility according to
human reason, of one page in the Bible from the
first verse in Genesis to the last verse of the Apocalypse?
If he does, I give him joy of his discovery,
and wish he would impart it to his fellow Christians.
If the Bible is a moral tale,
there is no believing in the Trinity.
But if it is the rule of faith—
I hope you will not think me in danger of perishing
everlastingly for believing too much, and when you
know all, with your aversion to thinking of the Jesuits,
you may think I have made a lucky escape,
if I do not believe in transubstantiation.
During almost the whole period of my residence in Russia,
I had the pleasure of a social and very friendly
acquaintance with the Right Reverend Father in God,
Thaddeus Brozowsky, then and now Father General
of the Jesuits, one of the most respectable, amiable,
and venerable men that I have ever known.
As I was the medium of communication between him
and his correspondents in the United States,
he used frequently to call upon me,
and I had often occasion to return his visits.
We used to converse upon all sorts of topics,
and among the rest upon religion.
He occasionally manifested a compassionate wish
for my conversion to the true Catholic faith,
and one day undertook to give me a demonstration
of the real presence in the Eucharist.
He said it was ingeniously proved in a copper-plate
print which he had seen, representing Jesus Christ
sitting between Luther and Calvin,
each of them bearing the water of the communion.
Each of them had also a label issuing from his lips and
pointing with the finger to the bread, Christ was saying,
“This is my body,” while Luther said,
“This represents my body,”
said Calvin, “This signifies my body.”
At the bottom of the whole was the question,
“Which of them speaks the truth?”
It was not the worthy Father’s fault if I did not
consider this demonstration as conclusive as he did.
Another day—and it will give you an idea of the simplicity
of this good man’s heart—we were discussing together
the celibacy of the clergy, which he deemed indispensable,
that they might be altogether devoted to the service
of their Lord and master, and not liable
to the avocations of this world’s concerns.
I did not think it would be generous to remind him
of the manner in which the experience of the world
had shown that the vows of religious chastity
usually resulted, but rather resorted
to authority with regard to the principle.
I observed to him that not only all the Protestant
communities, but the Greek Church also,
allowed the clergy to marry.
Upon which, after a moment of reflection,
he said, “Oui, c’est vrai.
Il n’y a que l’église romaine qui soit encore vierge!”
Indeed, you must give me some credit for
firmness of character, for withstanding
the persuasion of such a patriarch as this.
We have, in the newspapers of last evening
and this morning, the President’s message
at the opening of the session of Congress.
It gives upon the whole a pleasing view of the
state of our public affairs, but not quite so fair
an aspect of the finances as were to be wished.
Peace, however, will be the most healing of all medicines to
them, and the complexion of the message is entirely pacific.
The present intentions of the British government, I believe,
are of a corresponding spirit; but it is an opinion widely
circulated here, that peace itself, instead of healing
their finances, will prove their inevitable destruction.
That nothing but a new war can save them,
and that the most convenient and least
burdensome war would be with America.
The distrust in the continuance of the peace is so universal,
and I am beset by so many and so frequent anxious
inquiries from the same quarters, and mysterious hints
from others, that although the official professions have
been invariably pacific and friendly, I am sometimes
not without uneasiness, lest a want of sufficient
vigilance should leave undiscovered a lurking danger,
which might break upon us unawares.
A war, however, even with America, could not be
undertaken without preparations and armaments
of which there is not the slightest indication.
A war must be preceded by complaints well or ill founded,
of which there are indeed some on our part sufficient,
perhaps ultimately to result in hostilities, but which
neither require nor would justify them at this time.
On their part I have heard of none, nor have I
reason to suppose that Mr. Bagot, who is about
embarking for America as the British minister,
goes with any particular load of grievances.
He has been anxiously waiting, as I am gravely assured,
upwards of three months for his passage,
because men could not be obtained by enlistment
to navigate the frigate in which he is to go.
The effect of the peace here which proves
so distressing is the depreciation in the value of grain,
and of the other productions of the soil.
The natural and inevitable consequence of which
has been the inability of the farmers to pay their rents;
the fall in the value of all landed estates, a partial
defalcation of the revenue, and an aggravated
soreness under the burdens of tithes and taxation.
There is doubtless much exaggeration in some of the
accounts that are published of this state of things;
but on all sides it is admitted that the suffering
of the agricultural interest is very severe.
That peace should be followed by plenty,
is of very old experience.
But that plenty should operate as a great national calamity,
requires a public debt of a thousand millions sterling,
and a banking system to be accounted for.
At the meeting of Parliament, which is to be on the
first of February, the extent of the evil, and the remedies
to be provided for it, will be more fully ascertained.
Some put their trust in war, and some in famine,
to relieve the people from their burdens.
Others look for salvation by the
flooding of paper from the Bank.
That institution has called in so much of its paper that
there is now scarcely any advance upon silver and gold.
The project of resuming specie payments is to be
attempted, and whether it can be accomplished
with forty millions of annual interest upon the
public debt to be paid, is the problem now
about to receive the solution of experience.
Whatever the result may be,
the lesson may be profitable to us.
If a nation can prosper in peace or war with a debt of a
thousand millions sterling, it will be useful to us to make
ourselves perfect masters of the mode in which such
a marvelous paradox is converted into practical truth.
If the paper castle be really built upon a rock impregnable
and immovable, let us learn the art of building it.
If the same course of conduct which leads to inevitable and
irrecoverable private ruin is the sure and only path that
will conduct a nation to the pinnacle of human greatness
and power, let us trace it to its utmost bounds.
But if a day of reckoning for extravagance and profusion
must come for nations as well as individuals, if the wisdom
of ages will ultimately vindicate its own maxims, and if
prudence is not to yield forever her place as one of the
cardinal virtues to prodigality, then will the catastrophe
of paper credit, which cannot now longer be delayed in
this country, place before us the whole system of artificial
circulation in all its good and all its evil, and while disclosing
all the uses of this tremendous machine as an engine of
power, teach us at the same time the caution necessary to
guard ourselves from the irreparable ruin of its explosion.1
Adams on 8 January 1816 wrote this letter to Lord Castlereagh:
The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary from the United States of America in
reply to the note which he has had the honor of receiving
from Lord Castlereagh of the 5th instant, observes that
besides the reciprocal liberty of commerce between the
territories of the United States and all the British territories
in Europe, stipulated in the first article of the commercial
convention concluded in July last, there is in the second
article of the same convention a provision that “no higher
or other duties or charges shall be imposed in any of
the ports of the United States on British vessels than
those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United
States, nor in the ports of any of His Britannic Majesty’s
territories in Europe on the vessels of the United States
than shall be payable in the same ports on British vessels.
It appears to the undersigned that a restriction which
presents vessels of the United States to take from the ports
of Ireland only one passenger for every five tons register
of the vessel, while it allows British vessels to take one
passenger for every two tons, does not comply with
the engagement for a reciprocal liberty of commerce.
It likewise appears to him to subject in its
operation the vessels of the United States
to higher charges in the ports of Ireland than
those imposed in the same ports on British vessels.
The undersigned is informed that in the commercial
intercourse between the United States and Ireland the
greatest proportion of the freight of vessels going to
America consists of passengers, and that a limitation
of the number of them to one person for every five tons is
nearly equivalent to an exclusion of the vessels subject to it,
while other vessels are not liable to the same limitation.
So that while one of the principal objects of the contracting
parties to the commercial convention was to place the
vessels of the two nations upon a footing of equal burdens
and advantages in the ports of both, this regulation will
confine the commerce between Ireland and the
United States exclusively to British vessels, unless the
restriction be removed, or unless countervailing regulations
should be resorted to by the American government.
If it be said that the regulation in question does not directly
violate the letter of the stipulation to which the undersigned
refers, he requests His Lordship to suppose the case that by
a regulation of the government of the United States British
vessels in the ports of the United States should be
permitted to take a lading of only two-fifth of their tonnage
of the articles of export from that country, while
American vessels should possess exclusively the privilege
of shipping cargoes to the full extent of their tonnage.
Would not the inevitable effect of such a measure
be to subject British vessels to heavier charges
than those imposed upon American vessels?
Would it not be more effectual to deprive British
vessels of the equality contemplated by the commercial
convention than any discrimination of tonnage duties ever
established between the vessels of the two countries?
Assuredly such a regulation, applied in the ports of this
island to the vessels of the United States with respect
to the export of manufactured articles which constitute
their cargoes, would be tantamount to a prohibition of
the American merchant flag in the ports of Great Britain.
In the trade with America from Ireland passengers
form the principal article of export, and to allow them
to be exported only in British vessels is in its result
the same as if a prohibitory tonnage duty was
laid upon American vessels in the Irish ports.
The undersigned indulges the hope that in the execution
of that article of the convention, the object of which was
to abolish on both sides the discriminating burdens,
and to impart on both sides the benefit of equal privileges
to the shipping of each nation in ports of the other,
both governments will give it a construction corresponding
with the liberal and conciliatory spirit in which it was
formed—a construction which will give full effect to
the mutual intentions of the high contracting parties.
It was on this principle that he had the honor of addressing
Lord Castlereagh his former note upon the subject, and it is
with this sentiment that he now requests His Lordship to
accept the renewed assurance of his high consideration.2
J. Q. Adams in London sent this report to Secretary of State
James Monroe on 9 January 1816:
With my last dispatch I had the honor of enclosing a
copy of a note which I had addressed to Lord Castlereagh,
concerning a discrimination between vessels of the
United States and British vessels in the number of
passengers which they are permitted to take in the
ports of Ireland for conveyance to America.
I now enclose copies of his Lordship’s
answer and of my reply.
I have not yet addressed to him an official note
upon the subject of the Baltimore, taken within the
Spanish jurisdiction at St. Andrew, because the only
evidence of the fact contained in the papers is the
protest of the master and mate of the vessel.
This protest states that there was at the time
of the capture a Spanish pilot on board.
The owner’s nephew, Mr. Karthaws, has been here, and I
have advised him of the necessity of obtaining the testimony
of the pilot or of other impartial witnesses at St. Andrew.
For otherwise, as soon as my note shall be presented
to this government, they will refer it to the captain of
the ship which took the Baltimore, and will consider
his report as a satisfactory answer to the claim.
I have formerly mentioned to you another and a
similar case, that of the William and Mary, captured
last February at Cadiz, sent to Gibraltar, and
there condemned by the Vice Admiralty Court.
The violation of the Spanish jurisdiction was
in that case established upon indisputable evidence.
It was reported to the Spanish government by the Governor
of Cadiz himself, who made a fruitless demand for the
restitution of the captured vessel by the Court at Gibraltar.
Messrs. Dickason and Nevell, the agents of the American
owners here, had applied to Count Fernan Nuñez,
the Spanish Ambassador, for authority to enter an
appeal of territory before the Admiralty Court of Appeal,
which he had declined to do without orders from his court.
On October last I wrote to the Ambassador, stating the
circumstances of the case and requesting him to apply to
this government for instructions to authorize the appeal.
He readily complied, and on the 14th of last month
wrote me that he had received orders to demand the
restitution of the vessel and cargo or their equivalent.
That he had sent in a note to the British government
accordingly, and would communicate to me
their answer when he should receive it.
A few days since he sent me a copy of Lord Castlereagh’s
answer to his note which was, that as the case was
pending in the Admiralty Court of Appeal, the
Ambassador was authorized to authorize the agents
of the claimants to enter the appeal of territory.
The Count informed me that he was ready to give
the authority, it being understood that all the expenses
of the appeal were to be at the charge of the claimants.
I have given notice of this to the agents, and I trust the
cause will terminate in the restitution of the property.
I mentioned the case in a letter to Mr. Anthony Morris
at Madrid, requesting him if he should have the
opportunity, to urge an early answer to the
Ambassador’s demand for instructions.
Mr. Morris answers me on the 10th ultimo, that he
had in May last made to Mr. Cevallos two applications
in this same case, to which he had received in July only a
verbal and offensive answer that it was under advisement.
It is yet remarkable that even when he wrote to me,
he was not informed of the orders which had been
transmitted to Count Fernan Nuñez.3
John Quincy Adams in London reviewed foreign policy in a letter
to Secretary of State James Monroe on 22 January 1816:
It is to be hoped that the restoration of the ordinary
diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain
will be followed by a more conciliatory policy on the
part of the latter power than she has hitherto pursued.
The internal administration of Spain has given
so much disgust to the public feeling of Europe,
and particularly of this country, that the
British Cabinet has in some sort partaken of it.
The national sentiment in England is likewise strong
in favor of the South Americans, and the prevailing
opinion is that their independence would be highly
advantageous to the interests of this country.
A different and directly opposite sentiment
is entertained by the government.
Their disposition is decided against the South Americans,
but by a political obliquity not without example,
it is not so unequivocally in favor of the mother country.
In the year 1776 that wise and honest minister,
Mr. Turgot, reported to the King of France, that it was
for the interest of his kingdom that the insurrection in
North America should be suppressed, because the
insurgents, when subdued, would still be such turbulent
and mutinous subjects that it would employ all the force of
Great Britain to keep them down, and her weakness would
make her a peaceable or at least a harmless neighbor.
In the month of February 1778 France concluded a treaty
of commerce and an eventual treaty of alliance with the
United States, because they were de facto independent.
In the interval between those two periods France
was wavering and temporizing with one hand
seizing American privateers in her ports, and with the
other sending supplies of arms and ammunition to America.
This is precisely the present situation
of Great Britain towards Spain.
The Cabinet has many other reasons besides that of
Mr. Turgot to secure the good neighborhood of impotence,
for wishing that the insurrection should be suppressed:
1. They have a deep rooted inveterate prejudice,
fortified by all the painful recollections of their own
unfortunate contest against any revolution by which
colonies were emancipated and become independent states.
2. They have a forcible moral impression, like that
of their antipathy to the slave trade, that it is wrong
to assist or encourage colonies in the attempt
to throw off the yoke of their mother country.
3. They dread the influence of example, and always
remember how many colonies they themselves still possess.
4. They fear the consequences of South American
independence upon the whole system
of European colonial policy.
Their attachment to this has been amply displayed
in their anxious and persevering efforts to draw the
Braganza family back to Lisbon, efforts well known
to you, and which will probably not be successful.
5. The mystic virtue of legitimacy.
It is impossible to write with proper gravity
upon this subject, but it has no small operation
against the South American independents.
6. And last, but not least, they look with no propitious
eye to the relation which will naturally arise between
independent governments on the two American continents.
They foresee less direct advantage to themselves
from a free commercial intercourse with South America,
than indirect injury by its tendency
to promote the interests of the United States.
Perhaps they think a period may arise, when one of
the parties to this struggle will offer exclusive advantages
and privileges to them as the price of their assistance.
Hitherto they have professed to be neutral, and
at one time offered their mediation between the parties.
But they have assisted Ferdinand at least with money,
without which Morillo’s armament never could have
sailed from Cadiz, and they have suffered all sorts of
supplies to be sent to the insurgents from Jamaica.
For as, notwithstanding their inclinations, they are aware
the South Americans may ultimately prove de facto
independent, they hold themselves ready
to take advantage of the proper moment
to acknowledge them, if it should occur.
This is one of the points upon which the opposition are
continually urging the ministry but hitherto without effect.
Should the United States be involved in a war with Spain,
whether by acknowledging the South Americans, or from
any other cause, we must take it for granted that all the
propensities of the British government will be against us.
Those of the nation will be so perhaps in equal degree,
for we must not disguise to ourselves that the
national feeling against the United States is more
strong and more universal than it ever has been.
The state of peace, instead of being attended by
general prosperity, is found only to have aggravated
the burden of taxation which presses upon the country.
There is considerable distress weighing chiefly
upon the landed interest, although the accounts
which you will see of it are excessively exaggerated.
Enough however is felt to prompt a strong wish
for a new war in a great portion of the community,
and there is no nation with which a war
would be so popular as with America.
But I have no hesitation in stating my conviction
that the present policy of the ministry towards
America is more pacific than that of the nation.
They are aware of the responsibility that
such a war would bring upon them,
and are not at this time prepared to encounter it.
Of the cession of Florida I have not lately heard,
but I think there is no considerable armed force prepared or
preparing to be sent there, either from England or Ireland.
The navy, as I have informed you, is reduced to a
peace establishment unusually small, and even
the ships that are recommissioned cannot be
manned without bounties and impressment.
There is a Colonel Stapleton, Secretary
of the Commissioners of the barrack office,
going out in the frigate with Mr. Bagot.
He goes to Charleston, South Carolina,
as he says, on private business of his own.
This is the only symptom I have yet perceived
of a large military expedition to Florida.
I have the honor to enclose my reply
to Lord Bathurst’s note concerning the fisheries.
It has been delayed by an illness
which for several weeks disabled me from writing.4
John Quincy Adams in London on 31 January 1816 wrote about the
current situation with the British in a letter to Secretary of State James Monroe:
I spoke to Lord Castlereagh of the notes which
I have lately received from him requiring me upon
representations made by the Lord Mayor of London
and the Mayor of Liverpool to send to the United States
a number of distressed American seamen.
As the second requisition had been made to me
without any reply to the answer which I had given at first,
I concluded that Lord Castlereagh had not seen my answer,
and he confirmed me in the correctness of that conjecture.
He said my answer must have been received
while he was in the country, which had been
the cause of his not having seen it.
I then mentioned to him the substance of its contents,
the claim of far the greater portion of the American seamen
represented by the Lord Mayor of London to be in so great
distress to the consideration of the British government,
as having been recently discharged from their service,
into which most of them had been impressed, and the
propriety of indicating to me by name those whom I should
be required to take measures for sending to America.
I added that immediately after receiving his note
concerning the seamen at Liverpool for whom
I was called upon to provide, I had written to the
consul of the United States at that port requesting
him to ascertain who they were, and what claim
they had to relief from the American government.
The Mayor of Liverpool had stated
their number to be twenty-six.
The consul was informed that they would all attend at his
office; only nineteen presented themselves, and the consul
had no means of compelling the attendance of the others.
Of the nineteen only five had any document
or proof whatsoever to prove them Americans.
He must be aware that if the American consuls were
required to provide for and send to the United States
every man who should present himself to them as a
distressed seaman, and call himself an American,
it would open a door to many a British seaman
to find his way to America, and would tend to defeat
the intentions of the American government, however
earnestly intent upon closing it against them by law.
There were now great multitudes
of British seamen without employment.
It was matter of public notoriety that numbers of them
had already gone into the service of other countries;
the newspapers asserted that many had already
found employment in American vessels.
I hoped, therefore, that this government
would take into consideration the propriety,
1. Of making provision themselves for defraying
the expense of maintaining and of sending to the
United States all the destitute American seamen
recently discharged from the British naval service.
2. Of enabling those of them who were entitled to
small pensions, the reward of long service or of
mutilation by wounds, to receive those annuities
in America, without compelling them at once to go there
and to renounce their claim to this little stipend for
the mere amount of two or three years purchase.
3. Of specifying by name the persons whom they consider
me or the American consul bound to provide for and
send as destitute American seamen to the United States.
Lord Castlereagh said that certainly these were
very fair subjects of representation, and that he
would pay proper attention to them, but he thought
the inconveniences which had unavoidably resulted from
the reduction of the navy were now nearly done away.
Sixty or seventy thousand men had been in the course
of two or three months dismissed from the service.
It was impossible that such numbers of men of the same
occupation should be thus suddenly brought upon the public
without becoming for a time more or less burdensome.
London and Liverpool being the two principal seaports
of this country, an unusual proportion of the
discharged seamen had naturally resorted to them.
The representation from the Lord Mayor of London
referred to foreign seamen of various nations,
and the note from Lord Castlereagh
which I had received on that occasion was a circular.
But as commerce was now in a very flourishing situation,
the seamen were gradually finding employment;
and as the incumbrance which they have occasioned
was merely temporary, it was nearly passed over.
I shall give you in my next the sequel of this conference,
the result of which has confirmed all the opinions with
regard to the policy of this government
which I gave you in my last dispatch.
There appears to me no prospect that under the
present ministry any constitutional arrangement
for renouncing the practice of impressment will
be attainable, and you will observe the new argument
which Lord Castlereagh derives against such a stipulation
from the measures recommended by the President
for excluding foreign seamen from our service.
There is no immediate prospect of any maritime war,
nor indeed any remote discernible prospect
of such a war with the United States neutral to it.
As the occurrence, however, is not impossible,
and as the outrage of that practice can never be tolerated
by a nation of the strength and resources to which the
United States are rising, it cannot too forcibly be urged
upon their conviction, that the only means of protecting
their seafaring citizens in the enjoyment of their right will
consist in the energy with which they shall be asserted.
With regard to the other topics embraced in the
conference, I can only now state in a summary manner
that I think the proposal for mutually disarming on the
lakes of Canada which I made conformably to your
instructions will not be accepted; that no cession of Florida
by Spain to Great Britain has been made; that the British
policy is neutrality between Spain and the South Americans,
and that she considers the non-acknowledgment of their
independence as essential to this system of neutrality;
that the British government adhere to their doctrine
respecting the fisheries, but are willing to negotiate, and
do not wish to prevent our people from fishing; that they will
give no satisfaction for the slaves carried away in violation
of the treaty of Ghent, and that they are not pleased
at the emigrations from Ireland to the United States.5
On 8 February 1816 Adams in London sent a 14-page report of
his progress with the British to Secretary of State James Monroe.
He wrote about the British Foreign Minister Lord Castlereagh
and the Court of Spain. In the last portion he wrote,
Copies have been transmitted to you of the note I have
addressed to Lord Castlereagh, concerning a discrimination
made in the ports of Ireland between British and American
vessels in regard to the number of passengers which they
are allowed to take in proportion to their tonnage upon
voyages to the United States, of his answer and of my reply.
As no answer to this had been returned, and no
determination of the government upon my application
had been known to me, I spoke of these papers,
but he avoided any explicit assurance concerning it.
He said that the regulation had perhaps been made
before the convention had been concluded.
“But (said he) we might question the application
of the case, as the convention was not intended
to interfere in any restrictions under which we may
think proper to prevent emigration from Ireland.”
I assured him that my intention had not been
to object to the regulation as a restriction upon emigration;
that, I was aware, must be exclusively
the consideration of this government.
We had nothing to say about it.
It was the discrimination between the shipping
of the two countries of which I had complained.
I presumed that an order to the post office
would remove the distinction.
He said he did not know that.
It might be by act of Parliament, and they might question
our right to consider passengers as articles of merchandize.
They might regard the discrimination itself
as a mode of restriction upon emigration.
“You do not want our people” (said he),
to which I readily assented, observing that
our increase of native population was sufficiently
rapid so far as mere public policy was concerned.
We invited no foreigners.
We left all to individual option.
“No (he repeated), our people and our seamen—
you really do not want them.”
I observed that if that were the case, this country
should rather be under obligation to us for
relieving it of such unprofitable subjects.
He did not assent to this conclusion and left me
uncertain whether the regulation in question
would be removed or retained.
The great length into which this report has already run
precludes any comment of mine upon the substance
of this conference, in which Lord Castlereagh’s manner
was uniformly courteous, and his assurances of the
friendly disposition of this government towards
the United States were earnest and repeated.6
J. Q. Adams wrote in a letter on February 17 to Lord Castlereagh:
In pressing this subject once more upon the consideration
of His Majesty’s government the undersigned deems it
necessary to state the terms of the stipulation in the treaty,
and the facts in breach of it constituting the injury for
which he is instructed to ask redress from the justice
and good faith of the British government
The stipulation of the treaty is as follows:
All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken by
either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken
after signing the treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter
mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing
any destruction or carrying away any of the artillery or other
public property originally captured in the said forts or places,
and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the
ratification of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property.
The facts in violation of this stipulation are,
that in evacuating sundry places within the United States
which had been taken by the British forces during the war,
the British naval commanders did carry away great numbers
of slaves belonging to citizens of the United States.
In his letter of the 5th of September the undersigned had
the honor of enclosing a list of seven hundred and two
slaves carried away, after the ratification of the treaty of
peace, from Cumberland Island and the waters adjacent
in the state of Georgia, by the forces under the command
of Rear Admiral Cockburn, with the names of the slaves
and those of their owners, citizens of the United States.
A number perhaps still greater was carried away from
Tangier Island in the state of Virginia, and from other
places, lists of whom and of the proprietors the undersigned
expects to be enabled in like manner to produce.
The only foundation which these naval commanders
have alleged for this procedure was a construction of
the paragraph containing this stipulation, so contrary
to its grammatical sense and obvious purport, that the
undersigned is well assured, if the same phrase had
occurred in any municipal contract between individuals, no
judicial tribunal in this kingdom could entertain for a moment
a question upon it—a construction under which the whole
operation of the words “slaves or other private property”
was annihilated, by extending to them the limitation confined
by the words of the treaty to artillery and public property.7
Adams from London wrote again to Monroe on March 6:
On the 1st instant I called upon Lord Castlereagh
at his house to which he was then
confined by a slight indisposition.
I had received a letter from Mr. Luke, the Consul at Belfast,
enclosing one from several masters of American vessels at
Londonderry to Mr. Thomas Davenport, Vice Consul at that
place, complaining of the discrimination between British and
American vessels with regard to the number of passengers
which they were allowed to take from the Irish ports.
Lord Castlereagh apologized for not having replied
to the several notes which he had received from me,
alleging his indisposition and the great pressure
of business at this time in Parliament.
I told him there was only one of the subjects upon which
I was anxious for an immediate decision,
and that was this discrimination in Ireland.
There were a number of American vessels now
at Londonderry whose masters were waiting
only for this decision, and if it should be against them,
would be obliged to return home in ballast,
or come in search of freights to English ports.
He said if there had not been an earlier decision, it was
not from any indisposition here to meet us in giving the
fullest effect to the principle of equalizing the duties upon
the vessels of both nations, and they were desirous of
arranging this difference in Ireland to our satisfaction, and
without at the same time touching upon the question of their
policy in the existing restriction as a check upon emigration.
But he inquired how it was with regard to the execution
of the convention of 3rd July, 1815 in America?
Observing that he had seen that a bill for carrying it into
execution which had passed in the House of Representatives
of the United States had been rejected by the Senate,
I told him that I had no communication from the government
relating to the convention since its ratification, but that by
the Constitution of the United States as soon as the
ratifications were exchanged, it became the law of the land.
It must and would of course be executed, and by the public
accounts in the gazettes with respect to the bill to which
he referred, it appeared that the difference of opinion
between the two houses of Congress arose, not from
any disposition in either to oppose the execution of the
convention, but from a question whether an act of
Congress was or was not necessary to give it effect.
He then intimated that he had information that there had
been some difficulty as to its actual execution, and asked me
if I could state the time from which it had been understood
to commence in favor of British vessels in America?
I said that was a matter about which I believed it
would be necessary to come to a mutual understanding.
It was usual to consider treaties as commencing to
operate from the time of the exchange of the ratifications.
In this case, at the proposal of the British plenipotentiaries,
the convention was expressly made binding upon the
parties for four years from the day of the signature.
For some time after it was signed, an extra duty had been
levied here upon cotton imported in American vessels.
I had conversed upon the subject with Mr. Robinson,
one of the British plenipotentiaries who signed the
convention, and afterwards with the
Earl of Liverpool last summer.
An Order in Council had issued in August
removing this duty upon cotton.
Of all this you had been informed.
I had received a letter from you, written shortly after
the ratification of the convention, expressing the
expectation that it would be ratified, observing that
the President had not previously issued a proclamation
revoking the discriminating duties, because the Order
in Council of August had never been officially communicated,
and because it did not extend to tonnage duties.
My own opinion had been that the obligations of the
convention commenced from the day of its signature,
and that whatever extra duties contrary to it had been
since then levied by either government must be refunded.
He said it was then evident that there was yet something
to be done to give the convention its full effect; that as
Mr. Robinson had been one of the British plenipotentiaries
who had signed it, he would ask him to appoint a day
to meet me and agree upon some arrangement,
adding that there would be some inconvenience
refunding duties already collected.
As to the duties collected at the Trinity House,
light money for the maintenance of light houses,
they were levied by the particular charter of that
corporation; he thought the government could not
remove them, and that they were not included among
the duties and charges contemplated by the convention.
I observed that if that was the understanding, it was
necessary that we should know it, similar charges
of light money being levied in the United States; and
if the principle of equalization should not be applied them
here, it would of course not be applicable to them there.
He renewed the assurance that they were cordially disposed
to give the fullest practicable effect to it, and said that as to
the case of the passengers from Ireland they would put the
ships of the two countries on the same footing, either by
reducing the restriction upon American vessels to the same
scale as that upon British vessels, or by increasing that upon
the British to the standard of that upon the American.8
On 30 March 1816 Adams in London sent Secretary of State Monroe
a 6-page report on the situation with Spain and also more about Lord Castlereagh.
Here is the part about Spain:
A few days since Mr. Del Real, residing here as a
deputy from New Granada, called upon me and inquired
if I had any knowledge of the arrival at Washington
of Mr. Peter Qual in a similar capacity from that country.
I told him that I had heard generally that there was at
Washington deputies from the South American Provinces
but not particularly the name of that gentleman.
Mr. Del Real said he knew of his arrival at New York
but had not heard from him at Washington.
He then inquired what foundation there was
for a rumor gradually circulating here of
a rupture between the United States and Spain.
I knew nothing further than
had appeared in the English newspapers.
I had heard of a correspondence in December
and January between the Secretary of State
and the Spanish Minister which had been
communicated by the President to Congress and the
supposed substance of which had been published here.
It had further been said that about the 12th of last month
Mr. Onís had left Washington, and that all communication
between the American government had been broken off.
Later accounts equally unauthenticated contradicted
this last circumstance but repeated that
Mr. Onís had left Washington much dissatisfied.
It was impossible for me to say what the real state
of relations between the United States and Spain were,
but as to the question of peace or war, I was
persuaded it would depend upon Spain herself.
If the demands of Mr. Onís had been such as
they were represented, the American government
neither would nor could comply with them.
The present course of Spanish policy was incomprehensible.
If such demands were made, it could not but be with
a knowledge that they must and would be refused.
In ordinary cases the very making of such demands
would imply a settled determination of the power advancing
them to follow up the refusal of them by immediate war.
If such was the intention of Spain, the United States
would have no alternative left but to defend themselves.
But they had no desire for a war with Spain.
As to the South American Provinces struggling
for their independence the general sentiment in
the United States was certainly in their favor.
But the policy of the government, a policy
dictated equally by their duty to their own country,
by their state of amity with Spain and by their
good will to the South Americans themselves, was
a strict and impartial neutrality between them and Spain.
I said by their good will for the South Americans
themselves, because the neutrality of the United States
was more advantageous to them, by securing
to them the neutrality also of Great Britain,
than any support which the United States could
give them by declaring in their favor and making
common cause with them, the effect of which probably
would be to make Great Britain declare against both.
He was aware that the popular feeling in this country
was now favorable to the South Americans,
more so than the dispositions of the present ministry.
They complied so far with the prevailing opinion
as to observe a neutrality.
But the same popular sentiment here, he knew,
was very strong against the North Americans,
and if the United States were openly to join the cause
of South America, and consequently be engaged
in a war with Spain, the British people would immediately
consider them as the principals in the contest; all their
jealousies and national antipathies would be enlisted against
the common American cause; and as they were even now
tormented with an uneasy hankering for war which they
think would relieve them from their embarrassments,
then ministers would take advantage of these passions
and engage this nation upon the side of Spain, merely
because the United States would be on the other side.
He said he was perfectly convinced
of the justice of these observations.
I asked him if he had any knowledge of
an Order in Council lately issued here,
prohibiting all British subjects from supplying arms,
ammunition and warlike stores to the South Americans.
He said he had not.
That the professed system of this government
had always been and continued to be neutrality.
That they allowed a free intercourse between Jamaica
and the South American continent, and had given
orders to their Admiral on the station not to molest
the independent flag, and had refused to deliver up
vessels bearing it which had entered their ports.
But whenever applied to for an acknowledgment
of the independent governments, they had declined
upon the ground of their engagements with Spain.
I had shortly before had some conversation upon
these subjects with Count Fernan Nuñez, the
Spanish Ambassador at this court, who spoke to me
with some courteous expressions of concern of this
abrupt departure of Mr. Onís from Washington,
which he said was altogether unexpected to him, though
he supposed Onís could not have acted without orders.
He then referred to the points which had been
mentioned in the summary published here
of your correspondence with Onís.
He thought the expeditions from Kentucky and Tennessee
might justly be considered by the Spanish as offensive,
and that after the surrender of Carthagena there was
no insurgent government, and that all vessels under its
pretended flag were to be considered and treated as pirates.
I said that I had no knowledge what the alleged
expeditions from Kentucky and Tennessee were,
but was very sure that they had no countenance
from the government of the United States.
The President’s proclamation had on the contrary
warned all the citizens of the United States
against engaging in any enterprise hostile to Spain.
He said that the proceedings complained of
were subsequent to the proclamation.
I replied that if any illegal combination for such a purpose
had been formed at a distance from the seat of government,
it was to be considered that the government of the
United States had not the same means of immediate
or of complete control over them as in similar cases
were possessed by European governments.
They had an open country.
No barrier of fortified cities
to stop persons intending to pass the frontier.
No army of corps of gendarmerie to support and
give efficacy to measures of police, and no authority to
arrest individuals or disperse assemblages, until possessed
of proof that they have committed acts, or are in the
process of committing acts in violation of the law.
With these considerations I was very sure that if any such
expeditions had been undertaken, they had neither been
sanctioned nor connived at by the American government.
That they would on the contrary in the manner and
according to the forms allowed by our Constitutions be
ultimately and effectually prevented, unless this impatience
and heat of Mr. Onís should precipitate the two countries
into a state of hostility which we sincerely deprecated.
That as to commercial intercourse with the independents
and the admission of their flags into our ports, this
he knew was conformable to the received usages of nations.
It was practiced in this case by Great Britain, the closest
ally of Spain, and no one knew better than he that she had
refused either to interdict the commerce with the insurgents
to her subjects, or to exclude their flag from her ports.
He at first nodded assent to these remarks, and
I observed that if his colleague, Onís, was ordered to
demand his passports for causes such as these, I should
expect to hear that he, Fernan Nuñez, had also left this court
without taking leave, as the causes of offense to Spain were
the same here as had been alleged by him at Washington.
The Count said he did not know what Onís’ orders were,
and in truth it was not his concern;
but for himself he was pretty well satisfied with what
he had lately obtained here against the insurgents.
By which I understood him to allude to the
recent Order in Council which I mentioned
to Mr. Del Real, but of which he had not heard.
Fernan Nuñez is a man of great softness of manners and
politeness of demeanor and throughout the whole of this
conversation preserved the most perfect good humor.9
On 9 April 1816 John Quincy Adams recorded in his Memoirs
a conversation he had with the Foreign Secretary Castlereagh:
He next referred to the notes I had sent him concerning
the fisheries and the armaments on the Lakes.
He said the British Government was ready to make
a proposition to avoid all collisions in the fisheries,
and they were willing to meet the proposal of the
American Government that there might be no
unnecessary naval force upon the Lakes in
active service or in commission, so that there
should be nothing like an appearance of a dispute
which side should have the strongest force there.
The armed vessels might be laid up,
as they called it here, in ordinary.
It was, in short, the disposition of the British Government
fully to meet the proposition made to them,
and the only armed force which they should want
to have in service might be vessels for conveying
troops occasionally from one station to another.
He asked if I had instructions from the American
Government, or a power upon which
I could conclude anything upon the subject.
I told him that I had not; I had transmitted the papers
that had passed here concerning the fisheries—
my first note to Lord Bathurst, and his answer—last autumn.
I was expecting instructions in reply to them
every day and every hour.
As to the armaments on the Lakes, it being mutually
understood that no new armaments are to take place
on either side, and that orders shall accordingly be given,
there will be ample time to concert between the two
Governments the details of a specific article for the future,
which might be signed either here or at Washington.
As, however, the instructions which I am expecting may,
very possibly, give me no new power, but consist only
of observations upon the papers that I had forwarded,
it would save time, and perhaps be most advisable,
to have the proposal made immediately to the Government
of the United States, and through the British Minister there.
He said, as the fishing season was now approaching,
it would, he believed, be best to send the instructions and
power to Mr. Bagot, and then the instructions to the naval
officers on the American coast might be given accordingly.
I then asked him if anything had been done upon my
last note to him, enclosing copies of the correspondence
between Governor Cass, of the Michigan Territory,
and Colonel James.
Lord Castlereagh appeared not to understand me,
and had evidently not read, or retained no sort
of recollection of, the correspondence,
or of my remarks upon it.
Whether this ignorance was real or assumed
I could not positively determine;
but I believe he had never even read my note.
I recapitulated to him all the material facts and urged
to him the great danger that such transactions should
lead to actual hostilities between the bordering authorities.
He assured me that very strong instructions should be
sent out to secure due respect to the American jurisdiction,
and at the same time an opportunity might be given
to the officers complained of to offer
an explanation of their proceedings.
I then enquired if anything had been done
with regard to the discrimination in the Irish ports.
He said that orders had been sent to Ireland
which would remove the discrimination.
Without admitting the right, they would
put away the cause of complaint.
But he could not tell whether it would be by increasing
the restriction on one side, or by diminishing it on the other.
I repeated that as to the ground of our claim,
we must leave that choice to their option;
but I believed if they should subject the ships of
both nations to the restriction of one passenger
to every five tons, the effect would be equivalent to a
prohibition of trade between the United States and Ireland.
He asked, how?
I said it would be equivalent to a
prohibition of exports from Ireland to America.
Passengers, and the cargo required to carry them,
constituted the only exports.
Provisions were among the principal exports of Ireland.
Forty passengers for a vessel of two hundred tons
could not be equivalent to a freight.
There were now nearly a hundred American vessels
in the ports of Ireland, waiting for this decision,
and I supposed if it should be to allow only
one passenger for every five tons,
they would all be obliged to come away in ballast.
The servant had been in and announced Sir Henry Holford.
I took my leave and went to Craven Street.10
Also on April 9 Adams in London wrote this six-page letter
to Secretary of State James Monroe:
From the representations of the present condition
of this country, contained in all the newspapers
that you will receive and repeated day after day,
and week after week, in the parliamentary debates,
it is to be apprehended that erroneous impressions
of the reality may be made unless these highly colored
pictures should be received with suitable allowances.
It might perhaps be stated that there never was a
period in the history of this island, when there was less
of real suffering among the people than at this moment.
There certainly never was a period,
when the public tranquility was more profound.
The great and immediate cause of complaint
is excessive plenty, the consequence of which,
in point of fact, is that the whole people are fed.
The nature of their want will give
a striking idea of their real state.
They want a year of scarcity.
It is nevertheless true that this overflowing abundance,
combining with the load of taxation with which they are
oppressed, bears with peculiar hardship upon one
particular class of the people, a very important part
of the community—the small farmer.
Nothing can be more simple than that the calculation
of this load of taxation has been doubled upon them
by the depreciation of their stock to one-half
at which it could be sold during the war.
Hence the inability of many of them
to pay their rents and their tithes.
Hence the reduction in the wages of laborers,
which increases the numbers to be supported
or assisted by the poor rates.
Hence a falling off in the income of the landlords,
some of whom are compelled to retrench their expenses,
and others to intrench upon their capitals.
Hence a diminution of consumption in the articles
of commerce and luxury, and hence finally an
augmented number of distress for rent and
executions for the payment of taxes.
To what extent this may be carried hereafter
I will not undertake to say; but if it should amount
to anything that can deserve the name of national distress,
it will be discovered by symptoms far, very far differing
from any that have been hitherto discernible.
It is clear neither this nor any other government
can levy taxes upon the poor absolutely poor.
Taxation must in its nature be levied upon superfluity.
But there is a state of society just above that of poverty,
and from which the government may, and this government
does, commence the extraction of part of its superfluity;
and as that part was a large proportion of the whole when
the stock and income of this class of people was double
what it is at present, now that these have been reduced
one-half in value, the part extracted absorbs the whole
superfluity, and encroaching upon the stock itself,
ruins the man and casts him upon the parish for subsistence.
Cases of this kind have undoubtedly become numerous
and every individual case is of great hardship.
But on the other hand, it should be considered
that the property of the fund-holders has risen in value
in proportion as that of the land-holders has fallen.
The three and four and five percents
have nominally risen but little.
The prices at the stock exchange are nearly as they were.
But the forty millions a year, which the bank paid out
two years ago to the stock-holders as interest upon
their funded property, was worth not more than
twenty-five millions of gold or silver.
It is now equivalent to specie.
Here is then fifteen millions in value added to the
circulating superfluity of the nation, and the fund-holders
are enabled to enlarge their scale of expenditure as much
as the landed proprietors are obliged to retrench theirs.
This appears to be the circumstance which will
falsify the predictions of those who have foretold
the fact has hitherto proved directly the reverse.
a great falling off in the revenue as a consequence
inevitable from the distress of the landed interest.
The fact has hitherto proved directly the reverse.
All the taxes upon consumption and expenditure yield
more in 1815 than they ever had in any preceding year.
The returns upon the 5th of this month for the first quarter
of the present year indicate no symptoms of deficiency.
The excise, the assessed taxes, the stamps, are all
as productive as they ever have been, and hence it is
demonstrated that the consumption of luxuries as well as
of necessaries, the transfers of property, and the commerce
of internal circulation, are as great and as active as ever;
while the other fact, that the exchange and consequently the
balance of trade of all the world is in favor of Great Britain,
amply refutes the clamors of commercial distress
in which the merchants are indulging themselves,
rather for the sake of keeping in tune with the farmers,
than from any real participation in their sufferings.
The distress therefore about which so much is said
both in and out of Parliament is not the distress of the
nation, but it may with propriety be termed the distress
of the landed for the benefit of the funded interest.
That its tendency must be, should it long continue,
to destroy the harmony between those two important
parts of the community, is very obvious, and the
consequences may be serious, if the attention
of the nation should be allowed to fix itself for
a length of time upon its internal state, so that the debt
and the taxes may have their full undisturbed operation.
It is the opinion of many distinguished political
economists here, that the debt, however large,
is no burden upon the nation, because they
consider the nation both as debtor and creditor.
The nation, say they, owes to itself.
A more correct view of the subject seems to be
that the result of the debt is to make one-half the
nation debtors to the other, and the government is the
mere agent of the creditor for the collection of the payment.
The burden of taxation has evidently become
insupportable to the debtor part, and the rejection
of the proposal to continue the property tax at a
reduced rate is the first unequivocal indication of that fact.
But the relief from immediate pressure
has been obtained only by postponing
the attempt to obtain any permanent relief.
The sinking fund now pays off but twelve millions
of the debt yearly by the loss of the property tax,
and the war tax on malt.
The government is compelled to add by loans
or by issuing Exchequer bills fifteen millions to the debt.
But as there is reason to expect that the remaining revenue
will yield three millions more this year that it did the last,
the sum of debt will probably be at the end of the year
about the same that it was at the beginning.
Much is said by the ministers in Parliament to represent
the actual state of things as an intermediate stage
between war and peace, and they hold out the prospect
of being able to reduce their expenditures
six or five millions lower the next year than this.
That however is a very precarious promise.
Upon the principles on which they found their naval
and military establishments for the present year,
it is more likely they will find the want of increased
expenses for the next, than that they will think
themselves enabled to make further retrenchments.
There is therefore little reason to expect
for years to come any alleviation of the national debt;
but there is nothing in the present condition
of the nation that demonstrates inability to bear it.
The distress which is represented as pressing
upon the nation is in point of fact limited to a small,
though important, portion of the people.
It is even unbalanced by a corresponding augmentation
of the wealth of another part of the community;
and however afflictive the operation of this process
may be upon individuals, and however it may be justly
taken for the symptoms of a deep and most dangerous
disease in the state, it would be an utterly erroneous
conclusion to infer from it that it has any effect
to impair the present strength or resources of the nation.
The general aspect of affairs in Europe
seems to promise a durable tranquility.
No solid confidence can, however, be placed in it
so long as France shall remain in her
present forced and unnatural condition.
By the treaties this is to continue at least three,
and contingently five years.
If the people of France should for that length of time
submit to this new and extraordinary form of government,
it may be foretold with the most undoubting confidence,
that the necessity for keeping up the same guaranty
to maintain the authority of the Bourbons will,
at the end of the five years rather be greater
than less than it was when the arrangement was made.
Even if the present king, the least obnoxious to
the French people of the whole family, should live
through the period of this royal servitude, he will certainly
need the foreign armies to protect his authority;
so that it will be impossible for him to dispense with them.
To his legitimate successors they will be
still more necessary than to him.
But even should the course of nature change in their favor,
and should they feel their hold upon the affections of the
nations to be so strong that they can venture to dismiss
their allied guardians, it may be doubted whether
England, Austria, Prussia or Russia will be equally
convinced of the expediency, either of withdrawing
their troops or of restoring the fortresses
which place France so completely under their control.
From the duress under which France is now held
there appear to be only two possible issues.
One by the dissolution of the European alliance against her,
of which hitherto there is not the slightest prospect;
and the other by the impatience and desperation
of the people of France breaking out in abortive
insurrections, which would inevitably lead to further
dismemberment and to the final partition of the country.
The elements of civil society in France are dissolved.
Her military power is annihilated.
The conflict of political opinions and of
individual interest is inveterate, irreconcilable.
There is no real government.
No genuine tie of allegiance from the subject
to the sovereign, or of protection from
the sovereign to the subject.
Religion itself, after losing all its salutary control,
has yet just influence enough left to be
the cause of deadly dissension.
It is scarcely possible that France
should escape the fate of Poland.
The manner in which this event is to be consummated
and the distribution of the spoils will form perhaps
for some years the great subject of negotiation
and discussion among the European allies.11
At a banquet with several dukes in England on 15 April 1816 in response
to the Lord Mayor, John Quincy Adams spoke and wrote about it in his Memoirs.
The Lord Mayor next gave, “The President of the
United States,” upon which I arose from my seat and said,
”My Lord, I pray your Lordship to accept my hearty
thanks for the honor which you have done my country
in drinking the health of its Chief Magistrate.
I receive it as an earnest of peace, harmony,
and friendship between the two countries.
To promote peace, harmony, and friendship
between Great Britain and the United States
is the first duty of my station.
It is the first wish of my heart.
It is my first prayer to God.
I hope it will not be deemed unsuitable on this occasion
to recur to considerations of a religious nature.
In ordinary cases, and at ordinary times, it may be
proper and sufficient for Britons and for Americans
to say to themselves, ‘It is our interest on both sides
to live in peace, harmony, and friendship together.’
But, my Lord, the event which was this day
commemorated at this table in the convivial and
loving cups of your Lord and Ladyship, is the
most important even that ever occurred upon this globe.
It is an event in which we are all interested—
a pledge to us all of immortality.
It is the warrant to us all of another state of existence,
where all is peace, harmony, and friendship.
May it ever have the proper influence on the minds
of your lordship’s countrymen and of mine!”12
John Quincy Adams from London wrote to Secretary of State
James Monroe again on 15 April 1816.
At the request of Lord Castlereagh I called upon him
last Tuesday when he informed me that the British
government were prepared to make a proposal for an
arrangement of the question relating to the fisheries, and
to meet that of the government of the United States relative
to naval armaments on the Northern American lakes,
so far as to avoid everything like a contention between the
two parties which should have the strongest force there.
He asked me if I considered my powers adequate,
and if I had instructions which would authorize me now
to conclude an agreement upon these points.
I told him that I did not consider my power as extending to
the first, and should not feel myself warranted in concluding
an article upon the second without further instructions.
I had transmitted to you copies of all the papers
which had passed between Lord Bathurst and me
concerning the fisheries, and I was in daily and
hourly expectation of receiving instructions upon
the note from Lord Bathurst proposing negotiation
upon that subject; but possibly they might contain
only observations upon the proposal and no new power.
He said as the fishing season was now approaching,
perhaps it would be most expedient to make the
proposal directly to the government of the
United States at Washington, and to send a
power and instructions for that purpose to Mr. Bagot,
so that the instructions to the British naval officers
on the American station might be given accordingly.
With regard to the force upon the lakes, he said,
excepting the vessels which might be necessary to convey
troops occasionally from station to station, the British
government did not wish to have any ships in commission
or in active service, and all the armed vessels now existing
there might be laid up, as it was called here, in ordinary.
I said that understanding it as now agreed that no new
additional force should be commenced upon the lakes
on either side for the present, and all the effects of a
positive engagement as existing from this time,
there would be ample time for the concerting of
an express article which might be satisfactory to both
governments, and in many respects it might be most
convenient that this should be concluded at Washington.
I therefore readily assent to his suggestion and wished that
a power and instructions should be sent out to Mr. Bagot
upon both the points, which I trust will immediately be done.
I then observed that while speaking of the means of
preserving the peace between the bordering possessions
of the two countries, I would again ask his attention to
the correspondence between the Governor of the
Michigan Territory and Colonel James, copies of which
I had lately transmitted to him, and inquired if anything
had been done upon the note which I had
addressed to him on this subject.
He had probably not read either my note or the
correspondence, and if he had, he retained
no recollection of their contents.
I recapitulated to him all the facts: the manner in which
the Indian had been killed; the letters from Colonel James
to Governor Cass; the coroner’s inquest; the reward
offered by the Canadian magistrates of five hundred dollars,
and the proclamation of Governor Cass in defense of
the jurisdiction of the territory; and I reminded him
of the imminent danger there had been that acts
of violence and of hostility between the two jurisdictions
would have ensued from these transactions.
He said that a strong instruction should be sent out
to the colonial government, and the persons
complained of should be called upon to show
if they had any explanation to give for their proceedings.
I asked him if the discrimination between
the ships of the two countries in relation to
the carrying of passengers had been removed.
He said that without admitting the right,
orders to that effect had been sent to Ireland.
I understood him that it had been left to the
Irish government to determine whether the
restriction upon British ships should be increased,
or that upon American vessels diminished.
I told him that this must be at the option of the government.
But I apprehended if they should make the restriction
of one passenger to five tons universal,
it would be almost equivalent to a total prohibition
of commerce between the United States and Ireland.
The decision upon this matter has been much
procrastinated, and I should have pressed for it with more
importunity; but that it is yet uncertain here whether the
convention has been carried into effect in the United States.
This government has been loudly called upon to suspend
the operation upon that account, and I expected
Lord Castlereagh would have spoken to me of it.
But he did not, and the act of Parliament for
carrying the convention into effect here has passed.
Since this interview with Lord Castlereagh I have
received from him a note respecting the slaves carried away
from the United States after the ratification of the peace.
A copy of it is enclosed;
to reply to it at present would be to no purpose.
I shall wait for your further instructions.13
In another letter to Monroe on April 30 Adams reviewed issues
of his previous letters, and then he wrote about Spanish issues in this letter:
My letters of 22 and 31 January and 8 February,
have given you a very full account of the execution of
your instructions of 10 December and of the views of
this government in relation to Spain and Spanish affairs.
The debates in Parliament have occasionally furnished
since then further elucidations of the British policy.
At the very commencement of the session of Parliament,
Mr. Brougham made a motion in the House of Commons
for an address to the Prince Regent, requesting him to
interpose in behalf of the Spanish patriots who are suffering
under prosecutions by the government of Ferdinand VII.
On that occasion, after a very long speech of Mr. Brougham
and an animated debate, Lord Castlereagh closed the whole
by a speech equally long, the main object of which was
to inculpate the Spanish patriots, and to defend the
proceedings of Ferdinand’s government against them;
but in which he at the same time said,
that this government had interposed
and were yet interposing in behalf of the patriots.
If he had mentioned this at the time when Mr. Brougham
gave notice of his motion, the whole debate would
have been suspended, and it appears that the motive
for letting the debate take its course must have been
to have the opportunity of displaying in the face of
Europe a formal defense of Ferdinand’s government.
The interference in behalf of the patriots was thus an
ostensible compliance with the strong public sentiment of the
country, while the Spanish government easily understood
that against these representations it might assert all its spirit
of independence without much offending the remonstrants.
It does not appear that there has been any relaxation
of rigor in the treatment of the patriots,
but the Madrid Gazette has given the utmost publicity
in Spain to Lord Castlereagh’s defense of Ferdinand.
Since then in other debates notice has been taken of
the commerce between this country and South America,
and of the British subjects taken at Carthagena by Morillo.
Lord Castlereagh said this government was taking
all the measures in their power to increase the
commerce with South America, and that the
Spanish government was disposed to treat the
British subjects taken at Carthagena with indulgence.
From all this and especially from a comparison between
Lord Castlereagh’s speech on Mr. Brougham’s motion,
and what he was nearly at the same time saying to me
concerning Spain under an injunction of confidence,
the present British policy towards that country
may be accurately ascertained.
That the Spanish government relies upon the
support of that of Great Britain in making the demands
set forth in Mr. Onís’ letters cannot be doubted.
Great Britain, you will recollect, did at the Ghent negotiation
very decidedly manifest her disposition upon this subject.
And the conclusion of the peace had probably
produced no change in that respect.
You will particularly notice what Lord Castlereagh
said to me on the 25th of January, and in the discussion
of every question of difference between the United States
and Spain we must always take it for granted that
the British feeling and policy will be against us.
But that Mr. Onís’ demands have been instigated
by this government I am not warranted to assert.
There was, I believe, some communication between Spain
and this country before Mr. Onís’ instructions were sent out,
upon which he addressed those letters to you.
Yet I do not think it was the wish or intention
of this cabinet that the question should be
brought to an immediate issue of war.
The Spanish Ambassador here has evidently been
concerned at the prospects of extremities which
have been presented by the reports of the
correspondence which has lately circulated here.
He lately told me that Onís had written of the
rupture as of unfounded calumnies—
that Onís’ was satisfied—that he had indeed
asked personally for leave of absence on account of
his private affairs, but that it would not be granted.
From the whole tenor of his conversation
I should rather infer, if any counsel from the country
has lately been given to Spain, it has been rather
of a cooling than of an inflammatory character.
I ought to mention, that some intimation
has been conveyed to me of new orders
having been recently issued to the British naval officers
at Newfoundland and on the North American coast,
of special vigilance in the prevention of contraband,
which has probably relation to the fisheries.14
On 20 May 1816 John Adams wrote in a letter to his oldest son John Quincy Adams:
Mr. Dexter and the late Chief Justice Sewall, were to me,
Friends in need; when a barbarous Noise Surrounded Us
Such as had Surrounded me for more than twenty Years
before of Owls and Cuckoos, Asses Apes and Dogs.
When Perfidy and Treachery, Imbecility, Ignorance
Fanaticism and Fury Surrounded Us; all, Puppets danced
upon the Wires of a Bastard Bratt of a Scotch Pedlar.
That Period never will or can be explained to Mankind.
Characters must be drawn, that I Shudder to contemplate.
Facts must be stated that no man dares to insinuate.
Idle is the Talk of Freedom of thinking, Speaking, or writing.
There is no such thing in this Country, or in any other.
Never was; but I will not say never will be, for hope
remains after all the Evils have evaporated from the Box.15
On May 29 John Quincy Adams in a letter to his father John Adams wrote,
The question relating to the fisheries has been largely
discussed between me, and the British Government;
but hitherto without any other result than a
proposal from them to negotiate on amicable
arrangements of the matter at issue between
the two Countries, and an acceptance of that
proposal on the part of the United States—
Authority and Instructions were sent to me,
to negotiate a Convention to this effect,
but it arrived too late to be acted upon.
A Power to negotiate on the same point
had already been sent to Mr. Bagot,
and the business will be done at Washington.
How the pretensions of the parties can
be reconciled I cannot anticipate.
I have done the utmost in my power to
maintain our rights and hope they will be
more effectually maintained in abler hands.
Whatever may be the natural and necessary propensities
of mankind to War, my special duty at present is to preach
Peace, and from the bottom of my Soul I do preach it;
as well to those to whom, as to those from whom I am sent.
I am deeply convinced that Peace is the state best
adapted to the interest and the happiness of both Nations.
All things considered, my countrymen appear to me
inclined to be rather more proud than they have reason
of the War, from which they have so recently emerged.
They look too intently to their triumphs, and turn
their eyes too lightly away from their disasters.
It was a War from which if the account of disgrace
and of glory were fairly balanced, we should
have something, but not much to boast of.
May we do better next time! and that we may do better,
let us not be hasty to enter again upon the contest.
At the same time it is not “ignoble ease,
and peaceful Sloth” that I would counsel.
An efficient revenue, and a growing Navy—
these are the pillars of my Peace.16
On 22 June 1816 John Quincy Adams from London
wrote this letter to Secretary of State James Monroe:
From the communication of Lord Castlereagh to me,
the account of which was given in my last two dispatches,
and from the general purport of Lord Castlereagh’s
observation, I am convinced that Lord Exmouth
has on this occasion misunderstood the
real object and intentions of his instructions.
His government was perfectly satisfied
with the result of his first negotiation at Algiers.
They had manifested their indignation at the practice
of Barbary warfare in making Christian slaves.
They had charged their noble Admiral to read a moral
lecture to the Dey, and having paid this tribute to the
public feeling of Christendom, they were quite content
to encourage the Dey to abolish the practice of making
Christian slaves in future by stipulating the payment
of a heavy ransom for those he had already made.
But the Bey of Tunis and, as Lord Castlereagh a few days
since told me, the Bashaw of Tripoli were found so
tractable under Lord Exmouth’s admonitions that
they issued declarations renouncing for the future
the practice of reducing Christian captives to slavery,
and Lord Exmouth seems to have been tempted by38
the success of his exhortations to those two minor
potentates to renew with more vigor, or at least
with more menace of energy, the experiment of
obtaining a similar declaration from the Dey of Algiers.
If I have not grossly mistaken the views of his government,
they will be so far from thanking him for his renewed zeal
to carry this part of his instructions into execution that
they would most willingly have dispensed even
with the declarations from Tunis and Tripoli.
Lord Castlereagh told me that the only thing
they expected Lord Exmouth to have done upon his
return to Algiers was to make little protest
against the application to Great Britain of the 18th article
of the late Algerine treaty with the United States.
But Lord Exmouth’s demonstration of hostility, followed
by his subsequent retreat, have not only placed this
government in an awkward and mortifying position,
but by the public advices from that quarter of a
later date than Mr. Shaler’s letter, have produced
further unpleasant and even tragical consequences.
At Oran it is said that several British vessels
were immediately seized and their crews
with the British consul, sent prisoners to Algiers.
From later accounts however it appears that
they were afterwards released and restored.
But at Bona there has been a massacre of
two hundred Christians and upwards on the 27th of May,
and among them was included by the reports
now circulated the British consul.
There have also been rumors that the Bey of Tunis had
been deposed by his own son, in consequence of the
declaration which Lord Exmouth had obtained from him,
and that a squadron had issued from Tunis, by which
new depredations were committed on the coast of Italy.
Some notice of these extraordinary transactions has
been taken in the House of Commons where Mr. Brougham
moved for the production of Lord Exmouth’s treaties.
Lord Castlereagh declined producing them,
and Mr. Brougham ultimately withdrew his motion.
But in the debate the spirit of indignation
against the Barbary states was manifested
by the friends and supporters of the ministers
as strongly as by their opponents.
Lord Castlereagh alone withstood the general current,
and sufficiently indicated that it is not the intention
of the British government to extinguish
these piracies on the African coast.
On the contrary I am persuaded that a new
negotiation will take place, in which Lord Exmouth’s
proceedings, if not disavowed, will be explained away
on the ground of misconception; new sacrifices
will be made to pacify the Dey of Algiers,
and the commerce of all the secondary maritime states
and the Christian shores of the Mediterranean will
continue to be harassed and ransomed by the depredations
of the Barbarians as heretofore, and probably worse.
The next British negotiator at Algiers will understand
his instructions and the real object of his government.
In the late occurrences they appear to have been better
understood by the Dey than by Lord Exmouth himself.
For although his Lordship was ordered to give every
grave and charitable counsel to the Dey, and was
also explicitly authorized to use force, if necessary,
yet it was certainly not expected either that the advice
should be followed, or that the force should be used.17
On 8 July 1816 Adams wrote in his Memoirs that Castlereagh had told him that
the British Parliament had approved an Act allowing American vessels to take
the same number of passengers from Ireland as the British ships.
Adams noted that American ships had been cleared for direct access to British ports in India.
Adams and Foreign Minister Castlereagh worked on negotiating mutual interests,
and their work would lead to the Rush-Bagot Agreement on 28 April 1817
that reduced naval armaments in the Great Lakes.
In a letter to John Adams his son JQA wrote on 1 August 1816:
Since the peace it has evidently been the great struggle
of the faction still calling themselves federalists,
not as during the war to grasp or destroy the
national government, but merely to maintain their own
ascendency in the states where they had obtained it.
They have, however, failed even of that
in Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York.
In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland,
their majorities have dwindled almost into nothing.
Should no national misfortune befall us,
I anticipate their complete overthrow in another year.
It is hinted to me that the separation of the District of Maine
will prolong their dominion perhaps a year or two more
in the remnant of old Massachusetts;
but as the new state will immediately be redeemed from
their misgovernment, it will weaken them in the national
councils and scatter their ranks nearly as much as if they
were reduced to a minority in the whole Commonwealth.
If I were merely a man of Massachusetts I should
deeply lament this dismemberment of my native state.
But the longer I live the stronger I find my
national feelings grow upon me, and the less of
my affections are compassed by partial localities.
My system of politics more and more inclines
to strengthen the union and its government.
It is directly the reverse of that professed by Mr. John
Randolph, of relying principally upon the state governments.
The effort of every one of the state governments would
be to sway the whole union for its own local advantage.
The doctrine is therefore politic enough for a citizen of
the most powerful state in the union, but it is good for
nothing for the weaker states and pernicious for the whole.
But it is the contemplation of our external relations
that makes me specially anxious to
strengthen our national government.
The conduct and issue of the late war has undoubtedly
raised our national character in the consideration
of the world; but we ought also to be aware that
it has multiplied and embittered our enemies.
This nation is far more inveterate against us
than it ever was before.
All the restored governments of Europe
are deeply hostile to us.
The Royalists everywhere detest
and despise us as Republicans.
All the victims and final vanguishers of the
French Revolution abhor us as aiders and abettors
of the French during their career of triumph.
Wherever British influence extends, it is busy
to blacken us in every possible manner.
In Spain the popular feeling is almost
as keen against us as in England.
Emperors, kings, princes, priests, all the privileged orders,
all the establishments, all the votaries of legitimacy,
eye us with the most rancorous hatred.
Among the crowned heads the only friend we had
was the Emperor Alexander, and his friendship has,
I am afraid, been more than cooled.
How long it will be possible for us to preserve peace
with all Europe, it is impossible to foresee.
Of this I am sure, that we cannot be too well
or too quickly prepared for a new conflict
to support our rights and our interests.
The tranquility of Europe is precarious,
it is liable to many sudden changes and great convulsions;
but there is none in probable prospect which would
give us more security than we now enjoy
against the bursting of another storm upon ourselves.
I can never join with my voice in the toast which I see in the
papers attributed to one of our gallant naval commanders.
I cannot ask of heaven success, even for my country,
in a cause where she should be in the wrong.
Fiat Justitia pareat coelum.
My toast would be, may our country be always successful,
but whether successful or otherwise always right.
I disclaim as unsound all patriotism incompatible
with the principles of eternal justice.
But the truth is that the American union, while united,
may be certain of success in every rightful cause, and may
if it pleases, never have any but a rightful cause to maintain.
They are at this moment the strongest nation
upon the globe for every purpose of justice.
May they be just to secure the favor of heaven,
and wise to make a proper application of their strength.
May they be armed in thunder for the defense of right,
and self-shackled in eternal impotence
for the support of wrong.18
On August 24 John Quincy Adams from London sent
this letter to the Secretary of State James Monroe:
On Wednesday last I had an interview with
Lord Castlereagh, in which he informed me that
this government declined entering upon any negotiation
relative to the commercial intercourse between the
United States and the British colonies in the West Indies.
That they were averse to any discussion
relative to blockades and the other conflicting
pretensions of neutral and belligerent rights.
And that they were willing to receive any proposals
that we may wish to offer respecting the intercourse
by land between the United States and the British
continental colonies respecting seamen, but there was a
manifest reluctance to negotiate even upon these points.
With regard to the West Indies he said
it was understood by this government that the
United States would be perfectly free to adopt any
countervailing regulations, either of prohibition or
of additional duties, that they might think advisable.
That Great Britain would have no right to complain of them.
That the determination in this instance arose altogether
from that of adhering to their colonial system,
of the wisdom of which he spoke as being
in his own mind not unquestionable,
but from which it was not thought expedient now to depart.
He renewed at the same time the assurance of
the pacific and friendly dispositions of this government.
Since the commencement of this month
the government advertised for transports
to carry five thousand two hundred tons
of ordnance stores to Canada.
This advertisement, appearing immediately after the
publication in the newspapers of Governor Cass’s letter to
the commander of the Tecumseh produced an alarm among
the commercial people in the city of London which it might
perhaps have been intended to produce in another quarter.
But it occasioned a depression of the funds
which was probably neither intended nor expected.
A part of these stores lately sailed, together with officers
to command some of their vessels on the lakes.
At the beginning of the summer they had stripped
a number of their heavy merchant vessels at Quebec
of their crews to the heavy damage of their owners
and the ruin of some of the voyages for the purpose
of manning their armed vessels on the lakes, and now
they send out ordnance and officers at a season of
perilous navigation, and too late for service if they arrive.
Far from being alarmed at these measures,
I rather infer from the ostentatious publicity
given to them some alarm on their part.
They are the precipitances of imaginations
haunted with terrors of a sudden invasion
of Canada from the United States.
I believe there is no intention here of an immediate
war with America, but there may be a policy
of exciting frequently a public expectation of it.
I spoke to Lord Castlereagh of the improper conduct
of the officer from the Tecumseh, and told him I should
send him a note concerning it and copies of the affidavits.
He said he wished me to express in the note the conviction
that this government would take the promptest measures
to repress any misconduct of that nature
and to mark their disapprobation of it.
His Lordship also communicated to me the instructions
to Lord Exmouth on his present expedition to Algiers.
They are dated the 18th of July, and they direct Lord
Exmouth to offer peace to the Dey upon three conditions:
1. That the Dey shall sign a declaration similar
to that lately obtained from Tunis and Tripoli
never more to reduce Christian prisoners to slavery.
2. That he shall immediately liberate, and in the
first instance deliver up to Lord Exmouth, all the
Christian slaves of whatever nation now in his possession.
3. That he shall repay all the money paid for the Sardinian
and Neapolitan slaves under the treaties of 3 April last.
No modification of either of these three conditions
is to be accepted.
He is to prescribe a reasonable time within which
the Dey’s answer is to be given, and in case of refusal
of either of the conditions he is to commence
hostilities against the Algerine fleet.
In concluding the peace he is to admit
no stipulation for any consular present in future.
These instructions are founded upon the formal undertaking
of Great Britain to break up the whole system of
Barbary piracy, an enterprise worthy of her power and
among the noblest purposes to which it could be applied.
Nothing is left but for the execution
to correspond with the design.19
John Quincy Adams in a letter to Lord Castlereagh on 17 September 1816
in which he suggested negotiation on the following issues:
1. The commerce between the United States and the
British colonies in North America and in the West Indies….
2. Seamen….
3. Neutral and belligerent rights….
4. Slaves carried away from the United States
by British officers after the peace….
Should his Majesty’s government think proper to
accept this proposal for a negotiation upon the points
with regard to which the general wishes of the government
of the United States have been frankly exposed,
the undersigned will be ready to enter into further
communication with any person who may be authorized
to confer with him for the purpose of such a negotiation.
If the offer should not be deemed acceptable, he requests
the honor of as early an answer as may be convenient.20
Then John Quincy Adams September 18 wrote in a letter
to Secretary of State James Monroe:
You will perceive by all my late dispatches that
there is no prospect of doing anything here in the
way of a negotiation upon objects of commerce.
I addressed yesterday to Lord Castlereagh a note
renewing the proposal to negotiate, the object of which
is to have the refusal explicitly signified in writing.
In my last interview with Lord Castlereagh he did
unequivocally decline negotiation upon the trade
between the United States and the British colonies
in the West Indies, and upon all the questions
relating to neutral rights in time of maritime war.
He said they were willing to receive any proposition
respecting seamen, and respecting the inland
intercourse between the United States and
the British colonies in North America.
I told him I should repeat the proposal
for treating in a note.
He expressed a wish that I would not mention
in the note the neutral questions at all.
I was somewhat surprised at the objection,
but promised him I would give it full consideration
before I sent in the note.
I did accordingly take ample time for reflection
and have concluded that I ought not only to include
them in the note, but to urge with earnestness the
reasons which make it peculiarly desirable that the
two governments should come to an understanding upon
those points before the recurrence of a maritime war.
With this dispatch I have the honor of enclosing
the Gazette Extraordinary sent from the foreign office,
containing Lord Exmouth’s dispatches from Algiers,
with the account of his attack upon that place on the
27th of last month, the result of which was the
complete success of the expedition under his command—
the redemption of all the Christians who were
detained in slavery, the abolition stipulated
by the Dey of all such slavery for the future,
and the repayment of the money which had
been paid for ransom of Sardinians and Neapolitans
by virtue of Lord Exmouth’s previous treaties in April.
The issue, both of the hostile operations and of the
negotiations of the American squadron in the
Mediterranean in the summer of 1815, had sufficiently
shown to the Christian world what was the only
proper method of treating with the Barbary States,
and the perfect ease with which Algiers has now been
reduced to terms, including the gratuitous deliverance
of prisoners and the repayment of tribute money,
amply proves how inexcusable it would have been to have
endured any longer that system of tribute and servitude
which has been hitherto the disgrace of modern Europe.
I had indulged the hope that we ourselves were destined
to wipe off this disgrace from the face of Christian society;
but as the British government did finally undertake it,
I rejoice that they have been
so easily and so completely successful.
The precise tenor of the treaties is yet to be published,
and as they will effect a total revolution of the external
policy of Algiers, perhaps some time may elapse before
all the internal consequences of this event will be disclosed
as they may affect the government of the country.21
John Quincy Adams at London wrote this letter
on 28 September 1816 to President James Madison:
I have lately had the honor of receiving your favor
of 10th May last, accompanied by letters to Sir John Sinclair,
which I immediately delivered in person to him;
for Mr. Bentham, which I left at his house; and for
Dr. Eustis, which was forwarded by post to The Hague.
Sir John Sinclair then put into my hands the printed paper
which I now enclose, requesting me to forward it to you;
and Mr. Bentham has since sent me two small volumes
lately published by him under the title of Chrestomathia,
Parts 1 and 2, with a similar request.
They will be sent in a packet with this letter.
You will perhaps think there is something like
desperation in the remedies proposed by Sir John Sinclair
for the calamities which an insupportable debt and
intolerable taxes have brought upon this nation.
But the only practical problem for the British
financier to solve is, how to accomplish a
national bankruptcy or a composition with
the public creditors without appearing to make it.
When the distress, about which so much has been
and yet is said, and which I believe to have been
much exaggerated by almost all parties, when it
comes to pinch as it has hitherto only threatened, the
remedy will present itself as unequivocally as the disease,
and the most decisive proof to my mind of the exaggeration
in all the representations of general distress which have
been spreading over the world for so many months,
has been the arrant trifling of all parties in the character
of remedies they have administered or proposed.
While wheat was at six shillings a bushel,
the farmers must certainly have found it difficult
to pay their taxes, tithes, and poor rates,
and subsist themselves and support their families.
Had it continued long at that price,
they would have found it impossible.
But it has now risen again to ten shillings and upwards.
At that price the farmers can yet
stagger along with their load.
The streams of the revenue which had begun to fail
are again filling up; the cry of distress is still continued,
but the symptoms of suffering have much abated.
The present paroxysm has evidently passed its point
of greatest severity, and a great portion of those
who were really distressed are relieved for the moment.
It will, however, be scarcely possible to raise a revenue
of sixty millions sterling a year upon this people for any
considerable length of time, without occasioning frequent
renewals of the pressure which they will not always be
in a humor to endure with equal patience and resignation.
You will perceive by my correspondence with the
Secretary of State that the proposal of negotiating a treaty
of commerce has been declined with a profession of
readiness to receive and consider any specific proposition
upon two of the points suggested under your instruction.
Upon the point most immediately interesting,
our commerce with their colonies in the West Indies,
the refusal to treat is positive and unqualified.
Lord Castlereagh, with the utmost courtesy and politeness
in point of form, observed that with regard to any
regulations which might be contemplated on our part,
the whole subject was in the hands of the American
government; they might prohibit the trade in British vessels,
or they might impose aggravated duties upon it,
as might best suit their view of the policy of the
United States, and Great Britain would have
no right and feel no disposition to complain of it.
He appeared to intimate that the British Cabinet
had anticipated the effect of anything that could
be done by Congress, and were prepared for it.
He said it was merely an adherence to their colonial system,
and acknowledged that he had some personal doubt
whether it was for their own advantage.
I am indeed inclined to think that this inflexibility
upon colonial subjects proceeds rather from the
Colonial Department than from Lord Castlereagh.
When the first proposal in relation to the ships
at Venice was made, I was apprehensive that
there would be objections to the agency
of the person through whom it was proposed.
It was afterwards renewed through a regular and
unexceptionable channel, and I had hopes that
it would then have been found acceptable.
I have lately been asked from the official source of
the last proposal whether I had received any answer to it.
I had none from the Secretary of State, and it was a few
days before I had the honor of receiving your letter.
The terms upon which the ships may be obtained
are so advantageous, and the ships themselves
are so good, that another opportunity to
decide upon the proposal may be offered.
Some months ago since I received a letter from a person
in the Danish Province of Jutland requesting me to propose
to the government of the United States the purchase from
Denmark of the Nicobar Islands in the East Indies.
The writer of the letter intimates that the Danish
government would readily dispose of them to the
United States, but that there were particular and
satisfactory reasons for making the proposal
in this indirect and unaccredited manner.
I answered the letter and declined the negotiation
as having no authority to treat upon the subject.
The proposal was, however, repeated and urged
in a second letter which I have not answered.
I knew nothing of the writer of the letters, but they were
transmitted to me through the medium of the Danish Consul.
There is no inconsiderable alarm prevailing here
at this moment in consequence of rumors circulating
in the newspapers that an object of Mr. Pinkney’s
negotiation at Naples is to obtain a cession of
the Neapolitan island of Lampedusa to the United States.
Some of the public journals are for ordering Lord Exmouth’s
whole fleet immediately to the Bay of Naples to anchor,
yard arm and yard arm, along side of the American
seventy-four, and give courage to the Neapolitans
to reject the ridiculous American demands.
If you will send a Minister in a line of battleship
to Copenhagen with instructions to claim indemnity
for the Danish spoliations upon our commerce,
and let it be circulated that he is negotiating for
the Nicobar Islands, I will answer for its working
the British Cabinet and Parliament up to another year
of a thirty millions peace establishment, and shall not be
surprised if it rearms the whole body of the militia and
remounts all the yeomen cavalry of the British Isles.22
On 14 December 1816 John Quincy Adams in London wrote in a letter to Jonathan Russell:
The lakes of Canada may be considered as having in
the late war made their debut upon the political scene.
They are, if I mistake not, destined at no distant period to
perform upon that theater a still more conspicuous part.
Very early in the summer the British government
determined to maintain and increase in the midst
of peace their naval armaments upon them.
It appears that our government thought it
necessary to follow the example.
It is possible that if the peace should continue for some
years, both parties may become weary of the expense
which it will entail upon them, and gradually reduce the
force which they now propose to keep up;
but should there be an early renewal of hostilities,
as a general presentiment on both sides the Atlantic appears
to anticipate; those lakes will probably be the theater of
still more desperate conflicts, and God grant, of as heroic
achievements as they have been during the late war.23
J. Q. Adams in December 1816 wrote this letter to Lord Castlereagh:
The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary from the United States of America has
had the honor of receiving Lord Castlereagh’s note of
the 29th ultimo, informing him that a representation
has been made by the Lord Mayor of London to His
Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home
Department, stating that a number of American seamen
have been found wandering about the streets of London
in a most wretched and distressed condition, and that
several are now supported in the police establishments
and hospitals of the city at a very considerable expense.
His Lordship therefore requests the undersigned to take
measures in order that these seamen may be conveyed
to their native country with the least possible delay.
The undersigned has the honor to inform Lord Castlereagh
that provision is made by the laws of the United States for
the support and reconveyance to their native country of
destitute and distressed American seamen in foreign ports,
that this provision as been found sufficient for the purposes
for which it was intended in other countries, and in ordinary
circumstances in this; but that within these few months
the number of persons in this condition has been multiplied
beyond all former example, and that this increase has
been principally occasioned by the measures of the
British government; that by far the greatest proportion
of distressed American seamen who have made
application for relief at the consulate of the United States
have consisted of persons discharged
from the naval service of Great Britain.
Considerable numbers of these had been compelled
to enter the British service by the process of impressment,
others had been induced to enter it by the encouragement
held out to them by the British laws and proclamations.
It is confidently presumed by the undersigned that all,
or nearly all, those whose wretched situation has been
represented by the Lord Mayor of London to His Majesty’s
government are persons precisely in this predicament.
The undersigned is informed that several hundreds of them
have already been conveyed to the United States at the
expense of the American government, and that about
eighty are at the time receiving their daily sustenance
from the American consular office.
The undersigned would be deficient in his duty to his
country were he to forbear on this occasion to submit
to the consideration of His Majesty’s government that
the burden of supporting these men until they can be
restored to their country, and that of conveying them
thither, ought in justice to be borne, not by the American,
but by the British government; and he will add that
there are others whose claim to the equity and humanity
of Great Britain are no less deserving of consideration.
He refers to seamen not perhaps in absolute distress,
but who from their long services, or from wounds received
in the British service, are entitled to small pensions.
By the existing regulations of the navy the undersigned
understands that every such American seaman who
returns to his own country is reduced to the necessity
of alienating his annuity for the inadequate compensation
of two or at most three years purchase.
The undersigned flatters himself that the knowledge
of these circumstances being thus communicated,
His Majesty’s government will not hesitate to make
Provision for the reconveyance to the United States
of all the American seamen who have been discharged
from the British naval service by the late general
paying off of the navy, and for affording the means
to pensioners disabled in their service of receiving
after their return to the United States during their
lives the pensions which have been assigned to them.
The undersigned observes that the representations
of the Lord Mayor, being in terms very general and
containing specifically the name only of one American
seamen, he is unable to ascertain the individual
Americans represented to be in distress.
The means of designating them are doubtless in
possession of the British government; but is probable
there may be cases of seamen in a distressed condition
who alleged themselves to be Americans,
when they are not really such.
Should every person presenting himself at the
American consulate as an American seamen be
received as such, and conveyed to the United States
at their expense, a charge heretofore made, though
utterly without foundation, against the American
government, of inviting British seamen into the
service of the United States might recur
with an appearance of plausibility.
The undersigned deems it, therefore, proper to express
the expectation that when he is required by the British
government to provide for the reconveyance to their
country of American seamen, the individuals will be
pointed out to him in such a manner as to satisfy
him of their right to that provision.
He is, however, fully persuaded that the measures he
has herein suggested will render every other unnecessary,
and entirely remove the ground of a complaint upon which
the representation of the Lord Mayor was founded.24
Notes
1. Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford,
Volume V 1814-1816, p. 458-463.
2. Ibid., p. 463-465.
3. Ibid., p. 470-472.
4. Ibid., p. 487-490.
5. Ibid., p. 493-496.
6. Ibid., p. 509-510.
7. Ibid., p. 512-513.
8. Ibid., p. 526-529.
9. Ibid., p. 550-554.
10. Memoirs of Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848
by John Quincy Adams ed. Charles Francis Adams, Volume III, p. 329-331.
11. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume VI, p. 5-10.
12. Memoirs by John Quincy Adams, Volume III, p. 333.
13. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume VI, p. 16-19.
14. Ibid., p. 20-23.
15. From John Adams to John Quincy Adams, 20 May 1816. (Online).
16. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume VI, p. 37-38.
17. Ibid., p. 48-50.
18. Ibid., p. 59-62.
19. Ibid., p. 72-74.
20. Ibid., p. 81, 84-85, 86.
21. Ibid., p. 87-88.
22. Ibid., p. 98-101.
23. Ibid., 14 December 1816.
24. Ibid., December 1816.
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