On 4 February 1812 John Q. Adams wrote in his Diary about his conversation
with the Russian Foreign Minister Count Romanzoff:
Feb. 4, 1812. — At noon I called upon Count Romanzoff,
according to his appointment.
He apologized to me for receiving me in his full dress,
which he said was occasioned by his having just received
a deputation of Cabardinians; and I excused myself for
not being in full dress—at which he took no displeasure.
I began by informing him, with my thanks to him for the
packets which he had sent me, brought by the courier
from Paris, that I had received in them dispatches from
the Secretary of State, and a letter personally from the
President, according to the request which my inability
to return to the United States last summer had made
necessary on my part, had nominated another person to the
judicial office which had been previously designated for me,
and had instructed me to remain here;
a circumstance which I thought it proper to communicate
to this Government; which was one of my motives
in requesting the conference with him.
The Count very civilly expressed his satisfaction at this
arrangement with which he said he was the more gratified
as he had seen paragraphs in the English and German
gazettes stating that I was to be removed to England.
He had mentioned it to the Emperor, and had
thought it probable, as there appeared a manifestation
of conciliatory dispositions towards the United States.
I told him that the paragraphs in the English newspapers
were probably taken from some of the American papers,
where it was much the fashion to announce appointments
by anticipation, which never came to be realized;
that I had not the slightest insinuation of an intention
of the President to remove me to England,
but from the tenor of my dispatches I had every
reason to believe that no appointment of a Minister
would be made unless England should make further
and far more important advances toward conciliation
than she had yet made or appeared disposed to make.
He said that on the other hand it was understood at Paris
that in France a better understanding with America
was intended and even professed; that the entire revocation
of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, so far as concerned
the United States, was confirmed, and that with regard to
American vessels which should arrive in France there would
be little or no difficulty made as to whence they came,
or as to the nature of their cargoes; that in the general view
of the Russian policy this was very agreeable to him,
because it showed something like a relaxation in favor
of commerce; but he referred me to our former
conversations in which he had given me his opinion
upon the character of the Emperor Napoleon.
He did not think the permanency of anything to which he
should assent concerning commerce could be relied upon:
every resolution, every act, was the result of an impulse
of the moment, the effect of an occasional impression.
Today the impression was of one sort, and the measure
corresponded with it; tomorrow the impression would be of
an opposite nature, and the measure would follow that too.
To make them consistent was not in the nature of the man.
He never looked at commerce with commercial eyes;
he never considered that commerce was an interest
in which all mankind were concerned; he saw in it
nothing but the trade of a certain class of individuals.
“But in truth,” said the Count,
“commerce is the concern of us all.
The merchants are indeed only a class of individuals,
bearing a small proportion to the mass of the people;
but commerce is the exchange of mutual superfluities
for mutual wants—is the very chain of human association;
it is the foundation of all the useful and pacific
intercourse between nations;
it is a primary necessity to all classes of people.
The Emperor Napoleon will never see it in this light,
and so his commercial regulations and promises
will never be systematic or consistent—
you can place little dependence upon them.”
I said that his present measures appeared
obviously dictated by a political interest.
As he saw the situation in which the English Government
had chosen to place themselves with respect to America,
he was taking advantage of it by assuming a course of an
opposite character; and I believed the British Government
alone could prevent his succeeding in it completely.
And in order to defeat him they must adopt
measures to which they did not appear at all inclined,
and of which I had little hope.
He said that he should not dissemble to me,
that he had seen the English newspapers to the seventh
of January, which had been sent to him from Stockholm;
that the English Prince Regent’s speech at the opening
of the session of Parliament was in them;
that it spoke of the King’s health; said nothing at all
about the north of Europe; mentioned that the affair
of the Chesapeake frigate had been amicably arranged
with the United States; that several other topics
remained in discussion with them, upon which the
most conciliatory disposition was entertained by him.
I observed that the profession of conciliatory dispositions
had always been sufficiently made by the British
Government, but they had been so long the only things
we had experienced from England that were conciliatory,
that now something more would be necessary
to produce the effect; and of this, I was sorry to say,
I could scarcely discover any prospect.
The Count said there were some intimations that a
messenger had been sent over from France to England.
It was reported that he was charged
with overtures for a pacific negotiation.
But that might perhaps be an ostensible measure
to excite the opinion here of a negotiation between
France and England—which in the great and extraordinary
armaments said to be now making in France and
destined against Russia, might be thought
calculated to produce a certain effect here.
I said that as to negotiations between France and England,
I did not much believe in them, or in their success,
if really attempted; but that I had heard
there were prospects of war between
France and Russia, which I lamented.
He had mentioned the Emperor Napoleon
(the print of him, in all his imperial accoutrements
as Napoléon le Grand, was hanging at the side
of the wall over the sofa upon which we were sitting),
and how much was it to be wished that it were possible the
will of peace and tranquility could be inspired into his heart.
The world might then be allowed to enjoy a little peace.
The Count shook his head and said,
“No; it is impossible.
Tranquility is not in his nature.
I can tell you, in confidence, that he once told me himself.
I was speaking to him about Spain and Portugal,
and he said to me, ‘I must always be going.
After the Peace of Tilsit, where could I go but to Spain?
I went to Spain because I could not go anywhere else.’
And this,” said the Count, “was all that he had to say
in justification of his having gone into Spain and Portugal.
And now, as perhaps there he is not quite satisfied
with his going, he may intend to turn against us,
from the same want of any other place where to go.”
I said that one would think Spain and Portugal still
furnished and were likely long to furnish him
quite room enough to go in without making it
necessary to gratify his passion in another quarter.
The Count replied that there was no political consideration
whatever upon which he founded a hope that peace
might yet be preserved; but there was a consideration
of a different nature which might have its weight, and
upon the effect of which he still rested some expectation.
It was the scarcity of grain.
He understood it was considerable in Paris.
I said I had heard the same, and that the
price of wheat and flour had much advanced,
though not that of bread, which the Government
kept down by payments of their own to the bakers.
He said the scarcity was so great that there had been
recently several riots at the doors of the bakers,
both at Paris and Lyons.
And as large armies could not be put in motion without
very large supplies of such provisions, he still hoped that
as the months of April and May should come on,
the inconvenience and difficulty of procuring such supplies
for these armies would ultimately arrest their march;
“for which, however,” added the Count, “the circumstances
have rendered it proper for us to place ourselves
in a state of preparation, as we have accordingly done.”
I then passed to another subject, observing that
it ought perhaps to have been the first with which I should
have commenced—the removal of Count Pahlen from
the Russian Mission in the United States to that of Brazil.
I observed that my dispatches from the Secretary of State
made it my duty to express to the Emperor the sentiments
entertained by my Government, and their strong sense
of the friendly policy constantly pursued by his Majesty
towards them, and I had a letter from the President himself
mentioning that Count Pahlen had taken leave,
and speaking in terms of the highest satisfaction of his
deportment during the whole period of his mission—
with the assurance that he had conciliated by it the universal
esteem and regard of all who knew him; that it gave me
peculiar pleasure to communicate with him this information,
as I was persuaded it must be pleasing to the Emperor.
He said it certainly would, and that such a testimonial
would contribute to raise yet higher the Emperor’s good
opinion of that officer; that his letters had constantly
spoken in the highest terms of the treatment that he had
received from all classes of people in America; and that
he would quit the country with the warmest regard for it.
I observed that his mission to Brazil would place him
in an advantageous situation for observation,
not only in regard to that country itself,
but to the scenes which were passing in the other parts
of South America, particularly the Spanish provinces.
He asked me whether our Government
had taken any measures respecting them,
and in what light they were considered by us;
and whether they had any Ministers in the United States.
I said I was informed by my dispatches that there were
deputies at the seat of our Government of the United States
considered with favorable sentiments the change which
was taking place in those provinces believing that it would
prove generally advantageous to the interests of mankind;
and that I readily confided to him those views of my
Government, because from former conversations that
I had held with him, and from other circumstances
of which I had heard, I thought there was the most
perfect coincidence between his views on
this subject and those of my Government.
He said they were the same.1
Adams wrote in his Memoirs about a walk on 19 March 1812 with
Emperor Alexander who said, “And so it is after all, that war is coming which
I have done everything to prevent this struggle, but thus it ends.”
Adams asked, “But are all hopes vanished of still preserving peace?”
On March 31 Adams at St. Petersburg in a letter to Secretary of State
James Monroe wrote this in cipher about Emperor Alexander:
He himself told me last week that
notwithstanding all the pains he had taken
to avoid this conflict (cette lute), it must come.
That he would not commence the war;
but that he expected to be attacked,
and that every indication was of war.2
Alexander also said, “At all events we shall not begin the war;
my will is yet to prevent it.”
He then spoke in French how he hoped to avert the war.
Adams noted that several Russian regiments had been
marching from St. Petersburg to the frontiers.
He also wrote in cipher, “A war between France and Russia will doubtless
for the moment promote the interests of England,
but like all their former speculations will terminate in disappointment.”
In April 1812 President Madison persuaded the United States Congress
to approve a 90-day embargo on foreign commerce.
Quincy believed that a war against the British was inevitable.
Prime Minister Spencer Perceval supported the orders-in-council,
and on May 11 he was assassinated in the House of Commons.
Adams in June had learned that the British Parliament
had repealed those aggressive orders.
Madison’s Embargo was working.
Yet the British continued to impress American seamen on to their ships,
and they also seized ships.
They had refused to withdraw their soldiers from the Canadian frontier
according to the Paris Peace Treaty.
Thus on June 19 President Madison and the United States Congress
declared war against England beginning the War of 1812.
On 25 June 1812 Napoleon’s French army
with more than 500,000 men invaded Russia.
On June 30 Adams wrote in his Memoirs that the St. Petersburg Gazette
had reported that the Russian Imperial Council had announced
that the French had invaded Russian territories.
Tsar Alexander I was determined not to make peace
until there was no French soldier in Russia.
Count Romanzoff informed Quincy Adams that Russia and the British had signed
on September 12 a treaty of friendship and commerce.
In October and November 1812 John Quincy managed to help Robert Fulton
establish a monopoly for his steamboats for fifteen years running between
St. Petersburg and Kronstadt and on Russian rivers.
When Fulton tried to pay him, Quincy refused to accept any money from him.
He considered that effort part of his duty.
Quincy and his parents had been influenced by the ethical treatise
Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith who emphasized
self-interest and comfort and also considered sympathy for others.
On 25 November 1812 John Quincy Adams wrote in his Memoirs:
This morning I received notification from the
Grand Master of the Ceremonies, Narishkin, that
a Te Deum would be performed at the Cathedral
Church at Kazan at half-past eleven o’clock this
forenoon to return thanks for the defeat of the enemy’s
corps under the command of the Marshals Davoust and Ney.
I went with Mr. Smith accordingly at this hour.
It is the greatest victory that the Russians have gained since
the war commenced, and is perfectly decisive of the fate of
the campaign and of the Emperor Napoleon’s main army.
It is now morally impossible that
the remnant of them should escape.
In every probability they are
at this hour all prisoners of war.
He is lost without resource.3
John Quincy Adams in a letter to his mother Abigail on December 31 described
what had happened to Napoleon’s army in Russia:
As this propensity to surrender appears to be an
infectious distemper among out troops, I am in daily
expectation of hearing the third instance of it,
which I hope will be the last for some time—
As I am willing to believe that we shall learn
something by experience, I flatter myself that
among the acquisitions which our Warriors will make,
they will reckon that of receiving Surrenders in return—
If not, the best thing we can do will be to turn unanimously
disciples of George Fox and William Penn,
and be conscientiously scrupulous against bearing arms.
If indeed the practice of surrendering were about to become
a military fashion, as from the numerous examples of it
which within the last two months, I have almost had under
my eyes, would seem probable, there might be reason
to hope that War itself, would lose some of its favor
as the only occupation and amusement of mankind—
In my last Letter I gave you a sketch of the situation
at that time of Napoleon the Great—
There is no Account yet that he has personally
surrendered himself; but he has only saved himself
by the swiftness of his flight, which on one occasion
at least he was obliged to pursue in disguise—
Of the immense host with which, six months since,
he invaded Russia, nine-tenths at least
are prisoners or food for worms—
They have been surrendering by ten thousands at a time,
and at this moment there are at least one hundred fifty
thousand of them in the power of Emperor Alexander.
From Moscow to Prussia, eight hundred miles of road
have been strewed with French artillery, baggage-wagons,
ammunition-chests, dead and dying men whom
he has been forced to abandon to their fate—
Pursued by three large regular armies of a
most embittered and exasperated army
and by almost numberless militia of peasants,
stung by the destruction of their harvests and cottages….
It has become a sort of by-word among the
common people here that the two Russian generals
who have conquered Napoléon and all his marshals
are General Famine and General Frost.
There may be and probably is some exaggeration in the
accounts which have been received and officially published
here of the late Events; but where the realities are so
certain, and so momentous the temptation to exaggerate
and misrepresent almost vanishes—
In all human probability, the Career of
Napoleon’s conquests is at an end.
France can no longer give the law
to the Continent of Europe—
How he will make up his account with Germany
the victim of his former successful rashness,
and with France who rewarded it with an
Imperial Crown is now to be seen—
The transition from the condition of France in June last
to her present State is much greater, than would be
from the present to her defensive campaign against
the Duke of Brunswick in 1792—
A new Era is dawning upon Europe—
The possibility of a more propitious prospect is discernible;
but to the greater disposer of Events, only is it known,
whether this new Revolution is to be an opening for
some alleviation to human misery, or whether
it is to be only a variation of Calamities.
It is not without some Satisfaction that I have had
the opportunity of being so near a witness to the great
and decisive Events of the year, now ending—
It has been full of moral and political instruction—
To the Russian armies and Generals it has been
also a great military School; so great indeed, as not
altogether to leave reflection unconcerned, what future
uses may be made of what they have learned:
but as military instruction is of little use to me,
I have only had in this respect the opportunity
to observe the general features of the Campaign—
Its results have presented nothing new—
The Fabian system, which succeeded in our Revolutionary
War; which Lord Wellington has with equal success adopted
in Spain and Portugal, and which even in this Country had
triumphed a Century before over Charles the twelfth of
Sweden, has again been signally triumphant over the Hero
of the present age, but his errors, have been so gross and
flagrant, that their consequences so fatal to himself, can
teach nothing to the military Student, but what had been
taught a thousand times before—
It is not the present Disasters, it is the continuance
of his former successes which may hereafter
excite the astonishment of posterity.4
At the same time the Americans who had invaded Canada were also having a hard time.
At Detroit the British had captured 2,200 American troops as they gave up
control of Lake Erie and the Michigan Territory to British forces.
Militia from New York refused to leave that state,
and the Canadians took over the mountains by the Niagara River.
Twelve ships in America’s new navy had more success at sea.
In September 1812 Tsar Alexander in Russia offered
to mediate between the British and the Americans.
The British resumed the fighting at sea by attacking
the USS Chesapeake again, killing 146 Americans.
General Dearborn led an American invasion of Canada,
and they burned governmental buildings in the capital of Upper Canada.
On 22 April 1813 President James Madison and Secretary of State
James Monroe issued this “Commission for Treaty of Commerce.”
Know Ye, That for the purpose of confirming and
improving the amicable and beneficial relations between
the United States and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor
of all the Russias, and reposing special Trust and confidence
in the Integrity, Prudence and Ability of John Q. Adams,
Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of
His said Imperial Majesty, of Albert Gallatin, Secretary of
the Treasury of the United States, and of James A. Bayard,
a Senator of the United States, I have appointed them
jointly and severally Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the
Court of His said imperial Majesty; with full and all manner
of power and authority for in the name of the United States
to meet and confer with a Minister or Ministers of His said
Imperial Majesty, being furnished with the like power and
authority, and with him to agree, treat, consult and
negotiate of and concerning the general commerce between
the United States and Russia, and of all matters and subjects
connected therewith, which may be interesting to the two
nations; and to conclude and sign a Treaty of Treaties,
Convention or Conventions, touching the premises;
transmitting the same to the President of the United States
for his ratification by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate of the United States.5
James Monroe sent a letter to John Quincy Adams on April 26
with instructions from President Madison.
John Quincy Adams on 22 June 1813 wrote in his Memoirs explaining that
Tsar Alexander had informed him that the British had rejected Russia’s offer
to mediate the conflict after President Madison had appointed two commissioners:
I told him I should send him the Russian and German
translations when they should be completed.
I also showed him, and left with him, the National
Intelligencer containing the article relative to the
appointment of Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard, which
I received yesterday, observing that he had judged
more correctly than I had on the probability of this fact.
He said that he was very sorry to say he had received,
since he had seen me, further dispatches from Count
Lieven, stating that the British Government, with many
very friendly and polite assurances that there was no
mediation which they should so readily and cheerfully
accept as that of the Emperor of Russia, had, however,
stated that their differences with the United States of
America, involving certain principles of the internal
government of England, were of a nature which they
did not think suitable to be settled by a mediation.
I said this was no more than I expected; that
I much regretted the failure of this new attempt at
negotiation, but that I was happy the solemnity which
the President had given to the acceptance of the
Emperor’s offer, by the appointment of two persons
so highly distinguished in our country, would at least
manifest the sense which he entertained of the Emperor’s
friendly sentiments and proposal, as well as the
constant desire of the American Government for peace.6
Adams on July 3 recorded briefly in his Memoirs this important news:
July 3rd. I received a note from Count Romanzoff
enclosing a letter from Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard,
and one from Mr. Speyer at Stockholm.
The first informs me of the appointment of those two
gentlemen jointly with myself as Envoys Extraordinary
and Ministers Plenipotentiary to negotiate a peace with
Great Britain under the mediation of the Emperor of Russia;
of their arrival at Gottenburg, and their intention to proceed
as speedily as possible to St. Petersburg; also that
Mr. Harris is appointed Secretary of the Legation.7
On July 21 Adams wrote this in his Memoirs:
21st. Mr. Harris came in and told me that
Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard had just arrived.
I immediately went to see them
at the lodgings he has taken for them.
I invited them and Mr. Milligan, Mr. Dallas,
and Mr. Gallatin Jr., who are with them, to go home
with me and dine; but they excused themselves, being
much fatigued and having been three nights without sleep.
I sat with them about an hour, in which they gave us
the latest information from America, and I
communicated to them the general state of affairs here.
They gave me a large bundle of letters and dispatches
from the United States, which with the exception of an hour
at dinner, I was employed in reading until ten at night.
I thank Almighty God for the favors communicated to me
by these dispatches, and I pray for the gracious aid of
his Spirit to discharge with zeal, integrity,
and discretion the new duties required of me.8
On 24 July 1813 John Quincy Adams in Russia wrote in his Memoirs:
At eleven this morning I went with Mr. Gallatin
and Mr. Bayard to Count Romanzoff’s,
and presented them to him.
He received us in his saloon above-stairs
with his usual courtesy.
After some conversation upon the familiar and ordinary
topics, Mr. Gallatin gave him the copies and translations
of the credential letter and the two powers, observing
that we should address a note to him on the subject, but
that we now furnished him with the papers to give him an
immediate view by anticipation of the extent of our powers.
I mentioned to him that the object of one of them was
to form a treaty of commerce with Russia; upon which
he answered that we might be very sure of being
listened to in everything we might have to say here.
He said there might be reason to hope that the British
Government would be more inclined to negotiate now, as
upon the only remaining great object of dispute with us he
understood Congress had lately passed a law which must
take away a great part of the British grounds of complaint.
Mr. Gallatin added that besides this law, if anything
further was necessary to tranquilize Britain upon the
point of which she complained, we were authorized
to agree to any expedient that might be proposed and
which would be compatible with the rights of an
independent nation—the only point indispensable
on our part being to obtain a stipulation which
should protect our seamen from impressment.
The Count spoke of the late capture of York
in Upper Canada and asked if it would not
give us the command of the lakes.
Mr. Gallatin said we might hope it would lead to the
occupation of Upper Canada, and that the command of the
lakes could not be contested against us, after we had built
vessels upon them—the British having always had
a few vessels there, and we none until the war.9
On July 31 John Quincy completed the 497-pages on “The Mission to Russia”
with this thanksgiving prayer:
I close this volume of my Memoirs, containing four years,
within four days, of my life with sentiments of gratitude to
God for all the favors, preservations, and blessings received
at his hands during that period, of humble resignation under
the afflictions which his wise Providence has mingled in
my cup, and with conscious sorrow for the deficiencies
and omissions of improvement of the time which has
been indulged me—imploring at the same time his
further blessing upon my wife, my parents, my children,
my friends, and my country, and the whole world of
mankind, and especially asking for the aid of his Spirit,
that my future life may be more thoroughly devoted
to his honor and glory, and to usefulness on earth!10
John Quincy Adams in Volume II of his Memoirs entitled Chapter VIII “The Mediation.”
He composed a poem and then wrote on 3 August 1813:
Lord of creation! Thou from whom proceed
Each honest thought and honorable deed;
Parent of life! Without whose quickening ray
The soul’s deep darkness knows not how to pray;
Oh! let thy mercy teach my lips their task,
Or freely grant the boon they ought to ask!
Let not yon glorious orb’s returning light
Once from those eyes dispel the shades of night,
But from my heart spontaneous may arise
A prayer sincere and fervent to the skies,
That all earth’s choicest favors may attend,
And all thy joys, upon my bosom’s friend,
That thou would bless with ever-bounteous hand
My parents, children, friends, and native land;
Nor be my vows to these alone confined:
Forgive my foes, and bless all human kind;
And whatsoever thy wisdom shall decree
My future portion on this earth to be,
Let thy good Spirit ever nerve my will
To thee and man my duties to fulfill.August 3rd, 1813. Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard
came about one o’clock; we considered the answer
we had received from Count Romanzoff to our
first official note, and concluded that no reply
to it would be necessary for the present.
We finally agreed upon the note to be sent
relative to the treaty of commerce with Russia.
Mr. Harris’s commission not extending to this object,
I requested my colleagues to take some order concerning it.
Mr. Gallatin said that, however the commission might be,
he knew it was the intention that he should be the
secretary for all the objects of the mission; and that
he had been appointed by an intimation from the Russian
Government itself, or at least from Mr. Daschkoff.
It was therefore determined that Mr. Harris
should act as secretary upon all the powers.
Mr. Gallatin took with him the draft of the note
concerning the treaty with Russia, as finally settled.
He also took my formal instructions from the
Department of State on this subject
with the heads of a treaty as they were sent to me.
Mr. Gallatin told me that he and Mr. Bayard
had requested and had an interview with Count Romanzoff
on Sunday morning, in which they had suggested the wish
to the Count of being informed as soon as possible
if Britain should finally reject the mediation,
that they might not be unnecessarily detained here,
with no prospect of accomplishing any useful purpose.11
Adams on December 30 wrote a letter from St. Petersburg
on events in Europe to Secretary of State James Monroe:
The event of the campaign in Germany has been such
as was to be expected after the accession of Austria
to the cause of the allies, and the defection of the
Princes of the Rhenish Confederation from that of France.
By the sudden and it would seem unexpected change in the
policy of Bavaria, and by the junction of the Bavarian with
an Austrian army behind the Emperor Napoleon, his army
was placed in a situation so desperate that nothing but his
extraordinary military genius, which has never yet deserted
him, could have saved so large a portion of them from the
extremity to which they were reduced, and in the midst
of treachery of every description have effected a retreat,
through a hostile country, and through a host of adverse
forces at least three times more numerous than his own.
In the battles near Leipzig, which continued from
the 15th to the 18th of October, the combined
Russian, Austrian, Prussian, and Swedish armies
amounted according to their own statement,
probably underrated, to 400,000 men.
The number with the Emperor Napoleon
did not exceed 150,000.
His loss there was about 40,000, and with the remnant
he was yet to cut his way through an Austrian and
Bavarian army of 80,000 men in his rear, which
he actually accomplished at Hanau, and reached Mayence,
his official statements say, with 100,000 men.
From Mayence he returned immediately to Paris.
The headquarters of the Emperors of Russia and Austria
and the King of Prussia were transferred in the
beginning of November to Frankfort on the Main.
A corps of about 15,000 men commanded by
Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr had been left
by the Emperor Napoleon at Dresden.
After making an unsuccessful attempt to effect their retreat
to Magdeburg, they obtained a capitulation so favorable
that Prince Schwarzenberg the commander in chief
of the combined armies refused to ratify it, and
they have been sent as prisoners of war into Bohemia.
The fortress of Dantzig, Stettin, Modlin
and Tamose have also capitulated.
The retreat of the French corps on the lower Elbe
under Marshal Davoust has also been cut off.
The kingdom of Westphalia dissolved itself
without resistance, and a revolution was
immediately effected in Holland.
A deputation was sent to the Prince of Orange,
who was in England, inviting him to return
with the offer of the royal title, which he declined.
But he assumed that of sovereign prince of
the United Netherlands, probably as a temporary
character to be definitively settled
when a constitution shall be given to the country.
The constitution, the proclamations say,
is to be prescribed by the Prince himself,
and nothing explicit is announced of its character,
excepting that it is not to revive the old constitution
of the United Provinces or the office of Stadtholder.
All this of course is merely provisional and will certainly
terminate in arrangements under the sanction
and guaranty of the combined powers, and as far as
will be found practicable under the dictate of England.
The progress of the Austrian arms in Italy has been
slower and with more considerable vicissitudes.
The Viceroy has however been generally upon the
defensive, and has been retreating to the Adige.
As the appointment to the Austrian chief command has
recently been transferred to General Bellegarde,
it is probable that in the ensuing campaign that country
will be the scene of greater and more important exertions.
In Spain the fortresses of St. Sebastian and of Pampeluna
have surrendered, and Lord Wellington with
his army has entered upon the French territory.
So that France is at this moment invaded
at once on her northern and southern boundaries.
The Swiss Confederation has declared neutrality,
but it is said that this does not suit the views of the
combined powers, and that Switzerland will be
under the necessity not only of allowing the
passage to their troops, but of joining their
causes and furnishing a contingent of men.
Three successive conscriptions of 30,000, 280,000
and 300,000 men have been authorized in France
since the month of August.
Two armies of 100,000 men each are to be assembled
at Bordeaux and at Turin, and the rest, if they can be raised,
will doubtless be employed to strengthen the line of
defense from Holland to the frontier of Switzerland.
The Emperors of Russia and Austria and the
King of Prussia have issued a proclamation at Frankfort
preparatory to their invasion of France beyond the Rhine.
They renew the assurance of their great attachment
to the happiness of France, connected with
their determination to be also happy themselves.
They say they are willing that France should be greater
than she ever was under the Kings, and they have
made proposals of peace to the Emperor Napoleon.
Whether these proposals were accepted
or rejected they do not say.
There has been a general change of ministry in France,
where the Duke of Bassano having resumed
the office of Minister Secretary of State, and
Count Molé is Grand Judge in the place of Régnier.
Of all these events, as well as of the several
treaties of alliance and subsidy between
Great Britain and the combined powers, you will
have more direct and earlier information
than it would have been possible for me to give you.
Should a negotiation take place, I think there is
little prospect of its terminating at present,
or even very soon in a peace.
The Emperor Alexander has no expectation of
returning soon to his capital, and he has just
invited the Empress to join him at his headquarters.
She is to leave this city upon
that journey tomorrow morning.12
On 2 January 1814 J. Q. Adams in St. Petersburg wrot
in his letter to his father John Adams:
The communications are nearly annihilated,
and but for the return of the gentlemen who
came out here on the extraordinary mission
and that of their companions, I should be deprived
of all means of transmitting a letter to my friends.
The Neptune, the vessel in which these gentlemen came,
and which they ordered in the beginning of November
to go and wait for them at Gothenburg,
has effected her passage to that port.
Mr. Gallatin, who to this day has received information
of the decision of the Senate upon his nomination to
this mission only through the medium of a newspaper,
intends leaving this place in the course of eight or ten days.
He has received a letter from one of his relations in Geneva,
proposing to meet him in Switzerland, and I believe
contemplates commencing his journey in that direction.
You will easily judge from your intimate knowledge
of the usual course of official transactions of the situation
in which he personally and his colleagues have been placed,
with the certain information now nearly three months
since received of the vote in Senate upon the nomination,
and without any authentic communication of the fact.
As neither Mr. Bayard nor myself have received our
commissions under the appointment with advice and
consent, Mr. Gallatin’s powers to act are still precisely
the same as our own; and if the mediation had
been accepted and the negotiation in progress,
we should have been thrown into a dilemma
not a little awkward and embarrassing.
The British government, however, peremptorily
refused to treat with the United States under the mediation
of Russia, or as they expressed it, under any mediation.
This determination they communicated to the
Emperor Alexander at his headquarters,
and from the nature of the occupations which have
occupied his time and absorbed his attention no official
communication has yet been made to us of this event.
Mr. Gallatin, on receiving intelligence of the issue of his
nomination in the Senate, determined not to wait for
official dispatches announcing it; but as he has no
other means of returning to the United States
than by the Neptune, and as we have been daily
expecting the information from this government
which will authorize the departure of Mr. Bayard,
he has been waiting hitherto, until the state of the roads,
and the advancement of the season have induced him
to conclude upon his departure without longer delay.
The British government through an indirect channel
have offered to treat with the American envoys directly,
either at Gothenburg or in England, and intimated
to them an invitation to London for that purpose.
As we have no powers to treat otherwise than
under the mediation, we could not accept this invitation,
but Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard propose to avail
themselves of it to stop in England on their return home,
and to ascertain in a manner involving no responsibility
what the views of the British government are
in relation to a peace with the United States.
These views have, indeed, been made known to us
in a manner sufficiently intelligible to leave me little
expectation that my colleagues will find a favorable
opportunity for bringing an accommodation to a successful
issue; but the desire of our country and of our government
is so strong for peace that no honorable opportunity for
attempting to accomplish it ought to be neglected.
As the military and political revolutions in the
north of Europe have now opened a communication
from this country to England by the way of Holland,
Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard intend to take
that course instead of going to Gothenburg.
They propose ordering the Neptune to Falmouth
and going by land themselves to Amsterdam.
The packets already pass between Helvoetsluys
and Harwich, and will furnish them
the means of conveyance to England.
As Mr. Gallatin takes his departure first,
he will make his visit to Switzerland
and meet Mr. Bayard again in Holland.13
In early January 1814 the United States Secretary of State James Monroe wrote
in a letter to John Quincy Adams and James Bayard that the British government
had agreed to direct negotiation with the United States, and he instructed
Adams and Bayard to go to Gothenburg as emissaries with Henry Clay
and Jonathan Russell to work on a peace treaty.
John Quincy Adams on 24 January 1814, wrote about the Dutch in a letter
to his youngest brother Thomas Boyleston Adams,
and he provided an evaluation of Napoleon:
You will know long before this letter can reach you that
the Prince of Orange has returned to Holland, where
instead of resuming the title of Stadtholder, he has taken
that of “Sovereign Prince of the United Netherlands.”
The old constitution of States General,
States of the Provinces, and Sovereign Cities
has therefore been totally abandoned.
The Prince in one of his proclamations says
they shall have a constitution, and a previous
proclamation by a sort of Revolutionary Committee
of his friends, says it is to be prescribed by him.
The English government has sent troops there
to support him, and according to common report his son,
the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who has distinguished
himself in Portugal and Spain under Lord Wellington,
is to be the husband of the future Queen of England.
I am informed that one of the first acts of the
government formed under the Prince’s authority was
an informal notification to Mr. Bourne that his functions
as Consul General of the United States had ceased.
The same notification was given to Mr. Forbes at Hamburg
when that city was incorporated as a part of the French
Empire, and it may be principally a matter of form, or an
expedient to obtain a recognition of the new government.
There is certainly among the people of Holland
no disposition unfriendly to America,
and I can suppose none in the Prince.
But what his engagements with England
may be time only can disclose.
All the other allies of England have remained
neutral to her war with America.
There may be motives, and among them the strongest
will be the clear, manifest and important interest of
Holland to remain neutral, for prompting the British
government to deny the Hollanders the benefit of neutrality.
By the measures with which the Prince commences his
career connected with the proposed marriage, it may be the
project in England to make Holland hereafter an appendage
to the British Empire in form as well as substance.
Perhaps they will discover that Holland is
an alluvion of Hanover, a hint which they
may take from their friend the Ruler of France.
To whatever disposition they may adopt Holland must be,
as she has been ever since the first year of Batavian Liberty
(with which you were so well acquainted),
altogether passive.
The events of the last two years opened a new
prospect to all Europe, and have discovered the
glassy substance of the colossal power of France.
Had that power been acquired by wisdom,
it might have been consolidated by time
and the most ordinary portion of prudence.
The Emperor Napoleon says that he was never
seduced by prosperity; but when he comes to
be judged impartially, that will not be their sentence.
His fortune will be among the wonders
of the age in which he had lived.
His military talent and genius will place him
high in the rank of great captains;
but his intemperate passion, his presumptuous
insolence, and his Spanish and Russian wars will
reduce him very neatly to the level of ordinary men.
At all events he will be one of the standing
examples of human vicissitude, ranged not
among the Alexanders, Caesars, and Charlemagnes,
but among the Hannibals, Pompeys, and Charles the 12th.
I believe his romance is drawing towards its close
and that he will soon cease even to yield
a pretext for the war against France.
England alone will be “afraid of the gunpowder Percy,
though he should be dead.”14
On 28 January 1814 John Quincy Adams in a letter to Robert Fulton wrote:
I have now the pleasure of enclosing to you
a translation of a rescript from the Emperor,
addressed to the Minister of the Interior,
directing him to issue the patent for your steam boats.
It was sent me by Count Romanzoff, with a request
that I would give him notice for the information of the
Minister of the Interior, of the person empowered
by you to carry the design into execution here.
I answered the Count that I was authorized by your letter of
19 June 1813 to take out the patent in your behalf and was
ready upon the delivery of it to me to pay on your account
the 1500 rubles required conformably to the rescript;
that I could not name the person who would be charged
with the execution of the plan here by you, as your letter
had only mentioned your intention of sending your chief
engineer here for the purpose; that if the Minister of the
Interior thought a more formal power than that in your letter
to me indispensable for the delivery of the patent, he might
keep it in his hands until I could inform you of its being
ready for delivery to you or your agent duly authorized.
I afterwards saw the Minister of the Interior himself,
who told me that he should not hesitate to deliver the
patent to me upon the authority given by your letter
to me to receive it, but that the patent itself could not be
completed without a specification and a model of your boat.
Of course it will remain with him until you can furnish these,
and I acquiesced the more readily in this arrangement
as it occasions no loss of time to you.
In sending here your engineer for the construction
of the first boat you will be enabled at the same time
to transmit the model and specification, as well as the
regular power to take out the patent in your name.15
The United States Attorney General Richard Rush praised the diplomatic skill
of John Quincy Adams who then became the chief negotiator.
Adams sent a letter to Rush explaining why the British had rejected the offer of
mediation by Russia, and it was read by President Madison and
Secretary of State Monroe who sent the commissioners instructions in March 1814.
Monroe secretly asked them to try to get Canada from the British.
On 20 March 1814 John Quincy Adams wrote in his Memoirs:
Mr. Lewis sent me this morning a letter he
had just received by the way of Holland from
Mr. Diamond in London dated 15th February.
It says that the Fair American Cartel had arrived at
Liverpool with letters from New York to 22nd January,
and with Nathaniel H. Strong as Consul at Gottenburg,
who was bearer of dispatches for Mr. Bayard and me;
that we, together with Mr. Henry Clay of Kentucky and
Mr. Jonathan Russell, had been appointed to treat with the
British Government, upon the invitation of Lord Castlereagh,
at Gottenburg; that Messrs. Clay and Russell would not
sail from the United States until the 1st of April,
that I might have time to reach Gottenburg as soon as they;
that Mr. Strong was to embark in the next packet for
Holland or for Gottenburg, as he should find
most advisable to meet me with diligence.
This opens a new prospect of futurity
and a new change in the scenery of life.
Upon this change it becomes me to implore the blessing
of Heaven, which can turn to good the most unpromising
appearances, and above all which can preserve integrity
and inspire wisdom, whatever turn it may have
destined that the event should take.16
John Quincy Adams in St. Petersburg wrote this letter
to his mother Abigail on 30 March 1814:
Since I wrote you last, 1 February I have had
no opportunity of putting a Letter even on its way,
to reach you, when it should please Heaven.
The ordinary intercourse between this Country and England
by the way of Gothenburg has been suspended from the
24th of December until this day by the freezing of the
Harbors, and there are now 22 Mails due, from London—
The same Cause has prevented Travelers from hence
going in that direction, and I now write you without any
immediate prospect of a conveyance for my Letter,
but in adherence to the Rule of suffering no Month to pass,
without renewing at last this token of my affection and duty.
Your letter of 14 July 1813 is still the last date that
I have received from Quincy, or from any part of the
United States, but by the means of Newspapers,
we have some very recent Accounts from America—
By private Letters too from England, which have
found their way through Holland, and by others
from Holland, we have learned, the acceptance
by the President of the United States, of the
proposal made by the British Government
to treat for Peace at Gothenburg, and the appointment
of four American Commissioners for the Negotiation—
I am informed that a Mr. Strong has arrived in England,
charged with Dispatches for the two of the Commissioners
now in Europe, and that he was proceeding
as speedily as possible to Gothenburg,
for which place he has the appointment of Consul—
But I have not heard from Mr. Strong himself,
and Gothenburg will probably be still for
weeks to come inaccessible on the Water side—
Mr. Bayard I trust will receive the dispatches in Holland,
and from thence may communicate them to me.
I feel an inclination almost irresistible, to give my father
the whole budget of my feelings, and opinions, upon this
new effort to reconcile two Countries which seem incapable
of living either at Peace or at War with each other.
But mindful of an admonition in one of his last Letters,
I must reserve my thoughts, until they can be imparted
without restraint in the freedom of direct conversation—
I may simply add that I expect to have this pleasure
before the close of the year—
Whatever may be the issue of the intended conferences
at Gothenburg, I hope and believe they will not span out
beyond the bounds of the ensuing Summer,
and at all Events I conclude it is not the President’s
intention that I should return to this place—
If left to my own option I certainly shall not—
After five Winters passed at St: Petersburg,
I have no wish to try in my own person or to expose
my family to the experience of this Climate any longer—
There is not at present nor is there likely to be in future any
object of public concernment, which could occupy me here
in a manner satisfactory to myself or useful to my Country—
Many other Considerations will combine to draw me home,
and if the Negotiation at Gothenburg terminates as
I have every reason to believe it will, I flatter myself
that it will be the means of restoring us to our friends
and Country before the next New Year’s day.
We are given to understand that Mr. Gallatin
is not included in the new Commission,
which to me is a subject of regret—
Before his arrival here my personal acquaintance
with him was so slight that I could scarcely say
I knew him, otherwise than as a Public Man—
From the Relations in which we were placed together here,
his character and especially his Talents
gained ground upon my opinion—
His desire to accomplish the Peace was sincere and ardent.
I had several opportunities of observing his
quickness of Understanding, his Sagacity &
Penetration and the soundness of his Judgment—
I should have relied very much upon him had the
Negotiations taken any serious affect,
and shall be sorry not to have the benefit of his
Assistance in that of which the Prospect is before us.
Of the two new Colleagues said to be joined with us
at present, I know Mr. Clay, by having served with him
one Session in the Senate; and Mr. Russell by a
frequent and very agreeable Correspondence with him,
while he was Chargé d’Affairs in France and in England—
With what feelings, dispositions, or Instructions
those Gentlemen will come, I can only infer from
their Sentiments as they have been heretofore
made public and from conjecture.
Of the three former Commissioners, I should
probably have been the first to stop in the career of
concession to secure the main object of the Mission—
The new Comers, if they have had no change in their
Opinions, since I had last an opportunity of knowing them,
will be of sterner stuff than myself.
From the continual chain of unexpected and unexampled
success, which has been attending the British Cause
both in Arms, and in Negotiation from the hour that
their War with us commenced, we have anything
to anticipate but a spirit of concession in them.
They have little to boast of in the progress of
their War with us hitherto, but the chances of War
have all turned up prizes to them everywhere else.
France after having been twenty Years the Dictatress
of Europe has now in the course of two Campaigns
been brought completely at the feet of those Enemies
whom she had so often vanquished and so long oppressed—
Six weeks ago, an allied army of at least
three hundred thousand men was within
two days easy march of Paris, and by
the latest accounts received from thence,
was again within the same distance, or nearer—
In the interval they had met with some opposition
which occasioned a momentary check upon their
Operations and a short retreat to concentrate their forces.
There is little reason to doubt that they are
at this moment in possession of Paris, and that
the Empire of Napoleon is in the Paradise of Fools.
While the Allies were in the Heart of France, a Negotiation,
as hypocritical, and fallacious as the Congress of Prague,
was affected to be opened at Chatillon, without any
intention perhaps on any side, certainly not on the
side of the Allies that it should result in a Peace—
Their object is in giving Peace to France to make her
at the same time a present of the Bourbons, but even
in the extremity to which France is reduced there
have been very few and trifling manifestations of a
disposition in any part of her People to receive them.
As I am in daily expectation of receiving the order to
repair to Gothenburg, I may possibly be there as soon
as this Letter; or be obliged to take it on there with me.
It is now of the whole Year the worst time for undertaking
the Journey, and the passage of the Gulf between this and
Sweden, will probably for some weeks be impracticable—
It is however very doubtful whether I shall be able
to go before the breaking up of the Ice; in which case
I shall endeavor to get a passage directly by Water—
But the Navigation from hence is very seldom
open before the first of June.17
On 7 April 1814 John Quincy Adams in St. Petersburg wrote
in a letter to Secretary of State James Monroe:
On the 31st ultimo Mr. Strong arrived in this city
and brought me your favor (triplicate) of 8 January last,
and a letter from Mr. Bayard at Amsterdam, enclosing
a copy of your joint dispatch of the same 8 January,
sent to him and me; and the printed message of the
President of 6 January, and documents relating to the
proposal of a negotiation for peace at Gothenburg.
Mr. Strong informs me that he was also charged
with several packets of documents and newspapers
from the Department of State which by unavoidable
accident were left on board the packet in which
he crossed from England to Holland.
I received at the same time and from Mr. Strong
a letter from Mr. Beasley dated 1 March,
in which there is the following paragraph:It has been rumored for some days past, but I have not been able
to trace it to any satisfactory source, that this government has come
to the determination not to enter upon any negotiation until our
government shall have restored to the ordinary state of prisoners
of war, all the British officers held in the United States as hostages
to answer in their persons for the safety and proper treatment
of those prisoners who have been sent to this country for trial.
I hope it may not be so, but I should not be surprised at the
adoption of any measure calculated to prolong the war with us,
especially if there should be an immediate peace on the
continent of which there is a fair prospect at present.A report of the same kind, that the British government
had determined not to enter upon this negotiation,
had been generally circulated from the fact that so late as
the first of March no appointment of British commissioners
was known to have been made, although they had been
nearly a month before apprized that the President had
accepted the Prince Regent’s proposal for the negotiation.
Under these circumstance it might be questionable whether
it was not my duty to delay the execution of the instructions
to repair to Gothenburg, until something more certain of
the intentions of the British Government should be known.
But in considering that the instructions themselves are
peremptory, that the wanton violation of good faith in the
refusal to carry into effect their own proposal was not to be
credited upon mere rumors and surmises, and that
if such could be the intention of the British government
I might furnish them with a pretext for it by not repairing
to the appointed place, I concluded to proceed upon
the journey as speedily at this season of the year.
I hope to leave this city in the course of a fortnight,
and to be at Gothenburg by the 10th of May.18
John Quincy Adams wrote at St. Petersburg on 15 April 1814
in a letter to Secretary of State James Monroe:
It was apparently the object of the British Cabinet,
in rejecting the Russian mediation, to withhold
if possible from the public eye all evidence,
not only of that rejection and of the motives upon which
it was founded, but even that the offer had been made.
In the first instance they gave no positive answer,
but expressed doubts whether
the mediation would be accepted in America.
In their labors to persuade others they had succeeded
to convince themselves that the American government was
under French influence, and calculating that the mediation
of a sovereign at war with France and in close alliance with
them could not be acceptable to the President, they trusted
that a refusal on his part would release them from the
necessity of coming to a decision upon the proposal.
It was therefore not made at that time formally and in
written communication, but merely in personal conferences
between the Chancellor and Lord Cathcart here, and
between Count Lieven and Lord Castlereagh at London.
When it was found not only that the mediation was
accepted by the President, but that the envoys from
the United States were appointed for the mission,
a positive answer to Russia became absolutely necessary,
and Count Lieven was told that the question with
America involved principles of internal government
in Great Britain which were not susceptible
of being discussed under any mediation.
Lord Cathcart was instructed to explain the matter
verbally at the Emperor’s headquarters and had a
conversation with the Emperor himself upon the
subject at Bautzen between the 12th and 20th of May.
Still there was nothing written to prove the refusal of
the mediation, nor would there perhaps ever have been
anything, but for the renewed proposal which the Emperor
by Count Romanzoff’s advice directed to be made by
Count Lieven, the official note of which was sent from hence
to Count Lieven, and a copy has been transmitted to you by
us, and a copy of which has been transmitted to you by us.
Before this note was received by Count Lieven,
Lord Castlereagh had learned that it would come,
and then, that is about the last of July, Lord Cathcart
was instructed to decline the mediation in a written note.
This note he presented at Töplitz on the 1st of September.
So that when Count Lieven received his instructions
to renew the offer of mediation, he was told by
Lord Castlereagh that it had already been refused,
and all the grounds of refusal fully
set forth to the Emperor at headquarters.
Count Lieven therefore did not present the note according
to his instructions, and whatever Lord Cathcart’s verbal
elucidations of the motives of refusal may have been
to the Emperor, he has only referred to,
without stating them in the written note.
That they were not satisfactory to the Emperor,
I well know, for I have seen a letter in His Majesty’s
own hand writing, dated at Töplitz 8 September O. S.,
that is twenty days after Lord Cathcart’s note,
and in express terms approving completely
Count Romanzoff’s instruction to Count Lieven
for the renewal of the offer of mediation.
In the policy of suppressing as much as possible, the
evidence of the refusal to accept the mediation, it cannot
now be questioned that the Russian government has either
concurred with or acquiesced in the views of the British.
The importance of preserving the reality of harmony
between them at the most eventful crisis of their great
common cause against France urged alike upon both
parties the necessity of preserving the appearances
of it in regard to all objects of minor concernment.
The flat refusal of the mediation of a prince whose
partialities, if he could have been susceptible of
entertaining any while performing the office of mediator,
must have been all in favor of England, could not but
have upon the public opinion of the world an operation
in no wise advantageous to the British government.
The Emperor on his part might not incline to expose to the
world how very little consideration the British had for him
beyond the precise points in which his cause was their own.
He might be advised that in making public such a signal
and groundless mark of distrust on the part of his ally, the
sentiment of his dignity would require that he should take
some notice of it, which at this time would not be expedient.
It might also be admitted that the very proposal in
Lord Cathcart’s note was of a nature which would
have assumed a singular appearance if communicated
by the Russian government to the American envoys.
Lord Cathcart’s language to Russia is,
“We will not negotiate with America under your mediation,
but we ask your good office to prevail upon America
to negotiate with us without it.”
The delicacy of this procedure towards Russia was,
I suppose, duly reflected upon before Lord Cathcart
presented his note; but I acknowledge that
when I first read it among the printed documents
with the President’s message of 6 January,
I was not surprised that the Russian government
should have declined performing the office of mediator
merely to announce that her mediation was refused.
However this may be, certain it is that
the note never was communicated to us.
We never answered the overture contained in it,
because although we received indirect intimations
that it would be made; yet it never was actually made.
And we never said anything about mixing the affair
with those of the continent of Europe,
because nothing was ever said to us about it.
To the opinion of my colleagues upon this subject
I cannot speak; but for myself I do not consider
the questions at issue between the United States and
Great Britain as questions in which the continent of Europe
has no interest—not even the question of impressment.
In every naval war waged by Great Britain, it is the
interest and the right of her adversary that she should not
be permitted to recruit her navy by man-stealing under
the name of impressment from neutral merchant vessels.
Nor should I have felt at all inclined to indulge the
pretension on the part of Britain had it been disclosed
to us in the shape of a declaration that her contests
with us were nothing to the continent of Europe.
I thought it necessary, therefore, in my note
to Mr. Weydemeyer pointedly to disavow the answer
which Lord Castlereagh says he had been informed
by Lord Cathcart that we had given to the overture
in his note of 1 September.
It will be for Lord Cathcart to explain
whence he derived his information.19
Adams was still in St. Petersburg when he wrote this letter
to Secretary of State Monroe on April 25:
I propose to leave this city
in two or three days for Gothenburg.
My intention is to go to Reval
and there embark for Stockholm.
The passage by the way of Finland is now impracticable,
and there are twenty-five English mails known to be at
Grislehamn waiting for the possibility of passing the gulf.
The harbor of Reval is itself not yet open, and by
information which I have obtained from thence will probably
not be so before this day week, by which I hope to be there.
I have concluded upon this course as likely to be
the shortest to the place of my destination.
I have a letter from Mr. Harris
dated 14 March at Amsterdam.
He did not then know that the charge of our affairs here
was to be left with him, and was expecting to go
to England with Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard.
I wrote him on the 4th instant under cover to Mr. Bourne,
and have since written again under cover to Mr. Beasley,
informing him of the President’s order
concerning him and urging his return hither.
It is not probable he can arrive before some time in June.
In the uncertainty whether Mr. Clay or Mr. Russell
might arrive in Sweden before me, I thought it a proper
mark of respect to the Swedish government to give them
notice of the commission to Gothenburg, and of my
intention in pursuance of my instructions to proceed thither.
I therefore wrote to Count Engeström, the Swedish Minister
of Foreign Affairs, with whom I have been long personally
acquainted and had already been in correspondence.
As my letter went by the mail, and the passage
of the Gulf is impracticable, it may perhaps not arrive
sooner than myself; but the Swedish commercial
agent here will furnish me a passport.
I have continued to make the payment
and the charge for a Secretary of Legation.
I shall do the same for the present quarter,
and Mr. Smith with whom I shall leave the papers
and seal of the Legation will continue to perform
the office of secretary until Mr. Harris’s return.
He will then embark for Gothenburg,
and thence return to the United States.
From the time of my own departure from this place
I shall be without the assistance of any secretary,
upon which I beg leave to submit to your candor
and the President’s consideration some remarks
which I deem not unimportant to the public interest.
For a commission of three or four members,
upon a trust so momentous as that of a negotiation
for peace between the United States and Great Britain,
it is not only expedient, but for the responsibility
of each individual member of the Commission
indispensable, that he should have a copy
of every document relating to the negotiation.
There must therefore be not only as many letter books
as there are commissioners, but copies must be made
in them of many papers received as well as
of all those which are dispatched.
The mere manual labor is more than can be performed by
one secretary to the commission, and either he must employ
clerks for the work, or each commissioner must make the
copies for himself, or by the hand of a private secretary.
In the case of the extraordinary mission here,
both these expedients were used.
Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard had at first private secretaries,
and afterwards Mr. Harris employed a clerk.
The result of this is that all the papers of the most
confidential nature come to the knowledge
of all the persons thus employed.
The salary of an American Minister in Europe
will not admit of the expense of supporting
a private secretary in any manner confidential.
This employment of a common clerk at daily
or monthly wages is not without strong
inconveniences from the motives of a breach
of trust to which such persons would be accessible.
There would be no difference in obtaining all the assistance
of this kind which could be desired without any expense,
and offers to this effect have been made to me;
but I know they were founded upon projects
of commercial speculation in which use would
be made of the information thereby to be obtained,
and I do not think it ought to be so used.
I shall therefore take no secretary with me and
shall do as much of the copying as I can myself.
But I may be compelled to employ a copying clerk
at Gothenburg, and to take such a person for it
as I may have the fortune of finding there.
I must also request, if I am to return here,
that a secretary to this legation may be appointed.20
John Quincy Adams learned on 27 April 1814 that
Emperor Napoleon had gone into exile on the island of Elba.
Adams believed that Russia was the key to peace in Europe
and that he could arbitrate conflicts.
“The Mediation” chapter went on to April 28 and ended with this paragraph:
I had visits during the morning from Mr. Hurd and
Mr. Norman, and Mr. Montréal; the last of whom
informed me that a courier had this morning arrived
from the Emperor with the news that Napoleon Bonaparte,
on having a decree of the French Senate notified to him,
declaring that he was cashiered, had immediately
abdicated the throne, and thus that the war is at an end.
With this prospect of a general peace in Europe
I commenced my journey to contribute, if possible,
to the restoration of peace to my own country.
The weight of the trust committed, though but in part,
to me, the difficulties, to all human appearance insuperable,
which forbid the hope of success, the universal gloom
of the prospect before me, would depress a mind
of more sanguine complexion than mine.
On the providence of God alone is my reliance.
The prayer for light and vigilance, and presence of mind
and fortitude and resignation, in fine, for strength
proportioned to my trial, is incessant upon my heart.
The welfare of my family and country with the
interests of humanity are staked upon the event.
To Heaven alone it must be committed.
That my duty may be performed in sincerity
with fervent zeal and unsullied integrity,
is my heart’s desire and prayer to God.
And let his will be done.21
On that day Adams began Chapter IX which he called “The Negotiation for Peace.”
These Memoirs included traveling from St. Petersburg to many towns in the next four days.
J. Q. Adams at Reval (in Estonia) wrote another letter to Abigail Adams on 12 May 1814,
and this one described the current situation in Europe and what is likely to occur:
The coalition of Europe against France has
at length been crowned with complete success.
The annals of the world do not, I believe, furnish
an example of such a reverse of fortune as
that nation has experienced within the last two years.
The interposition of Providence to produce this
mighty change has been so signal, so peculiar,
so distinct from all human operation, that
in ages less addicted to superstition than the present
it might have been considered as miraculous.
As a judgment of Heaven, it will undoubtedly be considered
by all pious minds now and hereafter; and I cannot
but indulge the hope that it opens a prospect of at least
more tranquility and security to the civilized part
of mankind than they have enjoyed the last half century.
France for the last twenty-five years has been the scourge
of Europe; in every change of her government she has
manifested the same ambitious, domineering,
oppressive, and rapacious spirit to all her neighbors.
She has now fallen a wretched and helpless victim
Into their hands, dethroning the sovereign
she had chosen, and taking back the family
she had expelled, at their command; and ready
to be dismembered and parceled out as the resentment
or the generosity of her conquerors shall determine.
The final result is now universally
and in a great degree justly imputable to one man.
Had Napoleon Bonaparte, with his extraordinary genius
and transcendent military talents, possessed an ordinary
portion of judgment or common sense, France might have
been for ages the preponderating power in Europe,
and he might have transmitted to this posterity the most
powerful empire upon earth, and a name to stand by the
side of Alexander, Caesar and Charlemagne, a name
surrounded by such a blaze of glory as to blind the eyes
of all human kind to the baseness of its origin, and even
to the blood with which it would still have been polluted.
But if the catastrophe is the work of one man,
it was the spirit of the times and of the nation which
brought forward that man and concentrated in his
person and character the whole issue of the revolution.
“Oh! it is the sport (says Shakespeare)
to see the engineer hoist by his own petard.”
The sufferings of Europe are compensated
and avenged in the humiliation of France.
It is now to be seen what use
the avengers will make of their victory.
I place great reliance upon the moderation, equity,
and humanity of the Emperor Alexander,
and I freely confess I have confidence in nothing else.
The allies of the continent must be governed entirely
by him, and as his resentments must be sufficiently
gratified by the plenitude of his success, and the
irretrievable downfall of his enemy, I hope and wish to
believe that he has discerned the true path of glory open
before him, and that he will prove inaccessible to all the
interested views and rancorous passions of his associates.
The great danger at the present moment appears to me
to be that the policy of crippling France,
to guard against her future power, will be carried too far.
Of the dispositions of England there can be no question;
of those which will stimulate all the immediate neighbors
of France there can be as little doubt;
and France can have so little to say or to do for herself,
that she begins by taking the sovereign who is
to seal her doom from the hands of her enemies.
The real part for the Emperor Alexander now to perform
is that of the umpire and arbitrator of Europe.
To fill that part according to the exigency of the times,
he must forget that he has been the principal party
to the war; he must lay aside all his own passions
and resist all the instigations of his cooperators.
He must discern the true medium between the excess
of liberality which would hazard the advantages of the
present opportunity to circumscribe the power of France
within bounds consistent with the safety and tranquility
of her neighbors, and perhaps his own, would suggest,
to secure them at all events, by reducing France
to a state of real impotence, and thus leaving
her future situation dependent upon their discretion.
I have no doubt that the Emperor will see all this
in the general principle, and I wait not without anxiety
to observe its application to his measures.22
Notes
1. Memoirs of Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848
by John Quincy Adams ed. Charles Francis Adams, Volume II, p. 335-340.
2. Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford,
Volume IV, p. 305-306.
3. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume II, p. 422-423.
4. From John Quincy Adams to Abigail Smith Adams, 31 December 1812 (Online).
5. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume IV, p. 475-476.
6. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume II, p. 479.
7. Ibid., p. 486.
8. Ibid., p. 487.
9. Ibid., p. 491-492.
10. Ibid., p. 497.
11. Ibid., p. 498.
12. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume IV, p. 536-539.
13. To John Adams from John Quincy Adams 2 January 1814 (Online).
14. From John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, 24 January 1814 (Online).
15. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume V, 28 January 1814.
16. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume II, p. 583-584.
17. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume V, p. 22-27.
18. Ibid., p. 35-39.
19. Ibid., p. 39-41.
20. Ibid., p. 42-44.
21. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume II, p. 602.
22. From John Quincy Adams to Abigail Smith Adams, 12 May 1814 (Online).
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