The Americans and the British had worked out a treaty for the Convention
respecting fisheries, boundary and the restoration of slaves that was signed
on 20 October 1818, and it became effective on 30 January 1819.
The territory between the 49th and 45th parallel in the Oregon country of the northwest
was to be free and open to settlers who were British or from the United States.
On 1 January 1819 John Quincy Adams wrote in a letter to Richard Rush:
It is mentioned in one of your dispatches that Lord
Castlereagh had made some enquiry of you, in what
light the deputies from the South America revolutionary
governments were considered by that of the United States?
They have not been received or recognized in their
official capacities, because that would have been
equivalent to a formal recognition of the governments
from which they come as independent; but informal
communications have been held with them,
both verbal and written, freely and without disguise.
We have considered the struggle between Spain and
those colonies as a civil war, the essential question
of which was their independence of or subjection to Spain.
To this war the avowed and real policy of the United States
has been to remain neutral, and the principles of neutrality
which we consider as applicable to the case are these:
First, that the parties have in respect to foreign nations
equal rights, and are entitled, as far as is practicable,
to equal and the same treatment.
Secondly, that while the contest is maintained on both
sides with any reasonable prospect of eventual success,
it would be a departure from neutrality to recognize
either the supremacy contended for by Spain, or the
independence contended for by the South Americans.
For to acknowledge either would be to take the side of
that party upon the very question at issue between them.
But while this state of things continues, an entire
equality of treatment of the parties is not possible.
There are circumstances arising from the nature of the
contest itself which produce unavoidable inequalities.
Spain, for instance, is an acknowledged sovereign power,
and as such has ministers and other accredited and
privileged agents to maintain her interests and support
her rights conformably to the usages of nations.
The South Americans, not being acknowledged
as sovereign and independent states,
cannot have the benefit of such officers.
We consider it, however, as among the obligations
of neutrality to obviate this inequality as far as
may be practicable without taking a side,
as if the question of the war was decided.
We listen, therefore, to the representatives
of their deputies or agents, and do them justice
as much as if they were formally accredited.
By acknowledging the existence of a civil war, the right
of Spain, as understood by herself, is no doubt affected.
She is no longer recognized as the sovereign
of the provinces in revolution against her.
Thus far neutrality itself operates against her
and not against the other party.
This also is an inequality arising from the
nature of the struggle, unavoidable, and
therefore not incompatible with neutrality.
But this state of things is temporary; and neither
do the obligations of neutral states permit
that it shall be unreasonably protracted.
It naturally terminates with the preponderating
success of either of the parties to the war.
If, therefore, we consider the civil war as no longer in
that province an organized government, claiming to be
sovereign and independent, and maintaining that claim
by force of arms, upon the same principle though differently
applied we think the period is fast approaching when it will
be no longer a civil war between Spain and Buenos Aires,
because the independence of the latter will be so
firmly established as to be beyond the reach of any
reasonable pretension of supremacy on the part of Spain.
The mediation of the allied European powers
between Spain and her revolted colonies was
solicited by Spain with the professed object of
obtaining from the allies a guarantee of the
restoration of her sovereign authority in South America.
But the very acceptance of the office of
mediators upon such a basis, would have
been a departure from neutrality by the allies.
This was clearly seen by Great Britain, who very
explicitly and repeatedly declared that her intention
was in no event whatever resulting from the
mediation to employ force against the South Americans.
The allies did, however, assent to become the
mediators at the request of Spain alone, and upon
the basis that the object of the mediation should
be the restoration of the Spanish authority, though
with certain modifications favorable to the colonies.
As the United States were never invited to take
a part in that mediation, so as you have been instructed,
they neither desired, nor would have consented
to become parties to it upon that basis.
It appears in one of your conversations with
Lord Castlereagh, he expressed some regret
that the views of this government in relation to
that question were not precisely the same as those
of the British cabinet, and that we disapprove of
any interpretation of third parties, upon any other
basis than that of the total emancipation of the colonies.
The President wishes you to take an early and
suitable occasion to observe to Lord Castlereagh, that
he hopes the difference between our views and those
of Great Britain is more of form than substance—more
founded in the degree of complacency respectively due
by the parties to the views of Spain, than to any inherent
difference of opinion upon the question to be solved.
That as neutrals to the civil war, we think that no
mediation between the parties ought even to be undertaken,
without the assent of both parties to the war.
That whether we consider the question of the conflict
between Spanish colonial dominion and South American
independence upon principles, moral or political,
or upon those of the interest of either party to the war,
or of all other nations as connected with them;
whether upon grounds of right or of fact, they
all bring us to the same conclusion that the contest
cannot and ought not to terminate otherwise than
by the total independence of South America.
Anxious however, to fulfill every obligation of good
neighborhood to Spain, notwithstanding our numerous
and aggravated causes of complaint against her,
and especially desirous to preserve the friendship
and good-will of all the allied European powers,
as we have forborne under circumstances of strong
provocation to take any decisive step which might interfere
with the course of their policy in relation to South America.
We have waited patiently to see the effect of their
mediation, without an attempt to disconcert
or defeat any measures upon which they
might agree for assuring its success.
But convinced as we are that the Spanish authority never
can be restored at Buenos Aires, in Chile or Venezuela,
we wish the British government and all the European allies
to consider how important it is to them, as well as to us, that
these newly formed states should be regularly recognized;
not only because the right to such recognition cannot with
justice be long denied to them, but that they may be held
to observe on their part the ordinary rules of the laws
of nations in their intercourse with the civilized world.
We particularly believe that the only effectual means
of repressing the excessive irregularities and piratical
depredations of armed vessels under their flags,
and bearing their commissions, will be to require
of them the observance of the principles
sanctioned by the practice of maritime nations.
It is not to be expected that they will feel themselves
bound by the ordinary duties of sovereign states
while they are denied the enjoyment of all their rights.
The government at Buenos Aires have appointed
a consul general to reside in the United States.
He applied as long since as last May,
and again very recently for an exequatur,
which has not been issued, because that
would be a formal recognition of his government.
You will in the most friendly manner mention
to Lord Castlereagh that the President has it in
contemplation to grant this exequatur, or
otherwise to recognize the government of Buenos Aires
at no remote period, should no event occur which
will justify a further postponement of that intention.
If it should suit the views of Great Britain to adopt
similar measures at the same time and in concert
with us, it will be highly satisfactory to the President.
It will when adopted be a mere acknowledgment
of the fact of independence, and without deciding
upon the extent of their territory, or upon their claims
to sovereignty in any part of the provinces of La Plata,
where it is not established and uncontested.1
On 2 January 1819 Adams wrote in his Memoirs much about recognizing
the Government of Bueno Aires as independent.
Here are some highlights:
Mr. Calhoun said the views of Great Britain
had also been more distinctly ascertained and
more clearly pronounced since last winter.
But he thought it would be safer to press Great Britain
to go along with us in the recognition than
to give her notice that we will grant it without her.
If we take the step in concert with her,
it will be perfectly safe.
If we take it against her will, it will be in her power
to embarrass us exceedingly with the consequences
by stimulating Spain to war with us for it, or
by embroiling us with other European powers through it.
The trade to Havana alone was now almost the only
resource we had for procuring specie,
and if it should be cut off, it would greatly increase
the embarrassments of our circulating medium.
The President himself, on the first reading of my draft,
had thought the intention of recognizing Buenos Aires
was too strongly expressed, and proposed to me to say,
”It is contemplated, unless any material change of events
should occur,” instead of declaring it as a positive intention.
Mr. Crawford now said if the acknowledgment was to
take place, he should prefer making it in another form,
not by granting an “exequatur” to a Consul, but by sending
a Minister there; because the Senate must then act upon the
nomination, which would give their sanction to the measure.
Mr. Wirt added that the House of Representatives must
also concur by assenting to an Act of appropriation.
And the President, laughing, said that, as those bodies
had the power of impeachment over us, it would be
quite convenient to have them thus pledged beforehand.
I said my impressions were altogether different.
I would make the acknowledgment as simple
and unostentatious as possible, with as little
change in the actual state of things as could be.
I thought it not consistent with our national dignity
to be the first in sending a Minister to a new power.
It had not been done by any European power to ourselves.
If an exchange of Ministers was to take place,
the first should come from them.
As to impeachment, I was willing to take
my share of risk of it for this measure
whenever the Executive should deem it proper.
And, instead of admitting the Senate or House of
Representatives to any share in the act of recognition,
I would expressly avoid that form of doing it
which would require the concurrence of those bodies.
It was, I had no doubt, by our Constitution,
an act of the Executive authority.
General Washington had exercised it in recognizing
the French Republic by the reception of Mr. Genêt.
Mr. Madison had exercised it by declining several
years to receive, and by finally receiving, Mr. Onís;
and in this instance I thought the Executive
ought carefully to preserve entire the authority
given him by the Constitution, and not weaken it
by setting the precedent of making either
House of Congress a party to an act which
it was his exclusive right and duty to perform.2
Secretary of State Adams had defended the actions of General Andrew Jackson
in a letter to George Erving, and on 5 January 1819 Adams wrote this in his Memoirs:
I had a conversation with several members of Congress.
Some of them gave me notice that a formidable and
concerted attack upon my letter to Erving is to be brought
forward in the House of Representatives next week.
Clay has already commenced his attack
upon it in convivial companies out-of-doors.
Last winter Clay’s principal attack was levelled against
the President himself, but finding that this only injured
himself, he has this winter confined his hostilities to me.
My letter to Erving has been so well received in Congress
by the public that it has redoubled his rancor against me,
and among all the knots of intriguers in Congress,
by the partisans of half a dozen candidates
for the next Presidency (including General Jackson),
there is one common object of decrying me.
There is not in either House of Congress an individual
member who would open his lips to defend me
or move a finger to defeat any combination to injure me;
and as I am not there to defend myself, Clay has a free
swing to assault me, which he does, both in his speeches
and by secret machinations without scruple or delicacy.
It was hinted to me that he was now using C. F. Mercer
for his purposes; but of this I have doubts.
But all public business in Congress now connects itself
with intrigues, and there is great danger that the whole
Government will degenerate into a struggle of cabals.3
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in his Memoirs wrote this about
William H. Crawford who was from Georgia and was Secretary of the Treasury 1816-25:
January 7, 1819.—
Attended the Cabinet meeting at the President’s.
Mr. Thomson, the new Secretary of the Navy,
was there, and the meeting fully attended.
The President proposed again for consideration the question
whether it would be proper to submit to Congress the
expediency of their passing an act authorizing the Executive
to hold possession of Pensacola if Spain should not send
any person authorized to receive it, and also, under certain
contingencies, to take possession of Spanish Florida.
The subject was discussed with much
earnestness till near five o’clock….
In the course of the discussion, Crawford betrayed his
inveteracy against General Jackson more than he had
ever done before, and even let out, as a justification
for the very extraordinary proposal of abandoning
Pensacola even if not re-demanded by Spain, that it would
show to the world that it had been taken contrary to orders.
That Crawford has been all along deeply inveterate against
Jackson, as is asserted in a letter from Nashville lately
published in the Aurora, I have not seen adequate proof.
But since the publication of that letter,
it is impossible to avoid perceiving that he is so.
It happens, unfortunately, that Crawford’s interest
and stimulus of personal ambition, prematurely roused
by his having been started as a candidate for the
Presidency against Mr. Monroe at the late election, now
pushes him not only to contribute in running down Jackson
as a formidable rival, but even to counteract, as much as
is in his power, the general success of the Administration,
and particularly that of the Department of State.4
John Quincy Adams wrote in his Diary:
January 23.—
As I was going to the President’s,
General Jackson and his suite were going out.
The President called him and Colonel Butler back,
and introduced them to me.
The General arrived this morning from his residence at
Nashville, Tennessee, and had already called at my office.
Among the rumors which have been circulated by the cabal
now intriguing in Congress against Jackson, it has been very
industriously whispered that Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison
had declared themselves in very strong terms against him.
I had mentioned this report a few days since
to the President, who told me that
he was convinced there was no foundation for it.
This morning he showed me in confidence a letter
he had just received from Mr. Jefferson.
It not only expresses full satisfaction with the course
pursued by the Administration, but mentions my letters
of 12th March last to Onís, and of 28th November to Erving,
in terms which it would not become me to repeat.
He advises that they with others of my letters to Onís,
should be translated into French and communicated to
every Government in Europe as a thorough vindication
of the conduct and policy of this Government.5
John Quincy Adams on 3 February 1819 wrote in his Memoirs about
the ambitions and tactics of Andrew Jackson and Treasury Secretary William Crawford:
February 3.—General Jackson came to my house
this morning, and I showed him the boundary line
which has been offered to the Spanish Minister,
and that which we proposed to offer upon Melish’s map.
He said there were many individuals who would take
exception to our receding so far from the boundary of the
Rio del Norte, which we claim, as the Sabine, and the
enemies of the Administration would certainly make a
handle of it to assail them: but the possession of the Floridas
was of so great importance to the southern frontier of the
United States, and so essential even to their safety, that
the vast majority of the nation would be satisfied with the
western boundary as we propose, if we obtain the Floridas.
He showed me on the map the operation of the British force
during the late war and remarked that while the mouths of
the Florida rivers should be accessible to a foreign naval
force there would be no security for the United States.
He also entered into conversation upon the subject
of discussion now pending in the House of Representatives
on his proceedings in the late Seminole War,
upon that which is preparing in the Senate under
the auspices of Mr. Forsyth of Georgia, and upon the
general order given by Jackson in 1817, which was
considered as setting at defiance the War Department.
He imputed the whole to Mr. Crawford’s resentments
against him on account of his having at the last
Presidential election supported Mr. Monroe against him;
said there was not a single officer in the army known to
have been at that time in favor of Monroe whom Crawford
had not since insulted: that Mr. Monroe was of an open,
fair, unsuspecting character, amiable in the highest degree,
and would not believe human nature capable of the
baseness which Crawford, while holding a confidential
office under him, was practicing against him.
I told Jackson that Mr. Crawford had never in any of
the discussions on the Seminole War said a word which
led me to suppose he had any hostile feeling against him.
He replied that, however that might be,
Crawford was now setting the whole delegation
of Georgia against him, and by intentional insult
and the grossest violation of all military principle
had compelled him to issue the order of 1817.
Crawford, he said, was a man restrained
by no principle and capable of any baseness.
Crawford was now canvassing for the next Presidential
election, and actually wrote a letter to Clay proposing a
coalition with him to overthrow Mr. Monroe’s Administration….
That Crawford has written such a letter to Clay
as Jackson has informed, is to the last degree improbable.
He has too much discretion to have
put himself so much in Clay’s power.
But that all his conduct is governed by his views
to the Presidency, as the immediate successor to
Mr. Monroe, and that his hopes depend upon a
result unfavorable to the success, or at least to the
popularity of the Administration, is perfectly clear.
The important and critical interests of the
country are those the management of
which belongs to the Department of State.
Those incidental to the Treasury are in a state which would
give an able financier an opportunity to display his talents:
but Crawford has no talents as a financier.
He is just and barely equal to the current
routine of the business of his office.
His talent is intrigue.
And as it is in the foreign affairs that the success or failure
of the Administration will be most conspicuous, and
as their success would promote the reputation and influence,
and their failure would lead to the disgrace of the
Secretary of State, Crawford’s personal views center in
the ill success of the Administration in its foreign relations;
and perhaps unconscious of his own motives,
he will always be impelled to throw obstacles in its way,
and to bring upon the Department of State especially
any feeling of public dissatisfaction that he can….
The only possible chance for a head of Department
to attain the Presidency is by ingratiating himself
personally with the members of Congress:
and as many of them have objects of their own to obtain,
the temptation is immense to corrupt coalitions, and tends
to make all the public offices objects of bargain and sale.
That there has been intercourse of this kind,
more or less explicit between Crawford and Clay,
can scarcely be doubted.
But a coalition between them
would be liable to many difficulties.
They are both native Virginians.
Clay’s ambition has been so pampered by success
that he has evidently formed hopes of coming
in as the immediate successor of Monroe.
He refused both the War Department
and the mission to England.
Last winter he aimed at the unlimited control of the House
of Representatives and at the formation of a Western party.
His prospect of coalition then was with Governor Clinton,
and it was positively, but I think erroneously,
said to have been effected.
It has this winter much more the appearance of being
concluded with Crawford; but the Georgian attack upon
Jackson has scarcely any support from the West,
though an immense effort has been made to engage
Virginia in the cause, and with partial success.
Clay’s opposition has hitherto been so unsuccessful
that he sees, I believe, the necessity of contenting
himself with a secondary station under the next Presidency,
and this may bring him back to a coalition with
Crawford or Clinton, as the chances may arise.
His opposition to Jackson now
is involuntary and merely counteractive.6
On 4 February 1819 Secretary of State Adams talked with President Monroe
about the western boundary using the Red River with Spain, and he wrote in his journal:
The President was much inclined to accept this line,
but I think it would not be acceptable to the nation, and
that if Onís intends to conclude at all, we can obtain better.
I returned to my office,
and Mr. De Neuville soon after came there.
I discussed with him the substance of his note, told him
how exceedingly anxious the President was to accomplish
an arrangement with Spain, but that if we gave up the
boundary on one side, Spain must give up on the other.
After much conversation, we were unable to meet on
the proposed line, but De Neuville intimated that
he was persuaded Mr. Onís and I should agree.
The misfortune is, that upon this, as well as other subjects,
the other members of the Administration and members
of Congress talk freely both with De Neuville and Onís,
who gather from them a knowledge
how far they may urge pretensions,
and how far we shall be prevailed upon to concede.7
Secretary of State Adams wrote this in his Memoirs on February 6, 8, and 9 in 1819:
6th. Attended the Cabinet meeting at the President’s.
The French Minister’s English note was read and discussed.
The anxiety of the President to accomplish a settlement
of our differences with Spain is so great that he strongly
inclines to agree to this western boundary, and take the
line of one hundred longitude from the Red to the Arkansas
Rivers, and the line of forty-three latitude to the South Sea.
I had, however, drafted an article proposing the line
between one hundred and one and one hundred and two
longitude, and that of forty-one to the South Sea, with a
stipulation that Spain should make no settlements on the
Red or Arkansas Rivers, nor have the navigation of them,
which it was agreed I should offer, and then come as near
to the proposals of De Neuville as may be found necessary.
On going to the office, I sent for De Neuville,
who immediately came.
I gave him a copy of the article that I had drafted,
and had much discussion with him of it.
He urged very strenuously that we should accept the lines
as proposed in his English note, and said Onís never would
consent to stipulate against making the settlements,
or against Spain’s having the navigation of the rivers.
I finally hold him that if Mr. Onís would accept the
remainder of my drafted article, we would give up the
exclusions, and if he would accept the latitude forty-one,
I would refer to the President and recommend
the acceptance of the longitude one hundred….
8th. Mr. De Neuville came to tell me that he had conferred
since our interview last Saturday with Mr. Onís,
and had used every possible argument with him to prevail
upon him to meet us so far as to render a treaty practicable;
that Mr. Onís’s dispositions and ardent wishes were as
favorable as possible to an adjustment; that his powers
were unlimited, and his instructions gave him a great
latitude; and that he would call upon me himself
tomorrow at any hour that I should appoint,
and deliver to me a project of a treaty.
What it would be he (De Neuville) did not know
in all its details, and it was proper that we should
receive it from Mr. Onís himself; but he hoped and
believed it would contain no insuperable obstacle
to a final and amicable adjustment of our differences.
I appointed one o’clock tomorrow to receive Mr. Onís,
of which De Neuville engaged to give him notice.
The questions upon the proposed resolutions in the
House of Representatives, to censure General Jackson’s
proceedings in Florida, were this day taken,
and all decided against the resolutions and in his favor.
9th. As I was going to the office this morning,
I met General Jackson, who stopped and told me that
he was going to my house to apologize to me for having
declined accepting my invitation to dinner and afterwards
having dined with Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of War.
He had in the first instance declined accepting his
invitations also, but, Mr. Calhoun having assured him
it was only to meet a few military friends who were
occasionally here, he had been prevailed upon to accept.
He added that, as the question concerning him was not
decided, he was going to assure me of the sense which
he entertained of the part that I had taken in this affair,
and of the support given him by the Executive Government.
I told him I was happy that the decision of the
House of Representatives had confirmed the correctness
of the view taken of his conduct by the President;
that my share in these transactions had been dictated
entirely by a sense of duty and a conviction that his
conduct had been correct and proper, and that I hoped
yet to have the pleasure of seeing him at my house.
I made a short call at the President’s, but he was engaged,
and I went over to the office, where Mr. Onís came at the
appointed hour of one and delivered to me his project of a
treaty for the cession of the Floridas by Spain to the United
States, for the settlement of the western boundary, and for
the adjustment of the claims of indemnities of the citizens
of the United States against the Spanish Government.
He said it was drawn up in English with reference to the
unofficial interviews between Mr. De Neuville and me on
one part, and the same Minister and himself on the other.
It is in seventeen articles, upon which, after reading them,
I made some observations, and promised to lay them
before the President, who, I presumed, would direct
me to present him a counter-project.
He professed the most earnest desire to come to an
agreement with us, and a strong hope that we might
conclude before the end of the present session of Congress.
I took this project immediately to the President, to whom
I read it, and after conversing with him on the modifications
of them which it would be expedient on our part to propose,
I took it home with me, promising to prepare tomorrow a
counter-project, to be submitted the next morning at eleven
to the Administration, together with the project itself.8
John Quincy Adams wrote in his Diary on February 22:
Feb. 22. — Mr. Onís came at eleven with Mr. Stoughton,
one of the persons attached to his Legation.
The two copies of the treaty made out at his house
were ready; none of ours were entirely finished.
We exchanged the original full powers on both sides,
which I believe to be the correct course on the
conclusion of treaties, though at Ghent and on the
conclusion of the Convention of 3rd July 1815 the
originals were only exhibited and copies exchanged.
I had one of the copies of the treaty, and Mr. Onís the other.
I read the English side, which he collated,
and he the Spanish side, which I collated.
We then signed and sealed both copies on both sides—
I first on the English and he first on the Spanish side.
The acquisition of the Floridas has long been
an object of earnest desire to this country.
The acknowledgment of a definite line of boundary
to the South Sea forms a great epoch in our history.
The first proposal of it in this negotiation was my own,
and I trust it is now secured beyond the reach of revocation.
It was not even among our claims by the
Treaty of Independence with Great Britain.
It was not among our pretensions under the
purchase of Louisiana—for that gave us only
the range of the Mississippi and its waters.
I first introduced it in the written proposal
of 31st October last, after having discussed it
verbally both with Onís and De Neuville.
It is the only peculiar and appropriate right
acquired by this treaty in the event of its ratification.9
On 22 February 1819 John Quincy Adams and the Spanish Minister Luis de Onís
signed the Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits between Spain and the United States.
The document describes in detail the boundaries between the two nations and other issues.
The treaty would be ratified and became effective on 22 February 1821.
Here is the complete treaty:
ARTICLE I
There shall be a firm and inviolable peace and
sincere friendship between the United States and their
Citizens, and His Catholic Majesty, his Successors
and Subjects, without exception of persons or places.ARTICLE II
His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States in full
property and sovereignty all the territories which
belong to him, situated to the Eastward of the Mississippi,
known by the name of East and West Florida.
The adjacent Islands dependent on said Provinces,
all public lots and squares, vacant Lands, public Edifices,
Fortifications, Barracks and other Buildings, which
are not private property, Archives and Documents,
which relate directly to the property and sovereignty
of said Provinces, are included in this Article.
The said Archives and Documents shall be left in
possession of the Commissaries, or Officers of the
United States, duly authorized to receive them.ARTICLE III
The boundary-line between the two countries, west of the
Mississippi, shall begin on the Gulf of Mexico, at the mouth
of the river Sabine, in the sea, continuing north, along the
western bank of that river, to the 32nd degree of latitude;
thence, by a line due north, to the degree of latitude where
it strikes the Rio Roxo of Nachitoches, or Red River;
then following the course of the Rio Roxo westward, to
the degree of longitude 100 west from London and 23 from
Washington; then, crossing the said Red River, and running
thence, by a line due north, to the river Arkansas;
thence, following the course of the southern bank of the
Arkansas, to its source, in latitude 42 north; and thence,
by that parallel of latitude, to the South Sea.
The whole being as laid down in Melish’s map
of the United States, published at Philadelphia,
improved to the first of January, 1818.
But if the source of the Arkansas River shall be found
to fall north or south of latitude 42, then the line shall
run from the said source due south or north, as the
case may be, till it meets the said parallel of latitude 42,
and thence, along the said parallel, to the South Sea:
All the islands in the Sabine, and the said Red and
Arkansas Rivers, throughout the course thus described
to belong to the United States; but the use of the waters,
and the navigation of the Sabine to the sea, and of the
said rivers Roxo and Arkansas, throughout the extent
of the said boundary, on their respective banks, shall be
common to the respective inhabitants of both nations.The two high contracting parties agree to cede and
renounce all their rights, claims, and pretensions to
the territories described by the said line, that is to say:
The United States hereby cede to His Catholic Majesty,
and renounce forever, all their rights, claims, and
pretensions, to the territories lying west and south
of the above-described line; and, in like manner,
His Catholic Majesty cedes to the said United States
all his rights, claims, and pretensions to any
territories east and north of the said line,
and for himself, his heirs, and successors,
renounces all claim to the said territories forever.ARTICLE IV
To fix this line with more precision, and to place the
landmarks which shall designate exactly the limits of
both nations, each of the contracting parties shall appoint
a Commissioner and a surveyor, who shall meet before
the termination of one year from the date of the ratification
of this treaty at Nachitoches, on the Red River, and proceed
to run and mark the said line, from the mouth of the
Sabine to the Red River, and from the Red River to the
river Arkansas, and to ascertain the latitude of the source
of the said river Arkansas, in conformity to what is above
agreed upon and stipulated and the line of latitude 42,
to the South Sea: they shall make out plans, and keep
journals of their proceedings, and the result agreed upon
by them shall be considered as part of this treaty,
and shall have the same force as if it were inserted therein.
The two Governments will amicably agree
respecting the necessary articles to be furnished
to those persons, and also as to their respective escorts,
should such be deemed necessary.ARTICLE V
The Inhabitants of the ceded Territories shall be
secured in the free exercise of their Religion,
without any restriction, and all those who may
desire to remove to the Spanish Dominions shall
be permitted to sell, or export their Effects at any time
whatever, without being subject, in either case, to duties.ARTICLE VI
The Inhabitants of the Territories which
His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States
by this Treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union
of the United States, as soon as may be consistent
with the principle of the Federal Constitution,
and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges,
rights and immunities of the Citizens of the United States.ARTICLE VII
The officers and troops of His Catholic Majesty,
in the territories hereby ceded by him to the United States,
shall be withdrawn, and possession of the places occupied
by them shall be given within six months after the exchange
of the ratifications of this treaty, or sooner if possible,
by the officers of His Catholic Majesty to the commissioners
or officers of the United States duly appointed to receive
them; and the United States shall furnish the transports
and escort necessary to convey the Spanish officers
and troops and their baggage to the Havana.ARTICLE VIII
All the grants of land made before the 24th of January,
1818 by His Catholic Majesty or by his lawful authorities
in the said territories ceded by His Majesty to the
United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the
persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent
that the same grants would be valid if the territories
had remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty.
But the owners in possession of such lands, who by
reason of the recent circumstances of the Spanish nation,
and the revolutions in Europe, have been prevented
from fulfilling all the conditions of their grants,
shall complete them within the terms limited in the same,
respectively, from the date of this treaty;
in default of which the said grants shall be null and void.
All grants made since the said 24th of January, 1818,
when the first proposal on the part of His Catholic Majesty
for the cession of the Floridas was made, are hereby
declared and agreed to be null and void.ARTICLE IX
The two high contracting parties, animated with the most
earnest desire of conciliation, and with the object of putting
an end to all the differences which have existed between
them, and of confirming the good understanding which they
wish to be forever maintained between them, reciprocally
renounce all claims for damages or injuries which they,
themselves, as well as their respective citizens and subjects,
may have suffered until the time of signing this treaty.The renunciation of the United States will
extend to all the injuries mentioned in the
convention of the 11th of August, 1802.2. To all claims on account of prizes made by French
privateers, and condemned by French Consuls,
within the territory and jurisdiction of Spain.3. To all claims of indemnities on account of the suspension
of the right of deposit at New Orleans in 1802.4. To all claims of citizens of the United States
upon the Government of Spain, arising from
the unlawful seizures at sea, and in the ports
and territories of Spain, or the Spanish colonies.5. To all claims of citizens of the United States upon the
Spanish Government, statements of which, soliciting the
interposition of the Government of the United States
have been presented to the Department of State, or to
the Minister of the United States in Spain, the date of the
convention of 1802 and until the signature of this treaty.The renunciation of His Catholic Majesty extends
1. To all the injuries mentioned in the
convention of the 11th of August, 1802.2. To the sums which His Catholic Majesty advanced for
the return of Captain Pike from the Provincias Internas.3. To all injuries caused by the expedition of Miranda,
that was fitted out and equipped at New York.4. To all claims of Spanish subjects upon the
Government of the United States arising from
unlawful seizures at sea, or within the ports
and territorial Jurisdiction of the United States.Finally, to all the claims of subjects of His Catholic Majesty
upon the Government of the United States in which the
interposition of his Catholic Majesty's Government
has been solicited, before the date of this treaty
and since the date of the convention of 1802, or which
may have been made to the department of foreign affairs
of His Majesty, or to his Minister of the United States.And the high contracting parties, respectively,
renounce all claim to indemnities for any of
the recent events or transactions of their
respective commanders and officers in the Floridas.The United States will cause satisfaction to be made
for the injuries, if any, which, by process of law,
shall be established to have been suffered by the
Spanish officers, and individual Spanish inhabitants,
by the late operations of the American Army in Florida.ARTICLE X
The convention entered into between the two Governments
on the 11th of August, 1802, the ratifications of which
were exchanged the 21st December, 1818, is annulled.ARTICLE XI
The United States, exonerating Spain from all demands in
future, on account of the claims of their citizens to which the
renunciations herein contained extend, and considering them
entirely cancelled, undertake to make satisfaction for the
same, to an amount not exceeding five millions of dollars.
To ascertain the full amount and validity of those claims,
a commission, to consist of three Commissioners, citizens
of the United States, shall be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
which commission shall meet at the city of Washington,
and, within the space of three years from the time of their
first meeting, shall receive, examine, and decide upon the
amount and validity of all the claims included within the
descriptions above mentioned. The said Commissioners
shall take an oath or affirmation, to be entered on the
record of their proceedings, for the faithful and diligent
discharge of their duties; and, in case of the death, sickness,
or necessary absence of any such Commissioner, his place
may be supplied by the appointment, as aforesaid,
or by the President of the United States, during the
recess of the Senate of another Commissioner in his stead.The said Commissioners shall be authorized
to hear and examine on oath every question
relative to the said claims, and to receive all
suitable authentic testimony concerning the same.
And the Spanish Government shall furnish all such
documents and elucidations as may be in their possession
for the adjustment of the said claims, according to the
principles of justice, the laws of nations, and the stipulations
of the treaty between the two parties of 27th October, 1795;
the said documents to be specified when demanded
at the instance of the said Commissioners.The payment of such claims as may be admitted and
adjusted by the said Commissioners, or the major part of
them, to an amount not exceeding five millions of dollars,
shall be made by the United States, either immediately
at their Treasury or by the creation of stock, bearing
an interest of six percent per annum, payable from the
proceeds of sales of public lands within the territories
hereby ceded to the United States, or in such other manner
as the Congress of the United States may prescribe by law.The records of the proceedings of the said Commissioners,
together with the vouchers and documents produced before
them, relative to the claims to be adjusted and decided upon
by them shall after the close of their transactions be
deposited in the Department of State of the United States;
and copies of them, or any part of them, shall be
furnished to the Spanish Government, if required at
the demand of the Spanish Minister in the United States.ARTICLE XII
The treaty of limits and navigation of 1795 remains
confirmed in all and each one of its articles excepting
the 2, 3, 4, 21, and the second clause of the 22nd article,
which, having been altered by this treaty, or having
received their entire execution, are no longer valid.With respect to the 15th article of the same treaty of
friendship, limits, and navigation of 1795, in which it is
stipulated that the flag shall cover the property, the two high
contracting parties agree that this shall be so understood
with respect to those powers who recognize this principle;
but if either of the two contracting parties shall be at war
with a third party, and the other neutral, the flag of the
neutral shall cover the property of enemies whose
government acknowledge this principle, and not of others.ARTICLE XIII
Both contracting parties, wishing to favor their mutual
commerce, by affording in their ports every necessary
assistance to their respective merchant-vessels, have
agreed that the sailors who shall desert from their vessels
in the ports of the other, shall be arrested and delivered up,
at the instance of the consul, who shall prove, nevertheless,
that the deserters belonged to the vessels that claimed
them, exhibiting the document that is customary in their
nation: that is to say, the American Consul in a Spanish port
shall exhibit the document known lay the name of articles,
and the Spanish Consul in American ports the roll of
the vessel; and if the name of the deserter or deserters
are claimed shall appear in the one or the other,
they shall be arrested, held in custody, and
delivered to the vessel to which they shall belong.ARTICLE XIV
The Officers and Troops of His Catholic Majesty in the
Territories hereby ceded by him to the United States
shall be withdrawn, and possession of the places occupied
by them shall be given within six months after the exchange
of the Ratifications of this Treaty, or sooner if possible, by
the Officers of His Catholic Majesty, to the Commissioners
or Officers of the United States, duly appointed to
receive them; and the United States shall furnish the
transports and escort necessary to convey the Spanish
Officers and Troops and their baggage to Havana.ARTICLE XV
The United States to give to His Catholic Majesty,
a proof of their desire to cement the relations of Amity
subsisting between the two Nations, and to favor the
Commerce of the Subjects of His Catholic Majesty,
agree that Spanish Vessels coming laden only with
productions of Spanish growth, or manufactures directly
from the Ports of Spain or of her Colonies, shall be
admitted for the term of twelve years to the Ports of
Pensacola and St. Augustine in the Floridas, without
paying other or higher duties on their cargoes or of tonnage
than will be paid by the Vessels of the United States.
During the said term no other Nation shall enjoy
the same privileges within the ceded Territories.
The twelve years shall commence three months
after the exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty.ARTICLE XVI
The present treaty shall be ratified in due form, by the
contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged
in six months from this time, or sooner if possible.In witness whereof we, the underwritten Plenipotentiaries
of the United States of America and of His Catholic Majesty,
have signed by virtue of our powers the present treaty
of amity, settlement, and limits, and have thereunto
affixed our seals respectively.Done at Washington this twenty-second day of
February, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen.JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. [L. S.]
LUIS DE ONIS. [L. S.](1) This treaty was concluded February 22, 1819.
The ratifications were exchanged February 22, 1821,
and proclaimed February 22, 1821.
By the treaty of Saint Ildefonso, made October 1, 1800,
Spain had ceded Louisiana to France and France,
by the treaty of Paris, signed April 30, 1803,
had ceded it to the United States.
Under this treaty the United States claimed the countries
between the Iberville and the Perdido.
Spain contended that her cession to France comprehended
only that territory which, at the time of the cession,
was denominated Louisiana, consisting of the island of
New Orleans, and the country which had been originally
ceded to her by France west of the Mississippi.
Congress passed a joint resolution, approved
January 15, 1811, declaring that the United States,
under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis,
could not, without serious inquietude, see any part of this
disputed territory pass into the hands of any foreign power;
and that a due regard to their own safety compelled
them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the
temporary occupation of the disputed territory;
they, at the same time, declaring that the territory should,
in their hands, remain subject to future negotiation.
An act of Congress, approved on the same day, authorized
the President to take possession of and occupy all or any
part of the territory lying east of the river Perdido and
south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory,
in case an arrangement had been, or should be,
made with the local authority of the said territory,
for delivering up the possession of the same,
or any part thereof, to the United States,
or in the event of an attempt to occupy the said territory,
or any part thereof, by any foreign govermnent.10
John Q. Adams wrote this in his Diary on March 12:
March 12. — I told Senator Ninian Edwards that
General Parker had said to me the other evening
at Dr. Thornton’s that he was afraid General Jackson
had gone from this city to Virginia with the
determination to challenge J. W. Eppes.
I hoped it was not so.
He said, No; that he had intended it; that some
intimation of this intention had been given to the President,
and J. J. Monroe had come with two earnest messages
to him to interfere and restrain Jackson from this design.
He had called upon him,
and met Eaton of Tennessee coming from him.
Eaton had been endeavoring to
appease him without success.
When he (Edwards) went in, he found Jackson exasperated
beyond anything that he ever witnessed in man.
But Jackson was always willing to listen to
the advice of those whom he knew to be his friends,
and to give it all due weight.
So he sat down with him and argued the case
till two or three o’clock in the morning,
and then left him perfectly calm and good-humored,
and rescued from his project of fighting Eppes.11
Secretary of State Adams wrote in his Memoirs on 18 March 1819 about that day:
18th. At the President’s I met
Mr. Crawford and Mr. Thompson.
The instructions to be given upon the late Act
against piracy were mentioned again.
Among other suggestions that I had made to the President
in relation to his design of sending an Agent or
Commissioner of high character to South America
was one that, as the compensation of such a person
must be of considerable amount, it would be necessary
to think of the fund from which it should be drawn,
as that for the contingent expenses of foreign intercourse,
clipped down as it has been by Congress from fifty to thirty
thousand dollars, will not be adequate to meet the expense.
This morning the President said he had concluded
not to send any Commissioner at all, but to employ
the captain of one of our ships, selecting a man
of intelligence and discretion, and authorize him
to land and transact the business, which may
thus be done without attracting so much notice.
I have recommended to the President to send
a special messenger to Madrid with a duplicate
copy of the ratified treaty, to be exchanged for
the ratification of Spain, on the contingency of any
accidents happening to that taken out by Mr. Forsyth.
To this point the President has agreed.
Mr. Thompson, the Secretary of the Navy,
recommended to me Lieutenant Finch, late commander
of the Prometheus, who has lately been put out of
active employment by that vessel’s being condemned.
He wishes for an opportunity of going to Europe and would
be glad to go as bearer of dispatches from the Government.
I told Thompson that, as one good turn deserves another,
I had to recommend to him the case of poor Dr. Barton,
an eminent botanical writer, strongly recommended to me,
and whom he was turning with his family out
of their daily bread by suppressing his office.
He said he could not help it; he had agreed to allow
Dr. Barton three months to look about him and provide
for himself in some other way; but the establishment
in which Barton was placed was an expense to the public,
utterly useless, and it could not be continued.
He afterwards came and introduced
Lieutenant Finch to me at my office.
He also sent me a draft of his instructions
to the commanders of our armed vessels
for the execution of the Piracy Act.
He had adhered so closely to the idea of directing them
to capture only vessels having committed aggressions
upon our own citizens or their property, that he had
expressly enjoined them not to capture vessels for having
committed aggressions upon those of any other nation.
This appeared to me to be an instruction directly
in the face of the Act, and I thought there might
be many cases in which they ought to capture
for aggressions upon foreign vessels.
I dined with my wife at Mr. Hyde de Neuville’s—
a diplomatic dinner.
All the heads of Departments and foreign Legations there—
thirty-four persons at table.
I mentioned to Mr. Thompson my objection
to the part of his instructions which prohibited
what the law appeared expressly to enjoin.
He said he would alter them.
I told Mr. Onís that I had received a letter expressing
apprehensions that the vouchers and documents stipulated
to be delivered up in Florida would be carried away,
and I should write him a letter requesting him to give notice
to the Governor-General of Cuba, and to the Governors of
St. Augustine and Pensacola, of the engagement in the
treaty with a request that they would duly attend to its
execution, and that he would also at the same time give
them notice that the grants were annulled by the treaty.
He said he would very readily write such letters.
He then added, “If the Marquis of Casa Yrujo had been in
your situation or mine in making that treaty, what a fortune
he would have made by speculating upon those lands!
They have charged me,” said he
“with speculating in the lands; but it is not so.
The Governor offered me grants of the lands, as the
Governor of Porto Rico has made me the same offer for
lands in that island; but I refused them in both instances.
I particularly refused the grants in Florida, because
I was engaged in the negotiation for the cession.”
This declaration was spontaneously made and was
explicit and positive; but Onís has too much of the character
ascribed by Lord Chatham to Spanish negotiators in general.
He meant me to understand that he had no interest
directly or indirectly in the Florida lands.
But I pause in my belief.
He is the man of mental reservations, hackneyed in the
ways of Spanish diplomacy; and his workings and windings
in the drawing up of the eighth article of the treaty,
and his subsequent allegation that he did not know the dates
of the grants to Alagon, Puñon Rostro, and Vargas with the
qualified manner in which he admits that he signed the
treaty with the understanding that those grants were
null and void, leave scarce a doubt in my mind that he did
intend by that artifice to cover the grants, while we were
under the undoubting impression they were annulled.
Now I told Mr. de Neuville in conversation
with him on the subject the other day,
that if this was so, it was not the ingenious device
of a public Minister, but “une fourberie de Scapin.”
De Neuville did not believe it possible.
I wait to hear how the declaration to be delivered at the
exchange of the ratifications will be received in Spain.
If there was an intended deception on his part,
I can assign no other motive for it than a personal
interest of his own, for he must have been aware that
as a fraud upon the United States it could not ultimately
succeed, they having the remedy in their own hands.
Onís’s character is in strong contrast
with that of De Neuville.
Cold, calculating, wily, always commanding his own temper,
proud because he is a Spaniard, but supple and cunning,
accommodating the tone of his pretensions precisely
to the degree of endurance of his opponent, bold
and overbearing to the utmost extent at which
it is tolerated, careless of what he asserts or how
grossly it is proved to be unfounded, his morality
appears to be that of the Jesuits as exposed by Pascal.
In private life his character is respectable and amiable.
He is laborious, vigilant, and ever attentive to his duties;
vain of his decorations rather than of his talents;
a man of business and of the world,
but not of much literature or mental cultivation.12
On 14 April 1819 John Quincy Adams had a busy day, and he wrote in his Memoirs
how he had developed a friendly relationship with the British Minister Charles Bagot.
Here is some of what Adams wrote in his Memoirs about their meeting that day:
I then mentioned to him the Portuguese Memorial to
the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, and the final entry
upon the protocol, that representations should be
made to this Government by the Ministers
of the powers having Ministers in Washington.
I told him that these representations had been made by
the French Minister, and were expected from the Prussian
Minister and from the Russian Minister when he arrives.
As it was probable instructions from England to him were
on the way and might cross him on his passage,
I would advert to the facts that the substance of the
Neutrality Act of 3rd March, 1817 had been re-enacted and
made permanent in 1818, and that an additional Act against
piracy had been made at the late session of Congress.
I wished him to refer to these, in reporting to his
Government, as proofs of the earnestness with which
we were desirous of applying all suitable means for the
suppression of this irregular privateering from our ports.
He said he would not fail to do it, and had an entire
conviction that such were the views of the American
Government: it was indeed apparent that those
pirates annoyed the commerce of the United States
as much as that of other nations.
I told him that this subject naturally led to that of the
contest between Spain and the South Americans, which
was connected with it, and I recurred to the difference of
views between the United States and the European allied
powers with regard to the termination of that conflict.
From Mr. Rush’s report of a late interview between
Lord Castlereagh and him, it appears that the British
Government still adhere to the expectation that the
Spanish sovereignty in South America will be restored.
Our view of the subject is different.
We believe the Spanish power there to be extinct,
and that it is not in human power to restore it.
We have now no interest of our own to have
this event precipitated; we acquiesce in the
determination of the European allies, to wait
some time longer for the catastrophe.
Spain has rejected the interposition of the allies,
which she had solicited, and now undertakes
to reduce the Colonies herself.
The event must ere long be seen.
We think it impossible that Spain should recover
her supremacy, and we think there is a moral
obligation which at no distant day will make it
the duty of other nations to recognize Buenos Aires,
Venezuela, and Chile as independent States.
The period when this obligation will become
imperative may be more or less distant, but it is
constantly approaching and cannot now be remote.
We have already been prepared for the
acknowledgment of Buenos Aires, but we have
avoided interfering with the policy of the allies,
and we have proposed to all the great powers to
make the act of acknowledgment in concert with them.
We have made known explicitly to them our principles.
Circumstances may arise which we shall consider
as decisive to induce the recognition of Buenos Aires;
but, if they should, it will be only a formality,
for the purpose of having regular Agents there,
and receiving them from them, but without intending
to take their part in the war, and without stipulating
or accepting any special favors to ourselves.
He said he thought with me it was very probable
they would ultimately prevail in the struggle for
independence against Spain, but whether they
would be competent to establish permanent
governments for themselves he thought more doubtful.
He should, however, exactly report
my observations to his Government.
I then said there was another subject
upon which I was glad to have some
explanation with him at this time.
I meant the slave-trade.
Lord Castlereagh had communicated through Mr. Rush the
treaties concluded with Spain and the Netherlands, by which
the armed vessels of either power were authorized to cruise
for, search, and capture the slave-trading vessels under the
flag of the other, and take them for adjudication before a
joint Court, composed of Judges of both nations, holding
their Courts in the Colonies or possessions of both in Africa.
And Lord Castlereagh had proposed that the United States
should enter into similar arrangements with Great Britain.
These Mr. Rush had been instructed to decline, for two
reasons, each of which would have been decisive if alone.
One was, that the United States, having no Colony or
possession in Africa, had no territory where the joint Court
could hold their sessions, and the other, that the Constitution
of the United States admitted no appointment of Judges
who would not be amenable to impeachment by the
House of Representatives and before the Senate.
There was a third reason which had been mentioned to
Mr. Rush, but which he had not been desired to urge, if the
others should appear to be entirely satisfactory to the British
Government; perhaps he had not mentioned it to Lord
Castlereagh, to whom he had very fully disclosed the others.
But by a late dispatch from him I had heard that
Mr. Wilberforce had been holding conferences with him,
pressing the subject upon him with great earnestness,
and complaining that our resistance to the principle
of admitting the mutual right of search by the armed
vessels of either party of the merchant vessels
of the other had set the example to others, and
encouraged France particularly to the same resistance.
We took no exception to these discussions between our
Minister and Mr. Wilberforce, whom we understand to be,
by the common consent of the British Cabinet,
himself a sort of Minister of State upon slave-trade affairs.
He had held such a conference with me
a day or two before I left London to come home.
He had then proposed to me this system of mutual search
and common Courts with great earnestness, and I then had
explicitly stated to him what I apprehended would be an
insurmountable objection against it to the United States.
But, as he now appeared to be reverting to the same
project with increasing rather than diminished zeal,
I thought it well to come directly to the point or our
difficulty by stating it in all its force to the British Cabinet.
It was my opinion, and I could now give it as that of the
President and of all his official advisers, that the
United States ought on no consideration whatever
to listen to any proposal for admitting a right of search
in their merchant vessels by the commanders of foreign
vessels so long as the question remains open between
them and Great Britain concerning impressment for men.
As we had no wish to stir this question unnecessarily,
or to awaken feelings connected with it, when it can
be avoided, we had scarcely mentioned it in regular
communications to the British Government;
but now, and it might perhaps be best in this
informal manner, I could assure him that this
objection would be quite as insuperable as either
of the others, but that it proceeded from no aversion
in us to cooperate to the utmost extent of our power
in accomplishing the abolition of the slave-trade.
Congress had furnished a new and signal proof
of an Act passed at the last session,
in addition to those already existing, and with
which I presumed he was well acquainted….
I finally told Mr. Bagot that as the President felt the
highest gratification at the general good understanding
now subsisting between the United States and Great Britain,
so I hoped he would give Lord Castlereagh the fullest
assurance of our earnest desire to promote and
cultivate the good understanding to the utmost.
He said he should take the greatest pleasure in
performing this duty, as he knew that nothing could
be more gratifying to his own Government.
He thanked me for the facilities which
I had always given him in transacting business,
and we parted with the most friendly expressions
of personal cordiality and mutual good wishes.13
John Quincy Adams wrote in his Diary:
June 10.—Crawford told me much of the information
which he is receiving with respect to the operations
of the Bank and the gigantic frauds practicing
upon the people by means of those institutions.
The banks are breaking all over the country;
some in a sneaking and some in an impudent manner;
some with sophisticating evasions
and others with the front of highwaymen.
Our greatest evil is the question between debtor
and creditor, into which the banks have plunged us
deeper than would have been possible without them.
The bank debtors are everywhere so numerous and
powerful that they control the newspapers throughout the
Union and give the discussion a turn extremely erroneous,
and prostrate every principle of political economy.
Crawford has labors and perils enough
before him in the management of the finances
for the three succeeding years.14
On 19 June 1819 the Massachusetts legislature approved
that the District of Maine could become a separate state.
In his Memoirs on 10 August 1819 Secretary of State Adams wrote,
There was a Cabinet meeting at
the President’s from noon till four o’clock.
He proposed two questions for consideration:
1. Whether in the event of the non-ratification of
the Spanish Territory, at the meeting of Congress
next December, it will be proper for the President
to recommend to Congress that authority should be
given to the Executive to take possession of Florida; and
2. Whether a special message should be sent
immediately with instructions to Mr. Forsyth,
and what those instructions should be.
Upon the first there was no diversity of opinion.
The obligation of the King of Spain to ratify the treaty
was by all present considered as perfect;
his full power to Onís being unlimited, and
containing the promise without reserve to ratify
whatever he should sign and conclude.
It was unanimously agreed that it would be proper for the
Executive to recommend to Congress the measure of taking
possession, and it was observed that, from the experience
in the case of the late war with England, Congress would
not adopt the measure without such recommendation.
It was also agreed that a messenger should
be dispatched with instructions to Forsyth….
Crawford adhered steadily to his idea of instructing
Forsyth to ask for his passports and come away.
He thought it could not be taken as a declaration of war,
but that it would intimidate the Spanish Cabinet
and compel them to an immediate ratification.
He was, however, alone in his opinion, upon which I said
very little, leaving the discussion to Crawford and Calhoun.
I thought Forsyth’s instructions should be, offering still
to receive and transmit the Spanish ratification, to state that
if not given the President would make a full communication
to Congress on the subject, without saying that he should
recommend the immediate occupation of Florida,
but leaving that to be inferred by the Spaniards themselves.
I thought a direct menace would be less dignified
as regards Spain, and would leave the matter
more free for debate in Congress, where umbrage
might be taken if the Executive held out a threat
to a foreign nation of that which it could not, without
express authority from Congress, carry into execution.
This view was finally approved by the President,
and I was charged to prepare the draft of an instruction
to Forsyth, and also letters to A. Gallatin, R. Rush,
and G. W. Campbell, that suitable communications may be
made to the Governments of France, Great Britain, and
Russia of the measures which we shall probably pursue.
I was authorized also to communicate
with Poletica and De Neuville on the subject.
There was very little debate and
entire good humor throughout the meeting.
Crawford and Calhoun were the only members
of the Administration present besides myself.
Mr. Thompson, the Secretary of the Navy, was
detained at his lodgings by illness, and Mr. Wirt,
the Attorney General, was absent at Richmond.
We dined at the President’s and had a
discussion at table about the Bible.
I took a long ramble with Calhoun.15
Secretary of State Adams was in Boston on 8 October 1819,
and on that day he wrote in his Memoirs:
Boston, October 8th.—At one I went with
Joseph Hall and General Sumner and dined
with Governor Brooks at Medford.
There was no other company.
Soon after dinner Hall and Sumner left the table
to go and pay a visit to Mr. Bigelow, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth.
The Governor, when we were left tête-à-tête,
began by asking my opinion with regard to the
separation of the District of Maine from the State.
I gave it to him without reserve, that it was an event
much to be lamented, as affecting the importance
of the State as a member of the Union,
but quite avoidable from the moment that it became
the wish of the majority of the people in the District.
Massachusetts has been hitherto, in point of population
and wealth, one of the first States in the Union.
It will henceforth scarcely be the tenth.
The additional weight of two votes in the Senate
of the United States is a very inadequate compensation
for this loss of comparative importance.
It appears to be the general opinion here
that this event will render necessary a Convention
to revise the Constitution of Massachusetts.16
In his Memoirs on November 26 John Quincy Adams wrote:
Nov. 26. — At twelve o’clock I went to the President’s,
where I found Crawford.
I read as well as I could from the Spanish the letter
from the Duke of San Fernando to Mr. Forsyth,
finally declaring the determination of the King of Spain
to delay the ratification of the treaty, and to send
a Minister to the United States to ask for explanations.
I found that Mr. Crawford, who at the last meeting was
wavering upon the policy of taking possession of Florida,
was now very decided in favor of it and urged all
the considerations that recommend it very forcibly.
As the President has appeared to hesitate, and as the
dispatches from Europe have produced in my own mind
a disposition to pause and review before the decisive step
is taken, I suggested all the reasons that occurred to me
in favor of a recommendation to Congress to wait until
this new Minister shall arrive and demand his explanations.
As I am still doubtful myself whether the boldest course
is not also the safest, my argument
was not very strong nor very ardent.
The President said it was an exceedingly
difficult question, and he would think profoundly
upon it before coming to his final determination.
I told him that I the more freely given him all
my present impressions from a consideration that
it was by our Constitution the President himself
who was responsible for all the great national
measures recommended by him.
The heads of the Departments are
responsible only as his subalterns.
The measure now to be adopted
will be in itself an act of war.
It may very probably involve us
in a real and very formidable war.
I would not have it said that by my advice, we had
crossed the Rubicon without looking before or behind us.
And there are strange workings in the human mind.
Until yesterday I had invariably thought and
advised the President as Crawford did this day.
Until this day Crawford, without directly
advising otherwise, had constantly hinted
doubts and thrown dampers in the way.
Lately, and particularly yesterday, I saw that
my advice had become irksome to the President—
that he was verging to a suspicion that I was
spurring him to rash and violent measures.
I fell, therefore, entirely into his own views of the subject,
and Crawford, having discovered this, immediately
took the ground I had abandoned, and is for
at once assuming the offensive with Spain.
The enemies of the Mr. Monroe Administration
and my enemies have been continually laboring
with the industry and venom of spiders
to excite in his mind a jealousy of me.
They have so far succeeded that whatever
I earnestly recommend he distrusts.17
Secretary of State Adams on December 6 wrote in his Diary:
Dec. 6. — I found Mr. Wirt with the President,
who was discussing with him the question about the part
of his proposed message to Congress recommending an
amendment of the Constitution, giving Congress the power
to make internal improvements by roads and canals.
He said he had deliberately considered the objections which
I had suggested the other day, and they had determined
him to strike out all the argumentative part and to retain,
if anything, only the passage in which he enumerates
all the advantages which the Union would derive from
the investment of such a power in Congress, and his
opinion that the power is not given by the Constitution.
I renewed and repeated all the arguments which I had
before used to prevail upon him to leave it out altogether.
There was, as I had supposed, a motive which
he had not mentioned till now, for saying
something upon the subject in this message.
When he was upon his tour last summer and passed
through Lexington, Kentucky, Clay, who lives there,
was absent from home at New Orleans and was
supposed to have absented himself on purpose.
An attempt was made by some of his partisans
to make the inhabitants of the town pass a slight
upon the President by omitting to show him attentions
similar to those with which he had been received elsewhere.
The effect of it was that the respect shown him there was
rather more strongly marked than in almost any other place.
A committee from the town went out fifteen miles
from it to meet him, and accompanied by a
numerous cavalcade, escorted him in.
They presented him a very respectful address in which,
however, they said something about internal improvements.
He answered by declaring that he was deeply impressed
with the importance and necessity of them: but,
believing that the power to make them had not been
granted to Congress by the Constitution, he was anxious
that it should be given to them by an amendment.
After a long and earnest discussion, Wirt told the President
that he believed it would be better to omit the whole
paragraph, and the President determined that he would.
This resolution importing, as I know it does,
a sacrifice both of opinion and of feeling, affords
a very strong proof of his magnanimity and of his
disposition to listen to counsel—a disposition which
in so high a place is an infallible test of a great mind.
The advice that I have given him on this occasion
was dictated by a pure regard for himself, and a deep
conviction that if he had introduced the subject into the
message at all, it would have injured him and much
increased the disquietude of his future public service.
The President told me that several members
had come to him yesterday and asked him whether
it would be advisable to displace Clay as Speaker.
He had advised against it.
First, because it would be giving Mr. Clay
more consequence than belongs to him.
Secondly, because Mr. Clay in the course which
he has pursued and is pursuing against the Administration,
has injured his own influence more than theirs.
If it should be necessary to put him down,
let it be done by his constituents.
Thirdly, because there is no member
of the Administration from the Western country.
It is gratifying to them to have one of their
members Speaker of the House.
There is no other person from the Western section
sufficiently eminent to put in competition with him.18
Adams wrote in his Diary about a Cabinet meeting
on December 10 discussing issues related to the slave trade.
Dec. 10 — There was a Cabinet meeting at the President’s
at noon, Messrs. Crawford, Thompson, and Writ present.
The Act of Congress against the slave-trade of the
last session, and the questions of construction
arising from it, were under consideration.
The Colonization Society are indefatigable in their
efforts to get hold of the funds appropriated by that Act:
and having got the ear of the President and Crawford
for purposes of his own being one of them,
they already got their fingers into the purse:
the Government is to pay fifteen hundred dollars for
half the freight of a vessel they are about sending to Africa.
Their Colony is to be formed at the island of Sherbro
on the Coast of Guinea about five degrees north of the line,
so perfect a desert that they are to send out even the
timber to build the huts in which their colonists are to dwell.
And with all the multitudes of their members, and
auxiliary societies and newspaper puffs they have no funds,
and they are ravenous as panthers for the appropriation
of a hundred thousand dollars of the last session.
Crawford’s construction of the law would deliver up
to them the whole of it without reserve, though
he professes to be very much upon his guard against them,
and to have no belief in their success.19
On 27 December 1819 Adams met with Mark Langdon Hill who was from Maine
and was now a member of the United States House of Representatives,
and he asked about the current trade between the United States
and the British Colonies in the West Indies.
Hill showed Adams a letter that Thomas Jefferson
wrote to John Langdon of New Hampshire in 1810.
Adams then wrote in his Memoirs that the letter was, “full of his political Shandyism,
a mixture of profound and sagacious observation
with strong prejudices and irritated passions.”
Adams then wrote,
It is a sort of epitome of his political opinions and feelings.
Jefferson is one of the great men whom this country has
produced, one of the men who has contributed largely to the
formation of our national character—to much that is good
and to not a little that is evil in our sentiments and manners.
His Declaration of Independence is an abridged Alcoran of
political doctrine, laying open the first foundations of civil
society; but he does not appear to have been aware that
it also laid open a precipice into which the slave-holding
planters of his country sooner or later must fall.
With the Declaration of Independence on their lips, and the
merciless scourge of slavery in their hands, a more flagrant
image of human inconsistency can scarcely be conceived
than one of our Southern slave-holding republicans.
Jefferson has been himself all his life a slave-holder,
but he had published opinions so blasting to the very
existence of slavery, that however creditable they may
be to his candor and humanity, they speak not much
for his prudence or his forecast as a Virginian planter.
The seeds of the Declaration of Independence
are yet maturing.
The harvest will be what West, the painter,
calls the terrible sublime.20
Notes
1. Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume VI 1779-1796
ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford, 1 January 1819.
2. Memoirs of Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848
by John Quincy Adams ed. Charles Francis Adams, Volume IV, p. 205-206.
3. Ibid., p. 212.
4. Ibid., p. 213, 214.
5. Ibid., p. 227.
6. Ibid., p. 239-240, 241, 242-243.
7. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume IV, p. 244.
8. Ibid., p. 245-246, 247-248.
9. Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845, ed. Allan Nevins, p. 211-212.
10. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States of America
and His Catholic Majesty. 1819. (Online).
11. Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845, p. 212-213.
12. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume IV, p. 303-306.
13. Ibid., p. 333-337, 338.
14. The Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845, p. 217.
15. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume IV, p. 405-406-407.
16. Ibid., p. 421-422.
17. Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845, p. 218-219.
18. Ibid., p. 220-221.
19. Ibid., p. 221-222.
20. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Volume IV, p. 492-493.
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