Federalists published the Address of Members of the House of Representatives
on the Subject of War as a pamphlet with 20 editions.
They warned that a war of invasion could provoke another invasion.
On 1 July 1812 some inhabitants of Northampton, Massachusetts agreed
on a lengthy Memorial and Remonstrances that were signed
by the Moderator Joseph Lyman and the town clerk.
The US Congress adjourned on July 6 after a long session that passed 143 laws.
People in Deerfield, Massachusetts adopted the Northampton memorial,
and they sent a copy of this to Madison on July 9:
The Memorial and Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of
the Town of Northampton in the County of Hampshire &
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Humbly show
That your Memorialists have received with inexpressible
surprise and pain an Act of Congress declaring War
against Great Britain, and the Proclamation of the
President consequent thereon and earnestly desiring
to consult the best means, under the blessing of Divine
Providence, of abridging the Calamities of War “and of
obtaining a speedy, just, and honorable peace,” your
Memorialists feel it to be a paramount duty of the
citizens of New England to express to your honors,
in respectful terms, their decided disapprobation of the
declaration itself, and the policy, which has induced it.
It can never be concealed in the apprehension
of your Memorialists, that the protection of Commerce
was a leading object of the National Union.
The exercise, therefore, of the protection, which commerce
requires becomes a duty of the government, correspondent
in degree to the magnitude of that object; and every section
of the people not only have a constitutional “right, peaceably
to assemble and to petition government for a redress of
grievances,” but as well by the doctrines advanced in the
memorable declaration of Independence by the immutable
principles of our nature, they have a right, and it is their
duty to require of their Rulers as strict & constant
observance of the Federal compact.
Your Memorialists residing in the interior of
the country, none of them personally engaged
in navigation or Commerce, and are of course
less directly interested, than those of a different
description in the restrictions imposed by foreign
nations or our own government upon Trade.
But the interests of the Merchant are so closely
blended with those of the Mechanic and Husbandman
that any measures hostile to the rights and happiness
of either maintain the same character in relation to all.
And though your Memorialists by reason of
their want of practical knowledge of commercial
subjects may not view them with distinctness in
all their details, yet they may be the better able
on the same account to contemplate the recent
proceedings of Congress without irritation or prejudice.
In this unprecedented state of the world, when
commotion seems to be visiting it in all its parts,
your Memorialists conceive that there should exist
decidedly just causes of War against Great Britain
and a reasonable prospect of obtaining redress by force,
before a measure of such fearful magnitude is resorted to.
Without considering themselves, therefore, as debarred
the exercise of their constitutional privileges in consequence
of the existing state of War your Memorialists would take
the liberty of making such representations as they may
deem relevant to the present subject of inquiry.
In examining the alleged grounds of War against
Great Britain, as they are contained in the message of
the President compared with the report of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, your Memorialists conceive that
Congress could never have considered either the Blockading
order of May 1806, the disavowal of the arrangement with
Mr. Erskine, the secret mission of John Henry, or the
hostility of the Savages on our Frontiers, as distinct causes
of War, but only as tending to fill up the picture of wrongs
committed by Great Britain upon the United States.
But even in this point of view these several supposed
subjects of complaint seem unworthy in the apprehension
of your Memorialists of any very considerable influence.
The order of May 1806, though embracing in some sense
a large portion of the Coast, Rivers, and ports of the
Continent was confined in its operation as a Blockade to a
comparatively small extent of territory except as to vessels
laden with articles contraband of war and enemies property,
which are seizable without a Blockade; and except also as
to vessels trading from one port of her enemy to another;
an exception which Mr. Monroe, our then minister at
London, was led to believe a material concession of Great
Britain on a principal subject of difference between the two
countries and “to be viewed in a very favorable light.”
If then a sufficient force was allotted to render an approach
and entry of the Coast, rivers, and ports in relation to
which the Blockade was strict, manifestly dangerous,
as your Memorialists have been induced to suppose, and
no notice was taken by our government in the arrangement
with Mr. Erskine of any incorrectness in the matter of either
of the exceptions before stated, your memorialists feel
authorized to conclude that the Blockading order of May
1806 cannot now be made with any propriety a subject
of very bitter complaint against Great Britain.
With respect to the other subjects of complaint alluded to,
your Memorialists would remark, that information of a
supposed adjustment of existing differences between the
United States and Great Britain, through the agency of
Mr. Erskine was received in all parts of the Union with
unequivocal marks of approbation; but when it was
understood that the arrangement had been disavowed by
Great Britain on the ground that her minister had exceeded
his powers, the people had too recently witnessed the
proceeding of President Jefferson in relation to the Treaty
concluded between the British Commissioners and Messrs.
Munroe & Pinkney to question her authority, however they
might lament her promptitude to make the disavowal.
And in relation to the mission of Henry and Indian hostilities,
your Memorialists should consider them as subjects
entitled to higher attention, if sufficient evidence existed
of either, to authorize the government even to demand
an explanation of Great Britain; or indeed if Great Britain
had not solemnly disavowed through her Ministers in
Parliament and Mr. Foster here any disposition to excite
against us the hostility of the Savage Tribes on our
frontiers or any attempts to “subvert our Government
or produce a dismemberment of our happy union.”
The grounds of War with Great Britain seem therefore to
be principally two—the impressment of American seamen
into the British service and the British orders in Council.
Unless these grounds furnish sufficient justification of an
appeal to arms, the War is unjust, and the American people
have no reason to expect that its issue will be prosperous.
As to the first alleged cause of War, your Memorialists
feel confident that the occasional or even frequent
impressment of American citizens, while unauthorized
by the British Government, cannot of itself either upon
the ground of injury or disgrace justify the commencement,
at this time of hostilities against Great Britain.
The right claimed by Great Britain of taking her own
subjects, when found on board merchant Vessels upon
the high seas, has been claimed and exercised under
every administration of our government—even during
the administration of our revered and beloved Washington,
who was the Founder of our National honor and the Friend
as he was the Idol of the people; and it cannot be matter
of surprise that in the unexampled warfare in which she
is now engaged, instances of injustice committed upon
our own citizens by the mistake or willful misconduct of
her subordinate officers should frequently occur.
At the same time it ought to be noticed that improvidence
in the issuing of protections by the proper officers of the
American government, as well as the frauds in procuring
them practiced upon those officers by individuals owing
allegiance to Great Britain may not only have led to
unreasonable clamor when British subjects sailing under
the American Flag have been taken by British Vessels of
War but have tended to diminish the security of American
seamen by diminishing the evidence of citizenship, which
such protections would otherwise have naturally furnished.
But were the claim one of recent origin, your Memorialists
could hardly have imagined consistently with their views
of the responsibilities of governments and the peculiar
nature and object of our own, that the United States
could so far forget or misconceive the interesting character
of the present European conflict as to declare War
ostensibly for the protection of commerce and yet in
opposition to the wishes, as your Memorialists believe,
of a vast majority of the people of the Commercial States.
Whether the right claimed by Great Britain of taking
her own seamen or her injurious exercise of it in taking
American citizens be the principal subject of complaint is
immaterial since in the first case the citizens of the
United States would never willingly engage in War in
defense of British subjects, and in the last, the ordinary
courtesy of nations requires our government to believe,
upon the repeated assertion of Great Britain, that she
claims the right of taking, not American, but British seamen;
that she will instantly discharge American citizens, when
wrongfully impressed into her service upon proof of their
citizenship; and that this right of impressment in relation
to British subjects, the existence of her empire, in her
estimation forbids her to relinquish.
And that no doubt may remain as to the sincerity of
Great Britain in these declarations, your Memorialists
would observe that when a treaty was concluded in 1806
between the respective agents of the United States &
Great Britain, a communication was received by the
American from the British Commissioners, whereby
the subject of impressment as declared by Mr. Monroe,
the present Secretary of State, was placed on ground
“both honorable and advantageous.”
From a perusal of the public documents of that year it is
manifest to your Memorialists that an adjustment upon
this subject between the two governments might have
been easily accomplished had such an adjustment been
sought with that spirit of conciliation, which any wrong,
capable of becoming in the view of a Christian people,
a just cause of War must of necessity have required.
With respect to the only remaining cause of War,
the orders in Council, your Memorialists, without
recurring to their defense by Great Britain on the
ground of their retaliating the unjust decrees of her
enemy would respectfully ask, why is Great Britain
marked out as the object of American hostilities,
while France, equally at least obnoxious in her decrees,
whether viewed with relation to their priority in point
of time or to the principles they were designed to
establish, partakes of no part of our resentment?
Has Great Britain in proportion to her means made greater
depredations upon the property, or inflicted more multiplied
indignities upon the persons of our citizens, than France?
Has our intercourse with the latter
been accompanied by more good faith?
Has the correspondence between her Minister
and our accredited agent at Paris evinced less
disrespect of our rights or less contempt of
our Independence and national spirit?
Are the form of her government and the administration
of her Laws more republican in their nature, and thus
more congenial to our republican character?
Is France more the patron of science, more the
friend of rational liberty, more “the Bulwark of
the Protestant religion,” than Great Britain?
Does she more habitually respect the rights and
independence of neighboring states?
the Laws of nature and nations?
the unalterable & obvious principles of truth & justice?
Is the War, in which she is engaged,
more a War of self defense and for existence?
And does the experience of the dismembered though
since consolidated principalities of Europe proclaim
Napoleon Bonaparte more the friend of our race,
than the inhabitants of the Land of our ancestors?
These questions in the solemn judgment of your
Memorialists are pertinent and material; for upon the
ground that France and Great Britain are equally
aggressors and have inflicted injuries upon the United States
to an equal extent, (a supposition, which the mercantile part
of the community would probably decide to be monstrous)
it is important in the selection of our enemy that we select
that nation upon which our wrongs may be
most safely and satisfactorily avenged.
But it is not to be disguised that Great Britain, while seeking
her own happiness, regardless perhaps in any other view
of the present peace or ultimate security of other
governments is in truth engaged in a conflict inexpressibly
interesting in its event to the whole human race; and though
the American people will cherish as their life blood the
institutions and government of their Country, yet should
the day ever arrive when the contest in which they are
now engaged should terminate in the ruin of Great Britain
and the consequent establishment of the Dynasty of the
Bonapartes throughout the civilized world, they would
deprecate it as a day of the wrath of God.
Your memorialists are not ignorant that it has
been urged that France by a repeal of her decrees,
has ceased to violate our neutral rights.
But how is it possible, they would ask, that any matter
of fact can be safely affirmed true, when at least one
half the nation with all the evidence before them
believe it in their consciences to be otherwise?
How happens it that while Great Britain for nearly two years
past has professed to consider the repeal of the French
decrees to be conditional and the condition a condition
precedent, (to wit, either that the United States should first
insist upon the admission by Great Britain of principles
known to be entirely inadmissible, or that the United States
should first cause their rights to be respected by the English)
and has recently expressed her readiness to repeal her
orders in Council, whenever the Repeal of those Decrees,
so far as the United States in their character of a neutral
nation have a right to demand it, should be satisfactorily
proved to her government; how happens it, if the promise
of repeal to Mr. Armstrong were an absolute one and made
in good faith, that France has not furnished the usual
evidence of Repeal, the Decree of repeal itself?
Why this reluctance on the part of the French government
to confirm that repeal by a formal declaration of the fact;
why the repeated annunciation that the Berlin & Milan
Decrees were fundamental Laws of the French Empire;
and why have our Vessels and property to the day of the
declaration of War against Great Britain been seized, sunk,
and destroyed upon the ocean by virtue of those decrees?
But however reluctant France may heretofore have been
to answer the just demands of our Government by an
unequivocal rescinding of her Decrees the Decree of
Repeal will henceforth be gained by asking.
The object of the Decrees of France is now fully answered
and the condition of her promise of repeals complied with;
since in the understanding of the French minister,
the United States are now causing their rights to
be respected by the English.
But were the alleged causes of War against Great Britain
decidedly just, a view of our infant navy, our extensive
coast, our comparatively defenseless seaports and the
unprecedented naval strength of our enemy, would render
it in the opinion of your Memorialists highly inexpedient.
The evils of War are at all times sufficiently manifold
and various, as they respect the property, the habits,
the happiness and the lives of the people to awaken
the fears and animate the prayers of the Patriot;
but when undertaken at such a period as the present
with an exhausted Treasury and Millions of private
wealth exposed to certain capture with little prospect
of obtaining indemnity for past or security against future
wrongs, and at the hazard not only of aiding the Tyrant
of Europe in his subjugation of the continent, but of
being entangled in alliances subversive of the liberties
of our Country, your Memorialists cannot forbear to
lament the measure, as one, destructive in its
consequences of the best interests of the United States.
Under these impressions your Memorialists would
respectfully suggest that the people of New England
can see nothing in the declaration of War tending to
approbation of commerce, but rather the destruction of that
remnant, which the Embargo and Non Intercourse had left.
When President Jefferson in 1807 recommended the
protection of our Ships and Merchandize and Congress
imposed an Embargo, Commercial men lamented the
measure, as unnecessary & ruinous; under the
nonintercourse system, the friends of commerce have
been the principal sufferers; and now during the existence
of a War with Great Britain, commerce, commercial men,
and the commercial parts of our country will endure the
immediate hardships and perils of the contest.
Thus while the protection of commerce was a leading object
of the National Union, it has experienced for years past the
restrictive energies of the National Legislature; and while
struggling for life under Embargo and Non Intercourse,
it was virtually committed to the custody of Great Britain
and her thousand ships of War—and has perished.
With these sentiments your Memorialists cannot forbear
to express their decided disapprobation of a War with
Great Britain and of the whole restrictive system.
The latter is odious to New England, in as much as
it impoverishes her citizens and impairs their virtue
by repressing enterprise and industry.
In the former they cannot discern that justice and those
grounds of confidence, which would enable them to
contend with earnestness and strong hopes of success.
They cannot appeal to the God of Armies
to witness the justice or necessity of the conflict,
trusting in the righteousness of their cause
and the strength of the Almighty.
Your Memorialists would, therefore, in conclusion,
respectfully pray your honors, that such measures may
be adopted by the Government, as shall tend to produce
a speedy, just, and honorable peace; that commerce
may be relieved from that part of its pressing and long
protracted embarrassments, more directly occasioned
by the restrictive measures of Congress; and that the
Government would avoid, as the most execrable evil, that
can ever befall our beloved country, an Alliance as hateful
as it would be fatal with the government of France.1
Despite this criticism the United States was at war
against Great Britain and not against France.
On July 3 similar arguments were submitted to Madison by the people
of Greenfield, Massachusetts and by those in Springfield, Massachusetts.
The inhabitants of Holden, Massachusetts
sent this letter to Madison on July 14:
The memorial of the inhabitants of the Town
of Holden in the State of Massachusetts—
Humbly shows That your petitioners would have
found a very particular pleasure in perceiving the
measures adopted by the general government of
the United States, such as they could cordially approve,
& trust that none would be more ready than they to
cooperate in carrying such measures into effect.
Nothing can be farther from their wish than to impede
the wheels of government, were they bearing on the
nation at large to honor, peace, & happiness.
They desire to think & speak well of the powers
that be in the land so far as truth & reason demand.
But the right of private judgment they hold too dear
to be sacrificed to any consideration whatever, & they
regard it as the right & duty of the freemen of America,
with a manly & decent freedom to express their
disapprobation of measures which they soberly &
solemnly believe are fraught with evil, & may be
followed by consequences, shocking to their feelings,
subversive of their prosperity, & productive of
general misery, & they do now explicitly declare their
disapprobation of a war at this time with Great-Britain.
They will now submit to the candor of those whom
they address the reasons of this declaration.
War is confessedly a very great calamity, &
the charge of cruelty, & the unrighteous
shedding of human blood must rest somewhere
in case of war, & this is a very heavy charge.
We apprehend that those who declare war against any
nation ought to be able in sincerity to appeal to the Great
Arbiter of nations & searcher of human hearts that in such
a declaration they have not been governed by motives of
avarice & ambition—that they have no desire to aggrandize
themselves by unrighteous depredations of the property of
others—that they have felt, & exhibited a pacific disposition,
& spared no reasonable exertion for an honorable
compromise of existing disputes & that they sincerely
deprecate any war but that of self defense.
That the present war was unavoidable
except by the sacrifice of our honor & interest
as a nation, we find no reason to believe.
Let the disposition of the people of
Great Britain be what it may.
They have a mighty host of enemies to combat
& to struggle against all the artifice, & power
of a most formidable, & inveterate foe.
They know that ’tis for their interest as a nation
to be at peace with America, & can have no wish
to add to the mighty pressure of present burdens.
Every motive urges them against a state of hostility
with the United States of America, & they have
come forward with the olive branch to meet us—
have made reparation for the injury done to the
Chesapeake—have declared their readiness to
give up every American Seaman that may have been
pressed aboard their vessels of war, & explicitly declare
the repeal of their obnoxious orders of Council, when it
shall be made to appear that the no less obnoxious
decrees of France are actually & in fact removed.
The British Government have also declared in official
communications that to constitute a blockade, particular
ports must be actually invested & previous warning
given to vessels bound to them not to enter, & have
not British ships of war in many cases proved an
asylum to our merchant vessels from French rapacity?
Taking those & other things that might be mentioned
into consideration we cannot say that we believe a war
with Great Britain is wise, & righteous or necessary
to secure our honor as an independent nation.
We wish we could say that there is apparent in the
measures & movements of our general Government
a noble & magnanimous impartiality respecting the
belligerent nations of Europe, but we dare not,
till further evidence of it shall appear.
Among the evils we dread as a consequent of the present
war is an alliance offensive & defensive with France.
We say not that this is contemplated by any:
But one evil often produces another still more fatal,
& was such an alliance to take place, we should
consider it as a mortal stab to our liberties as a people.
For what stress can we lay on those that have paid
so little regard to a solemn treaty already in existence.
To hope for protection & stable friendship from one that
has committed the most flagrant outrage on every
principle of equity, & devoured like the grave the
freedom of millions would be as absurd as to expect
that fire had lost its power to burn & that we might
safely venture without any call into a flaming furnace.
We feel a willingness to venture life & property to ward
off the attacks of any invading foe, that shall threaten to
desolate our country & wrest from us our rights as
freemen, but wish not to plunge the sword into the
breasts of those that covet to be at peace with us,
though they may have failed of giving all the
demonstration of it which they might or ought.
We have no desire to exculpate anything that
is wrong in the British Government but cannot
say that they are obstinately bent to resist all
overtures for a state of honorable peace.
Whenever we enter the lists with an enemy our request is
to have the Lord of armies on our side—approving the
motives by which we are governed: for we are aware that
the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the
strong, that safety is of the Lord, & we cannot promise
ourselves the aid of an omnipotent arm when engaged in
a war that we are not satisfied is wise & righteous &
necessary to secure our existence & prosperity as a people.
We do therefore express our deep & ardent solicitude
that nothing within the bounds of propriety may be
left unattempted for the restoration of peace &
preventing an increase of public & individual distress.
We believe that many to whom we apply ourselves at this
time coincide with us in the sentiments we have expressed
& ’tis our most fervent desire that the period may soon
arrive when some happy expedient may be discovered
that shall arrest the fatal progress of war—sweep away
the multiplied embarrassments that rest on our Country &
commerce—prevent a dreadful load of taxes & brighten
the countenance of every citizen with Joy, & should this
event take place, may those who shall be active instruments
of producing it have their reward not only in the approbation
of their own consciences & the applause of grateful millions,
but in that blessed state where the guilt & miseries of war
are not known, & true peace reigns forever triumphant.
& your petitioners as in duty bound shall ever
pray in the name & behalf of the Town.2
On 15 July 1812 delegates from towns in Franklin, Hampshire
and Hampden Counties of Massachusetts expressed their concerns
about the war in a long memorial and concluded,
Under these circumstances your Memorialisits earnestly
pray your Excellency, that Commissioners may be
forthwith appointed on the part of the United States
to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain upon just, safe, and honorable terms.3
Many other people in Massachusetts especially and in other
northern states met and wrote such ideas at this time.
On July 9 President James Madison made this Proclamation:
Whereas the Congress of the United States by a joint
Resolution of the two Houses have signified a request, that
a day may be recommended to be observed by the People
of the United States with religious solemnity as a day of
public Humiliation and Prayer: and whereas such a
recommendation will enable the several religious
denominations and societies so disposed to offer at one
and the same time their common vows and adorations to
Almighty God on the solemn occasion produced by the war,
in which he has been pleased to permit the injustice of a
foreign power to involve these United States; I do therefore
recommend the third Thursday in August next as a
convenient day to be so set apart for the devout purposes
of rendering to the Sovereign of the Universe and the
Benefactor of mankind, the public homage due to his holy
attributes; of acknowledging the transgressions which might
justly provoke the manifestations of His divine displeasure;
of seeking His merciful forgiveness, and His assistance in
the great duties of repentance & amendment; and,
especially of offering fervent supplications that in the
present season of calamity and war he would take the
American People under His peculiar care and protection;
that He would guide their public councils, animate their
patriotism, and bestow His blessing on their arms;
that He would inspire all nations with a love of justice
& of concord, and with a reverence for the unerring
precept of our holy religion to do to others as they would
require that others should do to them; and finally that
turning the hearts of our enemies from the violence and
injustice which sway their councils against us, He
would hasten a restoration of the blessings of Peace.4
About July 12 Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin sent Madison this “Agenda:”
1. Organize regularly the encampment
at Albany by marching there all the recruits,
those intended for Niagara excepted.
2. Invite offers of volunteers everywhere,
but not giving orders to march (those intended
for Niagara excepted) until the number in most
places be ascertained, and it be known whether
the changes in England will produce immediate peace.
The inviting offers as aforesaid through letters to
General Dearborn & Pinkney and to several Governors.
Preparatory steps to be taken for the march & supplies
of volunteers so that any part wanted may be ready
within one month after issuing the orders to march.
3. Direct immediately a force to Niagara to take
the British fort there & co-operate with General Hull.
That force to consist of recruits & volunteers
from Kentucky, West Pennsylvania &
West New York & to amount to 3000 men.
The object of these measures is
1. to take without any delay possession
of Canada from Niagara upwards.
2. to prepare for attacking Montreal late in fall or
early in winter with the force consisting of all the regulars
who can be collected, of the troops which shall have
reduced Niagara, and of number of volunteers who,
according to the amount of opposing force, may be wanted.
3. to delay immediate attack on Montreal until trial
has been made of possibility of immediate peace.
4. On return of our frigates, keep them on our coast,
which will but protect our commerce and prevent any
but properly defensive engagements with enemy.
5. Communicate immediately to British ministry
our disposition for peace on following basis.
1. mutual restoration of territory
occupied & public vessels taken.
2. repeal of orders of council & definition
of blockade as agreed heretofore by them.
3. Restoration of seamen on both sides &
abolition of impressments, on condition of
restoration of deserters and non-employment of
subjects of other nation as heretofore agreed proposed.
4. Mutual promise not to occupy Florida
east of Perdido, it being understood that
America may acquire it by conventionArmistice as heretofore mentioned
6. Immediate evacuation of East Florida occupancy
being now altogether illegal & calculated as cause or
pretense for preventing peace (Holland to Joy).
7. Checking unnecessary expense.
This can be done only by Secretary of War & Navy.
It appears for that purpose absolutely necessary that
they should suspend or discontinue whatever is not
actually necessary at this time—regulate themselves
the amount & nature of each expense, leaving no
general discretion to Generals, Quarter Masters,
Commissaries, Agents, &c. to call militia, purchase,
or build without special authority for each such act
from Department—make no advances beyond what
is strictly necessary nor unless accounts of former
ones are rendered—limit most strictly the authority
to draw on them—systematize as soon as possible
every branch of expenditure where it is not yet done—
submit to the President all measures of general
nature requiring considerable expense.
Queries. 1. Effect of revocation of orders
in Council on non-importation.
2. Addit. appn. defense of maritime frontier—
also clause intended to forbid transfers.5
Those in southern states such as Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia,
Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Mississippi Territory usually pledged
their loyalty to fight for the United States Government against the British.
General Winchester did not leave Tennessee to take up his duty until July,
and James Campbell reported this to Attorney General Albert Gallatin on July 18.
William Hull had been governing the Michigan Territory since 1805,
and he volunteered and was appointed a general.
He was ordered to cut a road from Urbana in Ohio 200 miles to Fort Detroit.
He was in command of 2,000 troops when
he learned on July 1 that the war had begun.
On July 9th he received the order from War Secretary Eustis to attack
the British at Fort Malden, and he delayed until they were reinforced.
On July 17 the British without a fight took over Fort Mackinac that
was known
for its fur-trading by the straits of the great lakes Huron, Erie, and Superior.
On July 27 the Federal Republican published an
editorial on “mobocracy” that denounced the violence.
That evening youths gathered at the Hanson house
and taunted the Federalists by throwing rocks.
Men joined them but refused to disperse until the
Federalist fired warning explosives in the air.
The mob led by Dr. Thaddeus Gale came back and pushed through the door.
The Federalist fired, killing Gale and wounding others.
Brigadier John Stricker ordered Major William Barney to summon his cavalry;
but they refused to come to the scene until
two magistrates signed the order at three in the morning.
By six the crowd had grown to about two thousand.
The militia marched to the jail while people threw cobblestones at them.
After dinner the crowd became unruly, and the laborer George Wooleslager
led the mob that broke in and captured Federalists, severely beating
nine of them including Hanson and “Light-Horse” Harry Lee.
Brigadier General James M. Lingan was stabbed and died.
General Hull had led an invasion of Upper Canada on July 12,
though they did not attack Fort Malden.
On July 29 Hull was notified that the few Americans at
Michilimackinac
by Lake Huron had surrendered to the army
of more than a thousand British, Canadians, and Indians.
On August 3 a third riot occurred at the Baltimore post office
where the newspapers were distributed to subscribers.
The city was disturbed for another week, and officials stationed
a guard at the post office and proclaimed a curfew.
A grand jury indicted several of the leaders on several charges,
and only one man was convicted and sentenced to a small fine.
Many Federalists denounced this violence.
Yet riots against those opposing the war also occurred outside of Maryland.
The publicity caused many more people who opposed the war
to subscribe to the Federal Republican.
General William Hull and his officers had
withdrawn their army to Detroit on August 1.
Hull learned from Ohio officers that they could not
guarantee their men would follow orders.
On August 4 Hull sent 200 men to meet 230 militiamen
from Ohio led by Captain Henry Brush.
Hull led an assault on August 6, and two days later he heard that
the British were near and moved his men back to Detroit.
Hull had requested troops from Ohio and Kentucky.
Chief Tecumseh and his warriors trapped the relief convoy and killed many soldiers.
He also captured Hull’s dispatches and sent them to the British at Malden.
Four days later General Hull sent another force of 600 men;
but British troops crossed the River Raisin and attacked them
with Chief Tecumseh who was wounded in the battle.
General Hull eventually surrendered Detroit on August 16.
Secretary of State James Monroe wrote in a letter to Madison on August 4:
We arrived here on Sunday last & had the good fortune to
meet Mr. Hay & our daughter on their way to the springs.
Mrs. Monroe had intended to accompany
them there, but will remain here with the
younger part, being not far from indisposition
& too much fatigued to pursue the journey.
We took the Dumfries route, & breakfasted
at Lansdowne’s, the worst house we ever saw.
The upper route by Fauquier courthouse
is far preferable to this.
I intend to set out back the beginning of the ensuing week.
We hear nothing certain of Commander
Rodgers, & the accounts of the affair at
Baltimore still leave it in much obscurity.
However much to be regretted & censured popular
movements of this kind always are, nothing can be
said in favor of a party organized for the purpose of
its combating the mob, unknown to the law, equally
in defiance of it, and which could not fail, by the excitement
it was sure to produce to bring on the contest.
Mobs however must be prevented, & the
punishment even of such men as the Editors of
that paper must be inflicted by law, not mob movements.
It would do credit to the Executive of Maryland to
reestablish that paper, and the credit would be in
proportion to its past & future excesses.
I fear that if some distinguished effort is not made in favor
of the authority of the law, there is danger of a civil war,
which may undermine our free system of government.6
On August 5 a crowd of 1,500 gathered at Brentwood
in Rockingham County in New Hampshire.
Madison wrote this to Treasury Secretary Gallatin on August 8:
The communications from the British Government
lately received through Baker are of a curious character.
They promise that the Orders in Council would
cease on the 1st of August with a right reserved
to renew them in May next in case the conduct of
France and of the U. S. should require it; and
particularly in case the Non-Importation Act should
not be repealed within 14 days after a notification of
the actual repeal should be made to this Government.
The communication was so informal, that it was not
only not in writing, but not permitted by Baker to be
taken down in his presence by Mr. Graham.
It is not improbable that the vessel was dispatched,
in consequence of the notice from Foster by the May
Packet (referred to in his dispatches lately found on
board the Tulip) that war would be declared, and in
the hope that the expectation of a repeal of the
orders thus authorized would arrest the declaration.
In the meantime they would have an opportunity of learning
the issue in Congress and might govern themselves by it.
Baker professes however to expect another
arrival immediately making a further & more
particular communication on the subject,
and that it will contain the act of repeal.
He states also that the British Authorities at Halifax
with the sanction of Foster are willing to fix a day
in concert with this Government after which all
captures at sea are to be hung up in the Courts for
the final decision of the two Governments: this
arrangement to be accompanied by a suspension of
military operations in Canada, which Foster has advised
the Governor there to propose to the adverse Commander.
It may be inferred from the whole, that the British
Cabinet is in some agitation, and that it is believed
at Halifax that the road to peace cannot be made
too short: while they are careful to effect it by a
bargain as safe & advantageous as possible.
Perhaps it may be a ruse only to exhibit that
side as anxious to stop hostilities and throw
on ours the foreseen rejection of the proposal.
The latest information from Hull
is in the last National Intelligencer.
He finds it necessary to prepare heavy cannon (24s.) and
mortars in order to take Malden without a bloody storm.
He allowed himself two weeks to make the preparation.
A re-enforcement is ordered to him from the Ohio.
He seems to have severed the Indians
from their Allies for the present.
But without a conspicuous success in his Military
progress, there is reason to apprehend an
extensive combination against the Frontiers
of Ohio and all the neighboring Territories.
Should he be able to descend upon Niagara,
and an adequate co-operation be there afforded,
our prospect as to upper Canada may be good enough.
But what is to be done with respect
to the expedition against Montreal?
The enlistments for the regular army fall
short of the most moderate calculation.
The volunteer act is extremely unproductive.
And even the Militia detachments are either
obstructed by the disaffected Governors or
chilled by the federal spirit diffused throughout
the region most convenient to the Theatre.
I see nothing better however than to draw on
this resource as far as the detachments consist of
volunteers who it may be presumed will cross the
line without raising constitutional or legal questions.
An experiment must if possible, be made for cutting
off all British communications with the Indians.
If this cannot be done by occupying Montreal, is it
impossible to do it by some other operation that will put the
communication through the Utiwas River under our control?
The Secretary of State is on a visit to his Farm.
He will be back in the course of this week;
when, I find, I must follow his example.
I am much worn down and feel the approach
of my bilious visitor on tide water.
I have also some very pressing calls for my presence
on my farm. Accept my affectionate respects
James Madison
It is the wish of Baker that his communications
may be regarded as confidential till more
definite and formal ones shall arrive.
If you have an opportunity, obtain from
Jacob Lewis information leading to a use
of the ports of Haiti for our cruisers.
Perhaps he would be a good missionary for that purpose.7
Madison on August 9 wrote in a letter to General Henry Dearborn:
The last of your favors which I have to
acknowledge is that of the 3rd Ult: from Boston.
I am glad to see that you are again at Albany;
where your presence will aid much in doing all
that can be done for the reputation of the campaign.
The lapse of time & the unproductiveness of the laws,
contemplating a regular force and volunteers for an
entire year under federal commissions, compel us
to moderate some of our expectations.
It was much to have been desired that simultaneous
invasions of Canada at several points, particularly in
relation to Malden and Montreal might have secured the
great object of bringing all Upper Canada, & the channels
communicating with the Indians under our Command with
ulterior prospects towards Quebec flattering to our arms.
This systematic operation having been frustrated,
it only remains to pursue the course that will
diminish the disappointment as much as possible.
General Hull, as you will have learned, is preparing a
force for the attack of Malden: And that he may descend
towards Niagara with greater effect and be the more
secure against Indian dangers, a reinforcement of 1500
men is ordered; which will be promptly supplied by the
overflowing zeal of the detached Militia of Ohio & Kentucky.
We hope that your arrangements with Governor Tomkins
will have provided an effective cooperation for subduing
the hostile force opposite ours at Niagara and preparing
the way for taking possession of the Country at the
other extremity of Lake Ontario.
In these events we shall have in our hands not only
all the most valuable parts of the Upper Province:
but the important command of the Lakes.
It appears that General Hull was making an effort to
overpower the British force on Lake Erie; his success
in which will be critically useful in several respects.
In addition to these measures, it is essential,
notwithstanding the advance of the Season
and the difficulties thrown in the way that
the expedition against Montreal should be
forwarded by all the means in our power.
The number of regulars that can be procured for it,
cannot even yet be ascertained; but it is sufficiently
ascertained that an extensive auxiliary force will be
wanted; and it is nearly as certain that this will not be
furnished by the volunteer Act of February unless a sudden
ardor overcoming the objections to it should be inspired
by the vicinity of the object & the previous conquests.
The last resource therefore on which we are to
depend is that portion of the detached & other
Militia which may be within reach, will comply with
the call and voluntarily unite with their officers
in rejecting geographical limits to their patriotism.
To this resource I hope you will turn your full attention
with a view to the immediate steps proper to be taken
for making it supply the deficit of regulars & volunteers;
with respect to the latter of which, as far as they are
within a practicable distance, the number known here
to be in readiness is very inconsiderable.
From the Vermont & New Hampshire Militia,
favorable expectations are indulged, the State
Authorities being well disposed to promote the service.
As to Massachusetts & Connecticut even, notwithstanding
the obstructions created by the Governors, it is not yet
decided that the spirit of some of the detached or
other Corps may not give effect to your requisitions.
Should an adequate force be attainable from the whole or
part of the sources referred to, you will be the best judge
how far a demonstration towards Quebec may be proper in
aid of the measures against Montreal; which if we can take
by means of any sort, we shall find the means of holding.
Should it be found impracticable to take it, this campaign;
will it be possible to occupy any other spot that will cut off
the intercourse with the Indians through the Utiwas River?
You will have noticed the arrival of a
dispatch vessel from the British Government.
Nothing is disclosed from that quarter that ought in
the slightest degree to slacken our military exertions.
The Secretary of State is on a visit to his Farm
where he will leave his family.
On his return, which will take place in a few days,
I propose a like respite.
I find myself much worn down and in need of an antidote
to the accumulating bile of which I am sensible, & which
I have never escaped in August on tide water.8
On 11 August 1812 Madison sent this letter to Joel Barlow in Paris:
(Words that were put into code are italicized.)
As I write on short notice and in cypher,
I must be very brief.
The conduct of the French Government explained
in yours of May 12 on the subject of the decree of
April 1811 will be an everlasting reproach to it.
It is the more shameful as, departing from the
declaration to General Armstrong of which the
enforcement of the nonimportation was the effect
the revoking decree assumes this as the cause
and itself as the effect and thus transversa to
this government the inconsistency of its author.
The decree of April may nevertheless be
used by Great Britain as A pretext for revoking
her orders; not withstanding the contrary
language of castlereagh in parliament.
An authentic though informal communication has
just arrived in a dispatch ship from England
importing that the orders were to be revoked on
the first of August; subjectto renewal if required
by the conduct of France and the United States;
particularly if the nonimportation should not be
forthwith rescinded on the arrival of the act of revocation.
As this pledge was given before the declaration
of war was known it may not be adhered to.
It is not improbable however that it was hurried off
as a chance for preventing an apprehended war;
and that the same dislike to the war may possibly
produce advances for terminating it which if the
terms be admissible will be immediately embraced.
In the event of a pacification with Great Britain
the full tide of indignation with which the public mind
here is boiling will be directed against France if not
obviated by a due reparation of her wrongs.
War will be called for by the nation almost una voce.
Even without a peace with England the further
refusal and prevarications of France on the subject
of redress may be expected to produce measures
of hostility at the ensuing session of Congress.
This result is the more probable as the general
exasperation will coincide with the calculation of not
a few that a double war is the shortest road to peace.
I have been the more disposed to furnish you
with these prospects that you may turn them to
account if possible in your discussions with the
French government and be not unprepared to retire
from them altogether on a sudden notice so to do.
Your return home may possibly be directed even before
the meeting of Congress if the intermediate information
should Continue to present the French conduct in the
provoking light in which it has hitherto appeared.
The Secretary of State is absent; but you will
receive from Mr. Graham the usual supply of
current intelligence to which I refer you.9
The English had actually repealed the Orders in Council
and told the Parliament on June 16, and one week later
the British ended their system of blockades and licenses.
That was two days before the US Congress declared war against Britain,
though the newspapers with the text of the repeal
did not reach Washington until August 13.
Although the war had already started in America,
Madison sent a courier to London to request an armistice.
His demands that the British stop impressments, release American seamen,
pay an indemnity for seized American ships, and end its blockades
of European ports were sent to the British cabinet on August 24,
and five days later they rejected them.
Major General Isaac Brock arrived at Fort Malden
with 300 British reinforcements on August 13,
and Chief Tecumseh persuaded him to attack Detroit.
General Brock let a courier be captured by the Americans with
a report that 5,000 Indians were coming to join Tecumseh.
General Hull had ordered Fort Dearborn at Chicago evacuated.
Terms were arranged.
When the Americans marched out of the fort on August 15,
about 500 Potawatomis led by Blackbird attacked them;
many whites including Captain William Wells were killed.
The next day Brock led 300 British regulars,
400 militia and 30 artillerymen with five cannons.
Chief Tecumseh arrived with 600 warriors.
The British army crossed the river and attacked Detroit.
Hull felt trapped in the Michigan Territory and surrendered
after only seven men had been killed.
Brock and Tecumseh made sure that the prisoners were well treated.
General Brock paroled the 1,600 militiamen from Ohio and interned
the 582 American regulars in prisoner-of-war camps near Quebec City,
and he proclaimed Michigan part of Britain.
Eventually the British released William Hull,
and a court martial convicted him of cowardice.
He was sentenced to be shot, and President Madison pardoned him.
Potawatomi warriors and other natives took over Fort Dearborn and Fort Wayne.
Also on August 15 General Dearborn wrote to President Madison:
I was this day honored with your letter of the 9th inst.
having been placed in a very unpleasant situation I have
endeavored to make the best arrangements for the
ultimate success of our Army, that circumstances permit,
the particular circumstances which have occasioned the
most unfortunate embarrassments were my having no
orders or directions in relation to upper Canada,
(which I had considered as not attached to my command,)
until my last arrival at this place and my being
detained so long at Boston by direction.
If I had been directed to take measures for acting
offensively on Niagara & Kingston with authority such
as I now possess for calling out the Militia, we might
have been prepared to act on those points as early as
General Hull commenced his operation at Detroit; but
unfortunately no explicit orders have been received by
me in relation to upper Canada until it was too late,
even to make an effectual diversion in favor of General
Hull; all that I could do was done without any delay.
If the Troops from the Southward are pushed
on soon, I am persuaded that we may yet be
prepared to act with effect on upper Canada and
on Montreal before the season for acting is passed.
I have requested Governor Snyder to send
two thousand of the Militia of the Northwestern
frontiers of that State to Niagara;
Governor Tompkins will do everything in his power.
Vermont will do well—how many volunteers
we shall procure is uncertain, but there is a
prospect of a considerable number.
The months of August & September will give our new
troops a seasoning while they are training for the field,
and with such exertions as will be made for acquiring
the necessary knowledge of discipline & camp police,
I trust we shall have a body of men capable of effective
service—the deficiency in General officers, & in the
Commissary of purchases Department is felt in every
direction, but we must double our exertions and
endeavor to overcome all obstacles of whatever kind.
The moderate abilities I possess shall be exerted to their
utmost stretch—in general we shall have a respectable
corps of Officers, and by the next Spring we shall have an
efficient Army, but measures must be devised for checking
the outrageous & Treasonable conduct of our Tories.
Their apparent views are open hostility to
the General Government, and I fear there
will be serious & systematic measures taken
for producing a revolution in the Northern States.
I most ardently hope that Congress will take early & strong
measures for putting down those Treasonable proceedings.
I fear you have remained too long at Washington,
permit me Sir to entreat you to take care of your health.10
President Madison on 17 August 1812 wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson:
The seditious opposition in Massachusetts & Connecticut
with the intrigues elsewhere insidiously co-operating with it
have so clogged the wheels of the war that I fear the
campaign will not accomplish the object of it.
With the most united efforts in stimulating volunteers they
would have probably fallen much short of the number
required by the deficiency of regular enlistments.
But under the discouragements substituted and the little
attraction contained in the volunteer act, the two classes
together leave us dependent for every primary operation
on militia, either as volunteers or draughts for six months.
We are nevertheless doing as well as we can in
securing the maritime frontier and in providing
for an effective penetration into Upper Canada.
It would probably have been best if it had been
practicable in time to have concentrated a force
which could have seized on Montreal & then at
one stroke have secured the upper Province and
cut off the sap that nourished Indian hostilities.
But this could not be attempted without
sacrificing the western & northwest Frontier
threated with an inundation of savages under
the influence of the British establishment near Detroit.
Another reason for the expedition of Hull was that the
unanimity and ardor of Kentucky & Ohio provided the
requisite force at once for that service, while it was
too distant from the other points to be assailed.
We just learn but from what cause remains to be known,
that the important fort at Machilimackinac
has fallen into the hands of the Enemy.
If the reinforcement of about 2000 ordered from the Ohio,
and on the way to Hull should not enable him to take
Malden and awe the Savages emboldened by the
British success, his situation will be very ineligible.
It is hoped that he will either be strong enough,
as he has cannon & mortars to reduce that Fort,
or to have a force that will justify him in passing on
towards the other end of Lake Erie and place the British
troops there between him and those embodied under
arrangements of Dearborn & Tomkins at Niagara for the
purpose of occupying the central part of Upper Canada.
In the meantime the preparations against Montreal are
going on and perhaps may furnish a feint towards it,
that may conspire with the other plan.
I find that Kingston at the East End of Lake Ontario
is an object with General Dearborn.
The multiplication of these offensive measures
have grown out of the defensive precautions
for the Frontier of New York.
We have no information from England since the war was
known there or even seriously suspected by the public.
I think it not improbable that the sudden change in
relation to the orders in Council, first in yielding to a
qualified suspension & then a repeal was the effect of
apprehensions in the Cabinet that the deliberations of
Congress would have that issue, and that the Ministry
could not stand against the popular torrent against the
orders in Council, swelled as it would be by the addition of a
war with the U. S. to the pressure of the nonimportation act.
What course will be taken when the declaration here shall
be known is uncertain, both in reference to the American
shipments instituted under the repeal of the Orders and to
the question between vindictive efforts for pushing the war
against us and early advances for terminating it.
A very informal, & as it has turned out erroneous
communication of the intended change in the Orders,
was hurried over evidently with a view to prevent
a declaration of war, if it should arrive in time.
And the communication was accompanied by a proposal
from the local authorities at Halifax sanctioned by Foster
to suspend hostilities both at sea & on land.
The late message of Prevost to Dearborn,
noticed in the newspapers has this for its object.
The insuperable objections to a concurrence
of the Executive in the project are obvious.
Without alluding to others drawn from a limited authority
& from the effect on patriotic ardor, the advantage over
us in captures would be past before it could take effect.
As we do not apprehend invasion by land, and
preparations on each side were to be unrestrained,
nothing could be gained by us, while arrangements &
reinforcements adverse to Hull might be decisive;
and on every supposition the Indians would continue
to be active against our frontiers, the more so in
consequence of the fall of Machilimackinac.
Nothing but triumphant operations on the
Theatre which forms their connection with
the Enemy will control their bloody inroads.11
Delegates of Windham County, Vermont on August 19 wrote,
The War into which we are unhappily plunged
appears to have been declared prematurely, and
without that cool reflection and deliberate calculation
which a subject so momentous required.
We are unprepared: and had our national councils
been less precipitate, we might now, as we believe
have been in readiness amicably to terminate all
controversies between the two nations.
Will not the War and the hostile attitude of the two
Countries create new obstacles to such an adjustment?
And has not the American Government for years past,
been abundantly ready to resent and magnify British
offenses, if not to palliate and secrete those of France?
We anticipate with alarm and awful foreboding the
disastrous consequences of a long & bloody conflict.
In the sad train of national miseries immediately
connected with the present system of offensive War
against the only nation able to injure us materially,
and to withstand the deluge of gallic Conquest and
domination, may be classed—The total destruction of
commercial and profitable business, and public morality,
industry and prosperity—of all our usual sources and
means of Revenue—the reign of military conscriptions
and despotism, and the introduction of grievous exactions.
And your Memorialists apprehend that the renewal or
imposition of heavy land and other direct taxes must
prove impolitic and burdensome, more especially while
those formerly imposed remain yet uncollected in some
parts of the Union; and your Memorialists cannot foresee
any adequate advantages attainable by this War to
counterpoise such afflictive consequences.12
Also on August 19 Captain Isaac Hull on the USS Constitution
sank the Guerriere, killing 15, wounding 78, and capturing 257 men.
General Henry Dearborn was supposed to take Montreal, and he divided his forces.
In the Niagara campaign the Americans had 6,400 troops
facing about 2,300 British and Indians.
In New England many people were opposed to the war.
In August 1812 a Boston town meeting condemned the war,
and Massachusetts Governor Caleb Strong refused
to send the militia to aid the invasion of Canada.
The British sought a truce in Canada and tried to negotiate a permanent peace
while Madison urged Dearborn to march on Montreal.
The British tried to win over New England, and the Royal Navy exempted
that region from its blockade of the coast south to Georgia and of New Orleans.
On August 20 Kentucky’s Governor Charles Scott
made William Henry Harrison a major general in the militia.
Harrison went to Cincinnati to ask Ohio’s governor for more troops,
and then he went to Fort Wayne.
Monroe left for a short vacation in Virginia.
Madison knew that General Winchester was not respected,
and the President appointed Harrison commander of all troops
in the Northwest Territory which would eventually become the
states of
Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota.
On September 6 President Madison wrote in a letter
to Secretary of State James Monroe:
All the accounts printed & manuscript coincide
with the view given by Mr. Graham of the
Western feeling produced by Hull’s disaster.
The great point is to seize it and give it proper direction.
This requires one mind of the right sort within the proper
sphere and armed with the just latitude of authority.
It is impossible to attain, otherwise, a satisfactory
or successful issue to distant expeditions.
Hull has shown himself utterly unqualified for such a trust.
Is Winchester equal to it?
His want of that enthusiastic confidence on the part of those
who are to support & co-operate with him so peculiarly
essential to his success alone answers this question.
Is Harrison, if substituted, everything
that the public would wish?
Without disparaging his qualifications and allowing
their great superiority to Winchester’s his military
knowledge must be limited, and a more extensive
weight of character would be of material importance.
Should a junction of the two take place, what then?
No small degree of danger that jealousies & jars
might weaken more than the union of their talents
would strengthen their measures.
I am thus led to the idea which I find by letters from Rush
Mason &c occurs to the best judges among our best friends,
of availing the Crisis, if possible of your services.
You would carry with you the confidence of all,
would be the most unexceptionable depository of the
necessary powers and be most able to give impulse &
direction to the only force now applicable to the object.
If Winchester cannot be transferred to Dearborn,
the interposition of your superintending.
Council acquires peculiar importance.
How is it to be brought about?
If there be no legal course by which you can be put in
command, nothing is left but the expedient of your joining
the army as a volunteer with the known confidence &
approbation of the Government and with the ready
respect that would be paid by the highest in command
to your military judgment and grade of character.
If I mistake not, this idea once entered into conversation
between us on the subject of your visiting the other army.
In this case it would not be liable to some
of the objections occurring in that.
I am aware that it is without advantages which would
attend an authoritative commission, and I only resort
to it on the supposition that the latter is precluded.
Think of it in the same point of view.
If it be not admissible in the full extent, think of it as a
mere tour to the Western Country & a visit to the army.
In the present temper of both, I am persuaded your
presence would be of much use in tranquillizing those
under erroneous excitements, and reducing to method
and perhaps within necessary limits, the ardent
efforts which appear to be on foot.
If the alarms which have been excited, should not
speedily subside, there appears to be some danger,
that scattered bodies of volunteers may be so
multiplied as to exceed the means of employing them.
Unless the ordnance &c necessary for taking Detroit &
invading Canada can be transported in time, a number
competent to defend till the season will be a defense,
ought alone to burden the Treasury & waste the supplies.
In the event of your embarking in this business,
it will be proper for you to take with you a parcel
of the Blank Commissions under the volunteer Act.
It is possible that under certain circumstances the
attachment to the occupancy of Canada might induce a
portion of the Militia volunteers to engage under that act.
You will of course arm yourself with all the useful
information from the War Department as to the resources
of arms & supplies of every sort that can be depended on.
I have dwelt on this subject more than was necessary.
But the more I have turned it in my thoughts,
& the more I learn of the effect of Hull’s catastrophe,
the more I am convinced of the public good to be
expected from the contemplated measure.
I know that less of public spirit than you feel,
would shrink from the sacrifices imposed by it.
I am sensible also that your absence from your present
duties would be severely felt, but I think the business
might be preserved from essential injury, especially
if Mr. Graham’s absence should be abridged.
It will be very happy if affairs should take a turn
relieving all of us from the solicitude which
projects such taxes on patriotism.13
Madison wrote to Monroe again on September 8 with more instructions:
I have received yours of the 6th.
I am sorry to find that Pike confides
so little in our prospects.
From a letter of General Dearborn to the
Secretary of War, it appears that the force
at his disposal is more scanty than was hoped.
I am not sure whether his immediate plan is to take
advantage of the detachments of the British force
from Montreal by directing his principal operations
towards that place or to draw away the force from
above in order to strike at that at Niagara.
Whatever the purpose may be, I perceive no foundation
for sanguine hopes of a success in either quarter that will
heal the wound which Hull has given to the Campaign.
It becomes the more necessary to avail ourselves of the
western spirit in order to recover if possible what he has
lost and even to accomplish what he might have gained.
As men in abundance are already in motion or
awaiting orders, nothing is necessary but to
give them a head that will inspire confidence,
concentrate their force, and direct the application of it.
I am not without hopes that in some way or
other this critical service may proceed from you.
If neither a regular commission nor a brevet can
arm you with the regular authority, it will only
remain to substitute the expedient already suggested,
unless it be practicable to cover your services with a
Volunteer Commission under the Act of February.
My impression has been & still is that the enrollment of the
Volunteers is to precede the appointment of the officers.
But a blank commission of Major General might be
carried in your Pocket; & it being understood that
you were to command such a force, it would both
promote the enrollment; and in case of failure, give
the better gloss to your junction with the army and
guiding its councils if not commanding its operations.
Should you go in any capacity, the Secretary of War will
doubtless co-operate on your preparatory arrangements.
If other than persons in military office be desirable to you,
they must of course accompany you as volunteers.
I hope the difficulties as to competent ordinance will
have been overcome, and that provisions & all other
essential supplies may by proper exertions be attainable.
Should the lateness of the season be found a bar to success,
great good will result from such exhibitions of zeal,
of numbers and of effort, as may demonstrate that
that was the only bar to success.
It would have a most salutary effect on the savages
and abroad also; whether there be a desire in the
enemy to prosecute the war, which is to be discouraged,
or difficulties are to be met in the terms of peace.
Your interview with Onís will, I see, be fruitless.
It is clear that he has no powers now, if he ever had,
and improbable that he ever had them to cede Territory.
The general terms in his commission prove nothing.
He would have sent his instructions along with it or extracts
at least, if his advances had been supported by them.
His object is to bring himself into importance & to gain time.
The Spanish anxiety to prevent extremities is
seen in the neutrality avowed at the Havana.
I observe in the intercepted letters of the Governor
at St. Augustine that he has deliberately employed
Indian hostilities against us.
This will justify his expulsion; if nothing else would do it;
and the reason seems to be the
same as to Mobile & Pensacola.
I think it would not be amiss to let Onís
know that we have discovered these hostile
proceedings on the part of the Spaniards.
If Castlereagh was sincere & the weight of the Cabinet,
in saying to Mr. Russell that a declaration of war here
without our knowledge of the repeal of the Orders in Council
would not shut the door to adjustment; we may momently
expect interesting communications on the subject.
If certain passages in Russell’s letters which
are not to be used officially could like one from
a former letter go anonymously to the public,
they would be seasonable & useful.14
Lewis Cass criticized General William Hull on September 10,
and Monroe called Hull “weak, indecisive, and pusillanimous” and dismissed him.
The official account in the National Intelligencer
on September 15 blamed Hull for the defeats.
General John Mason and Richard Rush advised Monroe to get
Thomas Jefferson to return as Secretary of State, and Monroe favored that.
Monroe volunteered to replace Eustis as War Secretary,
and he asked for advice from President Madison who
declined to interfere with Jefferson’s retirement.
Samuel Harrison, having written before to Madison on May 11,
wrote again to President Madison.
Here is some of what he wrote on 14 September 1812:
The Honor of our Country calls loud for Peace.
The Interests, the permanent Interests of
both America and Great Britain call for Peace.
The People, The common People
of both Countries call for Peace.
None are hearty in the War, and unless You
hear the calls of Peace, The War will terminate
dishonorably—it will end in disgrace and will cause
Posterity to Curse your Memory—Yes Sir,
Your memory will be Cursed to the latest Generation.
Unless You turn about before it is too late,
Now is an accepted time; now is a Day for our
Country’s Salvation ... before more blood is Shed.15
Jonathan Dayton was the youngest person
to sign the United States Constitution in 1787.
He served in the House of Representatives 1791-99 and was Speaker 1795-99.
Then he was a Senator from New Jersey for six years.
Between May 1802 and 23 September 1812 he wrote ten letters to Madison.
Here is some of what Dayton wrote to Madison about September 17:
The uncertainty whether the Legislature would eventually
declare the war, prevented without doubt the taking of one
of the most important preparatory steps for acquiring a
superiority on the lakes, which should have been
commenced in January or February by sending up a corps
of artificers to cut & prepare the timber by hewing &
sawing for building the vessels in the spring.
Green timber would have answered every purpose,
for the superiority, once acquired, would never have been
lost, & the movements, operations & supplies of our Army
would have been rendered easy, cheap & successful by
our command of the water—the Indians could have been
kept in check; fewer troops could have done the business,
as detachments would be less necessary, & the garrison
could not be strengthened from the Lower posts.
This might all have been done with proper exertion,
even after the appointment of the Commander in chief,
who himself committed another great error in not
approaching & threatening Fort Erie, at the very
time when Hull was advancing upon Malden.
Had that been done, General Brock could never
have spared a soldier to the upper post, & still
less would he have gone there to act in person.
The projected armistice was on our part a weak,
indiscreet measure, for it left them free to act
with all their force above without endangering
their lower posts, & the noise of it served greatly
to check the military spirit & ardor of our militia.
If it even prevented the enemy during its temporary
continuance from bringing the war across the line
into our territory, it did us thereby no service,
for such an advance would inspirit & unite our people
far more than a purely defensive system on their part.
Be assured sir, by one who has himself made
such a campaign, that a winter campaign in
Canada cannot be carried on by such troops
as are now collecting for the expedition.
All they have to do this year, must be done before
the end of October, & ought to be by the middle of it
after which, if your soldiers are kept in tents, you will
lose more than the half of them by sickness.
The capture of Montreal will have the double
advantage of giving eclat to our military operations
& good quarters for our soldiers, as well with a view
to their comfort, as our early operations in the spring.
If after crossing our line against Malden, Erie, & on
the rout to Montreal, the troops proceed with rapidity
to their objects, they must succeed, if well commanded,
but if, after crossing, they linger or delay, from whatever
cause, their failure & defeat must be inevitable.
This communication is made from motives
of friendship towards you & of purest
attachment to our country’s cause & welfare.
The writer has no views to office, for nothing
would ever induce him to take one.16
Madison wrote this letter to Secretary of State Monroe on September 21:
Not a word from abroad, or the West, since you left us.
Dearborn has still one eye on Montreal and the other
on Niagara: forcing the attention of the Enemy to
both with a purpose, doubtless of striking, himself
at either or both according to circumstances.
The story of an armament against Plattsburg is groundless.
Niagara was very weak at the last date
and more in danger of attack than Plattsburg.
But Dearborn counted on about 3,000 regulars
& 4000 militia, as soon to be there.
Proofs multiply daily of the difficulty of obtaining
regulars and of the fluctuating resource in the Militia.
High bounties & short enlistments, however
objectionable, will alone fill the ranks;
and these too in a moderate number.
This plan would have given us a greater force in July,
when the Enemy were unprepared, than we shall
have in November when it is possible reinforcements
may have reached Canada from England.
Dearborn has allotted a Brigade at Niagara to Smith.
This has given rise to the pretensions in his letter to you;
which I am persuaded go beyond the intentions of
General Dearborn as well as beyond military rules.
How Van Rensselaer is to rank without commanding
him in a conjoint operation is not understood; or why
he should not do so without the limits of the U. S. if
under their Government, any more than without the
limits of New York: as in the case of such an
operation in Vermont is also to be explained.
Besides, an older Brigadier as Winchester may
take the Command of the regulars at that place.
If you answer his letter, I think it would be best
to refer him to Dearborn for explanatory
directions on those points with an intimation
not to act on his own ideas in the meantime.17
Madison wrote again to Monroe on September 23.
Still without authentic information from Abroad.
The Halifax papers expect Admiral Warren
with a naval force and an offer of peace.
It appears that Wellington has gained a victory
over Marmont; the extent of it not ascertained.
From the West the accounts are that a British & Indian
force amounting to about 600 left Malden after the
surrender of Detroit to attack Fort Wayne, & in case
of success to proceed to Fort Harrison & Vincennes.
As it is pretty certain Fort Harrison was invested,
it is apprehended that Fort Wayne may have fallen.
According to the latest dates however,
that is to say the 13th inst: from Urbanna,
no such information had come to hand.
W. H. Harrison has finally determined to push on
himself towards Fort Wayne; having left Piqua
on the 6th inst: with the rear of the Army, &
an intention to overtake it by forced marches.
The force then immediately with him will be about 3000.
Affectionate respects
James Madison
Good supplies of tents, Blankets & other articles
have been sent from Pittsburg as well as from
Philadelphia for the North Western Expedition.18
President Madison wrote in a letter to Henry Dearborn on 7 October 1812:
I have received your favor of September 30.
I am glad to find that you have succeeded in
producing such apprehensions at Montreal as to prevent
reinforcements from that quarter to the posts above.
It would have been fortunate if you could have
derived such Militia & Volunteer aids from Vermont
& Eastward of it, as might have substantially have
a like control on Prevost, and thereby have
augmented the regular force ordered to Niagara.
Appearances denote a better spirit or rather perhaps
a better use of it in the Eastern Quarter; but it may
be too late & too distant to answer immediate purposes;
unless indeed the volunteers of Maine, and the Militia or
Volunteers of New Hampshire should be in sufficient
numbers and forwardness to prevent descents on our
maritime frontier by a show towards Nova Scotia
which would excite defensive attention at Halifax.
The advance of the season would I presume render
a measure of that sort unavailing at Quebec.
Yet there is indubitably the Sensorium to which
projects of alarm may be most successfully
addressed when not too palpably chimerical.
You will receive from the War Office,
the last information from Harrison.
He has a prospect of doing something
towards retrieving the campaign.
The promptitude and numbers of the force under
his command will at least save the military character
of that part of the nation; will satisfy Great Britain
that the tendency of defeat is to rouse not depress
the American Spirit & will stamp deep on the Indian
mind the little security they have in British protection.
As Harrison seems to be making sure of food for his
Army, & the measures taken promise seasonable
supplies of other necessaries; I see nothing to
prevent his reaching Detroit early in this month.
And if the great exertions on foot to give him cannon should
not fail, it may be hoped he will not only be in possession
of that place but of Malden also and proceed towards a
still more effectual co-operation with the forces at Niagara.
Nor do we despair of his success, should the cannon
not reach him in time, if the British Garrisons be such
as are represented, & he can carry with him the force
he has in view; since he will be able to proceed with
a very impressive portion & leave sufficient
investments & precautions behind.
The artillery sent from this place had travelled
nearly to Pittsburg at a rate which promised a
good chance for its reaching Detroit before
November, if not by the 20th of this month.
As Hull’s army was lost, it is to be regretted
that the misfortune did not take place a little
earlier and allow more time, of course, for
repairing it within the present season.
This regret is particularly applicable to the great Lakes.
What is now doing for the command
of them proves what may be done.
And the same means would have been used in the
1st instance if the easy conquest of them by land
held out to us had not misled one calculation.
The command of the lakes by a superior force on the water
ought to have been a fundamental point in the national
policy from the moment the peace took place.
Whatever may be the future situation of Canada,
it ought to be maintained without regard to expense.
We have more means for the purpose & can
better afford the expense than Great Britain.
Without the ascendency over those waters,
we can never have it over the savages, nor
be able to secure such posts as Makinaw.
With this ascendency we command the Indians,
can control the companies trading with them;
and hold Canada while in Foreign hands,
as a hostage for peace & justice.
I don’t wonder you are oppressed with labor, as well
from the extent of your command rendered necessary
by the mutual relations between its objects, As from
the deficiency of General Officers; and particularly
the difficulty and delay in bringing the Staff
Department even into its present state.
The effect of these circumstances in burdening
you with details has been severely felt here in
throwing them where they as little belonged.
To carry on the War with due advantage;
more effectual inducements at least must
be put into the hands of recruiting Officers.
The Volunteer system must be essentially improved;
the use of the militia secured to the constitutional
authority and an addition made to the General
officers both of Divisions & Brigades.
It will be equally essential to discriminate
better the functions of the several Staff
Departments and to have heads of them
in immediate contact with the war department.
Experience enforces these truths; and nothing
but that will ever sufficiently inculcate them.19
On October 8 President Madison issued this proclamation:
Whereas information has been received that a number
of individuals, who have deserted from the Army of the
United States have become sensible of their Offenses
and are desirous of returning to their duty:
A full pardon is hereby granted and proclaimed
to each and all such individuals as shall within four
months from the date hereof surrender themselves
to the commanding officer of any Military post
within the United States or the territories thereof.
In Testimony whereof I have caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed to these presents
and signed the same with my hand.20
General William Henry Harrison organized three armies to carry out
guerrilla attacks in the Northwest Territory from September to December.
General Solomon Van Ransselaer led the attack
against Queenstown on October 13.
After 1,300 Americans retreated, 60 were killed,
170 were wounded, and 764 surrendered.
The Army was building Fort Harrison on the Wabash River,
and a fight occurred between sentinels and Indians on October 11.
Van Rensselaer resigned.
General Dearborn trained 5,000 troops and
marched them north in mid-November.
The state militia refused to cross the Canadian border because
they believed they were to fight only within their state.
Secretary of War Eustis ordered stronger measures against
the Shawnee Prophet, and William Henry Harrison took
that as a declaration of war against Indians.
Eustis had called out 1,500 militia from Tennessee to defend
the lower country on October 12, and he resigned on December 3,
the day the electoral college met.
For two months Monroe ran the State and War departments,
and western Congressmen objected.
Navy Secretary Paul Hamilton was seen drunk and resigned.
In November the invasion of Canada was called off.
General Alexander Smyth withdrew the American forces
even though the Canadian frontier was only guarded by a token force.
Madison sent his Fourth Annual Address to Congress
on November 4 when the election was still uncertain.
He called for expanding the Army and the Navy
and proposed revising the militia laws.
Government expenditures increased from $20 million in 1812 to $32 million in 1813.
Here is Madison’s entire Annual Message:
Fellow Citizens of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives
On our present meeting it is my first duty to invite your
attention to the providential favors which our Country
has experienced in the unusual degree of health dispensed
to its inhabitants and in the rich abundance with which
the Earth has rewarded the labors bestowed on it.
In the successful cultivation of other branches of industry,
and in the progress of general improvement favorable
to the national prosperity, there is just occasion also
for our mutual congratulations and thankfulness.
With these blessings are necessarily mingled
the pressures and vicissitudes incident to the
state of war into which the United States have
been forced by the perseverance of a foreign
power in its system of injustice and aggression.
Previous to its declaration it was deemed proper
as a measure of precaution and forecast, that a
considerable force should be placed in the Michigan
Territory with a general view to its security and
in the event of war to such operations in the uppermost
Canada, as would intercept the hostile influence of
Great Britain over the Savages, obtain the command
of the Lake on which that part of Canada borders, and
maintain co-operating relations with such forces, as
might be most conveniently employed against other parts.
Brigadier General Hull was charged with this
provisional service having under his command
a body of Troops composed of regulars and of
volunteers from the State of Ohio.
Having reached his destination after his knowledge
of the war and possessing discretionary authority to act
offensively, he passed into the neighboring territory of the
Enemy with a prospect of easy and victorious progress.
The Expedition, nevertheless, terminated unfortunately,
not only in a retreat to the town and Fort of Detroit,
but in the surrender of both and of the gallant
corps commanded by that Officer.
The causes of this painful reverse will
be investigated by a Military Tribunal.
A distinguishing feature in the operations which preceded
and followed this adverse event is the use made by the
Enemy of the merciless savages under their influence.
While the benevolent policy of the United States
invariably recommended peace and promoted
civilization among that wretched portion of the
human race; and was making exertions to dissuade
them from taking either side in the war; the Enemy
has not scrupled to call to his aid their ruthless ferocity,
armed with the horrors of those instruments of carnage
and torture which are known to spare neither age nor sex.
In this outrage against the laws of honorable war and
against the feelings sacred to humanity, the British
commanders cannot resort to a plea of retaliation:
for it is committed in the face of our example.
They cannot mitigate it by calling it a self defense
against men in arms for it embraces the most
shocking butcheries of defenseless families.
Nor can it be pretended that they are not answerable
for the atrocities perpetrated; since the Savages
are employed with a knowledge and even with
menaces that their fury could not be controlled.
Such is the spectacle which the deputed authorities of
a nation boasting its religion and morality have not
been restrained from presenting to an enlightened age.
The misfortune at Detroit was not,
however, without a consoling effect.
It was followed by signal proofs, that the national
spirit rises according to the pressure on it.
The loss of an important post and of the
brave men surrendered with it inspired
everywhere new ardor and determination.
In the States and Districts least remote it was no
sooner known than every Citizen was ready to fly
with his arms at once to protect his brethren against
the bloodthirsty Savages let loose by the Enemy on
an extensive frontier and to convert a partial calamity
into a source of invigorated efforts.
This patriotic zeal, which it was necessary
rather to limit than excite, has embodied an
ample force from the States of Kentucky and
Ohio and from parts of Pennsylvania and Virginia.
It is placed with the addition of a few regulars under
the command of Brigadier General Harrison; who
possesses the entire confidence of his fellow Soldiers,
among whom are Citizens, some of them volunteers
in the ranks not less distinguished by their political
stations than by their personal merits.
The greater portion of this force is proceeding on
its destination towards the Michigan Territory;
having succeeded in relieving an important Frontier post;
and in several incidental operations against hostile tribes
of Savages rendered indispensable by the subservience
into which they had been seduced by the Enemy;
a seduction the more cruel, as it could not fail to
impose a necessity of precautionary severities
against those who yielded to it.
At a recent date an attack was made on a post of the
Enemy near Niagara by a detachment of the regular and
other forces under the command of Major General Van
Renssalear of the militia of the State of New York.
The attack, it appears, was ordered in compliance with
the ardor of the troops; who executed it with distinguished
gallantry and were for a time victorious; but not receiving
the expected support, they were compelled to yield
to reinforcements of British regulars and savages.
Our loss has been considerable,
and is deeply to be lamented.
That of the Enemy, less ascertained, will be the more felt,
as it includes among the killed, the commanding General
who was also the Governor of the Province; and was
sustained by veteran troops from inexperienced soldiers,
who must daily improve in the duties of the field.
Our expectation of gaining the command of the Lakes
by the invasion of Canada from Detroit having been
disappointed; measures were instantly taken to provide
on them a naval force superior to that of the Enemy.
From the talents and activity of the Officer charged with
this object everything that can be done may be expected.
Should the present season not admit of complete success,
the progress made will ensure for the next a naval
ascendancy where it is essential to our permanent
peace with and control over the Savages.
Among the incidents to the measures of the war
I am constrained to advert to the refusal of the
Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut,
to furnish the required detachments of Militia
towards the defense of the maritime frontier.
The refusal was founded on a novel and
unfortunate exposition of the provisions
of the Constitution relating to the Militia.
The correspondences which will be before you,
contain the requisite information on the subject.
It is obvious that if the authority of the United States to call
into service and command the Militia for the public defense
can be thus frustrated, even in a state of declared war,
and of course under apprehensions of invasion preceding
war; they are not one nation for the purpose most of all
requiring it; and that the public safety may have no other
resource than in those large and permanent military
establishments which are forbidden by the principles of
our free Government and against the necessity of which,
the militia were meant to be a constitutional bulwark.
On the coasts and on the ocean the war
has been as successful as circumstances
inseparable from its early stages could promise.
Our public ships and private cruisers by their activity,
and where there was occasion by their intrepidity,
have made the enemy sensible of the difference
between a reciprocity of captures and the long
confinement of them to their side.
Our trade with little exception has safely reached
our ports; having been much favored in it by the
course pursued by a Squadron of our Frigates
under the Command of Commodore Rodgers.
And in the instance in which skill and bravery
were more particularly tried with those of the
Enemy, the American flag had an auspicious triumph.
The Frigate Constitution commanded by Captain Hull,
after a close and short engagement, completely disabled
and captured a British Frigate; gaining for that officer and all
on board a praise which cannot be too liberally bestowed;
not merely for the victory actually achieved;
but for that prompt and cool exertion of commanding
talents, which giving to courage its highest character,
and to the force applied its full effect, proved that more
could have been done in a contest requiring more.
Anxious to abridge the evils from which a state of war
cannot be exempt, I lost no time, after it was declared
in conveying to the British Government the terms on
which its progress might be arrested without awaiting
the delays of a formal and final pacification.
And our chargé d’affaires at London was at the same time
authorized to agree to an armistice founded upon them.
These terms required that the Orders in Council should
be repealed as they affected the United States without a
revival of blockades violating acknowledged rules;
and that there should be an immediate discharge of
American Seamen from British ships and a stop to
impressments from American ships; with an understanding
that an exclusion of the seamen of each nation from the
ships of the other should be stipulated; and that the
armistice should be improved into a definitive and
comprehensive adjustment of depending controversies.
Although a repeal of the Orders, susceptible of explanations
meeting the views of this Government had taken place
before this pacific advance was communicated to that
of Great Britain, the advance was declined; from an
avowed repugnance to a suspension of the practice
of impressment during the armistice and without
any intimation that the arrangement proposed
with respect to Seamen would be accepted.
Whether the subsequent communications from this
Government, affording an occasion for reconsidering
the subject on the part of Great Britain will be viewed
in a more favorable light or received in a more
accommodating spirit, remains to be known.
It would be unwise to relax our measures
in any respect on a presumption of such a result.
The documents from the Department of State which
relate to this subject will give a view also of the
propositions for an armistice which have been
received here, one of them from the authorities
at Halifax and in Canada, the other from the British
Government itself through Admiral Warren; and of the
grounds on which neither of them could be accepted.
Our affairs with France retain the posture which
they held at my last communications to you.
Notwithstanding the authorized expectation of an
early, as well as favorable issue, to the discussions
on foot, these have been procrastinated to the latest date.
The only intervening occurrence meriting attention is
the promulgation of a French Decree purporting to be
a definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees.
This proceeding, although made the ground of the repeal
of the British Orders in Council, is rendered by the time
and manner of it liable to many objections.
The final communications from our Special
Minister to Denmark afford further proofs of
the good effects of his mission and of the
amicable disposition of the Danish Government.
From Russia we have the satisfaction to receive assurances
of continued friendship, and that it will not be affected by
the rupture between the United States and Great Britain.
Sweden also professes sentiments,
favorable to the subsisting harmony.
With the Barbary powers, excepting that of Algiers,
our affairs remain on the ordinary footing.
The Consul General residing with that Regency
has suddenly and without cause been banished
together with all the American Citizens found there.
Whether this was the transitory effect of
capricious despotism, or the first act of
predetermined hostility is not ascertained.
Precautions were taken by the
Consul on the latter supposition.
The Indian Tribes, not under foreign instigations,
remain at peace and receive the civilizing attentions
which have proved so beneficial to them.
With a view to that vigorous prosecution of
the war to which our national faculties are
adequate, the attention of Congress will be
particularly drawn to the insufficiency of the existing
provisions for filling up the military establishment.
Such is the happy condition of our country, arising
from the facility of subsistence and the high wages
for every species of occupation, that notwithstanding
the augmented inducements provided at the last session,
a partial success only has attended the recruiting service.
The deficiency has been necessarily supplied
during the campaign by other than regular troops with
all the inconveniencies and expense incident to them.
The remedy lies in establishing more favorably
for the private soldier the proportion between
his recompense and the term of his enlistment.
And it is a subject which cannot too soon or
too seriously be taken into consideration.
The same insufficiency has been experienced in the
provisions for volunteers made by an act of the last session.
The recompense for the service required in this
case is still less attractive than in the other.
And although patriotism alone has sent into
the field some valuable corps of that description,
those alone who can afford the sacrifice can be
reasonably expected to yield to that impulse.
It will merit consideration also whether, as auxiliary
to the security of our Frontiers, corps may not be
advantageously organized with a restriction of their
services to particular districts convenient to them.
And whether the local and occasional services of
Mariners and others in the seaport Towns under a
similar organization would not be a provident
addition to the means of their defense.
I recommend a provision for an increase of the
General officers of the Army, the deficiency of which
has been illustrated by the number and distance of
separate commands, which the course of the war
and the advantage of the service have required.
And I cannot press too strongly on the earliest
attention of the Legislature the importance of a
re-organization of the Staff Establishment with
a view to render more distinct and definite the
relations and responsibilities of its several departments.
That there is room for improvements which will materially
promote both economy and success in what appertains to
the army and the war is equally inculcated by the examples
of other countries and by the experience of our own.
A revision of the Militia laws for the purpose of rendering
them more systematic and better adapting them to
emergences of the war is at this time particularly desirable.
Of the additional ships authorized to be fitted for service,
two will be shortly ready to sail; a third is under repair;
and delay will be avoided in the repair of the residue.
Of the appropriations for the purchase of materials for ship
building, the greater part has been applied to that object,
and the purchases will be continued with the balance.
The enterprising spirit which has characterized our
naval force and its success, both in restraining insults and
depredations on our Coasts, and in reprisals on the Enemy
will not fail to recommend an enlargement of it.
There being reason to believe that the act
prohibiting the acceptance of British licenses is not a
sufficient guard against the use of them for purposes
favorable to the interests and views of the Enemy;
further provisions on that subject are highly important.
Nor is it less so, that penal enactments should be provided
for cases of corrupt and perfidious intercourse with
the Enemy, not amounting to Treason,
nor yet embraced by any statutory provisions.
A considerable number of American vessels
which were in England, when the revocation of
the orders in council took place, were laden with
British manufactures under an erroneous impression
that the non-importation act would immediately cease
to operate and have arrived in the United States.
It did not appear proper to exercise on unforeseen cases of
such magnitude, the ordinary powers vested in the Treasury
Department to mitigate forfeitures without previously
affording to Congress an opportunity of making on
the subject such provision as they may think proper.
In their decision they will doubtless equally consult what is
due to equitable considerations and to the public interest.
The receipts into the Treasury during the year ending
on the thirtieth of September last have exceeded sixteen
millions and a half of dollars, which have been sufficient
to defray all the demands on the Treasury to that day,
including a necessary reimbursement of near
three Millions of the principal of the public debt.
In these receipts is included a sum of near
five millions eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars,
received on account of the loans authorized by the
acts of the last session: the whole sum actually obtained
on loan amounts to eleven Millions of dollars;
the residue of which, being receivable subsequent to the
thirtieth of September last will together with the current
revenue enable us to defray all the expenses of this year.
The duties on the late unexpected importations of British
manufactures will render the revenue of the ensuing year
more productive than could have been anticipated.
The situation of our country, fellow Citizens, is not
without its difficulties, though it abounds in animating
considerations, of which the view here presented,
of our pecuniary resources, is an example.
With more than one nation we have serious and
unsettled controversies; and with one, powerful
in the means and habits of war, we are at war.
The spirit and strength of this nation are, nevertheless,
equal to the support of all its rights;
and to carry it through all its trials.
They can be met in that confidence.
Above all we have the inestimable consolation of knowing,
that the war in which we are actually engaged, is a war,
neither of ambition nor of vain glory; that it is waged,
not in violation of the rights of others, but in the
maintenance of our own; that it was preceded by a patience
without example under wrongs accumulating without end;
and that it was finally not declared until every hope of
averting it was extinguished by the transfer of the British
Scepter into new hands, clinging to former Councils;
and until declarations were re-iterated to the last hour,
through the British Envoy here, that the hostile Edicts
against our commercial rights and our maritime
Independence would not be revoked; nay, that they could
not be revoked without violating the obligations of Great
Britain to other powers, as well as to her own interests.
To have shrunk under such circumstances from manly
resistance would have been a degradation, blasting our
best and proudest hopes: It would have struck us
from the high rank, where the virtuous struggles of our
fathers had placed us, and have betrayed the magnificent
legacy which we hold in trust for future generations.
It would have acknowledged that on the Element,
which forms three fourths of the globe we inhabit,
and where all independent nations have equal and
common rights, the American people were not an
independent people but colonists and vassals.
It was at this moment and with such
an alternative, that war was chosen.
The nation felt the necessity of it and called for it.
The appeal was accordingly made in a just cause
to the just and all powerful Being who holds in his
hands the chain of events and the destiny of nations.
It remains only that faithful to ourselves; entangled in no
connections with the views of other powers and ever ready
to accept peace from the hand of justice, we prosecute the
war with united councils and with the ample faculties of the
nation; until peace be so obtained, and as the only means
under the divine blessing of speedily obtaining it.21
Although the Federalists opposed Madison’s war,
they did not do well in the November 1812 election with their
presidential candidate DeWitt Clinton, who was George Clinton’s nephew.
They did make gains in New England as Federalists
gained 32 seats in the House of Representatives.
Yet the Republicans still had a 114 to 68 majority.
DeWitt Clinton won New York and New Jersey and all of New England
except Vermont, and he got 5 of Maryland’s electoral votes.
Madison won all the southern and western states and Vermont,
giving him a 128-89 victory in the electoral college.
The Republicans also retained a 22-14 advantage in the US Senate.
On 16 December 1812 General Henry Dearborn sent Madison a letter
that advised adding 30,000 more troops for the Army from states
north of the Potomac River with these numbers estimated for each state:
New York 7,000, Pennsylvania 6,000, Massachusetts 5,500, Maryland 2,000,
Kentucky 2,000, New Hampshire 1,600, Vermont 1,500, Connecticut 1,300,
Ohio 1,300, New Jersey 1,200, Rhode Island 400, and Delaware 200.
Notes
1. The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series, Volume 4 5 November 1811—
9 July 1812 with a supplement 5 March 1809—19 October 1811 ed. J. C. A. Stagg
et al, p. 529-535.
2. Ibid., p. 22-24.
3. Ibid., p. 29.
4. The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series, Volume 5 10 July 1812—
7 February 1913 ed. J. C. A. Stagg et al, p. 12-13.
5. Ibid., p. 581-582.
6. Ibid., p. 114.
7. Ibid., p. 128-130.
8. Ibid., p. 133-134.
9. Ibid., p. 144-145.
10. Ibid., p. 157-158.
11. Ibid., p. 165-166.
12. Ibid., p. 171.
13. Ibid., p. 278-279.
14. Ibid., p. 287-288.
15. Ibid., p. 314.
16. Ibid., p. 326-327.
17. Ibid., p. 343-344.
18. Ibid., p. 347.
19. Ibid., p. 371-373.
20. Ibid., p. 380.
21. Ibid., p. 427-433.