Adams from Ghent on 3 July 1814 wrote in a letter to Secretary of State James Monroe:
On the 2nd of June I left Stockholm
and on the 6th arrived at Gothenburg.
I met on the road Mr. Connell, who had been dispatched
by Mr. Clay to give Mr. Russell and me information of the
change of the place of negotiation which had been proposed
by the British government, and assented to by Mr. Bayard
and Mr. Gallatin on the part of the American ministers.
Instead of some place in Holland which had been previously
intimated as the wish of the British government, they had
finally fixed upon this city, the effect of which as we have
now reason to believe will be to remove us from the
neutral territory to a place occupied by a British garrison.
There are as yet no British troops here,
but they are at Antwerp and Brussels,
and are expected here in the course of a few days.
In proposing this place as a substitute for one unequivocally
neutral, it appears to me it was incumbent on the British
government to give notice to the American ministers of
the change in the condition of the place, which it must
have been at that time contemplated by them to make.
Mr. Clay had determined to come from Gothenburg
by land and had left that city before I arrived there.
Mr. Russell was detained a few days longer at Stockholm
but reached Gothenburg on the 10th of June.
The next day we embarked on board the John Adams
and on the 18th landed at the Helder.
From thence we came by land to this city,
where we arrived on the 24th.
Mr. Gallatin comes from London by way of Paris,
and we expect him here tomorrow.1
John Quincy Adams was joined by other American peace commissioners
by the end of May, and in that chapter on the “Negotiation for Peace”
he described them until 3 August 1814.
He concluded Volume II with this paragraph:
Thus far the record has given only the proceedings
preliminary to the assemblage of the Commissioners
of the two sovereign powers on the
important duty of restoring peace.
The details of the negotiation will be better understood
if kept entirely together: hence it has been deemed
best to embrace them all in the next volume.2
In Volume III “The Negotiation of Peace” continues from 7 August 1814
on page 1 to its conclusion on 10 January 1815 on page 144.
On 11 August 1814 J. Q. Adams wrote a 7-page draft for the commission
that was sent to Secretary of State James Monroe on August 12.
Here are some highlights:
We have the honor to enclose herewith copies of the
full powers produced by them at the first conference,
and of the protocol of the first and second conferences
as ultimately agreed to by mutual consent.
They opened the subject of our meetings by assurance
that the British government had a sincere and earnest
desire that the negotiation might terminate in the
conclusion of a solid and honorable peace; and
particularly that no events which had occurred since the
first proposal for this negotiation had produced the slightest
alteration either in the pacific dispositions of Great Britain,
or in the terms upon which she would be willing to concur
in restoring to both countries the blessings of peace.
These professions were answered by us,
for our government and ourselves, with expressions
of reciprocal earnestness and sincerity in the desire
of accomplishing a peace, and of the satisfaction with
which we received those they had addressed to us.
With regard to the first point stated by them as
a proper subject for discussion, that of impressment
and allegiance, they intimated that the British
government did not propose this, as one which they
were desirous of discussing; but that in adverting to
the origin of the war, it was one which they could not
overlook, among those which they supposed likely to arise.
The principal stress of their instructions appeared
to have been concentrated upon the second point—
the Indian pacification and boundary.
That statement of it in the first instance was in terms
not conveying altogether the full import of its meaning.
The motive which they appeared to impress upon our
minds as that of the British government in this proposal,
was fidelity to the interests of their Indian allies;
a generous reluctance at concluding a peace with the
United States, leaving their auxiliaries unprotected from
the resentments of a more powerful enemy, and a desire by
the establishment of a definite boundary for the Indians
to lay the foundation of a permanent peace, not only to the
Indians, but between the United States and Great Britain.
They expressly disclaimed any intention of Great Britain
to demand an acquisition of territory for herself.
But upon being questioned, whether it was understood as
an effect of the proposed Indian boundary that the
United States and the Indians would be precluded from
the right they have hitherto exercised of making amicable
treaties between them, without the consent of Great Britain;
whether for example the United States would be restricted
from purchasing and they from selling their lands;
it was first answered by one of the commissioners that
the Indians would not be restricted from purchasing and
they from selling their lands; but the United States would
be restricted from purchasing them; and on reflection
another of the commissioners observed that it was intended
that the Indian territories should be a barrier between
the British possessions and those of the United States;
that both Great Britain and the United States should be
restricted from purchasing their land, but that the Indians
would not be restricted from selling them to a third party.
On the point respecting the fisheries they stated
that this was regarded by their government
as an object of minor importance.
That it was not intended to deny the right of the Americans
to the fisheries generally; but with regard to the right of
fishing within the limits of their jurisdiction, and of landing
and drying fish upon their territories, which had been
conceded by the treaties of peace heretofore, those
privileges would not be renewed without an equivalent.
They manifested some desire to be informed
even at the first meeting whether the American
commissioners were instructed to treat with them
upon these several points as we might be instructed
by our government to offer for discussion.
They assented however to the desire expressed on our
part to consult together among ourselves, previous to
answering them in relation to the points presented by them,
or to stating those which we should offer on our part.
This was done at the second conference, and in the
interval between the two we received the originals
of your letters of 25 June and 27 June, the duplicates
of which have since then also come to our hands.
At the second meeting after answering that with regard
to the two points of the Indian pacification and boundary,
and the fisheries, we were not instructed to discuss them,
we observed that as they had not been objects of
controversy between the two governments heretofore,
but were points entirely new, to which no allusion had
even been made by Lord Castlereagh in his letter to
you proposing this negotiation, it could not be
expected that they should have been anticipated
by the government of the United States.
That it was a matter of course that our instructions
should be confined to the subjects of difference in
which the war originated, and to the topics of
discussion known by our governments to exist.
That as to peace with the Indians, we considered that
as an inevitable consequence of peace with Great Britain;
that the United States would have neither interest
nor motive for continuing the war
against the Indians separately.
That commissioners had already been appointed by the
American government to treat of peace with them, and
that very possibly it might before this have been concluded.
That the policy of the United States towards the Indians
was the most liberal of that pursued by any nation.
That our laws interdicted the purchase of lands
from them by any individual, and that every
precaution was taken to prevent the frauds upon
them which had heretofore been practiced by others.
We remarked that this proposition to give them
a distinct boundary different from the boundary
already existing, a boundary to be defined by a
treaty between the United States and Great Britain,
was not only new, it was unexampled.
No such treaty had been made by Great Britain,
either before or since the American Revolution.
No such treaty had to our knowledge ever
been made by any other European power.
In reply to the remark that no allusion had been made to
these new and extraordinary points in Lord Castlereagh’s
letter to you, it was said that it could not be supposed that
Lord Castlereagh, in a letter merely proposing a negotiation,
should have enumerated the topics which might be proper
for discussion in the course, since those would naturally be
determined by the events which had subsequently occurred.
And this remark was made by the gentleman, who had the
day before assured us with sufficient solemnity of manner,
that no events which had taken place since the proposal of
the negotiation had in the slightest degree altered the pacific
dispositions of the British government, or the terms upon
which she would be willing to conclude the peace.
Upon the observation from us that the proposition for an
Indian boundary was unexampled in the practice of civilized
nations, it was answered, that the Indians must in some sort
be considered as sovereigns, since treaties were concluded
with them both by Great Britain and the United States.
To which we replied by marking the obvious distinction
between making treaties with them, and a treaty
between two civilized nations defining a boundary for them.
We informed the British commissioners, that we wished to
receive from them a statement of the views and objects of
Great Britain upon all the points, and expressed our
readiness to discuss them all.
They inquired whether if they should enter further
upon discussion, and particularly on the point respecting
the Indian boundary, we could expect that it would
terminate by some provisional arrangement which we
could conclude subject to the ratification of our government.
We said that as any arrangement to which we could
agree upon the subject must be without specific authority
from our government, it was not possible for us previous
to discussion to decide whether an article on the subject
could be formed which would be mutually satisfactory,
and to which we should think ourselves under our
discretionary powers, justified in acceding.
That our motive in asking the discussion was,
that even if no arrangement could be agreed to
upon this point which was prescribed to them as the
sine qua non of a treaty, the government of the
United States might be possessed of the entire and precise
intentions of that of Great Britain upon it; and the British
government be fully apprised of all the objections on the
part of the United States to any such arrangement.
That if unfortunately the present negotiation must be
broken off upon this preliminary, the two governments
might be aware of each other’s views, and enabled to
judge of the expediency of a renewal of the negotiation.
The British commissioners objected that it would
be wasting time upon an unprofitable discussion,
unless we could give them the expectation that
we should ultimately agree to an article on this subject.
They proposed an adjournment of an hour that
we might have an opportunity of consulting between
ourselves, whether we could give them this pledge
of a possible assent on our part to their proposal.
We needed no time for such consultation,
as there was no hesitation upon the mind of any one
of us with regard to it, and we declined the adjournment.
They then proposed to suspend the conferences until they
could consult their own government on the state of things.
They sent off a special messenger the same evening,
and we are now waiting for the result.3
Also on August 12 John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay
and Jonathan Russell in Ghent signed the Report of the
American Peace Commissioners to the Secretary of State:
We have the honor to inform you that the British
commissioners, Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq.
and William Adams, Esq. arrived in this city
on Saturday evening, the sixth instant.
The day after their arrival, Mr. Baker, their secretary,
called upon us to give us notice of the fact and to
propose a meeting at a certain hour on the ensuing day.
The place having been agreed upon, we accordingly
met at one o’clock on Monday, the 8th instant….
The British commissioners then stated the
following subjects as those upon which it
appeared to them that the discussions would
be likely to turn, and on which they were instructed.
1st. The forcible seizure of mariners on board
of merchant vessels, and, in connection with it,
the claim of His Britannic Majesty to the allegiance
of all the native subjects of Great Britain.
We understood them to intimate that the British
Government did not propose this point as one which they
were particularly desirous of discussing; but that, as if it
had occupied so prominent a place in the disputes between
the two countries, it necessarily attracted notice and was
considered as a subject which would come under discussion.
2nd. The Indian allies of Great Britain to be
included in the pacification, and a definite
boundary to be settled for their territory.
The British commissioners stated that an
arrangement upon this point was a sine qua non;
that they were not authorized to conclude a treaty
of peace which did not embrace the Indians as allies
of his Britannic Majesty; and that the establishment of a
definite boundary of the Indian territory was necessary
to secure a permanent peace, not only with the Indians,
but also between the United States and Great Britain.
3rd. A revision of the boundary line between
the United States and the adjacent British colonies.
With respect to this point, they expressly disclaimed
any intention on the part of their Government,
to acquire an increase of territory, and represented
the proposed revision as intended merely for
the purpose of preventing uncertainty and dispute.
After having stated these three points as subjects
of discussion, the British commissioners added, that
before they desired any answer from us, they felt
it incumbent upon them to declare, that the British
Government did not deny the right of the Americans
to the fisheries generally, or in the open seas; but that
the privileges formerly granted by treaty to the United
States, of fishing within the limits of the British jurisdiction,
and of landing and drying fish on the shores of the British
territories, would not be renewed without an equivalent….
There could be no hesitation on our part in informing the
British commissioners that we were not instructed on the
subjects of Indian pacification or boundary, and of fisheries,
nor did it seem probable, although neither of these points
had been stated with sufficient precision in the first verbal
conference, that they could be admitted in any shape.
We did not wish, however, to prejudge the result, or, by
any hasty proceeding, abruptly to break off the negotiation.
It was not impossible that, on the subject of the Indians,
the British Government had received erroneous
impressions from the Indian traders in Canada,
which our representations might remove.
And it appeared, at all events, important
to ascertain distinctly the precise intentions
of Great Britain on both points.
We, therefore, thought it advisable to invite the British
commissioners to a general conversation on all the points;
stating to them, at the same time, our want of instructions
on two of them, and holding out no expectation of the
probability of our agreeing to any article respecting these.
At our meeting on the ensuing day, we informed the
British commissioners that, upon the first and third points
proposed by them, we were provided with instructions;
and we presented as further subjects considered
by our Government as suitable for discussion:
1st. A definition of blockade, and as far as might be
mutually agreed, of other neutral and belligerent rights.
2nd. Claims of indemnity in certain cases
of capture and seizure.
We then stated that the two subjects,
1st, of Indian pacification and boundary,
2nd, of fisheries, were not embraced by our instructions….
No such provision had been inserted in the treaty of peace
in 1783, nor in any other treaty between the two countries.
No such provision had, to our knowledge, ever been
inserted in any treaty made by Great Britain,
or any other European Power, in relation to the same
description of people, existing under the circumstances.
We would say, however, that it could not be doubted that
peace with the Indians would certainly follow a peace with
Great Britain; that we had information that commissioners
had already been appointed to treat with them;
that a treaty to that effect might, perhaps,
have been already concluded; and that the
United States, having no interest nor any motive
to continue a separate war against the Indians,
there could never be a moment when our Government
would not be disposed to make peace with them….
The British commissioners, after having repeated
that their instructions on the subject of the Indians
were peremptory, stated that, unless we could give
some assurance that our powers would allow us to make
at least a provisional arrangement on the subject,
any farther discussion would be fruitless, and that they
must consult their own Government on this state of things.
They proposed, accordingly, a suspension of the
conferences, until they should have received an answer,
it being understood that each party might call a
meeting whenever they had any proposition to submit.
They dispatched a special messenger the same evening,
and we are now waiting for the result.
It was agreed upon their proposition that a report
should be drawn up of the proceedings at these two
meetings by each party, and that we should meet the
next day to compare and collate them together, and
from the two form a final protocol agreed to on both sides.
The paper marked (C) is a copy
of the report thus drawn up on our part.
We enclose it to make known to you the passages,
to the introduction of which the British
commissioners at this third meeting objected.
Their objections to some of the passages were that they
appeared rather to be argumentative, and that the object
of the protocol was to contain a mere statement of facts.
But they also objected to the insertion of the fact, that
they had declared the conferences suspended, until they
could obtain further instructions from their government.
Such was nevertheless the fact, and the return of their
messenger may perhaps disclose the motive of their
reluctance to its appearing on the record.4
Quincy Adams related conversations especially with the other
commissioners Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, James Bayard, and Jonathan Russell.
The 54 pages on “Paris in the Hundred Days” goes from 26 January 1815 to May 15.
Problems with the German ship Ulysses delayed Adams,
and he arrived at Stockholm on May 25.
He had become a friend with Albert Gallatin when they were in the U. S. Senate.
The British insisted on moving the negotiation to Ghent in Belgium where they had troops.
From Gothenburg the Americans traveled on the USS John Adams
to the Netherlands, and they reached Ghent on June 28.
The U.S. Senate had rejected the nomination of Gallatin as head of the delegation,
and then the Senate accepted John Quincy Adams as the head with a 19 to 7 vote.
On 17 August 1814 John Quincy Adams wrote
in a letter to Secretary of State James Monroe:
It is no pleasing part of my duty to state to you
my conviction that neither this nor any other
remonstrance against the maritime outrages of
Great Britain will find, or be able to rouse either
in Russia or in any other European state a spirit of
resistance against the British pretensions or practices.
All the great powers of Europe are dependent upon
the good will of the British government for the attainment
of objects more important in their estimation than
any thing connected with the maritime questions.
They have all tacitly, if not formally, stipulated
not to bring any of those questions into the discussion
at the Congress of Vienna which is to be held in October,
ultimately to settle the new balance of Europe.
Mr. Gallatin had an audience of the Emperor Alexander
at London, an account of which will be transmitted to you,
and from which you will perceive that, although regretting
the disregard unequivocally manifested by the British
government to his repeated offers of mediation,
and to his wishes for peace between Great Britain
and the United States, he candidly expressed
his intention to take no further active part
in urging the settlement of their differences.
Sweden is not only destitute of all means of asserting any
maritime or neutral right against the pretensions of Britain,
but it is by the assistance of Britain alone that she can
expect to accomplish the conquest of Norway.
Holland is so far from possessing the means
even of remonstrating against the British maritime code,
that her merchants without a murmur submit to
purchase from the British Ambassador at the Hague
a license to send a ship to any of their own colonies.
Such is the ordinance prescribed to them by their own
sovereign prince, and with which they think it no derogation
to their national honor and independence to comply.
France and Spain are yet equally dependent upon
the will of England for their intercourse with their colonies;
none of those either of France or Holland
have been restored to them.
There is even no immediate prospect of their restoration.
In the arrangements with Holland the British
government has explicitly avowed the policy
of loading the trade of the Dutch to their colonies
with burdens equal to those under which the
English are obliged to carry on the same commerce.
It is probable that this principle of suffering no other
nation to carry on commerce less burdened with duties
and charges than their own, will henceforth be an
essential feature of the English policy, and I consider
it as one of their motives for continuing the war
with us upon which they are undoubtedly determined.
The dispatches from you to the joint mission
which I had been so long and so anxiously expecting,
were received by us on the day of our
first conference with the British commissioners.
They were of the utmost importance, inasmuch
as without them it would have been impossible
for us to proceed one step in the negotiation
upon the points on which the war originated.
But you will see by our dispatches that the British
commissioners at the first conference formally and
in the most peremptory manner placed the war
and the negotiation upon a ground entirely new.
They appeared to mention the subject of impressment,
with which they connected their doctrine of
unalienable allegiance, as a point which they supposed
we should be desirous of discussing, but which their
government would willingly pass over in silence.
They spoke of the fisheries also, rather to warn us
that we should want an article to secure us in the
continuance of the liberties we had enjoyed by the
stipulations in the treaties of 1782 and 1783, than to signify
that they had any wish to bring the subject into discussion.
But from the first moment they declared that the including
of the Indians in the peace, and the settling of an Indian
boundary line, was made by the British government a
sine quo non to the conclusion of a treaty;
and they attempted at the very first meeting
to entangle us in the alternative of conceding
the principle or of breaking off the negotiation.
At the second, after they were informed that we had no
instructions authorizing us to treat with them on this point,
they urged us to the admission that we might agree to
an article conceding the principle, if they would open
the discussion and upon our declining to make any such
engagement, they instantly proposed a suspension of the
conferences until they should consult their government.
So far as the intentions of the British government can
be collected from the newspapers it would appear that they
calculate upon an immediate rupture of this negotiation.
They have been taking up more than one hundred
transports for the conveyance of troops,
and are stated to want more.
This object is a particular expedition, probably
against New Orleans, to be commanded by Lord Hill.
They are to be ready to sail from Cork on the
first of September, and their commander at a late dinner
informed his table companions that he was going to
humble the Yankees, and reduce them immediately
to terms of peace glorious to Great Britain.
The Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands has
provisionally taken possession of the Belgic provinces,
and by a proclamation issued at Brussels has signified
to the people of this country that they are ultimately
to be united with Holland under his government.
In this arrangement the inclinations of the people have been
as little consulted as in the transfer of Norway to Sweden.
There is no destination which could be given to the
inhabitants of Belgium to which they would be
so averse as that of being annexed to Holland.
France is also said to be strongly dissatisfied
with this event, and France begins to show symptoms
of recovering her voice in the general affairs of Europe.
There are many rumors of approaching war which,
if not altogether unfounded, will probably be dispelled
by the negotiations at the Congress of Vienna.
The interest of all the European powers except France
is peace; and although France has a strong interest
and a stronger passion for an immediate renewal of the
Continental war, her fear of England with the undoubted bias
of the present government will at least for some time control
the spirit of the nation and especially of the army.5
Commissioner Adams on September 5 at Ghent wrote a 10-page letter to
Secretary of State Monroe about the conflicts over Canada and the Great Lakes
by the British and the Americans.
Here is the entire document:
On the 25th ultimo we sent in to the British
plenipotentiaries an answer to their note, and
have every reason to expect that before this day
the negotiation would have been terminated.
Two days afterwards Mr. Bayard was explicitly told
in a conversation with Mr. Goulburn that their reply
would be sent to us without delay, and that they
should have no occasion previous to sending it
for any further reference to their government.
On Wednesday, the 31st, Mr. Baker called upon
Mr. Gallatin with an apology for a delay of a very
few days, the British Plenipotentiaries having concluded,
in consideration of the great importance of the thing,
to send their note to England for the approbation
of their government before they transmitted it to us.
The next morning I had a conversation with
Mr. Goulburn which convinced me that the sole
object of this reference was to give a greater
appearance of deliberation and solemnity to the rupture.
Some of the particulars of this conversation
render it in my mind sufficiently interesting
for the substance of it to be reported to you.
I began it by expressing some satisfaction at having
learned their reference to their government,
as it tended to encourage the hope that they would
reconsider some part of their proposals to the United States.
He did not think it probable, and in the whole tenor
of his discourse I perceived a spirit of inflexible
adherence to the terms which we have rejected;
but under the cover of a personal deportment sufficiently
courteous, a rancorous animosity against America which
disclosed there was nothing like peace at the heart.
The great argument to which he continually recurred
in support of the Indian boundary and the exclusive
military possession of the Lakes by the British,
was the necessity of them for the security of Canada.
The American government, he said, had manifested the
intention and the determination of conquering Canada….
I answered that the conquest of Canada had never been
an object of the war on the part of the United States.
It has been invaded by us in consequence of the war,
as they themselves had invaded
many parts of the United States.
It was an effect and not a cause of the war.
I thought with him that we should not now conquer it.
But I had no doubt we should, and that at no
very distant period, if any such terms as they
now required should ever be submitted to by us.
The American government, I said, never had
declared the intention of conquering Canada.
He referred to General Hull’s proclamation.
I answered that the American government
was not responsible for that.
It was no uncommon thing for commanding officers
to issue proclamations which were disavowed by
their government, of which a very recent example
had occurred in a proclamation of Admiral Cochrane.
He said that the American government had not disavowed
Hull’s proclamation, and that the British government had
not disavowed any proclamation of Admiral Cochrane’s.
I replied that the American government had never been
called upon either to avow or disavow Hull’s proclamation,
but I had seen in a printed statement of the debates in the
House of Commons that Lord Castlereagh had been called
upon to say whether Admiral Cochrane’s proclamation had
been authorized or not, and had answered that it was not.
He said that Lord Castlereagh had been asked
whether a proclamation of Admiral Cochrane’s,
encouraging the negroes to revolt, had been
authorized by the government, and had answered
in the negative; that is, that no proclamation
encouraging the negroes to revolt had been authorized.
But the proclamation of Admiral Cochrane referred to,
gave no such encouragement;
there was not a word about negroes in it.
It merely offered employment or a settlement
in the British colonies to such persons as
might be disposed to leave the United States.
I asked him what was the import of the term free used in
the proclamation in connection with the offer of settlements?
He answered the question with some hesitation,
but admitted that it might be understood
as having reference to slaves.
I admitted on my part that the word “negroes”
was not in the proclamation, but remarked that
he must be as sensible as I was,
that it could have reference only to them.
That certainly no person in America
could mistake its meaning.
It was unquestionably intended for the negroes,
and corresponded sufficiently with the practice
of others of their naval officers.
It was known that some of them, under similar
inducements, had taken away blacks who had
afterwards been sold in the West Indies Islands.
Upon this Mr. Goulburn with an evident struggle
to suppress a feeling of strong irritation, said,
“that he could undertake to deny in the most
unqualified terms; the character of British naval officers
was universally known; their generosity and humanity
could never be contested; and besides that since the
act of Parliament of 1811, the act of selling any man
for a slave, unless real slaves, from one British island
to another, was felony without benefit of clergy.
I replied that without contesting the character
of any class of people generally, it was certain
there would be in all classes individuals capable of
committing actions of which others would be ashamed.
That at a great distance from the eye and control
of the government, acts were often done with impunity,
which would be severely punished nearer home.
That the facts I had stated to him were among the objects
which we were instructed to present for consideration,
if the negotiation should proceed, and he might in that case
find it more susceptible of proof than he was aware.
He thought it impossible, but that it was one
of those charges against their officers, of which
there were many, originating only in the
spirit of hostility and totally destitute of foundation.
With respect to the Indian allies, I remarked that there
was no analogy between them and the case of Portugal.
The peace would of itself include all the Indians
included within the British limits; but the stipulation
which might be necessary for the protection of the
Indians situated within the boundaries of the United States
who had taken the British side in the war, was rather in
the nature of an amnesty than of a provision for allies.
It resembled more the case of subjects who
in cases of invasion took part with the invader,
as had sometimes happened to Great Britain in Ireland.
He insisted that the Indians must be considered as
independent nations, for that we ourselves made treaties
with them and acknowledged boundaries of their territories.
I said that wherever they would form settlements and
cultivate lands, their possessions were undoubtedly to be
respected and always be respected by the United States.
That some of them had become civilized in a considerable
degree; the Cherokees, for example, who had permanent
habitations and a state of property like our own.
But the greater part of the Indians never could
be prevailed upon to adopt this mode of life.
Their habits and attachments and prejudices were
so averse to any settlement that they could not
reconcile themselves to any other condition
than that of wandering hunters.
It was impossible for such people ever
to be said to have possessions.
Their only right upon land was a right to use it as hunting
grounds; and when those lands where they hunted became
necessary or convenient for the purposes of settlement,
the system adopted by the United States was by amicable
arrangement with them to compensate them for renouncing
the right of hunting upon them, and for removing to remoter
regions better suited to their purposes and mode of life.
This system of the United States was an
improvement upon the former practice
of all European nations including the British.
The original settlers of New England had set the first
example of this liberality towards the Indians, which was
afterwards followed by the founder of Pennsylvania.
Between it and taking the lands for nothing, or exterminating
the Indians who had used them, there was no alternative.
To condemn vast regions of territory to perpetual
barrenness and solitude, that a few hundred savages
might find wild beasts to hunt upon it,
was a species of game law that a nation
descended from Britons would never endure.
It was as incompatible with the moral
as with the physical nature of things.
If Great Britain meant to preclude forever the people
of the United States from settling and cultivating those
territories, she must not think of doing it by a treaty.
She must formally undertake and
accomplish their utter extermination.
If the government of the United States should ever
submit to such a stipulation, which I hoped they would not,
all its force, and all that of Britain combined with it,
would not suffice to carry it long into execution.
It was opposing a feather to a torrent.
The population of the United States
in 1810 passed seven millions.
At this hour it undoubtedly passed eight.
As it continued to increase in such proportions,
was it in human experience or in human power to
check its progress by a bond of paper, purporting to
exclude posterity from the natural means of subsistence
which they would derive from the cultivation of the soil?
Such a treaty, instead of closing the old sources
of dissension, would only open new ones.
A war thus finished would immediately be followed
by another, and Great Britain would ultimately find
that she must substitute the project of exterminating
the whole American people, to that of opposing
against them her barrier of savages.
The proposal of dooming a large extent of lands naturally
fertile to be forever desert by compact would be a
violation of the laws of nature and of nations, as
recognized by the most distinguished writers on public law.
It would be an outrage upon Providence,
which gave the earth to man for cultivation,
and made the tillage of the ground the condition
of his nature and the law of his existence.
“What (said Mr. Goulburn) is it then in the inevitable nature
of things that the United States must conquer Canada?”
“No.”
“But what security then can Great Britain
have for her possession of it?”
“If Great Britain does not think a liberal and amicable course
of policy towards America would be the best security,
as it certainly would, she must rely upon her general
strength, upon the superiority of her power in other
parts of her relations with America, upon the power
which she has upon another element to indemnify
herself by sudden impression upon American interests,
more defenseless against her superiority than Canada
against ours, and in their amount far more valuable
than Canada ever was or ever will be.”
He said that Great Britain had no intention to
carry on a war either of extermination or of conquest,
but recurred again to our superior force,
and to the necessity of providing against it.
He added that in Canada they never took any of the
Indian lands, and even the government (meaning the
provincial government) was prohibited from granting them.
That there were among the Indians very civilized people;
there was particularly one man whom he knew, Norton,
who commanded some of the Indians engaged on the British
side in the war, and who engaged on the British side in the
war, and who was a very intelligent and well informed man.
But the removing the Indians from their lands to others was
one of the very things of which Great Britain complained.
That it drove them over into their provinces and made them
annoy and encroach upon the Indians within their limits.
This was a new idea to me.
I told him I had never heard any complaint
of that kind before, and I supposed that a
remedy for it would very easily be found.
He made no reply and seemed as if in the
pressure for an argument, he had advanced
more than he was inclined to maintain.
It was the same with regard to the proposal that we
should keep no armed force on or near the lakes of Canada.
He did not admit that there was anything humiliating
to the United States or unusual in it, but he evaded
repeatedly answering the question how he or the
English nation would feel if the proposition were made
to them of binding themselves by such a stipulation.
I finally said that if he did not feel that there was anything
dishonorable to the party submitting to such terms,
it was not a subject susceptible of argument.
I could assure him that we and our nation
would feel it to be such.
That such stipulations were indeed often extorted from
the weakness of a vanquished enemy; but they were
always felt to be dishonorable and had certainly
occasioned more wars than they had ever prevented.
It was true, as he had said, the United States had never
prior to the war had an armed naval force upon the Lakes.
I thought it infinitely probable that if Great Britain
had said nothing upon the subject in the negotiation,
the United States would not have retained a
naval force there after the restoration of the peace.
It was more than I could say that this anxiety manifested
by Great Britain to disarm them would not operate
as a warning to them to keep a competent portion
of the force now created, even during peace, and
whether his government by advancing the proposal to
dismantle, will not eventually fix the purpose of the
United States to remain always armed even upon the lakes.
The whole of this conversation was on both sides perfectly
cool and temperate in the manner, though sometimes very
earnest on mine, and sometimes with a hurry of reply and
an embarrassment of expression on his, indicating an effort
to control the disclosure of feelings under strong excitement.
The most remarkable instance of this was upon the
intimation from me that some of their naval officers
had enticed away numbers of our black people,
who had afterwards been sold in the West India islands.
I stated the fact on the authority of your instructions
to the present joint mission of 28 January last, and
persisted in asserting it on the assurance that there
is proof of it in possession of the Department of State.
In the present state of public opinion in England respecting
the traffic of slaves, I was well aware of the impression
which the mere statement would make upon Mr. Goulburn.
The rupture of this negotiation will render it unnecessary
for us to possess the proof which it was your intention
at the date of your instructions of 28th January to furnish us,
but at any future attempt to treat for peace it will be
important to produce it, and I would even suggest the
expediency of giving as much publicity as possible
to it in Europe, while the war continues.
The avowal of Admiral Cochrane’s proclamation,
and the explanation of Lord Castlereagh’s disavowal
of it in the House of Commons, were remarkable
as examples of the kind of reasoning to which
the British government is willing to resort.
Whether the distinction taken in this case really
belonged to Lord Castlereagh, or whether erroneously
ascribed to him by Mr. Goulburn, I cannot say;
but Mr. Goulburn was present in the House of Commons
when the debate referred to took place.
The strangest feature in the general complexion
of his discourse was the inflexible adherence
to the proposed Indian boundary line.
But the pretext upon which this proposition had in the
first instance been placed, the pacification with the
Indians and their future security, was almost abandoned—
avowed to be a secondary and very subordinate object.
The security of Canada was now
substituted as the prominent motive.
But the great and real one, though not
of a nature ever to be acknowledged,
was occasionally discernible through all its veils.
This was no other than a profound and rankling jealousy
at the rapid increase of population and of settlements
in the United States, an impotent longing to
thwart their progress and to stunt their growth.
With this temper prevailing in the British councils, it is not
in the hour of their success that we can expect to obtain
a peace upon terms of equal justice or of reciprocity.6
During the War of 1812 the British had invaded the United States from Canada,
and the Americans had invaded Canada from the United States.
Adams, after receiving a note from the British on September 9, responded by writing
a 10-page “Answer to the British Commissioners.”
Adams discussed issues regarding the Indians and concluded with these three paragraphs:
From the rigor of this system, however,
as practiced by Great Britain and all the other
European powers in America, the humane and liberal
policy of the United States has voluntarily relaxed.
A celebrated writer on the laws of nations, to whose
authority British jurists have taken particular satisfaction
in appealing, after stating in the most explicit manner
the legitimacy of colonial settlements in America,
to the exclusion of all rights of uncivilized Indian tribes,
has taken occasion to praise the moderation of the first
settlers of New England and of the founder of Pennsylvania,
in having purchased of the Indians the lands they
resolved to cultivate, notwithstanding their being
furnished with a charter from their sovereign.
It is this example which the United States since they became
by their independence the sovereigns of the territory,
have adopted and organized into a political system.
Under that system the Indians residing within the
United States are so far independent that they live
under their own customs and not under the laws of
the United States; that their rights upon the lands
where they inhabit or hunt, are secured to them
by boundaries defined in amicable treaties between
the United States and themselves, and that
whenever those boundaries are varied,
it is also by amicable treaties, by which they receive
from the United States ample compensation for
every right they have to the lands ceded to them.
They are so far dependent as not to have the right to
dispose of their lands to any private persons, nor to any
power other than the United States, and to be under their
protection alone, and not under that of any other power.
Whether called subjects or by whatever name designated,
such is the relation between them and the United States.
These stipulations by the Indians to sell their lands
only to the United States do not prove that without them
they would have the right to sell them to others.
The utmost that they can contend to show
would be a claim by them to such a right,
never acknowledged by the United States.
It is indeed a novel process of reasoning
to consider a disclaimer as the proof of a right.
An Indian boundary and the exclusive military possession
of the lakes could after all prove but futile and ineffectual
securities to Great Britain for the permanent defense of
Canada against the great and growing preponderancy of the
United States, on that particular point of her possessions.
But no sudden invasion of Canada by the United States could
be made without leaving on their Atlantic shores and on the
ocean, exposed to the great superiority of British force
to that of the United States, a mass of American property
far more valuable than Canada ever was or ever can be.
In her relative superior force to that of the United States,
Great Britain may find a pledge infinitely more efficacious
for the safety of a single vulnerable point,
than in stipulations, ruinous to the interests
and degrading to the honor of America.7
In a letter on 4 October 1814 Madison and Monroe instructed the delegation
to set aside the issues of impressment and neutral rights.
John Quincy Adams considered the War of 1812 America’s second war for independence.
He recommended that they begin their negotiation by considering
the situation before the war, status quo ante bellum.
John Quincy Adams on 25 October 1814 in another report to Secretary of State
James Monroe concluded with this paragraph on the situation
of the European nations at their Congress of Vienna:
It is now the general opinion that the Congress of Vienna
will terminate in a settlement of the general affairs
in Europe, if not to the satisfaction of all the great powers,
at least without opposition from any of them.
Such is the opinion that I have myself uniformly entertained.
All the principal governments and all the great nations,
except France, are most anxiously desirous of peace;
and as there is little else to arrange between them
besides a distribution of spoils, each one, however
eager to grasp at the most it can get,
will finally content itself with what it can obtain.
In France itself the warlike spirit appears to be
gradually subsiding, and will in all probability
yield itself to the continual and increasing
influence and authority of the government.
There is, therefore, little prospect that anything
occurring in Europe will inspire the British ministry
with a pacific disposition towards America.
They are in fact continuing to embark troops and
to send reinforcements of all kinds for another campaign.
It is not for me to judge what may be the effect
of the events now so rapidly succeeding one another
in our own hemisphere; but our country cannot be
too profoundly impressed with the sentiment that it is,
under God, upon her own native energies alone that
she must rely for peace, Union, and Independence.8
In a letter to his father on 27 October 1814 John Quincy Adams from Ghent
wrote that the main issues with the British were the same ones they dealt with in 1782
which were the borders, fisheries, and the Indians.
The letter describes his views on current circumstances:
The situation in which I am placed often brings to my
mind, that in which you were situated in the year 1782,
and I will not describe the feelings with which the
comparison, or I might rather say the contrast, affects me—
I am called to support the same interests, and in many
respects the same identical points and questions—
The causes in which the present war originated, and
for which it was on our part waged will scarcely form
the most insignificant item in the Negotiation for Peace—
It is not impressment and unalienable allegiance,
blockades and orders in Council, Colonial Trade and
maritime rights, or belligerent and neutral collisions
of any kind that form the subjects of our discussion—
It is the boundary—the fisheries—and the Indian Savages.
The principle upon which the Ministerial partisans in
England insist in the public Journals and occasional
pamphlets, as the only one to be pursued in this
Negotiation is that of prescribing all the terms,
and reducing America to unconditional submission—
The recovery of a part of the Territory of the
United States to the British Domination is pressed
upon the Government as expedient and necessary,
and though insidiously disavowed at the first opening
of the conferences, is now formally demanded—
As they had then nothing in their possession worth
demanding, and scarcely so much as would warrant
them in asking for a mutual restoration of Territory,
they brought forward the claim under the disguise
of an Indian boundary; and they kept us debating
upon that, until they knew that their troops had taken
possession of our Country, east of Penobscot river,
immediately after which they came out with a proposal
to adopt the uti possidetis, as the basis for the boundary.
The whole compass of the diplomatic skill employed
by the British Government in this Negotiation has consisted
in consuming time, without coming to any conclusion—
Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell arrived
at Gothenburg the 11th of April.
The Negotiation had been proposed by
Lord Castlereagh in November—had been
acceded to by the President in the beginning of January.
The British Government were informed in February
of the appointment of the American Plenipotentiaries—
Their first dilatory proceeding was to defer the appointment
of their Commissioners, until official notification should be
given them by the American Ministers themselves that they
were at the place of meeting which had been agreed upon—
One full month was gained by this.
The next device was to propose the transfer of the
Negotiation to Ghent, which absorbed six weeks more,
and then they left us from the 24th of June
to the 6th of August waiting here for
the appearance of their Plenipotentiaries—
Here, their first step was to offer us a sine qua non,
superseding all discussion upon other points,
on a subject which had never been known as a
difference between the two Countries,
and which they knew it was impossible for us to accept.
At the same time they told us that the right
of fishing and drying fish within their jurisdiction
secured to us by the Treaty of 1783,
would no longer be allowed without an equivalent.
We rejected their sine qua non.
Then they offered it in another shape.
We reject it again.
Then they proposed a different one; and every answer
we gave them was sent to England, there to be disposed of
by new Instructions to them before they sent us their reply.
We have thus been nearly three months debating
preliminaries, without approaching a hair’s breadth
towards the conclusion of a Peace.
We supposed at first, it was their intention
to break off the Negotiation immediately,
but that is now evidently not their policy.
They keep it open knowing that they can finish with
peace at any hour when it shall suit them; and calculating
upon such successes from the forces they have sent and
are sending to America, that we shall eventually be
compelled to sign whatever they may please to dictate.
The extreme anxiety for Peace, manifested by all parties
in our Country, the symptoms of weakness, of disunion,
of disaffection to our government, and of attachment
to the enemy and his cause, which are constantly
coming from America, the shameful success of their attack
upon Washington, and the still more infamous capitulations
of Alexandria, Nantucket, and Washington County,
Massachusetts have countenanced all the pretensions of
the British Ministers, and encouraged them to rise in their
demands, in proportion as these tidings have reached us.
The Battles of Chippewa and Bridgewater, and the defense
of Fort Erie on the 15th of August have led us to hope that
we may at some future day have troops able to face our
enemy in the field, and Lake Champlain has afforded a new
and glorious demonstration, that we want nothing but
equal force to meet him upon equal terms on the Water.
On our part we have not broken off the negotiation,
because we so earnestly desired Peace ourselves, because
it was so ardently desired by our Government and Country,
and because to this day the case has constantly been, that
if any serious prospect of new troubles in Europe, or any
signal failure of the British arms in America had occurred,
the Peace might have been immediately accomplished.
How far it may be the interest or the policy of our own
Country to continue this game of chance, and to keep
us here as puppets to move according to the chapter of
Accidents, it is not for me to determine; but at present
there is much more prospect of our being detained here
the whole winter, than there was after the first fortnight
that we should remain here ten days longer.
It is nothing extraordinary, but a strong evidence of the
real character of the contest in which we are engaged,
that the most offensive and inadmissible of the British
demands are pointed against the State of Massachusetts.
It is a part of her Territory of which they require the
cession, and it is the fisheries of her citizens which
they declare themselves determined no longer to allow.
It is not the general right to the fisheries
which they contest; but the liberty of fishing
and of drying fish within their jurisdiction,
stipulated in the 3rd Article of the Peace of 1783.
For my own part, I consider the whole Article as containing
parts of the general acknowledgment of our Independence,
and therefore as needing no renewal by any future Treaty.
But as the subject will certainly come under the
consideration of the Government of the United States,
they will have time to give instructions founded upon
their view of it, before any peace can be concluded.
There is no doubt, whenever the Negotiation is resumed
that this point will become again a subject for discussion.
If there is among your Papers relating to the
Negotiations of Peace in 1782 and 1783 any
information tending to elucidate the third Article
of those Treaties, which you can communicate to me,
it may perhaps serve a valuable purpose to the public.
And as this Letter contains more than I should
at this moment think myself warranted to communicate
even to you but for the particular motive which
occasions it I must also request you
to consider it as entirely confidential.
The Congress at Vienna appears to have met with
some unexpected obstruction to its formal opening,
which has been postponed to the first of November.
France has taken a ground, which must embarrass
the other great powers in their arrangements
to settle the new balance of Europe.
If they proceed to complete them against her formal protest,
though she declares she will not oppose them by force
the tranquility of Europe will not be fixed
upon very solid or durable foundations.
If they admit her principle, they must give her
a share of the common stock taken from her;
or throw much into the common Stock,
which they have considered as their own.
There is however no immediate prospect
of the rupture of the Peace.9
Adams from Ghent in a letter to Levett Harris wrote on 15 November 1814:
Near the close of the month of August it was
our expectation that the negotiation here
would have terminated in a very few days.
It soon after became apparent that the intention
of the British government was to keep it open,
and to shape its demands according to the
course of events in Europe and America.
This policy still continues to pervade the British Cabinet.
Nothing decisive is yet known to them to have
occurred either at Vienna, or in the other hemisphere,
and accordingly they temporize still.
Unless something should happen to fix their wavering
pretensions and purposes it will belong to the American
government alone to bring our business to a point.
This on their part would certainly be an honorable
and spirited course of conduct, and I should have
no doubt of its being pursued, if the desire of peace
were not paramount to every other consideration.
The occurrences of the war in America
have been of a diversified natured.
Success and defeat have alternately attended the arms
of both belligerents, and hitherto have left them nearly
where they were at the commencement of the campaign.
It has been on our part merely defensive, with the single
exception of the taking of Fort Erie with which it began.
The battles of Chippewa and of Bridgewater, the defense
of Fort Erie on the 15th of August, and the naval action
upon Lake Champlain on the 11th of September have
redounded to our glory, as much as to our advantage;
while the loss of Washington, the capitulations of Alexandria,
and of Washington County, Massachusetts, and of
Nantucket, have been more disgraceful to us than injurious.
The defense of Baltimore has given us little more
to be proud of, than the demonstration
against it has afforded to our enemy.
Prevost’s retreat from Plattsburg has been more disgraceful
to them, than honorable to us, and Wellington’s veterans,
the fire-eater Brisbane and the firebrand Cockburn,
have kept the rawest of our militia in countenance
by their expertness in the art of running away.
The general issue of the campaign is yet to come
and there is too much reason to apprehend
that it will be unfavorable to our side.
Left by a concurrence of circumstances unexampled
in the annals of the world to struggle alone and friendless
against the whole colossal power of Great Britain,
fighting in reality against her for the cause of all Europe,
with all Europe coldly looking on, basely bound
not to raise in our favor a helping hand, secretly wishing
us success, and not daring so much as to cheer us in
the strife—what could be expected from the first furies of
this unequal conflict but disaster and discomfiture to us.
Divided among ourselves, more in passions than interest,
with half the nation sold by their prejudice and their
ignorance to our enemy, with a feeble and penurious
government, with five frigates for a navy and scarcely
five efficient regiments for an army, how can it be
expected that we should resist the mass of force which
that gigantic power has collected to crush us at a blow?
This too is the moment which she has chosen
to break through all the laws of war,
acknowledged and respected by civilized nations.
Under the false pretense of retaliation Cochrane
has formerly declared the determination to destroy
and lay waste all the towns on the sea coast
which may be assailable.
The ordinary horrors of war are mildness and
mercy in comparison with what British vengeance
and malice have denounced upon us.
We must go through it all.
I trust in God we shall rise in triumph over it all;
but the first shock is the most terrible part of the process,
and it is that which we are now enduring.10
On 20 November 1814 Adams wrote at Ghent in a letter
to Secretary of State James Monroe:
From the nature of the British pretensions and demands
as disclosed in the first note from their plenipotentiaries
to us, and from the tone with which they were brought
forward, both in that note and in the conference of the
day on which it is dated, we had concluded that the
rupture of the negotiation would immediately ensue,
and expected to have been discharged from our
attendance at this place before the first of September.
The British plenipotentiaries, after receiving our
answer to their first note, appeared to entertain
the same expectation, and if the sincerity of their
conversation can be implicitly trusted, they were
not altogether in the secret of their government.
It soon became apparent from the course pursued by them,
that the intention of the British Cabinet was neither
to break off the negotiation nor to conclude the peace.
They expected that a powerful impression would be
made in America by the armaments, naval and military,
which they had sent and were continuing to send.
At the same time the result of the Congress
at Vienna was a subject of some uncertainty.
The expediency of another campaign in America
might depend upon its issue.
Success in either hemisphere would warrant them
in raising their demands at their own discretion.
Failure on either, or even on both sides, would still
leave them with a certainty of a peace as favorable
as they could have any reasonable pretense to require.
They have accordingly confined their plenipotentiaries
to the task of wasting time.
After spending more than two months upon a preliminary
article, which ultimately bore scarcely a feature of its
original aspect, they twice successively evaded our
request for an interchange of the project of a treaty.
They have at least started it as a point of etiquette,
and appear to consider it as an advantage
to receive the first draft instead of giving it.
We have now endeavored to gratify them in both respects.
We have sent them our project
and are now waiting for theirs.
In the meantime Lord Liverpool has avowed in the
debates on the Regent’s speech that their demands
and proposals are to be regulated by circumstances,
which implies that they are not yet prepared to conclude.
One of the latest ministerial papers announces that
the negotiation is not to succeed, and that their
plenipotentiaries are very shortly to return to England.
Of the latter part of their information I much doubt;
for although the progress of the negotiations at Vienna
daily strengthens the expectation that it will end
without any immediate disturbance of the peace of Europe,
it does not yet promise a state of permanent tranquility
which would make the policy of continuing at
all events the war with America unquestionable.
I have received and shall forward by the Transit a packet
of dispatches for you and Mr. Harris at St. Petersburg.
It doubtless contains copies of the note which
he addressed to the Imperial Department of
Foreign Affairs in relation to Admiral Cockburn’s
proclamation of blockade of 25 April last.
I know not whether it is to be regretted that
Mr. Harris’s note was not presented until
after the Emperor’s departure for Vienna.
He writes me that Mr. Weydemeyer at his suggestion
had written to Count Nesselrode, requesting him to
communicate directly to me the Emperor’s
answer on the subject of the note.
But I have not heard from the Count.
The popular sentiment throughout Europe has been,
and still is, that the United States must sink in the present
struggle against the whole power of Great Britain.
And such is the British ascendancy over all the governments
of Europe, that even where the feelings of the people incline
to favor us, they dare not yet unequivocally express them.
The late events in America, as far as they are known here,
tended to produce some change in this respect.
The destruction of the public buildings at Washington
has been publicly reprobated in some of the
French gazettes, but it has been defended in others.
The general effect upon the public opinion has been
unfavorable to the English, but the impression of their
defeat at Baltimore, and especially of the retreat
from Plattsburg, has been much deeper.
We shall have no valuable friends in Europe until
we have proved that we can defend ourselves without them.
There will be friends enough, if we can maintain
our own cause by our own resources.11
On 14 December 1814 John Quincy Adams wrote this
in his Memoirs demonstrating how he negotiated:
14th. Began upon the journal of the day before
yesterday, and wrote until eleven, the hour of our
mission meeting, which was again held in my chamber.
I had proposed several alterations,
chiefly erasures from Mr. Gallatin’s new draft
of the note to the British Plenipotentiaries.
The most important was one in which he expressed
our willingness to agree to an article for negotiating
hereafter concerning the Mississippi navigation and the
American liberties in the fisheries, provided our claim to
those liberties by our construction of the Treaty of 1783
should be in no wise considered as impaired thereby.
Mr. Bayard had proposed an additional amendment,
stating that we were forbidden by our instructions
to enter upon a discussion respecting the fisheries.
I had intended to propose the same amendment,
but omitted it merely from an apprehension
that it would not be adopted.
I supported that proposed by Mr. Bayard,
but he himself did not, and it was not admitted.
The passage which I wished to be stricken out was
also retained, and others inserted, expressly and explicitly
with the view ultimately to give up the point if necessary.
I contended for Mr. Bayard’s amendment, and for
erasing the passages which I thought objectionable,
as long as argument could have any effect.
Mr. Russell at length said that he would insist
for the fisheries as long as possible, but he would
sooner give them up than continue the war for them.
I appealed again to our instructions
as within the British jurisdiction.
I asked him how they would be construed by our
countrymen after we should have given them up.
He said he supposed some would construe them
as I did, and some as he did.
He supposed there would be a great clamor about it,
but that must be disregarded.
He believed it more for the interest of the country to give
up the point rather than continue the war to maintain it.
I finally told my colleagues that I saw the difference
between them and me was, that they had determined
ultimately to give up the point, and I had not.
I believed the ground we had originally taken
to be good and solid.
I could make no distinction between the
different articles of the Treaty of 1783.
If I admitted this day that a half of one of its articles was
abrogated by the war, I should give the enemy an argument
to say tomorrow that the other half is abrogated equally.
If we gave up the liberty today,
we might be called to give up the right tomorrow.
Our instructions were in general terms.
They authorized no such distinction as that now made,
and no new instruction concerning the fisheries
has been given us, since our Government
knows the pretension of Great Britain.
Mr. Gallatin said he had always thought
our ground upon that point untenable,
that I had now almost a majority against me,
and he did not wish we should commit ourselves to
anything precluding us from abandoning our ground at last.
Mr. Russell said that he considered everything of a
permanent nature and founded on natural right in the
Treaty of 1783 as not affected by a subsequent war;
but privileges granted by the treaty,
and which we should not have enjoyed without it,
he thought were abrogated by war.
I said there was no grant of new privileges in the treaty.
The liberties, as well as the rights, were merely
a continuation of what had always been enjoyed.
It was necessary for the fishermen to go to the part
of the coast frequented by the fish, and when, by the
independence of the United States, it became a foreign
jurisdiction, we had a right to reserve the liberty of
continuing to fish there, and the circumstance of the
jurisdiction alone occasioned the change of the expression.
Mr. Clay said he did not wish to make up his mind
upon the subject until it should be absolutely necessary.
He said we should make a damned bad treaty,
and he did not know whether he would sign it or not;
but he could draw in five minutes an article agreeing
to negotiate concerning the Mississippi and the fisheries
without impairing our claim to them by the Treaty of 1783.
He drew an article accordingly, which I read and told
him I had no other objection to it than that it would
be instantly rejected by the British Plenipotentiaries.
I further said that as they were all determined at last
to yield the fishery point, I thought they were wrong
not to give it up now, and sign the treaty without another
reference to England, as well as without my signature.
I could not sign it, because
I could not consent to give up that point.
But if I were of their opinion,
I would make sure of the treaty now.
They were setting everything afloat by another reference,
and it was arrant trifling to be still cavilling about a
point upon which they had resolved ultimately to yield.
They said they preferred making one effort more;
and the note was adjusted, and given to Mr. Hughes
to be copied fair and taken to the British Plenipotentiaries.
We adjourned from half-past one to half-past three o’clock,
when we met again at my chamber and signed the note.
Mr. Russell came in after the rest of us had signed,
and when Mr. Hughes had already gone in search of him.
I told him again I thought they were wrong in not
making sure of the treaty now, if they had resolved
to give up the fishery question at last.
I said I felt myself under peculiar obligations
to defend their interest, besides those incumbent
upon the other members of the mission.
He said he supposed it was because
my father had obtained them before.
I said I could not be insensible to that consideration,
but that was not all.
It was an interest in which the people of Massachusetts,
I owed a duty to the State distinct from that which
we all owed to it as a member of the Union.
I was called upon to make a double sacrifice, both in this
and the Moose Island question, and it had placed me in
one of the most painful dilemmas I had ever experienced.
He said he was now a citizen of Massachusetts also,
though he was not born there; that he should yield upon
these points with extreme reluctance, and should be
sorry to lose my signature to the treaty,
but he did not think we could continue the war for them.
Mr. Hughes carried the note,
and Mr. Baker wrote him a note in the evening
to say that it had been referred to England.12
John Quincy Adams continued to write about the negotiations on the 22nd and
the 23rd and until the commissioners Gambier, Henry Goulbourn, William Adams,
John Quincy Adams, J. A. Bayard, H. Clay, Jon. Russell, and Albert Gallatin
finally signed the Treaty of Ghent on December 24.
Also on 24 December 1814 J. Q. Adams in Ghent
wrote in a letter to his mother Abigail Adams:
A Treaty of Peace between the United States and
Great Britain has this day been signed by the
British and American Plenipotentiaries at this place.
It is to be dispatched tomorrow by Mr. Hughes,
the Secretary of the American Mission,
who is to sail in the Transit from Bordeaux—
I have not time to write a single private Letter
excepting this, but I request you to inform my brother
that I have received his Letter of 2 October,
brought by Mr. William Wyer to France.
I was much disappointed in not receiving either by him,
or by the Ajax, the second Dutch vessel arrived
from Boston, any Letter from you—
I have none later than that of 1 May.
You know doubtless that heretofore the President
intended in case of Peace, to send me to England—
If the Treaty should be ratified, I am uncertain
whether he will still retain the same intention or not—
I have requested to be recalled
at all Events from the Mission to Russia.
I shall proceed from this place, in a few days, to Paris,
to be there, in readiness to receive the President’s orders;
and I shall write immediately to my wife,
requesting her to come and join me there.
If we go to England, I beg you to send
my Sons George and John there to me—
After the Peace there can be no want of good
opportunities for them to come, and I wish them to
embark at the most favorable Season for a safe passage.
If any other person should be sent to England, I intend to
return as soon as possible to America, and shall hope
before midsummer to see once more my beloved Parents.
Of the peace which we have at length concluded
it is for government, our country and the world to judge.
It is not such as under more propitious circumstances
might have been expected, and to be fairly estimated
must be compared not with our desires, but with
what the situation of the parties and of the world
at and during the negotiation made attainable.
We have abandoned no essential right,
and if we have left everything open for future controversy,
we have at least secured to our country
the power at her own option to extinguish war.13
John Quincy Adams wrote in his Memoirs:
25th. Christmas Day.
The day of all others in the year most congenial to
proclaiming peace on earth and good will to men.
We had a meeting of the mission at one o’clock.
My draft of a dispatch to the Secretary of State
had passed through the hands of all my colleagues,
and had been altered and amended by them all.
I agreed to all the amendments excepting one by Mr. Clay,
which, at the first reading, I had not perceived.
In mentioning to the Secretary of State the principle
on which we had relied respecting the fisheries,
I had stated that we considered the Treaty of 1783
as a permanent contract, no part of which was
liable to be abrogated by the subsequent war.
Mr. Clay, with the assent of Mr. Russell had
altered it to read, we thought it might be considered.
Mr. Russell made out the fair copy
of the dispatch to be sent.
On reading it over, to compare it with the original
draft and amendments, I perceived this alteration,
and immediately objected to it.
I insisted upon substituting the word must for might, to read,
we contended the Treaty of 1783 must be considered, etc.
Mr. Russell and Mr. Bayard agreed to this amendment….
I then went to the Intendant’s office,
where I found assembled a party of about
one hundred and twenty persons, almost all at cards.
We received the congratulations of the Intendant and his
family, and many others, upon the signature of the peace,
and frequently with expressions of pleasure that its
conditions were understood to be advantageous to us.
The party broke up about ten in the evening….
27th.
We had a meeting of the mission
in my chamber at one o’clock.
Mr. Gallatin had suggested last Friday, immediately
after we had come to the agreement to sign the
treaty of peace, that we ought to make to the
British Government an official communication of
our full power to negotiate a treaty of commerce.
The proposition was now renewed, and after
some discussion it was agreed that Mr. Gallatin
should make a draft of a note for that purpose.
The subject of an answer to the note from the British
Plenipotentiaries of the 7th instant, respecting the sale
of negroes taken from the Southern States
in the West Indies, was further considered.
I proposed that, the peace being now made,
we should send a copy of the affidavit
furnished us by the Secretary of State.
This was opposed by Mr. Clay; and he engaged to
make a draft of an answer, referring it to the American
Government, to give or to withhold the proof requested….
29th.
We had a short meeting of the mission and signed the
note concerning the sale of negroes drawn by Mr. Clay.
I sent it and the note we had prepared
yesterday to the British Plenipotentiaries.
We determined to break up our establishment
tomorrow, when the fifth month of
our residence in this house expires.14
In the war the British had captured thousands
of runaway slaves, which was a difficult issue.
Adams believed humans were entitled to more consideration than property.
Eventually in 1826 the British agreed by arbitration to pay
$1.2 million in compensation to Americans with claims.
Negotiations also helped return American sailors who had been impressed
into service on British ships which Adams considered to be slavery.
This is the entire Treaty of Ghent:
Treaty of Peace and Amity between His Britannic Majesty
and the United States of America.His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America
desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily
subsisted between the two Countries, and of restoring
upon principles of perfect reciprocity, Peace, Friendship,
and good Understanding between them, have for that
purpose appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries,
that is to say, His Britannic Majesty on His part has
appointed the Right Honorable James Lord Gambier,
late Admiral of the White now Admiral of the Red Squadron
of His Majesty’s Fleet; Henry Goulburn Esquire, a Member
of the Imperial Parliament and Under Secretary of State;
and William Adams Esquire, Doctor of Civil Laws.
And the President of the United States, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate thereof, has appointed
John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan
Russell, and Albert Gallatin, Citizens of the United States;
who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective
Full Powers, have agreed upon the following Articles.ARTICLE THE FIRST.
There shall be a firm and universal Peace between
His Britannic Majesty and the United States,
and between their respective Countries, Territories,
Cities, Towns, and People of every degree
without exception of places or persons.
All hostilities both by sea and land shall cease
as soon as this Treaty shall have been ratified
by both parties as hereinafter mentioned.
All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever taken by
either party from the other during the war, or which may
be taken after the signing of this Treaty, excepting only the
Islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without
delay and without causing any destruction or carrying away
any of the Artillery or other public property originally
captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain
therein upon the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty,
or any Slaves or other private property; and all Archives,
Records, Deeds, and Papers, either of a public nature or
belonging to private persons, which in the course of the war
may have fallen into the hands of the Officers of either
party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith
restored and delivered to the proper authorities and
persons to whom they respectively belong.
Such of the Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are
claimed by both parties shall remain in the possession of the
party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the
Exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty until the decision
respecting the title to the said Islands shall have been
made in conformity with the fourth Article of this Treaty.
No disposition made by this Treaty as to such
possession of the Islands and territories claimed
by both parties shall in any manner whatever
be construed to affect the right of either.ARTICLE THE SECOND.
Immediately after the ratifications of this Treaty by both
parties as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the
Armies, Squadrons, Officers, Subjects, and Citizens of the
two Powers to cease from all hostilities: and to prevent all
causes of complaint which might arise on account of the
prizes which may be taken at sea after the said Ratifications
of this Treaty, it is reciprocally agreed that all vessels and
effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days
from the said Ratifications upon all parts of the Coast of
North America from the Latitude of twenty-three degrees
North to the Latitude of fifty degrees North, and as far
Eastward in the Atlantic Ocean as the thirty-sixth degree
of West Longitude from the Meridian of Greenwich, shall
be restored on each side: that the time shall be thirty
days in all other parts of the Atlantic Ocean North of
the Equinoctial Line or Equator: and the same time for
the British and Irish Channels, for the Gulf of Mexico,
and all parts of the West Indies: forty days for the
North Seas for the Baltic, and for all parts of the
Mediterranean sixty days for the Atlantic Ocean South of
the Equator as far as the Latitude of the Cape of Good Hope.
Ninety days for every other part of the world South
of the Equator, and one hundred and twenty days
for all other parts of the world without exception.ARTICLE THE THIRD.
All Prisoners of war taken on either side as well
by land as by sea shall be restored as soon as
practicable after the Ratifications of this Treaty
as hereinafter mentioned on their paying the debts
which they may have contracted during their captivity.
The two Contracting Parties respectively engage to
discharge in specie the advances which may have
been made by the other for the sustenance
and maintenance of such prisoners.ARTICLE THE FOURTH.
Whereas it was stipulated by the second Article in the
Treaty of Peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty
three between His Britannic Majesty and the United States
of America that the boundary of the United States should
comprehend “all Islands within twenty leagues of any part
of the shores of the United States and lying between lines
to be drawn due East from the points where the aforesaid
boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part and
East Florida on the other shall respectively touch the
Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting such
Islands as now are or heretofore have been within the
limits of Nova Scotia, and whereas the several Islands in
the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of
Fundy, and the Island of Grand Menan in the said Bay
of Fundy, are claimed by the United States as being
comprehended within their aforesaid boundaries, which
said Islands are claimed as belonging to His Britannic
Majesty as having been at the time of and previous to the
aforesaid Treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty
three within the limits of the Province of Nova Scotia.
In order therefore finally to decide upon these claims
it is agreed that they shall be referred to two Commissioners
to be appointed in the following manner: viz:
One Commissioner shall be appointed by His Britannic
Majesty and one by the President of the United States,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
thereof, and the said two Commissioners so appointed
shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide
upon the said claims according to such evidence
as shall be laid before them on the part of His
Britannic Majesty and of the United States respectively.
The said Commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews in
the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to
adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit.
The said Commissioners shall by a declaration or
report under their hands and seals decide to which
of the two Contracting parties the several Islands
aforesaid do respectively belong in conformity with
the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of
one thousand seven hundred and eighty three.
And if the said Commissioners shall agree
in their decision both parties shall consider
such decision as final and conclusive.
It is further agreed that in the event of the two
Commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters
so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of
the said Commissioners refusing or declining or willfully
omitting to act as such, they shall make jointly or
separately a report or reports as well to the Government
of His Britannic Majesty as to that of the United States,
stating in detail the points on which they differ, and
the grounds upon which their respective opinions
have been formed, or the grounds upon which they or
either of them have so refused, declined or omitted to act.
And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the
United States hereby agree to refer the report or reports
of the said Commissioners to some friendly Sovereign
or State to be then named for that purpose, and who
shall be requested to decide on the differences which
may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon
the report of one Commissioner together with the
grounds upon which the other Commissioner shall have
refused, declined or omitted to act as the case may be.
And if the Commissioner so refusing, declining, or
omitting to act, shall also willfully omit to state the
grounds upon which he has so done in such manner
that the said statement may be referred to such
friendly Sovereign or State together with the report
of such other Commissioner, then such Sovereign or
State shall decide ex parse upon the said report alone.
And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of
the United States engage to consider the decision
of such friendly Sovereign or State to be final
and conclusive on all the matters so referred.ARTICLE THE FIFTH.
Whereas neither that point of the Highlands lying due
North from the source of the River St. Croix, and designated
in the former Treaty of Peace between the two Powers
as the North West Angle of Nova Scotia, nor the North
Westernmost head of Connecticut River has yet been
ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line
between the Dominions of the two Powers which extends
from the source of the River St. Croix directly North to the
above mentioned North West Angle of Nova Scotia, thence
along the said Highlands which divide those Rivers that
empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence from those
which fall into the Atlantic Ocean to the North Westernmost
head of Connecticut River, thence down along the middle
of that River to the forty fifth degree of North Latitude,
thence by a line due West on said latitude until it strikes
the River Iroquois or Cataraquy, has not yet been surveyed:
it is agreed that for these several purposes two
Commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and
authorized to act exactly in the manner directed
with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding
Article unless otherwise specified in the present Article.
The said Commissioners shall meet at se Andrews in
the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to
adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit.
The said Commissioners shall have power to ascertain
and determine the points above mentioned in conformity
with the provisions of the said Treaty of Peace of one
thousand seven hundred and eighty three, and shall
cause the boundary aforesaid from the source of the
River St. Croix to the River Iroquois or Cataraquy to be
surveyed and marked according to the said provisions.
The said Commissioners shall make a map of the said
boundary, and annex to it a declaration under their
hands and seals certifying it to be the true Map of the
said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude
of the North West Angle of Nova Scotia, of the North
Westernmost head of Connecticut River, and of such other
points of the said boundary as they may deem proper.
And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration
as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary.
And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing,
or both, or either of them refusing, declining, or willfully
omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or
statements shall be made by them or either of them,
and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State
shall be made in all respects as in the latter part
of the fourth Article is contained, and in as full
a manner as if the same was herein repeated.ARTICLE THE SIXTH.
Whereas by the former Treaty of Peace that portion of the
boundary of the United States from the point where the
forty-fifth degree of North Latitude strikes the River Iroquois
or Cataraquy to the Lake Superior was declared to be
“along the middle of said River into Lake Ontario, through
the middle of said Lake until it strikes the communication
by water between that Lake and Lake Erie, thence along
the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through
the middle of said Lake until it arrives at the water
communication into the Lake Huron; thence through the
middle of said Lake to the water communication between
that Lake and Lake Superior:” and whereas doubts have
arisen what was the middle of the said River, Lakes, and
water communications, and whether certain Islands lying
in the same were within the Dominions of His Britannic
Majesty or of the United States: In order therefore
finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred
to two Commissioners to be appointed, sworn, and
authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with
respect to those mentioned in the next preceding
Article unless otherwise specified in this present Article.
The said Commissioners shall meet in the first instance at
Albany in the State of New York, and shall have power to
adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit.
The said Commissioners shall by a Report or Declaration
under their hands and seals, designate the boundary
through the said River, Lakes, and water communications,
and decide to which of the two Contracting parties the
several Islands lying within the said Rivers, Lakes,
and water communications, do respectively belong
in conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty
of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three.
And both parties agree to consider such designation
and decision as final and conclusive.
And in the event of the said two Commissioners
differing or both or either of them refusing, declining,
or willfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations,
or statements shall be made by them or either of them,
and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State
shall be made in all respects as in the latter part
of the fourth Article is contained, and in as full
a manner as if the same was herein repeated.ARTICLE THE SEVENTH.
It is further agreed that the said two last mentioned
Commissioners after they shall have executed the duties
assigned to them in the preceding Article, shall be, and they
are hereby, authorized upon their oaths impartially to fix
and determine according to the true intent of the said Treaty
of Peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three,
that part of the boundary between the dominions of the
two Powers, which extends from the water communication
between Lake Huron and Lake Superior to the most
North Western point of the Lake of the Woods; to decide
to which of the two Parties the several Islands lying in the
Lakes, water communications, and Rivers forming the said
boundary do respectively belong in conformity with the true
intent of the said Treaty of Peace of one thousand seven
hundred and eighty three, and to cause such parts of the
said boundary as require it to be surveyed and marked.
The said Commissioners shall by a Report or
declaration under their hands and seals, designate
the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the
points thus referred to them, and particularize
the Latitude and Longitude of the most North Western
point of the Lake of the Woods, and of such other
parts of the said boundary as they may deem proper.
And both parties agree to consider such designation
and decision as final and conclusive.
And in the event of the said two Commissioners differing,
or both or either of them refusing, declining, or willfully
omitting to act, such reports, declarations or
statements shall be made by them or either of them,
and such reference to a friendly Sovereign or State
shall be made in all respects as in the latter part
of the fourth Article is contained, and in as full
a manner as if the same was herein revealed.ARTICLE THE EIGHTH.
The several Boards of two Commissioners mentioned
in the four preceding Articles shall respectively have
power to appoint a Secretary, and to employ such
Surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary.
Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations,
statements, and decisions, and of their accounts,
and of the Journal of their proceedings shall be delivered
by them to the Agents of His Britannic Majesty and
to the Agents of the United States, who may be
respectively appointed and authorized to manage
the business on behalf of their respective Governments.
The said Commissioners shall be respectively paid in
such manner as shall be agreed between the two
contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at
the time of the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty.
And all other expenses attending the said Commissions
shall be defrayed equally by the two parties.
And in the case of death, sickness, resignation, or necessary
absence, the place of every such Commissioner respectively
shall be supplied in the same manner as such Commissioner
was first appointed; and the new Commissioner shall
take the same oath or affirmation and do the same duties.
It is further agreed between the two contracting parties
that in case any of the Islands mentioned in any of the
preceding Articles, which were in the possession of one
of the parties prior to the commencement of the present
war between the two Countries, should by the decision of
any of the Boards of Commissioners aforesaid, or of
the Sovereign or State so referred to, as in the four next
preceding Articles contained, fall within the dominions
of the other party, all grants of land made previous to
the commencement of the war by the party having had such
possession, shall be as valid as if such Island or Islands had
by such decision or decisions been adjudged to be within
the dominions of the party having had such possession.ARTICLE THE NINTH.
The United States of America engage to put an end
immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty
to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with
whom they may be at war at the time of such Ratification,
and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations
respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which
they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand
eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities.
Provided always that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to
desist from all hostilities against the United States
of America, their Citizens, and Subjects upon the
Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to
such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly.
And His Britannic Majesty engages on his part to put
an end immediately after the Ratification of the present
Treaty to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of
Indians with whom He may be at war at the time of
such Ratification, and forthwith to restore to such
Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions,
rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed
or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred
and eleven previous to such hostilities.
Provided always that such Tribes or Nations
shall agree to desist from all hostilities against
His Britannic Majesty and His Subjects upon the
Ratification of the present Treaty being notified to
such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly.ARTICLE THE TENTH.
Whereas the Traffic in Slaves is irreconcilable with the
principles of humanity and Justice, and whereas both His
Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing
their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby
agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their
best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.ARTICLE THE ELEVENTH.
This Treaty when the same shall have been ratified
on both sides without alteration by either of the
contracting parties, and the Ratifications mutually
exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and the
Ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington in the
space of four months from this day or sooner if practicable.
In faith whereof, We the respective Plenipotentiaries have
signed this Treaty, and have hereunto affixed our Seals.Done in triplicate at Ghent the twenty-fourth day of
December one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.15
John Quincy Adams from Ghent wrote to his father
John Adams on 26 December 1814:
Mr. Hughes, the Secretary to the American Mission
for negotiating Peace, was dispatched early this morning
with one copy of the Treaty signed by the British and
American Plenipotentiaries the Evening before last.
It was executed in triplicate to provide against the accidents
which might befall any single copy on the passage—
Mr. Clay’s private Secretary, Mr. Carroll is
to go this day with another Copy to England,
there to embark as speedily as possible—
We shall send the third copy by a dispatch vessel
which we have ready at Amsterdam, unless she should
be locked in by the ice, as from the present severity
of the weather we have some reason to apprehend—
Mr. Hughes goes to Bordeaux there to take passage in the
Franset, the vessel in which Mr. Boyd came to Europe—
Mr. Carroll may perhaps go in company with Mr. Baker,
the Secretary to the English Mission, who is to be
the bearer of the Treaty with the English Ratification—
In the hurry of dispatching Mr. Hughes, I found it
possible to write only one short private Letter
to my dear Mother, and I shall probably have
only time to write this one to send by Mr. Carroll—
I transmitted however by Mr. Hughes
a duplicate of my last Letter to you dated 27 October,
which I still entreat you to answer, if I am destined
to a longer continuance in Europe, and upon which
I ask all the advice and information which
it may be in your power to bestow.
It relates principally to the subject of the greatest
difficulty we have had in the Negotiation, and that
which of all others is left in the state the most
unsatisfactory to us, and particularly to me—
It has been now for a full month ascertained that
unless new pretensions on the part of Great Britain
were advanced, a Treaty of Peace would be signed;
but it was not until last Thursday that I ceased
to doubt whether it would receive my signature.
The British Plenipotentiaries had declared to us,
at the outset of the Negotiation, that it was not
the intention of the British Government to grant
to the People of the United States, in future,
the liberties of fishing and drying and curing fish within
the exclusive British Jurisdiction without an equivalent.
There is as you must remember, in the third Article
of the Treaty of 1783 a diversity of expression,
by which the general fisheries on the Banks are
acknowledged as our Right, but these fishing privileges
within British Jurisdiction are termed liberties—
The British Government consider the latter as franchises
forfeited, ipso facto by the War, and declared they
would not grant them anew without an equivalent.
Aware that by this principle they too had forfeited
their right to Navigate the Mississippi, recognized
in the same Treaty of 1783, they now demanded
a new provision to secure it to them again.
We were instructed not to suffer our right
to the fisheries to be brought into discussion—
We had no authority to admit any discrimination
between the first and the last parts of the third Article
of the Treaty of 1783—no power to agree to an
equivalent either for the rights or the liberties.
I considered both as standing on the same footing—
Both as the continuance of franchises always enjoyed,
and the difference in the expressions only as arising from
the operation of our change from the condition of British
Subjects to that of a Sovereign People, upon an object in
one part of general, and in the other of special Jurisdiction—
The special Jurisdiction had been that of our own Sovereign;
by the Revolution and the Treaty of Peace it became
a foreign, but still remained a special Jurisdiction.
By the very same instrument in which we thus acknowledge
it as a foreign Jurisdiction, we reserved to ourselves,
with the full assent of its Sovereign, and without any
limitation of time or of Events the franchise which we had
always enjoyed while the Jurisdiction had been our own—
It was termed a liberty, because it was a freedom to be
enjoyed within a special foreign Jurisdiction
the fisheries on the Banks were termed Rights,
because they were to be enjoyed, on the Ocean the
common Jurisdiction of all Nations; but there was
nothing in the terms themselves, and nothing in the Article
or in the Treaty implying an intention or expectation of
either of the contracting parties that one more than the
other should be liable to forfeiture by a subsequent War.
On the maturest deliberation I still hold this argument
to be sound; and it is to my mind the only one,
by which our claim to the fisheries within
the British Jurisdiction can be maintained.
But after the declaration made by the British Government, it
was not to be expected that they would be converted to this
opinion without much discussion, which was forbidden to us;
and the result of which must have been very doubtful upon
minds at all times inclined, and at this time most peculiarly
prone, rather to lean upon power, than to listen to reason.—
We stated the general Principle, in one of our Notes to the
British Plenipotentiaries, as the ground upon which our
Government deemed no new stipulation necessary to secure
the enjoyment of all our rights and liberties in the fisheries—
They did not answer that part of our Note; but when
they came to ask a stipulation for the right of British
Subjects to navigate the Mississippi, we objected that by
our construction of the Treaty of 1783 it was unnecessary—
If we admitted their construction of that Treaty,
so as to give them a new right to the navigation,
they must give us an equivalent for it—
We offered an Article recognizing the continuance
of the rights on both sides; this offer met however
with very great opposition among ourselves,
for there were two of us against making it, and who
thought the Navigation of the Mississippi incomparably
more valuable than the contested part of the fisheries—
Not so did the British Government think—
for they, instead of accepting it, offered us an Article,
stipulating to negotiate hereafter for an equivalent
to be given by Great Britain for the right of navigating
the Mississippi, and by the United States for the
liberties of the fisheries within the British Jurisdiction.—
This was merely to obtain from us the formal admission
that both the rights were abrogated by the War—
To that admission I was determined not to subscribe—
The Article was withdrawn last Thursday by the British
Plenipotentiaries, who accepted our proposal to say nothing
in the Treaty about either, and to omit the Article by which
they had agreed that our boundary West from the Lake of
the Woods should be the 49th parallel of North Latitude—
They at the same time referred again to their original
declaration that the fisheries within British Jurisdiction
would not hereafter be granted without an equivalent.
It is evident that it must be the subject of a future
Negotiation—the only thing possible to be done now
was to reserve our whole claim unimpaired,
and with that I consented to sign the Treaty.
We were also obliged to except from the immediate
restitution of Territory taken during the War,
the Islands in Passamaquoddy Bay.
The British claim them as having been before the
Peace of 1783 within the limits of Nova Scotia,
and insisted upon holding them, not as taken
during the War but as of right belonging to them.
At first they declared their right to be too clear even for
discussion; but they finally agreed to refer to
Commissioners and to a friendly Sovereign the title to them
and even to the island of Grand Menan in the Bay of Fundy,
which has been since 1784 in their possession—
We persisted in demanding that the Passamaquoddy
Islands should be included in the general restoration,
until they manifested a determination
to break off rather than yield the point.—
Their inflexibility upon two objects exclusively interesting
to the State of Massachusetts, is a melancholy comment
upon that policy by which Massachusetts has arrayed
herself against the Government of the Union—
Had Massachusetts been true to herself and to the Union,
Great Britain would not have dared to hinge the
question of Peace or War upon Moose Island,
or upon the privileges of Massachusetts fishermen—
As a Citizen of Massachusetts I felt it to be most
peculiarly my duty not to abandon any one of her rights,
and I would have refused to sign the Treaty,
had any one of them been abandoned.
But it was impossible to force a stipulation in favor of the
fisheries, and for a temporary possession of Moose Island,
merely until it shall be ascertained whether it belongs
to her or not, we could not think of continuing the War.
I expect to be detained here about ten days longer,
and then to proceed to Paris,
and wait there for the President’s orders.
I shall write to my wife inviting her to join me there—
If a new service should be assigned to me in Europe,
it will be known to you, and I shall hope to hear
from you as frequently and as much at large
as will suit your convenience—
If I go to England, I wish my Sons
George and John to be sent to me—
My Colleagues propose to leave Europe about the first of
April in the Neptune which is waiting for them at Brest—
I have great satisfaction in saying that our harmony
has been as great and constant as perhaps
ever existed between five persons employed
together upon so important a trust—
Upon all the important questions
we have been unanimous.16
Notes
1. Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford,
Volume V 1814-1816, p. 56-57.
2. Memoirs of Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848
by John Quincy Adams ed. Charles Francis Adams, Volume II, p. 662.
3. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume V, 11 August 1814.
4. Ibid., 12 August 1814, p. 76-82.
5. Ibid., 17 August 1814, p. 84-88.
6. Ibid., 5 September 1814, p. 111-120.
7. Ibid., September 1814, p. 127-129.
8. Ibid., 22 June, 1815, p. 173.
9. To John Adams from John Quincy Adams, 27 October 1814. (Online).
10. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume V, 15 November 1814, p. 186-188.
11. Ibid., 20 November 1814, p. 200-202.
12. Memoirs by John Quincy Adams, Volume III, 14 December 1814,
p. 127-128, 128-129, 129, 132.
13. From John Quincy Adams to Abigail Smith Adams, 24 December 1814. (Online).
14. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume II, p. 127-129, 132.
15. Treaty of Ghent (1814) (Online).
16. To John Adams from John Quincy Adams, 26 December 1814. (Online).
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