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We are mad, not only individually, but nationally.
We check manslaughter and isolated murders;
but what of war
and the much vaunted crime of slaughtering whole peoples?
There are no limits to our greed, none to our cruelty.
And as long as such crimes are committed
by stealth and by individuals,
they are less harmful and less portentous;
but cruelties are practiced
in accordance with acts of senate and popular assembly,
and the public is bidden to do
that which is forbidden to the individual.
Deeds that would be punished by loss of life
when committed in secret, are praised by us
because uniformed generals have carried them out.
Man, naturally the gentlest class of being,
is not ashamed to revel in the blood of others,
to wage war, and to entrust the waging of war to his sons,
when even dumb beasts and wild beasts
keep the peace with one another.
Seneca, Letter to Lucilius 95: 30-31If my purpose on this occasion
were to speak in behalf of concord,
I should have a great deal to say,
not only about human experiences but celestial also,
to the effect that these divine and grand creations,
as it happens, require concord and friendship;
otherwise there is danger of ruin and destruction
for this beautiful work of the creator, the universe.
Dio Chrysostom, Discourse 48:14.So I try to quell my anger above all
by not denying the defendants the right to justify themselves,
but by listening to what they have to say.
This helps because time checks emotion
and gives it space to dissolve,
and also because rationality finds
what method of punishment is appropriate,
and how much is fitting.
Plutarch, “On the Avoidance of Anger” 459EFor freedom is not acquired
by satisfying yourself with what you desire,
but by destroying your desire.
Epictetus, Discourses 4:1:176You can be invincible,
if you never go into a contest,
which is not in your power to win.
Look out lest seeing some more honored
or with great power or otherwise blessed with fame,
you are ever carried away by the impression.
For if the essence of the good is in your power,
neither envy nor jealousy have a place;
and you yourself will not wish to be a magistrate,
nor a president or consul, but free.
There is one way to this,
looking down on things not in your power.
Epictetus, Manual 19
Zeno was a Phoenician from Citium on Cyprus.
He died about
260 BC at the age of 72 or 90.
His fortune of a thousand talents
was lost in a shipwreck on the Attic coast about 314 BC.
His merchant
father had brought him many books about Socrates when he was a
boy.
He was reading Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates in Athens
when he asked where men like that were to be found.
Someone pointed
to the Cynic philosopher Crates,
who lived like a beggar with
the woman Hipparchia, another philosopher.
Zeno was a pupil of
Crates and attended the lectures of Xenocrates and Stilpo for
ten years.
An oracle told him to take on the complexion of the
dead,
and so he studied the ancient authors.
However, his natural
modesty did not allow him to practice
the ascetic shamelessness
of the Cynics.
When Crates tried to drag him away from Stilpo
by pulling his cloak,
Zeno said that the proper way to seize a
philosopher is by the ears
and to drag one by persuasion; violence
may take his body,
but his mind would still be with Stilpo.
Zeno
once pointed out to a youth talking nonsense that we have two
ears
and only one mouth so that we may listen more and talk less.
Zeno began to teach pacing back and forth in a colonnade, and
thus his school
of philosophy became known as the Stoics from
the Greek word for porch (stoa).
Athens honored him with
the keys to the city, a gold crown, and a bronze statue.
Antigonus
Gonatas liked his lectures and invited him to his court;
but Zeno,
writing he could not go at the age of eighty, sent two of his
companions instead.
He said a friend is another I.
When he was
punishing a slave for stealing, the slave pleaded that it was
his fate to steal;
Zeno agreed and said it was his fate to be
beaten too.
Zeno could endure and practiced frugality, eating
uncooked food and wearing a thin cloak.
The Stoics considered the first impulse of all animals to be
self-preservation;
pleasure only comes as a by-product.
Zeno wrote
that the purpose of life is agreement with nature,
for our individual
natures are part of the whole universe.
Right reason pervades
all things,
and the law common to all forbids what is contrary
to nature.
The virtue of the happy person in the smooth flow of
life is when all actions promote
the
harmony of the spirit living
in the individual with the will of the one who orders the universe.
Virtue is valuable for its own sake as a harmonious disposition
and not from hope or fear of external motives.
Virtue is the state
of mind that makes life harmonious.
A rational being may be perverted,
however, by the deception
of external pursuits or by the influence
of associates.
The Stoics argued that virtue can be taught,
because bad people
do sometimes become good.
The primary virtues are wisdom, courage,
justice, and moderation.
Particular virtues are magnanimity, continence,
endurance,
presence of mind, and good counsel.
Wisdom is defined
as knowledge of good and evil,
courage as knowledge of what one
ought to choose.
Magnanimity is what enables one to rise above
anything that happens;
continence is the disposition and habit
in accord with reason
that is
never overcome by pleasure; endurance
is the knowledge of what to hold on to;
presence of mind is finding
out what is best to be done at any moment;
and good counsel is
knowing what we need to do and how to do it for the best.
The
corresponding vices come from ignorance.
Goods can be external
or mental.
For the Stoics all good is expedient, binding toward unity,
profitable, useful, serviceable,
beautiful, beneficial, desirable,
and just or right in that it brings people together.
What most
people consider to be external values such as life, health, pleasure,
beauty,
strength, wealth, a good reputation, and noble birth,
and
their opposites to the Stoic
are neutral and thus neither good
nor evil, though they may be "preferred."
What is good
benefits and does not injure, but those things which can be used
either for good or bad are not goods in themselves.
However, Poseidonius
(c. 135-50 BC), who taught at Rhodes,
did maintain that these
values are good too.
Chrysippus (c. 286-206 BC) denied that pleasure
is a good,
because some pleasures are disgraceful.
For most Stoics
these things are indifferent,
though those valued may be preferred
and others rejected.
Harmony in life's process is what determines
duty or what one ought to do.
Appropriate acts are those guided
by reason such as honoring the gods, parents,
brothers, and country
and communicating with friends.
Taking care of one's health is
considered an unconditional duty;
other duties depend on circumstances.
Falsehood can lead to perversion and the passions or emotions,
which Zeno defined as unnatural movements in the soul or as excessive
impulses.
Zeno classified the emotions into the categories of
grief, fear, desire, and pleasure.
Chrysippus wrote that emotions
are judgments;
avarice, for example, is based on the supposition
that money is a good.
Grief or pain they held to be a mental contraction
expressed as pity, envy,
jealousy, rivalry, heavy grief, annoyance,
distress, anguish, and distraction.
Fear is an expectation of
evil and can be terror, nervous shrinking (from action),
shame,
consternation, panic, and mental agony.
Desire or the craving
of an irrational appetite ranges as want, hatred,
contentiousness,
anger, love, wrath, and resentment.
Pleasure is an irrational
elation at getting what one wants and includes ravishment,
malevolent
joy, delight, and transports of delight that can melt away virtue.
The three emotions that are considered good by the Stoics are
joy, caution, and wishing,
which are the rational counterparts
of pleasure, fear, and desire.
The wise person is passionless
and does not fall into the weakness of the emotions,
although
a bad person can be apathetic in being callous and relentless.
The wise are free of vanity, being indifferent to good or bad
reports,
genuinely earnest in self-improvement, and free from
pretense and business cares.
They are not liable to madness nor
to grief.
Stoics were willing to participate in politics in order
to restrain vice and promote virtue,
and they married and raised
children.
They believed that the wise are free, and the bad are
slaves of their vices.
They also condemned the subordination of
traditional slavery.
They believed only the wise and good are
fit to be magistrates, judges, and orators.
The wise do not hurt
others or themselves.
The wise pray to the gods for good things,
and they believed that friendship,
which is a common use in treating
friends as oneself,
can only exist between the wise and good.
The unwise are mad, which comes from folly.
Wisdom comes from
understanding and good counsel,
moderation from good discipline
and orderliness,
and courage from constancy and vigor.
Stoics held that a wise person might make one's own exit
from
life for the sake of one's country and friends
or if suffering
from intolerable pain, mutilation, or an incurable disease.
Zeno
in his Republic and Chrysippus in his treatise On Government
both favored
a community of wives with the free choice of partners,
sharing paternal affection
for all the children alike and, they
believed, ending the jealousies arising from adultery.
They both
recommended a mixed government of
democracy, kingship, and aristocracy
(rule by the virtuous).
God they identified with reason, fate,
Zeus, and many other names.
Zeno maintained the unity of the world,
and the Stoics considered the world a living being
endowed with
a soul, as indicated by the individual souls making it up.
For
the Stoics, God is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect,
intelligent, happy,
with no evil, and taking providential care
of the whole world but not having a human shape.
The various Greek
gods and goddesses represent peculiar attributes of God.
Zeno's
successor was considered by most to be Cleanthes,
who lived to
be nearly ninety, dying in 232 BC.
Chrysippus studied with Cleanthes
and wrote extensively.
The Hellenistic times were hard with many wars, occasional
famines, and increasing slavery.
30,000 slaves toiled in Athens'
silver mines at Laurion,
and the gold mines of the Ptolemies worked
by slaves were notorious.
Slave revolts were becoming more frequent
and larger, and Poseidonius warned that
the ill treatment of slaves
by their masters endangered the whole community.
City states had
lost power to larger kingdoms;
wealth and power had become concentrated
in fewer hands;
and philosophers had responded by turning inward
for personal happiness.
Utopian visions were written by Euhemerus,
who lived at the court of
Macedonian king Cassander about 300
BC and suggested in his fanciful Sacred History
that the
gods had once lived on Earth, and by Iambulus, a Nabatean
who
wrote about a city of the sun found near Ethiopia,
where people
lived communally with dignified free labor and no class distinctions.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born about 4 BC in Spain.
His father
was a lawyer and procurator, who wrote books on rhetoric.
The
child was raised by an aunt in Rome.
Suffering bad health (possibly
the asthma that affected his later years),
young Seneca lived
for a while in Egypt, where his aunt's husband was prefect.
Seneca
served as quaestor during the reign of Tiberius.
Seneca's skill
as an orator almost led the envious Caligula to have him killed;
but the Emperor was persuaded the sickly intellectual would die
soon.
When Claudius became emperor, Seneca was accused by the
empress Messalina
of adultery with Julia, daughter of Germanicus,
and was banished to Corsica.
Eight years later in 49 CE Seneca was recalled to Rome by the
new empress Agrippina
to tutor her son Nero; the next year he
was appointed praetor.
When Nero became emperor, Seneca served
as his chief advisor for civilian affairs.
Many attribute the
good government of Nero's first five years to the influence of
Seneca,
though in 59 he wrote the letter to the Senate justifying
the murder of Nero's mother Agrippina.
According to Tacitus the
senator Suillius asked by what philosophy Seneca
acquired 300,000,000
sesterces in four years of imperial friendship;
then he suggested
it was by huge rates of interest and legacies.
Seneca tried to restrain Nero from eliminating contenders,
saying,
"No matter how many you slay, you cannot kill your
successor."1
Seneca was attacked for his enormous wealth
and extravagant estate.
Since Seneca criticized Nero's amusements
in charioteering and singing,
they argued the Emperor no longer
needed a tutor.
Seneca thanked the Emperor for the wealth he had
bestowed upon him
and offered to give up his property to imperial
agents.
When the military advisor Burrus died in 62 CE,
apparently
unable to control Nero's crimes, Seneca decided to request retirement.
Nero expressed gratitude to his tutor and hoped for his continued
counsel,
fearing his retirement would make him seem mean.
Seneca
dismissed his entourage and stayed home studying philosophy,
escaping
poison by living on fresh fruit and running water.
He was soon
implicated in the Piso conspiracy and was ordered to commit suicide,
which he did in the year 65.
His wife also attempted suicide then,
but she was rescued.
Seneca's writings helped to make Stoicism a popular Roman philosophy.
"On Providence" answers the question of his friend Lucilius
why many evils happen to good people if the world is governed
by providence.
Seneca accepted the Stoic idea that the orderly
universe
could not persist without some caretaker.
Seneca believed
the gods are best to the best people,
and Nature never allows
the good to be harmed by the good,
for a friendship between the
gods and the good is forged by virtue.
Fathers restrain their
sons with severe discipline in order to prepare them
for the world
because they love them.
Though misfortunes may happen to good
people, evil cannot.
The evils God keeps away from the good are
sin, crime, greed, lust, and avarice.
God protects and defends
the good but not necessarily their baggage.
Good is found within
and does not need good fortune.
The mind and courage were given
to withstand what is sad, dreadful, and hard to bear.
Good people
become more capable by maintaining poise and assimilating all
that occurs.
They regard all adversity as exercise to gain strength.
They turn every hardship and difficulty into advantage.
Disaster
is virtue's opportunity.
What matters is not what you bear but
how you bear it.
A soft and easy life tends to produce weak people.
One should never feel sorry for the good because,
although
they may be called unhappy, they can never actually be unhappy.
Seneca asked if the dictator Sulla was happy
because his way to
the forum was cleared by the sword.
Struggling to hold on to things
can bring pain; it is better not to cling to them.
Seneca wrote
that he does not submit against his will; he is God's follower,
not his slave, because he knows all things proceed according to
eternal laws.
Everything must be given up eventually, and dying
is short and easy.
After Seneca went into exile to Corsica in 41 CE,
he wrote
for his mother "Consolation to Helvia."
He knew of no
one who was the object of grief writing to console,
and he hesitated
to exacerbate her sorrow.
However, he believed the treatment would
be worth the pain of opening the wounds.
Seneca assured his mother
that he was happy and could not be made unhappy
because Nature
requires no extra equipment for happiness.
The wise are neither
elated by prosperity nor depressed by adversity
but rely on themselves
for satisfaction.
Though he acknowledged that emotions are not
always under control and that
distraction only tends to cheat
them for a while,
grief overcome by reason can be appeased forever.
For the primal source of the mind is the heavenly spirit.
Seneca
argued that exile is not bad, as many peoples have changed their
homes.
Marcus Brutus had noted that exiles carry their virtues
with them.
Seneca observed that Nature fashioned Caligula to show
the height of vice
when it is combined with power, and he ridiculed
his extravagance
in spending a million on hard-to-get foods for
one meal.
It is absurd to believe that one's financial balance
is more important than mental balance.
There can never be enough
for the greedy, but Nature is satisfied with little.
The mind
can never be exiled, because it is divine and free to explore
all time and space.
Seneca wrote "On Firmness" to his young Epicurean
friend Serenus.
Seneca argued that the wise can not truly be injured.
Fortune may snatch away what she has given;
but she does not give
virtue, and it can never be taken away.
Instead of shrinking from
difficult circumstances, the wise consider
even injury profitable
as making trials of virtue and proving one's self.
The wise may
be wounded, but injuries received may be overcome, arrested, and
healed.
Verbal insults are even less difficult, and the wise regard
them with a smile;
for true criticisms are beneficial, and false
ones are irrelevant.
Seneca wrote his long essay On Anger to his older brother
Novatus,
later known as Gallio when he governed Achaea starting
in 52 CE.
Seneca called anger the most hideous and frenzied of
all the emotions,
and he noted it has been called temporary insanity.
Because it causes numerous crimes and wars,
no plague has harmed
the human race as much.
Aristotle defined anger as the desire
to repay suffering.
No creature is more loving than humans, and
Seneca asked what is more cruel than anger.
Humans were born to
help each other, but in anger they destroy each other.
He referred
to Plato's analysis that both punishment and anger are not consistent
with good because one injures, and the other takes pleasure in
injuring.
Reason remains the mistress as long as she keeps apart
from the passions;
but if she mingles with them, she becomes contaminated
and cannot hold them back.
Passion and reason are not separate
and transform the mind toward the better or the worse.
If reason
surrenders to anger, how can it free itself?
Seneca criticized
Aristotle's view that anger can be useful as a soldier.
For Seneca
following the leadership of reason is not anger, which he describes
as willfulness.
In the analogy anger would be disobedient soldiers.
Seneca found no reason for hating wrong-doers since error causes
their mistakes.
Does one hate the members of one's own body when
undergoing surgery?
Anger can be replaced by the desire to heal.
Seneca observed that anger is unbalanced and usually goes farther
than it should,
For it indulges its own impulses, is capricious in judgment,
refuses to listen to evidence, grants no opportunity for defense,
maintains whatever position it has seized,
and is never willing to surrender its judgment even if it is wrong.2
Reason, however, postpones action in order to listen to both
sides and sift out the truth.
Seneca described three stages of
anger as:
1) a menace prompts passion involuntarily;
2) an act
of volition assumes it is right to revenge one's hurt or punish
another; and
3) one wishes to take vengeance whether it is right
or not.
Although the first reaction cannot be controlled,
the
other two stages can be banished by judgment.
Some argued that anger is expedient because it escapes contempt
and terrifies the wicked.
Seneca replied that powerful anger may
cause one to be feared,
which is worse than being scorned, and
powerless anger exposes one to ridicule.
Seneca found that it
is easier to be virtuous but costly to indulge in vices.
He suggested
not falling into anger; but if one does, to do no wrong.
Anger
is best corrected by delay.
Arrogance and ignorance make us prone
to anger.
Anger is especially dangerous because more than any
other vice it can affect a whole state.
Nothing is worse than
the enmity anger breeds, as nothing is more deadly than war.
Seneca
urged us to fight against ourselves, to conquer anger so that
it will not conquer us.
He suggested keeping it hidden in the
depths of the heart
so that it should not drive but can be driven.
If the countenance is unruffled, the voice gentle, and the step
slow,
gradually the inner person will conform.
Let us remember
that even the wisest have faults, and let us forgive the foolish.
For Seneca the greatest punishment for wrong-doing is having done
it
because of the torture of remorse.
Vengeance exposes the doer
to more injuries.
Seneca asked us to find time to love and not
waste time on evil things.
He then gave numerous examples of anger,
pointing out that in most cases
it is the result of attaching
great value to petty things.
In "On the Shortness of Life" Seneca addressed Paulinus,
who was in charge of Rome's grain supply.
Seneca recommended leisure
for the practice of philosophy by being detached
from involvement
rather than wasting one's time
pursuing fortunes and pleasures
that do not last.
He considered spending time in drinking and
lust as the sorriest abuse of time,
for he thought avarice, wrath,
and unjust hatreds were more manly sins.
For Seneca only philosophers
really live and can explore the wisdom of past philosophers.
He
suggested that Paulinus take time for himself as he had given
much of his life to the state.
It is better to know the balance
sheet of one's life than of the public grain supply.
"On Tranquillity of Mind" was written to Serenus,
Nero's prefect of police.
He had asked Seneca how he could stop
his mental vacillations that prevent tranquility.
Seneca observed
that mental balance is disturbed by unrealized desires
and the
inability either to control or yield to passions.
Although Seneca
recommended quiet retirement, he also valued willingness
to be
of service to individuals and humanity with one's intelligence
and counsel.
Stoics claim the whole world as their fatherland
and thus afford virtue a broad scope.
Seneca advised choosing
friends who are free from passions
because we are affected by
those nearest.
Thrift leads to contentment; even the poor can
be wealthy by being thrifty,
whereas without thrift even riches
will fail to satisfy.
One should avoid laboring for empty ends
or without motivation.
Seneca suggested cutting down on gadding
about and making the rounds.
Instead of being stuck in a rigid
program, being adaptable is helpful.
When Emperor Nero was eighteen, he signed his first death warrant,
commenting that he wished he had never learned to write.
At that
time Seneca wrote "On Clemency" to recommend mercy to
the Emperor
so that he could enjoy a clear conscience.
Seneca
considered this the most humane of the virtues.
A high spirit
is distinguished by composure, serenity,
and the lofty disregard
of insult and injury.
Gentleness enhances the security of kings.
Although frequent punishment may crush a few, it provokes the
hatred of all.
A stern king by destroying enemies may only multiply
them.
Although his temper flared in youth, Augustus learned clemency
and gained a great reputation over the years.
Seneca commended
the early reign of the young Nero during which
he could boast
of not shedding blood anywhere in the world.
Perhaps the greatest
problem with cruelty is that one must keep to the same road,
as
crimes need more crimes to protect them.
Seneca praised the ruler whose solicitude is all-embracing,
who fosters every part of the commonwealth as a member of himself,
who inclines to milder courses than punishment,
who is reluctant
to use harsh remedies, whose spirit is free of hostility and cruelty,
who wields power with even temper in order to satisfy his subjects,
who makes his prosperity a public asset,
who offers easy access
and is affable in conversation, whose amiability wins affection,
who is sympathetic to reasonable requests but not impatient with
the unreasonable -
such a person is loved, defended, and cherished
by the whole state.
Humans require skillful handling without passions
like anger.
Just as we treat diseases without getting angry,
so
human problems can also be treated gently.
One must learn that
wishing to be feared is as bad as being in fear.
Seneca asked
why anyone would lead such a life when one can be harmless to
all.
Only the king who provides security to others is secure.
Most of books two and three of "On Clemency" are lost.
Seneca concluded the first book by comparing the prince who
saves the lives
of fellow citizens in the exercise of duty as
a godlike power,
while to kill multitudes without discrimination
is like the power of fire and ruin.
Seneca wrote "On the Happy Life" to his brother Gallio.
Seneca accepted the Stoic premise that the happy life is in harmony
with its own nature.
It is attained with a sound mind that is
courageous and energetic,
careful of one's body
but without anxiety,
and attentive to all the advantages
of life without being too
attached to any.
The happy person is free from fear and desire
by the gift of reason.
Concord and unity result from virtues,
while discord comes from the vices.
Asked why he had so much wealth
when he discounted the value of money,
Seneca replied that he
was not equal to the best, though he was better than the wicked.
He was content to be reducing his vices.
While acknowledging that
philosophers do not always practice what they preach,
Seneca held
that they practice much of what their virtuous minds conceive.
Seneca thought it noble to aim at high things.
He hoped to do
nothing for opinion but everything for conscience,
endeavoring
to be guilty of nothing that impaired human liberty.
Seneca found more expression for virtue with riches than in
poverty;
for being poor requires only endurance, but riches need
moderation, liberality, diligence, orderliness, and grandeur.
Because he was willing to give up his riches, Seneca believed
he was not owned by them as some people are.
Why condemn wisdom
to poverty?
Seneca believed that wealth acquired without harming
anyone or base dealing is honorable.
Although he was known for
his generosity, Seneca's critics were skeptical of the means
he
used to gain such immense wealth in such a short time by using
his imperial favor.
Seneca argued that the wise can use wealth
by sharing it with the worthy.
Yet he held that riches themselves
are not a good,
because though desirable they cannot make one
good.
Seneca's longest work, On Benefits, discusses ingratitude
as the most common vice.
Great souls seek to do benefits;
they
search for good persons even after discovering bad people.
The
most important part of a benefit is the good will that bestows
it;
the ignorant regard only what meets the eye.
A benefit is
a virtuous act that no power can undo.
The most important benefits
are the necessary; the useful are second;
the pleasurable, especially
things that endure, are third.
The best benefits anticipate one's
desire; next is to indulge a request.
Seneca concluded this work
by noting that it is not the proof of a fine spirit
to give a
benefit and lose it, but rather to lose and still to give.
During the last three years of his life Seneca could concentrate
on philosophy
and wrote more than a hundred letters to Lucilius,
the procurator in Sicily.
Seneca's short discussions of philosophical
issues later inspired the essay form
used so well by Montaigne,
Francis Bacon, and Emerson.
Seneca wrote that a friend must be
trusted, but before that you must judge.
Philosophy promises the
feeling of fellowship and of belonging to the human community.
For Seneca the motto of living in conformity with nature did not
mean
torturing one's body
nor rejecting simple standards of cleanliness
nor adopting a hideous diet.
Philosophy calls for a simple life,
not a crude life of penance.
He found a compromise between the
ideal and popular morality
in a life that can be admired and understood.
Seneca found that part of the joy of learning is that it enabled
him
to teach so as to benefit others besides himself.
In his 7th
Letter Seneca warned against watching the butchery
and slaughter
of the shows in the arena.
He suggested retiring into yourself
as much as possible and
associating with people who are likely
to improve you.
Seneca wrote for later generations helpful recommendations
that
he hoped would be like successful medicine to lessen sores.
Seneca delighted in quoting Epicurus in many letters, though he
believed the Stoic sages
feel their troubles but overcome them
while the Epicureans do not even feel them.
He felt the wise can
do without friends although they do not desire to do without them.
Seneca's teacher Hecato recommended the best love philter:
"If
you wish to be loved, love."3
Although philosophy is not
a popular occupation, Seneca believed that
it molds and builds
character, orders life, regulates conduct,
shows what to do
and
what not to do, and keeps one on a correct course without fear
or worry.
The duty and proof of wisdom is that word and deed should
be in accord.
It may take time but terrors may be quieted, incitements
quelled, illusions dispelled,
extravagance checked, and greed
reprimanded.
In Letter 41 Seneca mentioned the divine spirit
that is near you, with you, and inside you.
This divine spirit
resides within us, guards us, and watches us.
As we treat it,
so it will treat us.
No one is good without God, and no one can
rise above fortune without help from God.
This is what prompts
us to noble and exalted endeavors.
In the 47th Letter Seneca was glad to hear that Lucilius
lived
on friendly terms with his slaves as an enlightened person
should.
Seneca laughed at those who thought it degrading to eat
with a slave
but would fill their bellies and then vomit everything
up.
Though he did not question having slaves,
Seneca recommended
being kind and courteous to them.
He observed that many people
are slaves to sex or money or ambition,
and all are slaves to
hope or fear.
He believed it is better to have slaves respect
you than fear you.
To be respected truly is to be loved; love
and fear do not mix.
Seneca believed discipline should be verbal,
as correctional beatings are for animals only.
Seneca felt the
concern of a friend as his own, writing,
Friendship creates a community of interest
between us in everything.
We have neither successes nor setbacks as individuals;
our lives have a common end.
No one can lead a happy life
if he thinks only of himself
and turns everything to his own purposes.
You should live for the other person
if you wish to live for yourself.4
Seneca advised against quibbling since straightforwardness
and simplicity are in harmony with goodness.
Seneca found greater
power and value in that which creates (God) than in matter.
In
humans the body should serve this better spirit.
Seneca held that
the supreme good is virtue alone.
People make mistakes because
they consider the parts of life but not life as a whole.
The greater
part of progress is the desire to make progress.
Those who wish
to be happy should conclude
that the good consists only in what
is honorable.
God relates to the soul; but sensual goods are only
opinions.
Seneca justified suicide, writing that the wise live
as long as they should,
not as long as they can; quality of life
is more important than quantity.
Dying well is more important
than dying early or late if it means escaping living ill.
Yet
Seneca believed in learning as long as one is ignorant; even the
old can learn.
Reason perfects humans and makes them blessed.
Virtue is the sole good, and there is no good without it.
Seneca observed that so-called pleasures, when they go
beyond
reasonable limits, become punishments.
In Letter 88 he
discussed from the ethical viewpoint liberal studies
that are
supposed to make a person free.
Seneca believed that the pursuit
of wisdom leads to freedom
but questioned whether literary scholarship
leads to virtue.
As to music he preferred bringing harmony to
his mind by getting his thoughts in tune.
He wanted to learn how
to avoid uttering plaintive notes
when things went against him
in life.
He asked what was the use of mastering a horse
if one
is carried away
by unbridled emotions,
or of overcoming an opponent
in wrestling or boxing if one is overcome by temper.
Liberal studies
alone do not improve character,
but they may prepare the mind
to acquire moral values.
In the 89th Letter Seneca focused
on the moral part
of philosophy and divided it into three sections.
First, theory assigns everything its proper place and assesses
value;
second is to control impulses; and third is to harmonize
action resulting from impulses
in order to attain consistency
with the values.
He recommended studying not to increase knowledge,
but to improve it.
Seneca believed life is a gift of the immortal gods, but living
well
is the gift of philosophy that is bestowed by the gods.
Philosophy
does not construct arms for use in war,
but it is a voice for
peace, calling all humans to live in harmony.
Seneca seemed to
be criticizing Epicureans when he wrote that his philosophy
did
not take the citizen out of public life nor gods out of the world
nor hand morality over to pleasure; he held that nothing is good
unless it is honorable.
Virtue for Seneca is all important, and
it only comes to character
by schooling, training, and continuing
practice.
Even the best people must cultivate virtue.
Things can
be made easier by viewing them with equanimity.
Disasters, losses,
and injuries have no more power
against virtue than a cloud against
the sun.
In discussing refraining from bloodshed in Letter 95,
Seneca thought it a little thing
not to harm those you ought to
help.
Yet to treat others with kindness is worthy of great praise.
Seneca believed that all that is part of God and humanity is one
- parts of one great body.
Nature created us from the same source
and for the same end,
engendering in us mutual friendship and
establishing fairness and justice.
Like Socrates, Seneca held
it is more wretched to commit injury than to suffer it.
Since
our birth is common, let us possess things in common.
Freedom
cannot be won without sacrifices.
If you value freedom highly,
everything else must be valued as little.
In Letter 105 Seneca observed that to be feared is to
fear.
No one can strike terror into others and still enjoy peace
of mind.
Not wronging others is a good start toward peace of mind.
People without self-restraint lead disordered lives, experiencing
fear
equal to the injuries they do others because of conscience
demanding answers.
To expect punishment is to suffer it, and to
deserve it is to expect it.
Those with bad consciences may find
circumstances of impunity
but never freedom from anxiety.
Even
in his time Seneca noted that philosophy was degenerating
from
the study of wisdom to philology, the study of words.
Seneca found
that we are naturally attracted by wealth, pleasures, good looks,
political advancement, and other enticing prospects,
and we are
repelled by exertion, death, pain, and limitations.
He concluded
that we need to train ourselves not to crave
the former while
not being afraid of the latter.
He suggested retreating from attractive
things
and rousing ourselves to meet what attacks us.
He compared
this to leaning forward while walking uphill
and leaning back
when coming down.
In his last letter Seneca explained that the
Epicureans by making pleasure their ideal
hold that good resides
in the senses; but the Stoics find good in the intellect
that
is able to judge good and bad according to virtue and honor.
Dio Chrysostom was born in Prusa of Bithynia about 40 CE and
died about 120.
Dio became a sophist and criticized philosophers
such as Musonius
until he was converted by him in Rome.
In 82
Dio was banished by Domitian from Rome, Italy, and Bithynia
for
advising a conspiring relative of the Emperor.
He lived like a
poor Cynic traveling and doing manual labor.
People often asked
him questions, and he began to speak
about human duties and what
is beneficial.
Chrysostom means "golden mouth."
In Viminacium
on the Danube, Dio wrote a history of the Getae, but it is not
extant.
Dio visited military camps in his rags.
According to Philostratus,
when he saw troops beginning to mutiny
after Domitian's assassination,
Dio leaped on an altar
and stripped off his rags like Odysseus
as he quoted Homer.
Then he energetically indicted the tyrant
but persuaded the soldiers
it would be wiser to act according
to the will of the Roman people.
Dio's exile was ended, and the next summer he made an oration
at Olympia.
At Rome he was well received by Emperor Nerva.
Dio
Chrysostom gained royal favors for his native Prusa and returned
there.
He headed an embassy from Prusa to thank the Emperor, but
Nerva had died.
Dio became a close friend of Emperor Trajan, who
said he loved him as himself
even though he did not understand
what he was saying.
Dio traveled before returning to Prusa to
beautify the city,
where he became involved in an urban renewal
lawsuit in 111 CE.
No more was heard of him after that.
Some of Dio Chrysostom's four discourses On Kingship
may have been presented at birthday celebrations of Trajan.
In
the first Dio wrote that although music may arouse the martial
spirit,
it is more difficult for it to make the soul just and
prudent;
he believed only the spoken word of the wise can do that.
A king should not use power to become licentious and profligate,
arrogant, and lawless;
but he should devote his attention to guiding
and shepherding his people.
The just and good person has the greatest
faith in the just and good gods.
Next a good king honors and loves
the good, while caring for all.
His greatest pleasure may come
from conferring benefits.
Dio favored preparing for war so as
to be able to live in peace.
Yet the greatest defense of a king
is found in the loyal hearts
of those watching out for his welfare.
In the third discourse Dio praised Trajan but argued that he
was not flattering him,
claiming he was the only one bold enough
to risk his life in telling the truth to Domitian
when others
thought falsehood necessary.
Flattery he considered outrageous
because it gives to vice the rewards of virtue.
Such a perverter
of truth lies to the very persons who know best one is lying.
Unless the object of flattery is a fool, one appears more odious
than pleasing.
When flatterers are discovered, they are hated
and mocked.
It is reasonable for a ruler to steel oneself against
pleasure because life is short
and filled mostly with remembrance
of the past and expectation of the future.
Dio asked whether the
wicked or the virtuous find more joy
in remembering the past or
are more encouraged about the future.
The wise realize that labor
brings health and a good reputation
while luxurious ease results
in the opposite and makes labor
appear more difficult while blunting
pleasures.
The fourth discourse is a dialog between the Macedonian conqueror
Alexander
and the Cynic philosopher Diogenes.
Diogenes argues
that this powerful king is his own bitterest foe
as long as he
is bad and foolish.
Diogenes asks if he realizes it is a sign
of fear to carry a weapon.
Thus he encourages him to trust acting
justly, not arms.
He should not try to become king before he attains
wisdom.
He will never be a king until he has made his spirit commanding,
free,
and royal instead of slavish, illiberal, and vicious.
Diogenes
then describes the three most common lives as
self-indulgence
in pleasures, acquisitive greed, and ambition for glory.
In his 6th discourse Dio described the simple and free life
of Diogenes,
the only independent person in the world,
comparing
this to the misery of the king of Persia.
He continued this theme
in his 8th discourse on virtue, arguing that a noble person
battles
hardships as one's greatest antagonists.
The strongest person
is the one who can stay farthest from pleasures.
Like Diogenes,
during his exile Dio found that the pleasure of eating and drinking
is increased when one is hungry or thirsty and
that simple food
and water can be most delightful.
One can condition oneself to
cold and heat as other animals do.
Dio wrote how Diogenes at the
Isthmian games
questioned the value of being proclaimed the fastest
runner.
In Dio's 10th discourse Diogenes encounters a man looking
for his lost slave
and wanting to consult a god; he persuades
him to give up both pursuits.
He can simplify his life without
a bad slave,
and he should first aim to know himself before consulting
an oracle.
Dio believed that as courage, justice, and temperance increased,
there would be less surplus wealth and luxuries.
He observed that
most people consider freedom the greatest blessing
and that slavery
is a shameful condition.
Yet they have little knowledge of what
freedom and slavery are,
and they do little to escape slavery
and to gain freedom.
We are permitted to do what is just and beneficial because
doing the opposite results in suffering and punishment.
Thus freedom is knowing what is allowed,
and slavery is ignorance
of what is just and good.
In discussing distress Dio pointed out
that an intelligent person is free
by not feeling pain because
of troubles and stress.
Nothing by itself must cause fear, but
it results from false opinion and our own weakness.
There is uncertainty
in everything.
All who have come before us are dead, and we may
die any day.
Perhaps the greatest achievement would be
to live
one day free of worry, fear, and similar emotions.
In his discourse on coveting, Dio associated this vice with
greed,
citing a passage from Euripides' Phoenician Women
that
greed destroys the prosperity of families and overthrows
states,
that human law requires us to honor equality in order
to establish
common friendship and peace for all.
Yet quarrels,
strife, and foreign wars are due to desire for more
but result
in each side being deprived even of what is sufficient.
What is
more important than life?
Yet men destroy even that for money,
often causing their own countries to be laid waste.
Wealth moderately
put to use does not injure but makes life easier and frees it
from want;
but if it becomes excessive, it causes far more worries
and troubles than pleasures.
Dio wrote that the great majority
feed in their hearts an entire army of desires
and try to accumulate
property far beyond their needs.
In outlining education for public
speaking, Dio most highly recommended reading
the works
of Homer,
Menander, Euripides, Thucydides, Demosthenes, and Socratics like
Xenophon.
In writing about retirement Dio noted that the mind
should be trained never to turn aside
or withdraw from its proper
work, or one will not be able
to rise above one's surroundings
to accomplish things.
Dio Chrysostom questioned whether it is right to go to war
with those who have not done a wrongful act.
If they have done
something wrong, he asked, how serious is it?
Philosophers take
a long-range perspective and are not influenced by anger,
contentiousness,
and bribery, but act justly.
Dio believed that guardian spirits
are good and that the wise are fortunate and happy
because they
are guided by them; but the unhappy are so,
not because their
guardian spirit is bad, but because they neglect the good spirit.
Philostratus in his Lives of the Sophists wrote that
Dio often reproached licentious cities,
but he managed to do so
without being ungracious like one
who restrains an unruly horse
with the bridle rather than the whip.
At Rhodes, Dio criticized
their assembly for voting statues to honor men
and then chiseling
off the names of old statues to add the new name.
He spoke in
the theater at Alexandria criticizing their usual entertainment.
He said the gods control all blessings and
distribute them to
those who are ready to receive,
like the water from the Nile that
comes from a divine source above;
but evils like the filthy canals
in the city are their own creation.
Human folly and love of luxury
and ambition make life
vexatious and full of deceit, wickedness,
pain, and other ills.
The one cure from the gods is education;
for persons who
use reason consistently will be healthy and happy.
At the Cilician capital of Tarsus, Dio suggested that the gods
no longer love the wanton,
senseless, and unrestrained, who are
inclined toward insolence, laziness, and luxury.
They should not
rely on speakers who praise them,
for they only deceive and vainly
excite them like foolish children.
Rather they should welcome
the one who will
point out their faults and can make them think.
Dio compared those who said that practically everyone has changed
to those who do not take care of themselves in an epidemic because
nearly all are sick.
People are walking around asleep dreaming
instead of being guided by reason.
Dio is like the physician who
touches the sore spot;
he makes it smart, but his medicine is
mild considering the seriousness of their case.
In relation to
other cities Dio asked them to behave with consideration
according
to their honor and not in a spirit of hostility and hatred.
If
they do so, everyone will follow their leadership willingly with
admiration and affection.
Superiority in virtue and kindness are
their true blessings and are worthy of emulation.
Dio noted how
the rivalry between Athens and Sparta caused them both
to lose
their good reputations and then their power and wealth
until finally they were subjected by their foes.
This is like fellow slaves
quarreling with each other over glory and pre-eminence.
Yet the
greatest things the philosophers pursue seriously are always within
our control.
In speaking to his native country in Borysthenes, Dio promoted
the philosophical theory
of a noble and benevolent fellowship
of gods and humans which gives a share
of citizenship to all living
beings who have reason and intellect.
He believed this code better
and more just than that
of Sparta which denied citizenship to
the Helots.
He recounted a Zoroastrian myth in which
the gods
are led by the one best endowed with truth.
Dio spoke to the Nicomedians urging them to find concord with
their neighbor Nicaea.
Although concord is so much better than
war, people have often chosen wars
not because they are deluded
that fighting is better than keeping the peace,
but because some
are striving for royal power, some for liberty,
some for territory, and some for control of the sea.
These two cities are struggling
for primacy;
but if they are concerned for the welfare of all
Bithynia,
they will be no less displeased over wrongs inflicted
upon others than those inflicted upon themselves;
also if anyone
flees to them for succor, they will aid them promptly and impartially.
This conduct will yield them primacy, not quarreling with Nicaeans
over titles.
By joining forces they will control other cities
that might wrong them;
but now other cities take advantage of
their strife, giving primacy to them.
Together the two cities
would double their resources,
and lawbreakers could not escape
justice by fleeing from one city to the other.
They should not
listen to those who malign them to each other for selfish purposes,
and so they should avoid being irritated for petty reasons.
Dio
believed that once concord is achieved, the gods will help it
to endure.
Dio also spoke against the internal strife in Nicaea, suggesting
that the gods
desire nothing more than virtue, orderly government,
and honor for good citizens.
He prayed that the gods might cast
out strife and jealousy and implant love and unity.
In his own
city of Prusa, Dio argued for concord with their neighbor Apameia,
as he believed it is never profitable even for the greatest city
to indulge in hostile strife with the humblest village.
When the
opposing city is not small, the hostility will inevitably cause
pain and do harm.
Dio reminded them that the Apameians need Prusa's
timber and
that Prusa has no other harbor for trade except that
of Apameia.
Dio believed unwillingness to yield or make concessions,
which some imagine are not manly, is rather senseless and stupid.
Dio felt patriotic feelings toward Prusa, but he also recognized
the democratic
right of others to disagree with him, confident
he could persuade them to change.
Immunity from criticism is more
likely to be given to dictators than to benefactors.
Dio described
the disadvantage of enmity and the benefits of concord and friendship.
Furthermore, any enmity towards any people
is an irksome, grievous thing.
For there is no enemy so weak as not on occasion
to hurt even the man who appears to be very strong,
or to display his hatred by either saying some painful word
or doing some injurious act.
For the fruit of hatred is never, so to speak, sweet or beneficial,
but of all things most unpleasant and bitter,
nor is any burden so hard to bear or so fatiguing as enmity.
For example, while it always interferes
with strokes of good fortune,
it increases disasters,
and while for him who suffers from something else
it doubles the pain,
it does not permit those who are enjoying good fortune
to rejoice in fitting measure.
For it is inevitable, I suppose,
that the masses should be harmed by one another,
and, on the other hand, be despised
and held in low esteem by the others,
not only as having antagonists to begin with,
but also as being themselves foolish and contentious.
However, there is nothing finer or more godlike
than friendship and concord,
whether between man and man or between city and city.
For who are they who acquire
the good things of life more becomingly,
when it is their friends who assist in supplying them?
Who escape the bad things more easily
than those who have friends as allies?
Who are less affected by distress
than those who have persons to share their suffering
and to help them bear it?
To whom is good fortune sweeter
than to those who gladden by their success
not only themselves but others too?5
After bringing concessions for Prusa from Trajan, Dio Chrysostom
promoted
such
improvements to the city as colonnades and fountains
but also fortifications, harbors, and shipyards.
He even aimed
to bring together many inhabitants in a
federation of cities with
Prusa as the head.
According to Dio all in the assembly approved
his plan and supported it financially.
In old age probably at Rome Dio delivered his Euboean Discourse
in which he told
the story of simple hunters who generously aided
a shipwrecked traveler.
He described the happiness of their rural
life and noted that the poor often
are more helpful to those in
need than the rich,
whose aid usually is a loan which must be
returned with interest.
Dio then turned to the difficulty the
poor had surviving in cities,
where only the water was free; even
firewood had to be bought.
He was concerned that many jobs for
those without wealth were sedentary and unhealthy.
He was also
critical of corrupt professions such as entertainers and lawyers.
Dio's strongest arguments were against prostitution as shameful
and brutal lust.
Brothel-keepers unite individuals without love
and affection for the sake of filthy lucre.
Women and children
captured in war or purchased as slaves
are exposed to shameful
ends in dirty booths.
Dio believed this sordid trade should be
forbidden and not legal.
This adultery committed with outcasts
can lead to assaults
on the chastity of women and boys of good
families.
To the argument that unbarred brothels at low prices
would protect
free and respected wives from bribes and gifts,
he argued that
men become weary of what is cheap and desire what
is forbidden.
Where intrigues with married women are carried on
with respectability,
the maidenhood of unmarried girls will be
in danger.
When the seduction of women becomes easy, some men
will turn to corrupting boys.
Although Dio Chrysostom never mentioned
Christians,
his preaching in many ways was a classical parallel
of that new morality.
Plutarch was born about 46 CE in Boeotia at Chaeronea,
which
is midway between Thebes and Delphi.
His father was also a philosopher
and biographer,
and Plutarch was given a good education.
In 66-67
he studied mathematics and philosophy at Athens
with the Peripatetic
philosopher Ammonius, though as a Platonist
Plutarch was later
more closely associated with the Academy.
He often lectured at
Rome between 75 and 90.
At Chaeronea he held municipal posts such
as building commissioner and chief magistrate.
He traveled in
Greece, to Sardis, Alexandria, and on public business to Rome.
Plutarch lectured and taught adults philosophy and ethics at Chaeronea.
About 95 he became one of the two permanent priests at Delphi,
and he had a second home there.
He was married and mentioned four
sons when his infant daughter died.
Plutarch probably died about
120.
Plutarch is best known for writing biographies, of which 48
survive,
including 22 pairs of parallel Greek and Roman lives
down to
the end of the civil war with Antony's death in 30 BC.
His motive for undertaking these was the ethical improvement of
others;
and
he soon found history to be a mirror from which
he
learned to adjust and regulate his own conduct.
Extant also are
78 ethika or moral essays, though this designation
was
originally for the largest group, not all of his other varied
writings.
Some of these were not written by him but were given
his name.
The influence of Plutarch's writing has been great.
Marcus Aurelius took his biographies with him campaigning against
the Marcomanni.
Writing in Greek, his work became schoolbooks
in the eastern empire for centuries.
Byzantine scholars introduced
them into Italy during the Renaissance.
An excellent French translation
by Jacques Amyot of the Lives in 1559
and the Moralia
in 1572 led to North's English Parallel Lives in 1579
and
Philemon Holland's English Moralia in 1603.
In writing on "Moral Virtue" Plutarch reviewed the
theories of
Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.
He agreed
with Plato that in the psyche there is clearly a difference between
what judges and what suffers passions and that the latter obeys
the former and yields,
while the rational element is what is obeyed
or resisted.
The one who has the worst part obedient to the better
has power over oneself
and is
better than the one who allows the
brutish and unreasonable part of the soul to get its way.
The
reason as divine and heavenly should naturally
command and rule
that which is sensual.
In "Virtue and Vice" Plutarch
wrote that people enjoy wealth, power,
and reputation better
and bear poverty, exile, and old age more gently
according to
the serenity of their character.
Vice makes every activity more
troublesome.
Yet a courageous soul is calm and joyful.
Learn what
is honorable and good, and you will be content with your lot.
In "Can Vice Cause Unhappiness?" Plutarch held that
vice makes everyone
completely miserable without needing instruments
or ministers.
No misfortune is really bad without the aid of vice.
Yet vice can ruin the fortunate with lust, anger, superstitious
fears, and so on.
Plutarch sent an essay "On Listening" to a young
man just old enough to wear adult clothes,
warning him that undisciplined
youths wanting freedom often set over themselves
more tyrannical
masters than teachers or trainers, namely desires.
Now is the
time to replace the rules they have been under with the divine
leadership
of reason; for only those who follow reason can be
considered free.
Listening is more important than speaking, because
we listen more than we speak.
One is apt listening to others to
notice faults such as sloppy thinking, hollow phrases,
clichés,
applause seeking, and so on more than when one is speaking oneself.
Plutarch recommended the study of poetry as a search for truth
with the critical awareness of what is false from fables that
may be taken allegorically.
He suggested that unjustifiable writings
be corrected or balanced by other passages.
He believed poetry
can prepare students for philosophy.
Plutarch wrote that the virtues of men and women are the same,
and he gave numerous
examples of courageous women from various
cities and heroic individual actions by women.
In a long essay
"On the Malice of Herodotus" he criticized the pioneer
historian
from an ethical point of view for characterizing people
in abusive ways.
Plutarch wrote in defense of Boeotians, Corinthians,
and other Greeks.
Plutarch gave many examples in his essay "How to Distinguish
a Flatterer from a Friend."
Self-love can open the domain
of friendship to the flatterer.
Truth and knowing oneself are
the best defenses against the deception of flattery.
Flatterers
imitate the pleasant and attractive aspects of friendship
by putting
on a cheerful face and never being negative.
They may even imitate
frankness by criticizing activities and ways of life
he or she
sees the subject disliking while praising extravagantly what the
other likes.
The flatterer has no constancy nor authentic likes
and dislikes but acts like a vanity mirror.
Like an understudy,
the flatterer, while imitating the other person,
keeps inferior
and defective in everything except what is bad.
A true friend
will not be afraid to upset one when it does good
but should not
let the upset destroy the friendship,
using it like a sharp medicine
to protect the patient.
Plutarch asked if it is not flattery that
diverts tyrants into utterly scandalous behavior.
Flatterers do not defer to virtue or age but rather to wealth
and reputation.
They wait for some emotion they can fatten up,
like a tumor that inflames the mind.
They encourage the angry
to lash out, the spendthrift to buy,
the cowardly to run away,
and the suspicious to be cautious.
A friend is straightforward,
uncomplicated, and sincere;
but the flatterer always conforms
to the other person
in opinions, pleasures, and passions.
For a friend is there as a colleague not a co-rogue,
to consult with not to conspire with,
for support in spreading facts not fictions—
and yes, even to share his adversity not his perversity.6
Plutarch warned against using candor to a friend when many
people are there.
It was said that Pythagoras once reproached
a pupil harshly in front of others,
and the young man hanged himself.
Pythagoras never again told anyone off in the presence of others.
Most disgraceful is to expose a husband where his wife can hear,
a father where his children can see, someone in love before the
beloved,
or a teacher in front of the pupils.
Such people may
completely forget themselves when censured before those
whose
good opinion they want to maintain.
In "On Being Aware of Moral Progress" Plutarch noted
that frenzied and agitated dreams
can tell us that our mind does
not yet have its own regulator but is still being formed
by opinions
and rules which are unraveled by the emotions.
Detachment is an
exalted and divine state,
and progress toward it is a taming of
the emotions.
Thus it is important for us to examine our emotions
and assess their differences.
If our desires and fears and rages
are less intense than they were before
because we are using reason
to decrease their violence so that our sense of disgrace
is sharper
than our fear, we prefer to emulate rather than envy;
we value
a good reputation more than money; our actions are slow rather
than hasty;
and we are astounded rather than contemptuous of arguments;
then we may assume progress in that the vices now engage more
respectable emotions.
In "How to Profit by One's Enemies" Plutarch observed
that as states must have
good order and government to counter
border warfare so individuals may be
stimulated by enmities to
practice soberness and guard against bad habits.
He suggested
you could distress the person who hates you,
not by reviling but
by showing self-control, being truthful,
and treating everyone
with kindness and justice.
If you do criticize, make sure you
are not guilty of those things,
because nothing is more disgraceful
than that hypocrisy.
He agreed with Antisthenes that if one is
not admonished by true friends,
one needs ardent enemies to turn
one from error.
Insults and abusive attacks can also help one
to discipline the temper and learn patience.
Plutarch warned against
residues of envy, hatred, jealousy, and vindictiveness that
may
be introduced by enmity, just as laws made during war under bad
conditions
may injure people if they are not abolished after the
emergency.
Plutarch in "On Having Many Friends" described the
coin of friendship as
goodwill and graciousness combined with
virtue, and he considered this rare.
True friendship is good because
of virtue, pleasant because of intimacy,
and necessary because
of usefulness.
He found it as difficult to put aside an unsatisfactory
friend
as it is to get rid of harmful food once it has been eaten.
He recommended not accepting friendship from acquaintances too
readily
but to seek after those who are worthy.
Too many friends
causes separation as it does not allow blending of goodwill in
intimacy,
because one's attention is constantly being transferred
to another.
Friendship seeks intimacy with a steady character,
which is hard to find.
Plutarch gave advice about keeping well, suggesting that good
and constant habits will make life pleasant.
He warned against
excess in eating and drinking and against all self-indulgence.
Increase in civil discord and the rule of despots
may be blamed
on luxury and extravagance.
He recommended appropriate exercise
for scholars and deep massage with oil.
He concluded that health
provides the best opportunity
for obtaining and using virtue in
words and action.
He also advised cooperation and intellectual
companionship to brides and grooms.
Plutarch's concept translated "Superstition" literally
means "dread of deities,"
and he described it as an
emotional idea that
produces fear of gods causing pain and injury.
Even an unmoved atheist is better off than the perverted mind
of the superstitious person.
Plutarch believed atheism is based
on erroneous reasoning,
but superstition is an emotion based on
erroneous reasoning.
By denying all spirits atheism can look for
other causes of events.
Superstitious fear renders one impotent
and helpless, because it can relate
to anything as "afflictions
of God" or "attacks by an evil spirit."
Atheism
does not cause superstition, but superstitious beliefs can lead
to atheism.
Plutarch concluded that true religion lies in between
the extremes of superstitious belief and hardened atheism.
Like Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca, Plutarch also wrote
on anger.
In his "On the Avoidance of Anger" Sulla asks
Fundanus to explain how
he has been able to tame his temper so
that it is now moderate and obedient to reason.
Fundanus admits
that anger makes the inside full of chaos, smoke, and noise
so
that the mind cannot see or hear what is beneficial.
When rational
discrimination immediately bears down on an outburst,
it not only
remedies the current situation but also strengthens
the mind's
detachment and energy for the future.
He recommends not listening
to or obeying a tyrannical temper
by keeping quiet as if the angry
emotion were a disease.
Anger arises from mental pain and suffering
because of weakness;
he disagrees with the notion that it is the
mind's tendons.
Just as Philip destroyed Olynthus and could not
rebuild it,
anger too is good at demolition and ruination; but
construction, preservation, mercy,
and patience require gentleness,
forgiveness, and the moderating of passion.
Fundanus also disagreed
with the poet who wrote
that respect follows fear, arguing that
it is the reverse.
Respect engenders the fear that leads to self-restraint,
while flogging does not instill remorse but the intention
to get
away with misdeeds in the future.
Plutarch has Fundanus describe how he tries to quell his anger
in punishing
by allowing the defendants the right to justify themselves
and by listening to them.
This gives time to check the emotion
and let it dissolve
while rationality finds a fitting punishment.
He observed that anger is often triggered by the belief
that one
has been slighted and ignored.
Thus angry feelings are increased
by self-regard and discontent,
usually accompanied by a luxurious
and enervating way of life.
Anger can ruin marriage and friendship.
When anger is absent, even drunkenness can be tolerated,
though
drinking and anger can produce cruelty and madness.
In our lighter
moments anger imposes enmity on affability, disputing on debate,
arrogance on authority, envy on success, and hostility on failure.
Anger even accepts harm to oneself while destroying another,
as
its most disagreeable element is the desire to hurt someone else.
Turning our thoughts inward to see how we are like that too
may
change righteous indignation to tolerance.
Similarly in writing "On Contentment" Plutarch asked
why be so quick
to spot someone else's weakness while overlooking
your own?
Also people may obsessively contemplate their own faults
while failing to apply one's mind to good things.
Instead of being
upset about what one has lost,
why not feel happy about what one
has kept?
He warned against the usual practice of envying those
who are better off,
as prisoners envy the freed, the freed those
who have always been free;
these envy citizens, who envy the rich,
who envy provincial commanders,
who envy kings, who envy the gods.
Clearly contentment is not based on one's position in society.
Plutarch suggested treating the mind like a painting, giving prominence
to bright and vivid colors while allowing the gloomy hues
to fade
into the obscurity of the background.
Plutarch took the Stoic position that fortune may deprive us
of wealth and relationships;
but it cannot make a good person
bad, cowardly, mean-spirited, petty, or spiteful,
and it cannot
deprive us of a helpful attitude toward life.
The wise calm most
physical matters because their self-control,
responsible regimen,
and moderate exercise tend to prevent illness.
Plutarch reminded
us that it is always in our power not to lie, mislead, steal,
or intrigue.
These are important to happiness because while reason
eradicates other discomforts,
reason itself may create remorse
when the conscience is pricked.
Good deeds leave behind in the
intelligent person's mind a pleasant and fresh impression.
Plutarch
believed the world is a sacred temple suitable for divinity,
and
life is an initiation into its natural wonders.
Thus he suggested
we celebrate them everyday in joy and contentment.
Plutarch explained why some become preoccupied with
other people's
lives in "On Being a Busybody."
Yet there are some who cannot bear to face their own lives,
regarding these as a most unlovely spectacle,
or to reflect and revolve upon themselves,
like a light, the power of reason,
but their souls, being full of all manner of vices,
shuddering and frightened at what is within,
leap outwards and prowl about other people’s concerns
and there batten and make fat their own malice.7
He explained the origin of the word "sycophant" as
one who informed against
those
exporting prohibited figs, and
he warned busybodies that they may be similarly hated.
In "On the Love of Wealth" Plutarch noted that this
desire is not satiated
like hunger and thirst; for neither gold
nor silver relieves the craving for money,
and the greed for gain
is not stopped by acquiring new gains.
A person absorbed in getting
money, lamenting expenditures, and doing base
and painful things
to acquire more money even though one has houses, land, herds,
slaves, and much clothing has the trouble Plutarch called "mental
poverty."
Avarice is an oppressive and vexing mistress, because
it compels us to make money
but forbids us spending it; it arouses
the desire but cheats us of the pleasure.
He concluded that mastery
of self is needed
whether one dines alone or gives a sumptuous
feast.
In his essay "On the Slowness of the Gods to Punish"
Plutarch noted that a horse
is best trained by immediately punishing
its mistakes;
but if there is a long delay, it does no good.
Yet
divine retribution seems to take a long time and may even affect
future generations.
Yet on the human side it can be argued that
some delay in punishing
can teach us to avoid anger so that reprimanding
may be more rational.
Perhaps God is taking a careful look at
sick minds to see if they are inclined to remorse.
It can be argued
that every sinner's mind ponders how to get rid of the memory
of its crimes in order to cleanse its conscience and make a fresh
start in life.
Plutarch closed this essay with a fabulous tale
about Thespesius,
who went out of his body and observed souls
in the other world.
Those who had spent their lives in undetected
iniquity, covering themselves
with the semblance of goodness,
were harassed and tormented
until they turned themselves inside
out.
The last thing he saw was souls being prepared for rebirth.
Plutarch gave a very dramatic account of the patriotic plot
that
liberated Thebes from Spartan rule in December 379 BC
in
a fascinating dialog called "On the Daimonion of Socrates."
The conspirators meet at the house of Simmias, a friend of Socrates,
and discuss the Spartan excavation of the Alcmena tomb.
An ancient
script was deciphered by Egyptian priests as a message that God
advises
the Greeks to stop fighting but compete in philosophy
and to give up their weapons
and settle their disputes by means
of the Muses and discussion.
Pythagorean ideas are criticized
by Galaxidorus, who
denounces religious mysticism in favor of
the rationalism of Socrates.
Yet Theocritus replies that Socrates
had a daimonion
(which might be translated as a "guardian
angel").
Then the Theban hero Epaminondas arrives with the
Pythagorean Theanor.
The latter wants to repay the former for
attending to the funeral of the Pythagorean Lysis;
but Epaminondas
refuses the gift because of his philosophic discipline of poverty.
Meanwhile Hipposthenidas tries to call off the plot because
he fears it is discovered;
but his messenger is delayed and called
back.
Simmias admires Socrates for being able to receive guidance
from the angel directly in waking consciousness.
Simmias relates
the story of Timarchus, whose soul left his body and traveled
to the other world, where he observed the process of reincarnation.
Disobedient souls are restrained by a kind of bridle, which people
experience as remorse for sins or lawless and indulgent pleasures.
Finally the Thebans carry out their plan to make the Spartans
drunk
so that they can kill them and recover their city.
When Plutarch wrote to his wife to console her for the death
of their infant daughter,
they already had four sons and grandchildren.
He commended her for not indulging in excessive grief,
which can
be an enemy of affection and love and can lead to
an insatiable
desire to grieve if it becomes a habit.
Mental distress subsides
when it is dispersed in physical calm.
He reminded her that since
the soul cannot be destroyed, life in the physical body
could
be compared to the behavior of caged birds.
In "On the Use
of Reason by 'Irrational' Animals" Plutarch had
one of the
transformed pigs in the Odyssey debate with Odysseus
whether
humans or animals had more virtue and contentment.
In his essay "Philosophers and Men in Power" Plutarch
argued that philosophers
by associating with rulers can make them
more just, moderate, and eager to do good.
They will be a public
blessing by dispensing justice
and making the orderly and good
prosper.
Writing "To an Uneducated Ruler" he asked who
shall rule the ruler
and gave Pindar's answer, the law, which
he interpreted as reason found within.
The ruler should be more
afraid of doing evil than of suffering it,
because the former
causes the latter.
The danger is that those who can do what they
wish will do what they should not.
Power gives wickedness speed,
making anger murder,
erotic love adultery, and coveting confiscation.
Suspicion may cause those slandered to be executed.
Power quickly
reveals the corruption in souls, like water poured into a leaky
container immediately spills out as acts of desire, anger, falsehood,
and bad taste.
Plutarch shared his "Precepts of Statecraft."
He
began by recommending policy be based on
judgment and reason,
not impulse or contentiousness.
Politicians must apply themselves
to understanding the character of the citizens,
and after gaining
their confidence they can try to train their character gently
toward what is better by treating them mildly.
Being on the public
stage, one must first educate and order one's own character,
for
it is difficult to change the multitude.
Virtue though is not
the only important thing; oratory is its co-worker.
One's speech
should be unaffected, high-minded, frank,
foreseeing, and thoughtfully
concerned for others.
One should be careful about assisting friends
only after the main public interests are safe
and of course should
not do so in corrupt ways.
Plutarch believed that refusing to
make peace with a personal enemy
for things we ought to give up
even for a friend is uncivilized and beastly.
Politicians in assembly should not all express the same opinion
as if by a previous agreement but should express different opinions
and draw people along by persuasion to the public advantage.
Plutarch
also knew the value of having friends in high places,
and he stated
that the Romans are eager to promote the political interests of
their friends.
Ordinary citizens may be soothed by granting them
equality,
and the powerful can be given concessions within the
bounds of local government,
solving problems as though they were
diseases in the body politic.
One may conciliate superiors, honor
equals, and
add prestige to the inferior, while being friendly
to all.
One should compete with every official in zeal,
forethought
for the common good, and wisdom.
He urged us to moderate our ambition,
because honor is within ourselves.
The main thing is to instill
concord and friendship
while removing strife, discord, and enmity.
Private troubles can become public ones and small troubles great
ones
if they are overlooked and do not receive counsel and treatment
from the beginning.
Thus the politician should attend to offenses,
like diseases in a person that might
spread quickly if one does
not take hold of them, treat them, and cure them.
Plutarch's two short essays on "The Eating of Flesh"
argued against that practice.
Meat is usually unnecessary now
that food is more plentiful than in primitive times.
Humans are
not naturally carnivorous and lack the
appropriate teeth, claws,
and stomach to digest flesh.
Humans don't eat lions and wolves
that are killed in self-defense
but tame animals that harm no
one.
He believed that meat, like wine, may strengthen the body;
but they weaken the soul, especially when consumed to satiety.
He wrote, "We shall eat flesh, but from hunger, not as a
luxury.
We shall kill an animal, but in pity and sorrow, not degrading
or torturing it,
which is the current practice in many cases."8
The killing of animals has aroused violent instincts
and led to
wars and the murder of humans.
Another argument against the practice
is the migration of souls from body to body.
Plutarch also wrote extensively on the religion of Isis and
Osiris,
oracles such as the one at Delphi, and the various philosophical
schools.
He noted that the Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus
wrote about government,
but none of them were involved in political,
diplomatic, or military activities.
He found numerous inconsistencies
in the writings of Chrysippus.
He criticized the hedonists in
the long essay
"That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life
Impossible."
In addition to his biographical contributions
and as a Platonist philosopher and teacher,
Plutarch wrote much
to apply ethical values to various aspects of life
in his synthesis
of classical philosophy and religion.
Epictetus was born to a slave woman in the city of Hierapolis
in Phrygia about 50 CE;
his name means "newly acquired."
His master Epaphroditus was Nero's secretary and allowed him to
study
with the prominent Stoic teacher Musonius Rufus in Rome.
Origen quoted an account by Celsus describing how his master twisted
his leg.
Epictetus smiled and informed him it would break; after
it broke,
he merely reminded his master that he had told him it
would.
He was lame for the rest of his life.
Epictetus gained
his freedom and began teaching philosophy some time
before Domitian
banished philosophers from Rome and Italy in 89.
Then Epictetus
went to Nicopolis, a town in Epirus
founded by Augustus to celebrate
his victory at Actium.
There he taught while living simply in
a house with a mat, a pallet,
and an earthenware lamp, which replaced
the iron one that was stolen.
In his old age when friends of his
were going to expose their baby,
Epictetus married in order to
bring up the child.
He emulated Socrates and did not write anything;
but his pupil Flavius Arrianus (the historian Arrian) published
his notes
in eight books of Discourses, the first four
of which survive,
and a compendium Handbook (Encheiridion).
Epictetus probably died late in the reign of Hadrian which ended
in 138.
Epictetus focused on the rational faculty, which is the only
faculty we have received
that examines itself and all other faculties.
It is best and supreme over all and is the only thing
which the
gods have put in our power.
All other things are not under our
power.
Thus we must make the best use we can of what is within
our power
while using the rest according to nature as it pleases
God.
I must die, and I may have to be put in chains or go into
exile;
but Epictetus questioned whether I must lament.
No one
can hinder me from smiling and being cheerful and content.
You
may fetter my leg, he said, but not even Zeus can overpower my
will.
In deciding what to do, each person knowing oneself must
decide
how much one is worth and at what price one should sell
oneself;
for all sell themselves at various prices.
We have a body in common with the animals and intelligence
in common with the gods.
Many incline toward the miserable and
mortal kinship, a few to what is divine and happy.
Everyone uses
things according to their opinions;
the few formed for fidelity
and modesty have no ignoble thoughts about themselves.
Yet most
neglect what is better and attach themselves to things related
to their wretched flesh, like treacherous wolves, lions, and foxes.
Virtue produces tranquility.
The work of improvement enables one
to achieve what one desires
and not fall into that which one would
avoid.
Epictetus praised providence based on seeing and gratitude.
God has made humans spectators of God and its works,
yet not only
spectators but interpreters as well.
God has given us the ability
to bear everything that happens
without being depressed or broken.
Epictetus aimed to reveal powers for greatness and courage,
while
expecting others to show fault-finding and accusations.
Instead of identifying as an Athenian or Corinthian, Epictetus
encouraged people
to think of themselves as citizens of the world.
In observing the intelligent administration of the world one realizes
the greatest
and most comprehensive community is of people and
God.
By having communion with God one may not only call oneself
a cosmopolitan but also a son of God.
With this divine kinship
why should we grieve or flatter or envy?
A person is not made
miserable through the means of another.
We are only responsible
for what is in our power, the proper use of appearances.
Why then
draw on ourselves things for which
we are not responsible and
so give trouble to ourselves?
When someone asked Epictetus to
persuade his brother to stop being angry with him,
he pointed
out that philosophy does not secure external things.
The art of
living is each person's life.
His brother's anger is external
to him; but if he would send his brother,
Epictetus would talk
to him about it.
He asked why we are angry with many,
and one
might say because they are thieves and robbers.
This means they
are mistaken about good and evil.
Then should we be angry with
them or pity them?
Show them their error, and they may desist
from their errors.
Epictetus defined education as learning how to adapt intelligence
to particular things
according to nature, then to distinguish
what things are in our power.
In our power are will and all acts
depending on will.
Things not in our power are the body, possessions,
relatives, country,
and all with whom we live in society.
Thus
we should transfer the concept of the good to what is within our
power.
To look after my own interest may lead to taking the land
of a neighbor,
which is the origin of wars, civil commotion, tyrannies,
and conspiracies.
It is circumstances which reveal what people
are.
Therefore when a difficulty falls on you, remember that God
is training you.
Keep by all means what is your own, and do not
desire what belongs to others.
Fidelity and virtuous shame are
yours.
Who can take them from you?
Who will hinder you using them?
But when you act by seeking what is not your own, you lose what
is your own.
The law of life is to act according to nature.
We
should realize that consequences will not escape us.
Nothing else can conquer will except will itself,
and opinion
conquers itself and is not conquered by another.
Since the law
of nature is that the superior overpowers the inferior,
why not
use the superior principles?
Epictetus admitted that the man who
stole his lamp was superior in wakefulness;
but he bought the
lamp at the price of becoming a thief.
Epictetus explained that
caution should be used in things
that are dependent on the will,
but we may employ confidence in those things not within our power.
Yet many do the reverse and attempt to avoid what is not within
their power,
resulting in fear and being disturbed.
We can be
confident about death, because it is inevitable;
but we can be
cautious about the fear of death since that is within our power.
Many think that only the free should be educated;
but philosophers
believe that only the educated are free.
God does not allow those
not educated to be free.
No one in a state of fear or sorrow or
perturbation is free;
but the one who is free of those is delivered
from servitude.
If you run after externals, you must ramble up
and down in obedience
to the will of your master, who is the one
who has power over
the things you seek to gain or avoid.
Epictetus
argued that divination is useless,
because it does not explain
anything about good or evil.
When one known for adultery came to him, Epictetus noted that
laying aside fidelity to make designs on a neighbor's wife
destroys
a person of fidelity, modesty, and sanctity.
One is also overthrowing
neighborhood, friendship, and community,
for who will trust that
person?
Modest actions preserve the modest person; immodest actions
destroy that.
The same is true with fidelity.
Shamelessness strengthens
the shameless person, faithlessness the faithless,
abusive words
the abusive person, anger the person with an angry temper,
and
unequal giving and receiving makes the avaricious even more so.
This is why philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with
learning only,
but they urge us to add study and practice.
For
we often have long been accustomed to doing contrary things.
Just
as the adulterer loses modesty and temperance,
so the angry person
loses temper, and the coward fortitude.
No one is bad without
suffering some loss and damage;
though if you look at money only,
they may gain in that.
Epictetus asked why he should respond to
an unjust act with an unjust act
since that would be hurting himself
because the other had hurt himself.
Philosophers weigh and test rules of behavior by examining
and confirming them;
then when they are known, the wise and good
use them.
Epictetus suggested that the way to cast away sadness,
fear, desire, envy, malevolence,
avarice, effeminacy, and intemperance
is by looking only to God
with your affection and consecrating
yourself to divine commands.
Any other way compels one to be overcome
by stronger things,
and then one will never be able to find tranquility.
In struggling against appearances he observed that
the affections
of the soul easily become habits.
So being angry feeds the fire
of that habit.
Being overcome by sexual intercourse increases
incontinence.
Corresponding acts strengthen those habits.
If you
wish not to be angry, count the days on which you have not been
angry.
The habit will weaken as you experience more peaceful days;
when you reach thirty days or more, the habit may be completely
destroyed.
Epictetus commended himself for abstaining when a woman
stripped
and lay down next to him and even tempted him with fondling.
He exhorted us to be willing to appear beautiful to God
in purity
with our own pure self and God.
In regard to friendship Epictetus believed that only those
who
understand the good can also know how to love.
How can those
unable to distinguish good from bad possess the power to love?
Thus true loving is only in the power of the wise.
Everyone is
attached to their own interest,
for wherever the "I"
and "Mine" are placed, the animal inclines.
If it is
in the flesh, then that is the ruling power;
if in the will, then
it is there; and if in externals, it is there.
Only when I am
where my will is, may I be a friend as I should be;
for then my
interest will be to maintain fidelity,
modesty, patience, abstinence,
and cooperation.
If I separate myself from honesty, Epictetus
concluded, then the doctrine of Epicurus,
that honesty is only
what opinion holds, becomes strong.
Can there be friendship without
honest communication?
Give thanks to God for things like wine and oil that you receive,
but remember that God gives you something better, the ability
to use them,
prove them, and estimate the value of each.
Eyes
see, but whether we should look upon the wife of someone else
and in what manner is decided by the will.
Whether we believe
what is said or not and whether we are moved by it or not
are
also in the faculty of the will.
The will makes use of everything
else and can even destroy the whole person.
Can anything be stronger
than this?
Why then are the things subject to restraint often
stronger than what is not?
Those who do not know who they are
nor for what purpose they exist,
what the world is, with whom
they are associated, what things are good and bad,
beautiful and
ugly, who do not understand discourse nor demonstration
nor what
is true or false and cannot distinguish them,
will neither desire
according to nature nor turn away nor move upward
nor intend nor
assent nor dissent nor suspend judgment.
Such people go around
blind thinking they are somebody when they are nobody.
Every error
is a contradiction, because those who err do not wish to do so;
but they do not do what they wish to do.
Thieves seek their own
interest, but do they achieve it?
Show the rational faculty a
contradiction, and it will withdraw from it.
If you do not show
it, blame yourself instead of the one not persuaded.
Just as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the true,
dissent from the false,
and withhold judgment from what is uncertain,
so it is its nature to move toward the good,
turn away from the
evil, and feel neutral toward what is neither good nor evil.
Yet
we often make judgments about things that lie outside
the province
of moral purpose and so weep and sigh.
Misfortune, strife, disagreement,
fault-finding, accusing, and impiety are all such judgments.
Epictetus
recommended that the arrogant practice submission
when you are
reviled and not being disturbed when you are insulted.
Then you
will make progress so that even if someone hits you, you will
not react.
Neighbors may be bad for themselves; but for me they
can be good,
because they exercise my good disposition and fair-mindedness.
Epictetus called this the "magic wand of Hermes,"
which
turns what it touches into gold.
Bring whatever you will, and
I will turn it into a good.
Disease, death, poverty, reviling,
danger to one's life in court -
all these become helpful when
treated as challenges to the good will.
Let not someone else acting contrary to nature become an evil
for you;
for you are born not to be humiliated nor to suffer misfortune
but to share good fortune.
God made all humanity to be happy and
serene, giving us resources,
some our own and others not our own.
What is subject to hindrance, deprivation, and compulsion are
not our own;
but those which cannot be hindered are our own.
God
gives us the ability to distinguish the true nature of the good
and evil.
Epictetus recommended we become affectionate
as a person
of noble spirit who is fortunate;
for it is against nature to
be abject or broken in spirit or depend on something
other than
yourself or to blame either God or other people.
Yet in loving
others remember they are mortal, as generals riding in triumph
are reminded by one standing behind.
They are not one of your
possessions but have been given to you temporarily
like figs or
clusters of grapes in certain seasons.
To want such fruit in the
winter is foolish.
The longest chapter in the Discourses of Epictetus is
on freedom.
The free live according to their will and are not
subject
to compulsion nor hindrance nor force.
Their choices are
unhampered; they attain their desires;
and their aversions do
not fall into what they would avoid.
Epictetus asked who wishes
to live in error, deceived,
impetuous, unjust, unrestrained, peevish,
or abject?
The answer is no one.
Thus no bad person lives according
to their will, and no bad person is free.
For no one wishes to
live in grief, fear, envy, pity,
desiring things and failing to
get them, avoiding things and falling into them.
Epictetus pointed
out that even the friend of Caesar is not relieved
of hindrance
or compulsion nor does that one live securely or serenely.
Whoever
possesses the science of how to live cannot help but be a master.
True human nature is not to bite or kick or throw into prison
or behead,
but to do good, work together, and pray for the success
of others.
Therefore one is doing badly when one acts unfeelingly.
Epictetus cited Socrates and Diogenes as the greatest exemplars
of freedom.
He concluded that freedom is not satisfying what you
desire
but is gained by destroying your desires.
He suggested
keeping vigils to acquire judgment that will free you,
and he
recommended devoting yourself to a philosopher instead of to a
rich old man.
Epictetus warned against continuing to associate too much
with
those descending to lower levels, or you will ruin yourself.
Remember
that nothing is done without paying for it and that
one will not
remain the same person if one does not do the same things.
Choose,
therefore, what you prefer.
He asked why you blame the one who
gives you all
when something is withdrawn from you.
When you have
lost some external thing,
ask yourself what you have acquired
in its place.
If this is more valuable, do not say you have suffered
a loss but made an exchange.
By paying attention to your sense
impressions and watching over them
you are guarding self-respect,
fidelity, and mental constancy
undisturbed by passion, pain, fear,
or confusion.
In this way one may be free and a friend of God.
Regardless of what the external object may be,
the value you put
on it makes you subservient to someone else.
Epictetus emphasized
self-improvement.
If you see any of the things
that you have learned and studied thoroughly
coming to fruition for you in action,
rejoice in these things.
If you have put away or reduced
a malignant disposition and reviling or impertinence
or foul language or recklessness or negligence;
if you are not moved by the things that once moved you,
or at least not to the same degree,
then you can keep festival day after day;
today because you behaved well in this action,
tomorrow because you behaved well in another.
How much greater cause for thanksgiving is this
than a consulship or a governorship?
These things come to you
from your own self and from the gods.
Remember who the Giver is,
and to whom He gives, and for what end.
If you are brought up in reasonings such as these,
can you any longer raise the questions
where you are going to be happy,
and where you please God?9
The fine and good do not contend with anyone, nor do they,
as far as they have power, allow others to contend.
Epictetus
urged people to announce that they are
at peace with all people,
no matter what they do.
He even suggested being amused at those
who think they are hurting you.
He pointed out that the opinions
of others are in the class of things
outside one's sphere of moral
purpose and beyond one's control.
So if you are disturbed by the
opinions of others, do you still fancy that
you have been persuaded
as to what things are good and evil?
Epictetus found his true
emancipation in God by knowing divine commands.
No one could make
a slave of him although they might master his body or property.
Their power still did not extend beyond those things to him.
He
chose to wish what takes place; for he regarded God's will as
better than his will.
He attached himself to God as a servant
and follower,
making his choice and desire and will one with God's.
He was not frightened by threats made against his body;
for he
knew that he was not flesh, bones, and muscles but that which
employs them,
that which governs the impressions of the senses
and understands them.
Epictetus taught,
You have but to will a thing, and it has happened;
the reform has been made;
as, on the other hand,
you have but to drop into a doze and all is lost.
For it is within you that both destruction and deliverance lie.
But what good do I get after all that?
And what greater good than this are you looking for?
Instead of shameless, you will be self-respecting;
instead of faithless, faithful;
instead of dissolute, self-controlled.
If you are looking for anything else greater than these things,
go ahead and do what you are doing;
not even a god can any longer save you.10
There is no activity in life to which attention does not extend.
Is not attention always better than inattention?
Epictetus suggested
paying attention to general principles,
that no one is master
of another's moral principles.
Thus no one has the power to procure
good for me nor to involve me in evil,
but I alone have authority
over myself in these.
When these are secure, there is no excuse
for being disturbed about external things.
I have but one whom
I must please and obey; that is God, and after God, myself.
God
commends me to myself and subjects me alone to my moral purpose,
giving me standards for its correct use.
Epictetus hoped that
death would find him occupied with these things
so that he could
say to God that the faculties he received enabled him
to understand
God's governance and to follow it, that he did not dishonor God,
that he dealt with his senses and his preconceptions without blaming
God,
that he was not discontented with what happened nor did he
wish it otherwise,
that he did not violate his relationships with
others,
and that he was grateful for what God gave him.
The Encheiridion or Handbook of Epictetus summarizes
many of his teachings and includes more preaching.
He noted that
our duties are generally measured by our social relationships
to a father or brother or neighbor or citizen or a commanding
officer.
Even if they are bad or wrong you, you can still maintain
your good relation with them.
For no one will harm you without
your consent, and
you are only harmed when you think you have
been harmed.
Epictetus contrasted the position and character of
the average,
who never expect benefit or harm from themselves
but from those outside,
with the philosopher, who expects every
benefit or harm to come from oneself.
He summarized the signs
of those making progress as follows:
They blame no one, praise no one,
fault no one, accuse no one,
say nothing about themselves
as though being someone or knowing something.
If someone praises them,
they laugh to themselves at the one praising;
if blamed, they make no defense.
They go around like the feeble,
taking care about moving any of what is set,
until it has been fixed.
They keep out of themselves every desire;
and they transfer aversion
only to things against nature in our power.
They use unrestrained effort toward everything.
If they seem foolish or unlearned, they do not care.
In a word, as a treacherous enemy they guard themselves.11
Such were the teachings of the man born a slave who found freedom within himself.
1. Dio Cassius, Roman History 62: 18 tr. Earnest Cary.
2. Seneca, On Anger 1:17:7 tr. John W. Basore.
3. Seneca, Letters 2:5 tr. Robin Campbell, p. 49.
4. Ibid., 48:2, p. 96.
5. Dio Chrysostom, 41st Discourse 11-13 tr. H. Lamar Crosby.
6. Plutarch, "How to Distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend"
64C tr. Robin Waterfield.
7. Plutarch, "On Being a Busybody" 516C-D tr. W. C.
Helmbold.
8. Plutarch, "The Eating of Flesh" 996-997 tr. W. C.
Helmbold.
9. Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus 4:4:46-48 tr. W. A.
Oldfather.
10. Ibid. 4:9:16-18 tr. W. A. Oldfather.
11. Arrian, Handbook of Epictetus 48 tr. Sanderson Beck in the Wisdom Bible.
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