Congress had debated war in December 1811,
and they voted 97-22 to arm merchant ships.
Senator Giles proposed raising 25,000 men for five years.
On 11 January 1812 President Madison signed the Giles bill
that enlarged the Army to 35,000 men, though no funds
were appropriated to enlist, arm, or clothe them.
Madison signed the bill and the Federalists hoped
that the necessary taxes would ruin him.
In arguing for 50,000 volunteers Madison reported that 6,200
American seamen had been impressed into the Royal Navy.
The bill called for militiamen who were not
supposed to be used for foreign service.
The Senate cut the House’s appropriation of $3 million to $l million.
In the debate over a Navy bill the Treasury Secretary
Albert Gallatin estimated that a war could cost $50 million.
He advised direct taxes for $3 million, additional excises for $2 million,
and the rest to be borrowed at $10 million per year.
Gallatin reported that during the first year of restored trade exports
to Britain and her allies Spain and Portugal had been worth
$38,500,000 compared to only $1,194,000 to France and Italy.
The Republican House voted down 59-62 the bill for new frigates.
The Congress had difficulty trying to pass a bill to recruit troops,
and on January 30 William Duane printed “The Rat in the Treasury”
to criticize the policy of Gallatin who opposed the war.
On 7 February 1812 President Madison
issued this Presidential Proclamation:
Whereas information has been received, that a
number of individuals, who have deserted from the
army of the United States, have become sensible of
their Offense and are desirous of returning to their duty.
A full pardon is hereby granted & proclaimed to each
and all such individuals as shall within four months
from the date hereof surrender themselves to the
Commanding Officer of any military Post within
the United States or the territories thereof.
In testimony whereof I have caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed to these
presents and signed the same with my hand.1
Madison on February 24 wrote this letter to Joel Barlow in France
so that he would work for reducing French tariffs and abolishing their licenses.
Mr. Morris delivered yesterday morning the dispatches
committed to him including your letters to me.
The reasons for hastening the departure of
the vessel now ordered to France will not permit
the Secretary of State to do much more than
acknowledge the receipt of your communications.
The instructions you wish relative to the question of a
Commercial Treaty with France at this time, as well as the
requisite terms, should such a one be admissible, will be
subjects of due consideration and early communication.
I see with pleasure the auspicious attentions which have
distinguished your intercourse with the French Government,
and the convincing views presented on your part, of the
commercial policy which it ought to adopt towards the U. S.
From these sources encouragement is drawn.
In other respects the prospect suggests
distrust rather than expectation.
The delay in answering your note, the vagueness of
the answer when given; the refusal to sign the contents
of the paper presented by you, even in the ordinary &
unexceptionable form proposed; and the substitution
of a verbal for a written notification of the orders to
the Custom Houses &c &c by which our Merchants
were to be invited to the French Market are
circumstances which necessarily attract serious notice.
The reserve manifested on the subject of the paper
alluded to is the more remarkable as a written
sanction to it would have so little committed them.
Beyond a freedom of the French ports to the
products of the U. S. under all the existing limitations
& incumbrances, it pledged nothing more than a melioration
of formalities as to ownership and origin; leaving Colonial
produce on the old footing of special licenses.
The liberation of the remaining ships & cargoes
could surely have created no difficulty, if any real
purpose of friendship or good faith be entertained.
It would seem therefore that the objection must
have lain against the clause forbidding captures
& seizures for other cause than forged papers.
The recent condemnations in the Baltic cases, and the
avowal of the French Consul in Denmark that all vessels,
whithersoever bound with Colonial produce were within the
orders to capture, favor this conjecture; and if it be the true
one, adjustment is hopeless; and the consequences obvious.
I do not forget that your understanding of all
these particulars was better than mine can be,
and that my constructions may be merely colorable.
I wish this may be the case, but we find so little
of explicit dealing or substantial redress mingled
with the compliments and encouragements which
cost nothing because they may mean nothing, that
suspicions are unavoidable; and if they be erroneous,
the fault does not lie with those who entertain them.
From the scanty attention I can now give to the subject
of a commercial Treaty with France I am at a loss for the
necessity of it or the motives of France to set it on foot,
if it be not meant to gain time and be guided by events.
On our side we have nothing to stipulate,
which is not secured to her as long as she merits it,
by our general system which leaves our exports
& imports free without any duties on the former
and with moderate ones on the latter.
It is on her side that changes & securities
are necessary to a friendly reciprocity; and
these will for the present be satisfactory to us
in the form of stable regulations fairly executed.
Among them a reduced tariff favoring all our great Staples,
and a transit through French ports to inland markets are
indispensable to a continued admission of French staples.
The system of licenses must be abolished,
if not by France by us.
The neglect of the subject by Congress is remarkable,
but the event cannot be doubtful.
Such a mode of commerce corrupts one class
of Citizens and disgusts all the rest; & when the
trade licensed is in foreign, not native articles,
the evil preponderates still more over the profit.
The French Government seems to have
taken up a radical error with regard to the
commercial interests of the two Countries.
It overrates our desire of her commodities.
The present footing of the commerce is
intolerable to the U. S., and it will be prohibited,
if no essential change takes place.
At all times it will be a barter of food & raw materials for
superfluities in great part: and altogether so (with the
temporary exception of colonial re-exports) as long as
a balance in money is prevented by the existing policy
of France, and a return of useful fabrics by the war.
Why might not certificates of origin from
French Consuls or still better of direct shipment
from our ports take the place of licenses.
The advantages of the change are numerous & obvious.
Mr. Gallatin promises to say
something to Mr. Lee on this head.
I am concerned that the prospect of indemnity for the
Rambouillet and other spoliations is so discouraging as to
have led to the idea of seeking it through King Joseph.
Were there no other objection than the effect on the
public mind here, this would be an insuperable one.
The gratification of the sufferers by the result would
be lost in the general feeling against the measure.
But Joseph is not yet settled on the Spanish Throne:
when so, de facto, he will be sovereign neither
de facto, nor de jure, of any Spanish part of this
Continent; the whole of which, if it had not on other
accounts a right to separate from the peninsula
would derive it from the usurpation of Joseph.
So evident is it that he can never be King of
a Spanish province, either by conquest or consent,
that the Independence of all of them, is avowedly
favored by the policy which rules him.
Nor would a purchase under Joseph
place us an inch nearer our object.
He could give us neither right nor possession;
and we should be obliged to acquire the latter
by means which a grant from him would be
more likely to embarrass than promote.
I hope therefore that the French Government will be
brought to feel the obligation & the necessity of repairing
the wrongs, the flagrant wrongs in question, either by
payments from the Treasury or negotiable substitutes.
Without one or other or some fair equivalent there
can be neither cordiality nor confidence here; nor any
restraint from self redress in any justifiable mode of
effecting it; nor any formal Treaty on any subject.
With Justice on this subject formal stipulations
on others might be combinable.
As the Hornet had reached France before
the sailing of the Constitution, and the latter
had not a very short passage, We shall soon
look for further communications from you.
I hope they will correspond equally with your
patriotic exertions and the public calculations.
If they do not exhibit the conduct of the French
Government in better colors than it has yet assumed,
there will be but one sentiment in this country,
& I need not say what that will be.2
About March 6 James Monroe drafted a letter to the
British political diplomat Augustus John Foster:
This letter represents the cases of the Catharine & Julian,
as proofs that the Berlin & Merlin Decrees were in force,
and repeats its call for the instrument of revocation.
With respect to this repetition of this call, I refer to the
superabundant explanations already given on that subject,
remarking here only that while France does not profess to
have revoked such part of her decrees, as exclude British
products from the Continent of Europe or as relate to other
neutrals than the U. S. on the high seas, and the U. S.
require a revocation only of the Decrees as they violated
their neutral commerce, and while Your Government insists
on an absolute repeal of those Decrees as they operate
both on the Continent and against other Neutrals as an
essential preliminary to a repeal of the British Orders in
relation to the U. S.; no just motive can be perceived,
for urging as your Government continues to do,
a production of the French instrument of repeal,
inasmuch as if produced in a form ever so
satisfactory, and in a sense ever so absolute in
relation to the U. S. it would be of no avail in procuring
a repeal of the British Orders in relation to the U. S.
With respect to the Case of the American ship
Catharine, it is Stated that after touching at
Gothenburg, she sailed for St. Petersburg, was
captured on her way by a French Privateer, carried
into Dantzig and condemned by the prize Court at Paris,
as Enemy’s property, evinced by the circumstance
of her being unmolested by an English armed vessel at
Gothenburg, and of her cargo consisting of Colonial produce.
The case of the Julian is not essentially different
having a cargo chiefly of Colonial produce; and being
condemned on the presumption drawn from sundry
circumstances that it was in reality an Enemy’s trade.
In this case a further circumstance is mentioned, to wit that
the Julian had been visited by an English Ship of War at sea.
From these cases you infer the insincerity of the
alleged repeal of the British & Maritime decrees.
In what particular respect they have proved it
you have forborne to point out.
Is it in the interruption of a voyage
from Gothenburg to St. Petersburg?
Certain it is that there is not in either of those decrees,
the slightest allusion to a trade with an ally of France
as being within the scope of those Decrees.
Is it in the circumstance of founding the condemnation
on the hostile ownership of the property?
To this your Government can make no objection.
It is the precise ground embraced by the invariable form
of her Admiralty sentences of Condemnation, the principle
which she asserts as among her essential maritime rights
and the attempt to change which, by France she cites as
among the most Conspicuous proofs of a dangerous spirit
of innovation on the established law of Nation.
Is it the admission of unsatisfactory evidence
of facts by the Court of Prizes?
This would prove only that the Court was
unskillful or corrupt, but not that the rule
of Decision was shown unlawful.
It would prove nothing as to the
rule of law pursued in the case.
Nor ought it to be suppressed, that much of the injustice of
which the U. S. have room for complaint against Decisions
in British Admiralty Courts, has lain in the admission of
unsatisfactory evidence as the basis of them.
Is it in the circumstance of the condemnation being
referred to the cargo as consisting of Colonial produce?
To this your Government cannot complain, because
it has itself condemned a trade in those articles,
sometimes on the presumption of their being enemies
property, sometimes on the ground, that a trade in
those articles in time of war was unlawful.
Or by an English Frigate, it would be no proof
that the neutral rights of the U. S. and the
belligerent of Great Britain had been violated
as a correlation to the neutral right of the U. S.
It is true that the Berlin decree includes such
a visit among the causes of condemnation.
Note that these things are gross injuries to
the U. S. & may be made a cause of war,
but are matter between U. S. & France only.3
On March 6 Madison wrote to Jefferson that
the House had passed the taxes in preparation for war.
The State Department paid $50,000 for the letters of Army Captain
John Henry who was working as a British agent trying to destroy
the American Union by connecting Eastern states to Great Britain.
President Madison on March 9 sent the Henry correspondence to the Congress,
though he had the names of the Americans erased, hoping that this warning
would bring them back to reuniting against the common enemy.
Madison had been supported for re-election by the legislators
of Virginia in February and by those in Pennsylvania on March 7.
On 9 March 1812 President Madison sent this
short message to the United States Congress:
I lay before Congress copies of certain Documents,
which remain in the Department of State.
They prove that at a recent period, while the United States,
notwithstanding the wrongs sustained by them,
ceased not to observe the laws of peace and neutrality
towards Great Britain; and in the midst of amicable
professions and negotiations on the part of the British
Government through its public Minister here;
a secret Agent of that Government was employed in
certain States, more especially at the Seat of Government
in Massachusetts, in fomenting disaffection to the constituted
authorities of the nation; and in intrigues with the
disaffected for the purpose of bringing about resistance
to the laws and eventually in concert with a British force,
of destroying the Union and forming the Eastern part
thereof into a political connection with Great Britain.
In addition to the effect which the discovery of such a
procedure ought to have on the public Councils;
it will not fail to render more dear to the hearts of
all good Citizens that happy Union of these States, which,
under divine providence is the guaranty of their liberties,
their safety, their tranquility, and their prosperity.4
Monroe admitted to the French minister that they used Henry’s
documents to excite the nation and the Congress for war.
Jefferson on March 26 wrote this letter to Madison:
Your favor of the 6th was duly received.
The double treachery of Henry will do
lasting good both here & in England.
It prostrates the party here and will prove to the people
of England beyond the power of palliation by the ministry,
that the war is caused by the wrongs of their own nation.
The case of the Batture not having been
explained by a trial at bar as had been expected,
I have thought it necessary to do it by publishing
what I had prepared for the use of my counsel.
This has been done at New York, and the printer
informs me by a letter of the 21st that he had
forwarded by mail some copies to myself, and would
send by the stage under the care of a passenger
those I had ordered for the members of both houses.
But those sent to me are not yet arrived.
From this parcel I shall send some to yourself
and the members of the Cabinet, which I have
thought it necessary to mention by anticipation,
that you may understand how it happens, if it does
happen, that others get copies before yourself.
Everybody in this quarter expects the declaration
of war as soon as the season will permit the
entrance of militia into Canada, & although peace
may be their personal interest and wish, they would,
I think, disapprove of its longer continuance under
the wrongs inflicted and unredressed by England.
God bless you and send you a prosperous
course through your difficulties.5
In March 1812 the United States had only 5,000 soldiers fit for duty,
and Madison requested 5,000 more; but Senator Giles called for
a total of 25,000 with provision for 50,000 more volunteers.
Congress enacted another embargo, but it was not to go into effect until July 4.
The war hawks in Congress blamed the British for the impressments
by the Royal Navy, the Orders in Council by the cabinet,
and for supporting the Indian insurrection in the northwest.
General Mathews led 200 American adventurers into East Florida
and took over Amelia Island on March 16, and J. H. McIntosh
with only eight followers declared independence.
The Spaniards surrendered the province south to the St. John’s River,
and McIntosh ceded it to the United States.
On March 23 news arrived that French frigates had destroyed
two American merchant ships that had been bound for Spain.
On March 31 George Logan in his usual quest for peace
wrote another letter to Madison:
Although not in public life, I feel with the deepest anguish
the progress of events passing before my eyes, and in an
alarming degree threatening the peace of my country.
We appear to be approaching a crisis in our affairs,
which calls for the whole wisdom of our councils.
I allude to the contemplated invasion of Canada,
a subject every rational citizen regards with horror.
Perhaps you may ask, Why I trouble you,
who have so much important business on
your hands with my political opinions.
Because I am your friend, and because as chief
magistrate invested with immense power, respecting
our foreign relations; it rests with you to restore
peace and prosperity to our distracted country.
No period of time was ever more propitious
than the present to preserve peace between
the United States and Great Britain.
The Prince of Wales has just come to the throne.
He is in his political principles a decided Whig.
His associates have always been the friends of the United
States; in opposition to the contracted views of his Father.
A respectable mission sent to England to congratulate
him on the event: and at the same time by amicable
discussion to point out the mutual interests of both
countries to preserve peace; would enable you at
the meeting of Congress in December next to
submit to the consideration of Senate a treaty
honorable to yourself and beneficial to your country.
I speak with confidence derived from personal
conversations (when lately in England) with
men of all parties and in every situation of life.
We have had sufficient experience of the
total failure and ill effects of recrimination and
retaliation, even supported by the partiality of
many of the most distinguished characters in England.
Proceed to the invasion of Canada—
or adopt any other hostile measures favorable to France,
and you will unite every man in England against you.
It is not my business decisively to blame or excuse
the pretexts urged by either contending party.
I know that every one’s own cause appears the most just.
I only desire that before we involve our country
in the miseries of war we should adopt measures
of the most sincere pacification; not only to satisfy
our own minds, but such as will justify us in the
opinion of the present and future generations.
Let us remove from the path of peace every hostile act.
Let us negotiate with candor, frankness and
forbearance becoming the republican character.
The crisis will not admit of frivolous
ceremony or procrastination.
I address you in the language of a friend,
and in the spirit of a free citizen.
I conjure you as you value your future peace of mind,
and the liberties of your country over which you preside;
not to lose a moment in restoring the peace,
happiness and prosperity of our beloved country.
May God give you wisdom and
firmness of mind in this day of trial.6
On April 1 Madison requested a General Embargo law for 60 days;
the Senate increased it to 90 days, and the
President signed the bill into law on the 4th.
The National Intelligencer called for “open and manly war.”
Although this editorial was attributed to the hawkish Henry Clay,
it was actually written by Secretary of State James Monroe.
Madison asked for two assistant secretaries in the War Department,
and both houses favored the bill; but Senator Michael Leib
of Pennsylvania shelved it by postponing a House amendment.
President Madison on 3 April 1812
wrote to the House of Representatives,
Having examined and considered the Bill entitled
“An Act providing for the trial of Causes pending in
the respective District Courts of the United States
in case of the absence or disability of the Judges thereof,”
which Bill was presented to me on the
twenty fifth of March past, I now return
the same to the House of Representatives,
in which it originated, with the following objections:
Because the additional services imposed by the Bill
on the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,
are to be performed by them, rather in the quality of other
Judges of other Courts, namely Judges of the District Courts,
than in the quality of Justices of the Supreme Court.
They are to hold the said District Courts and to do
and perform all acts relating to the said Courts,
which are by law required of the District Judges.
The Bill therefore virtually appoints, for the time,
the Justices of the Supreme Court to other distinct offices;
to which, if compatible with their original offices,
they ought to be appointed, by another than the
Legislative Authority in pursuance of Legislative
provisions authorizing the appointments.
Because the appeal allowed by law from
the decision of the District Courts to the Circuit Courts
while it corroborates the construction which regards
a Judge of the one Court, as clothed with a new office,
by being constituted a Judge of the other, submits for
correction, erroneous Judgments, not to superior or
other Judges, but to the erring individual himself,
acting as sole Judge in the appellate Court.
Because the additional services to be required,
may by distances of place and by the casualties
contemplated by the Bill, become disproportionate
to the strength and health of the Justices who
are to perform them; the additional services being
moreover entitled to no additional compensation;
nor the additional expenses incurred to reimbursement.
In this view the Bill appears to be contrary to equity;
as well as a precedent for modifications and
extensions of Judicial services encroaching
on the Constitutional tenure of Judicial Offices.
Because by referring to the President of the United States
questions of disability in the District Judges and of the
unreasonableness of delaying the suits or causes pending
in the District Courts and leaving it with him in such cases
to require the Justices of the Supreme Court to perform
additional services, the Bill introduces an unsuitable
relation of Members of the Judiciary Department, to a
discretionary authority of the Executive Department.7
Also on April 3 Madison wrote this letter to Thomas Jefferson:
I have received your favor of the 26th and have made
to the members of the Cabinet the communication you
suggest with respect to your printed memoir on the Batture.
I learn from the Department of State that some books
were received for you and duly forwarded.
What they were was not ascertained or remembered.
If they do not on their arrival correspond with your
expectation, let me know, & further enquiry will be made.
Meantime there is in my possession a very large
packet addressed to you, which is probably a
continuation of Humboldt’s draughts or other Maps.
It was accompanied by no letter to me, and being
unfit for the mail waits for the patronage of some
trusty traveler bound in the Stage towards Monticello.
A late arrival from Great Britain brings dates subsequent
to the maturity of the Prince Regent’s Authority.
It appears that Percival &c. are to retain their
places, and that they prefer war with us to a
repeal of their orders in Council.
We have nothing left therefore but to make ready for it.
As a step to it an embargo for 60 days was recommended
to Congress on Wednesday and agreed to in the
House of Representatives by about 70 to 40.
The Bill was before the Senate yesterday who
adjourned about 4 or 5 o’ Clock without a decision.
Whether this result was produced by the rule which arms a
single member with a veto against a decision in one day on
a bill or foretells a rejection of the Bill, I have not yet heard.
The temper of that body is known to be equivocal.
Such a measure, even for a limited and short time,
is always liable to adverse as well as favorable
considerations; and its operation at this moment,
will add fuel to party discontent and interested clamor.
But it is a rational & provident measure and will be relished
by a greater portion of the Nation than an omission of it.
If it could have been taken sooner and for a period of 3
or 4 months, it might have enlisted an alarm of the
British Cabinet for their Peninsular System on the side of
Concessions to us; and would have shaken their obstinacy,
if to be shaken at all; the successes on that Theatre,
being evidently their hold on the Prince Regent: and
the hold of both on the vanity & prejudices of the nation.
Whether if adopted for 60 days, it may beget
apprehensions of a protraction & thence lead to
admissible overtures before the sword is stained
with blood, cannot be foreknown with certainty.
Such an effect is not to be counted upon.
You will observe, that Liverpool was Secretary
for the Foreign Dept. ad interum, & that
Castlereagh is the definitive successor of Wellesley.
The resignation of this last, who has received
no other appointment is a little mysterious.
There is some reason for believing that he is
at variance with Percival; or that he distrusts
the stability of the existing Cabinet and courts an
alliance with the Grenville party, as likely to overset it.
If none of that party desert their colors, the
calculation cannot be a very bad one; especially
in case of war with the U. S: in addition to the
distress of British trade & manufactures and the
inflammation in Ireland; to say nothing of possible
reverses in Spain & Portugal, which alone would
cut up the Perceval ascendancy by the roots.
From France we hear nothing.
The delay of the Hornet is inexplicable,
but on the reproachful supposition that the
French Government is waiting for the final
turn of things at London before it takes its course,
which justice alone ought to prescribe towards us.
If this be found to be its game, it will impair the
value of concessions if made, and give to her
refusal of them, consequences it may little dream of.
Be assured of my constant and sincerest attachment
James Madison
I understand the Embargo will pass the Senate today;
and possibly with an extension of the period to 75 or 90 days.8
On April 4 Secretary of State James Monroe wrote to
General George Mathews to disavow the seizure of Amelia Island, and
Madison replaced Mathews with Georgia’s Governor David Brydie Mitchell
and instructed him to return the occupied territory to Spain.
He also ordered him to remain there to protect the inhabitants.
Controversial territory was not included in the slave state of Louisiana,
and it was admitted into the Union on April 30 as the 18th state.
It was the first to be added that was not connected to another state.
The state of Tennessee prohibited the importation of slaves.
Henry Dearborn had been Secretary of War for President Jefferson 1801-1809,
and on 27 January 1812 he became the senior officer in the United States Army.
On April 6 Dearborn wrote this letter to President Madison:
As the principal object of the command, which
may be confided to my direction, will probably be
the conquest of Lower Canada, it may not be improper
for me to Suggest the outlines of what occurs to my mind,
in relation to principal points of attack, the probable
means of defense, and the necessary force for rendering
Success as certain as the usual exigencies of War will admit;
taking into view the unavoidable or unfortunate
casualties incident to Military operations.
After Securing the Small posts on the southern
Side of the River St. Lawrence, the Town & Garrison
of Montreal will be the first important object: Its insular
position and the width of the River with a Garrison of
regular and provincial Troops of uncertain numbers
(but probably not less than from four to eight thousand)
will render an approach with undisciplined troops, somewhat
difficult, and will of course require on the part of the
assailants a Strong Superiority in point of numbers.
Small Craft or Boats of different kinds for
transporting the Troops and Artillery will be
indispensable and in Sufficient number to transport
Six or Eight thousand Men at once with their Artillery.
When Montreal Shall have been carried, and Suitable
measures taken for disposing of the garrison, and
disaffected inhabitants, and for Securing at least a passive
or neutral disposition among the People generally by Such
proclamations and assurances of protection of Persons,
religion, and property, as the Commanding Officer may
be authorized to give; And also for procuring Such
regular and certain Supplies as will be necessary.
When these objects are accomplished, a forward movement
should be made with a large body of the Army, as far down
the River towards Quebec, as existing circumstances may
warrant for the purpose of establishing a Strong position
for covering the Country, and affording protection to the
well disposed Inhabitants, as well as for Securing as great
a proportion of the provisions as may be practicable:
In the meantime it might be expedient to engage as many
of the Inhabitants in our service, as should be inclined to
enter; and to establish such force on the River, as would
afford protection to our Water Communication between
Montreal and the Posts below and on the River Sorrel.
To afford a reasonable certainty of Success to the
expedition, it would in my opinion require an Army
of at least sixteen thousand Men, Rank & File, present
and fit for duty; Or in other words, that number of Men
actually in the Field with a suitable train of Field Artillery;
and in the Park a sufficient number of 18 pounders,
large howitzers with some Mortars of different sizes.
The Boats should mostly be built on Lake Champlain,
say at White hall and other places nearer to Canada;
and materials for the construction of light scows for
Artillery should be procured and transported with the
Army to the Bank of the St. Lawrence; while the light Boats,
should be transported by Land from St. Johns or Chambly.
To advance into the immediate vicinity of Quebec with
an intention of carrying the place by Assault or Siege
will require a strong force composed of troops Sufficiently
disciplined and inured to service to be able to act in
open Field against regular Troops and to encounter
with firmness Assaults with the Bayonet, as frequent
sorties from a strong Garrison must be anticipated.
It may be calculated that Quebec will have as strong a
Garrison as the extent of its works require, and of course
will be vigorously and obstinately defended; from the nature
of its peninsular situation, its particular position, and works,
it would be necessary in case of a Siege to divide the
besieging Army into at least two Bodies Vizt, One on the
heights of Abraham and the other across the River St.
Charles on the position occupied by the right wing of
Montcalm’s Army in 1759 (previous to the decisive battle).
It would also be necessary to detach a body of Troops to
the south side of the River to cover the Country & hold the
inhabitants in Check and to prevent, as far as practicable,
any Supplies of Men or provisions to the Garrison.
Each of the two first-mentioned bodies should be
sufficiently strong for resisting with certainty the
whole force of the Garrison; Consequently the
besieging Army should be at least in point of
numbers three times as strong as the Garrison.
A temporary Bridge could be thrown over the St. Charles,
which would afford a more ready and certain
communication between the troops on the heights of
Abraham, and those on the opposite side of the St. Charles.
We may calculate on a Garrison of at least six thousand
Men, exclusive of Seamen, and the Inhabitants; of course
the besieging Army ought not to be less than 24,000 Men;
supplied with a large train of Battering Cannon and Mortars,
and an ample Stock of all kinds of Ammunition and with
at least two or three first-rate Engineers, who have had
Sufficient practical experience in different sieges:
and as we have no Such Engineers, we must
endeavor to import such as can be fully relied on.
As the conquest of Upper Canada will not, I presume,
be considered as under the direction of the Commander
of the Force destined against Lower Canada, I will only
observe on that subject generally that to render the
Conquest certain, and to effect it in the Shortest possible
time it may be well to direct three different Attacks,
as nearly as practicable, at the Same time: Vizt.
One from Detroit, one from Niagara, and one from the
Black River Country; for the two first, I should presume,
that 3,000 Men for each would be sufficient, for the last,
I should Suppose 5,000 Men would be requisite.
It will be essential that these different bodies Should
understand distinctly what each ought to perform, and at
what point or points their junction Should be formed:
and as Soon as the Conquest is Secured, about 2,000
Troops may be Sufficient for the Several Garrisons,
and the remainder might be discharged after enlisting as
many of them as practicable for a longer term; and the
British troops with such others, as ought not to be allowed
to remain in the Province, might be Sent off to Albany.
I will take the liberty of Suggesting the expediency of
sending a small expedition composed of 3,000 of the
Militia of the District of Maine under a Suitable
Commander to take possession of the Province of
New Brunswick; the whole might be effected in two
or three months with very little expense or risk.
Colonel Trescott of Passamaquoddy is a
good Officer and well acquainted with the Country.
It Should be observed that in the course of the foregoing
observations such a reinforcement of British troops,
as would enable them to take the Field with an Army of
8 or 10,000 Men exclusive of Militia and of a competent
Garrison at Quebec, has not been contemplated.
It may however be considered as a possible event and
perhaps not very improbable; for with the addition of
only 5 or 6,000 Men by leaving a Garrison of
1,000 Men in Quebec, an Army of 8 to 10,000 Men
(including those at Montreal and Three Rivers)
might take the Field with the addition of 5 or 6,000 Militia.
Under such circumstances Montreal might be
so defended, as to render it impracticable to
approach it with the force above stated.
And if contrary to the present expectations, such an
additional force should be Sent to Canada, as would
enable the enemy to take the Field with an Army of
12 or 15,000 Men, exclusive of Militia, it would require
a greater force on our side, even for defensive
Operations on the immediate borders of Canada,
than has been proposed for an Offensive expedition.
I shall close this hasty Sketch by observing that when
a declaration of War can no longer be avoided,
but by the Sacrifice of our National honor and
Independence, it will be of infinite importance
that it should be So prosecuted, as to produce
a Satisfactory peace in the shortest time possible;
and I confidently presume that every intelligent man will
agree that to secure those objects the only legitimate policy
and economy of lives and treasure will be that of making
use of such efficient force in every offensive operation,
as will render success, as certain as ample numbers,
judiciously directed could promise.9
Madison hoped that the British Foreign Secretary
Castlereagh’s letter might still prevent war.
Yet on April 14 an editorial in the National Intelligencer called for a war.
Thomas Jefferson to help the farmers on 17 April 1812
wrote in a letter to Madison:
The enclosed papers will explain themselves.
Their coming to me is the only thing
not sufficiently explained.
Your favor of the 3rd came duly to hand.
Although something of the kind had been apprehended,
the embargo found the farmers and planters only
getting their produce to market and selling as fast
as they could get it there.
I think it caught them in this part of the state
with one third of their flour or wheat and ¾
of their tobacco undisposed of.
If we may suppose the rest of the middle country
in the same situation, and that the upper & lower
country may be judged by that as a mean,
these will perhaps be the proportions of produce
remaining in the hands of the producers.
Supposing the objects of the government were
merely to keep our vessels and men out of harm’s way,
and that there is no idea that the want of our flour
will starve great Britain, the sale of the remaining
produce will be rather desirable, and what would
be desired even in war and even to our enemies.
For I am favorable to the opinion which has been
urged by others, sometimes acted on, and now
partly so by France and great Britain, that commerce
under certain restrictions and licenses may be indulged
between enemies mutually advantageous to the
individuals and not to their injury as belligerents.
The capitulation of Amelia island, if confirmed,
might favor this object, and at any rate get off
our produce now on hand.
I think a people would go through a war with much
less impatience if they could dispose of their produce,
and that unless a vent can be provided for them,
they will soon become querulous & clamor for peace.
They appear at present to receive the embargo with
perfect acquiescence and without a murmur, seeing
the necessity of taking care of our vessels and seamen.
Yet they would be glad to dispose of their produce
in any way not endangering them, as by letting it
go from a neutral place in British vessels.
In this way we lose the carriage only;
but better that than both carriage and cargo.
The rising of the price of flour, since the first panic
is passed away, indicates some prospect
in the merchants of disposing of it.
Our wheat had greatly suffered by the winter
but is as remarkably recovered by the
favorable weather of the spring.10
Vice President George Clinton died of an illness on April 20.
Joel Barlow in Paris wrote another letter to Madison on April 22:
I have interested myself a good deal (not officially) in aid
of General Lafayette for the sale of his Pointe Coupé lands.
He has now sold them all, & we think very well;
but for the last two thousand acres he cannot
receive the money till he delivers the patents.
He doubts not that you will send them as soon as
convenient & will doubtless write you by this conveyance.
But knowing the interest you take in what concerns him
he desires me to add my opinion to his own
that he could not have done better.
Indeed the price of 60 francs an acre
paid here is probably a great price.
It is equal (according to the present rate of exchange)
to 15 dollars in the United States.
He wishes you to perceive in this transaction
the only means he had of freeing himself
completely from a load of debt.
It will do this, when completed, & he will be left
with an income including his half pay as general & his
landed estate in France of about 20,000 francs a year.
And his habits of expense have now been
so long regulated on a moderate scale,
that he will be very comfortable as to revenue.
It is impossible for me to say from the
present face of things what turn the Emperor
will give to our urgent claims for indemnity on the
spoliations, of which I have said so much & they so little.
The duke seems to have got seriously
to work at it, as a thing that must be
laid at rest in some way, & the settlement
to accompany or precede the treaty of Commerce.
From hints I have had from that quarter, though
not from the Duke himself, I very much doubt
whether any money or stock will be given or promised,
or in short any other mode offered than such as was
suggested before but with considerable modifications.
I beg you to consider with indulgence
my motives for detaining the Hornet so long.
I have detailed them, as far as I dared
in an official form to the Secretary of State.
The great point I aimed at, as paramount to all others,
was to remove the causes of war with England.
I thought it could be done from this quarter.
And perhaps the delays I have had thrown in my way
have here arisen from a suspicion that such was my object.
Perhaps the horror I have for that war is scarcely
felt by any other of my countrymen.
It arises from a cause that I do not like to explain on paper.
It may be perceived in a view of the critical State
of England, the present posture of this continent
& the moral character of its master.
If you do not agree with me in opinion,
I know you will perceive the honesty of my zeal.11
Madison wrote again to his friend Jefferson on 24 April 1812:
I have just received your favor of the 17th.
The same mail brings me the “Proceedings of the
Government of the U. S. relative to the Batture”
for which you will accept my thanks.
I had not supposed that so great a proportion
of produce, particularly of Wheat & flour,
was still in the hands of the farmers.
In Pennsylvania it was known to be the case.
In New York almost the whole of the last crop
is in the Country, though chiefly in the hands
of the Merchants & Millers.
The measure of the Embargo was made a difficult one,
both as to its duration & its date, by the conflict of
opinions here and of local interests elsewhere;
and to these causes are to be added that invariable
opposition, open with some & covert with others,
which have perplexed & impeded the
whole course of our public measures.
You will have noticed that the Embargo
as recommended to Congress was limited to 60 days.
Its extension to 90 proceeded from the united votes of
those who wished to make it a negotiating instead of a
war measure, of those who wished to put off the day of
war as long as possible, if ultimately to be met, & of those
whose mercantile constituents had ships abroad, which
would be favored in their chance of getting safely home.
Some also who wished & hoped to anticipate the expiration
of the term calculated on the ostensible postponement
of the war question, as a ruse against the Enemy.
At present great differences of opinion exist, as to
the time & form of entering into hostilities; whether
at a very early or later day or not before the end
of the 90 days, and whether by a general declaration
or by a commencement with letters of Maury & Reprisal.
The question is also to be brought forward
for an adjournment for 15 or 18 days.
Whatever may be the decision on all these points,
it can scarcely be doubted that patience in the
holders of wheat & flour at least, will secure them
good prices; Such is the scarcity all over Europe
and the dependence of the West Indies on our supplies.
Mr. Maury writes me on the 21st of March that flour had
suddenly risen to 16½ dollars, and a further rise looked for.
And it is foreseen that in a State of war the Spanish &
Portuguese flags & papers, real or counterfeit, will afford
a neutral cover to our produce as far as wanted in ports
in the favor of Great Britain Licenses therefore on our
part will not be necessary; which though in some respects
mitigating the evils of war are so pregnant with abuses of
the worst sort, as to be liable in others to strong objections.
As managed by the Belligerents of Europe they are
sources of the most iniquitous & detestable practices.
The Hornet still loiters.
A letter from Barlow to Granger fills us with serious
apprehensions that he is burning his fingers with matters
which will work great embarrassment & mischief here;
and which his instructions could not have suggested.
In East Florida Mathews has been playing a tragicomedy
in the face of common sense, as well as of his instructions.
His extravagances place us in
the most distressing dilemma.12
Joel Barlow in Paris on 2 May 1812 wrote another letter to Madison:
It is impossible to form a satisfactory opinion
at this time as to the result of the propositions
contained in my letter of yesterday to the minister,
a copy of which I herewith send to the Secretary of State.
You will have perceived that the polestar
from which I have all along graduated my compass
was to remove the cause of war with England.
The object of this government being directly contrary,
you will easily discern at least one of the causes of the
delays they have practiced not only in completing the
arrangements I had prepared, but in answering official
letters on pressing subjects, in giving up ships which
they really meant to give up, in explaining themselves
distinctly on any point that could bear upon our relations
with England, & finally in the studied omission of the
United States on the occasion of the Duke’s report of
the 10th of March, of which I took notice in my letter
to the Secretary of State of the 16th of that month.
The only chance of arriving at my object was to conceal it,
& whenever I alluded to our impending war with England
it was necessary to assume that it was inevitable.
As this however was not very apparent,
I could not push the minister for an explicit declaration
& solemn promulgation as to the repeal of the decrees.
To have asked him for it would have done
more harm than good; until the prince regent’s
declaration has luckily come to my aid.
This has enabled me to raise a strong demand founded on
facts that cannot be denied nor with decency overlooked.
I think it will now appear pretty plain,
as far as this government can judge of our affairs,
that the war is so positively decided on by the British,
as that the French would run no risk of
preventing it by agreeing to my demand.
And I have put it on the double footing of
undeniable justice to us, & of producing a
unanimity in our country in war measures.13
On May 6 in Albany 800 citizens signed a petition asking
for repeal of the embargo, and the next day some inhabitants
of Troy, New York sent this Circular to President Madison.
The Inhabitants of the town of Troy, feeling in common
with their Fellow Citizens the calamities with which the
disastrous policy of the Government has overwhelmed
our Country, and apprehensive of evils in prospect still
more destructive and extensive, and at the same time
impressed with a belief that the baneful measures of
their Rulers are adopted from a mistaken impression
that they are coincident with the wishes and feelings
of the great body of the People have at this momentous
crisis with a unanimity unexampled for the last thirteen
years, assembled and expressed to the Government
and World, their most decided disapprobation of the
recent measures and views of Congress.
Believing that it is only necessary that the voice
of the People should be expressed to dispel the
illusion which the misrepresentations of our public
Journals have occasioned, and arrest the progress of
the ruinous measures adopted and projected, we take
the liberty to transmit to you the proceedings of this town,
and invite the aid of your influence and exertions to
call forth a manly expression of public sentiment upon
these momentous subjects in your vicinity.14
Samuel Harrison had fought in the Revolutionary War and had attended
the convention in Vermont that ratified the United States Constitution.
On 11 May 1812 he wrote this heartfelt letter to President Madison:
Ever since my introduction to your Excellency
at Washington in March 1806 by my worthy friend
Doctor William Thornton, I have held your affability
and virtues in profound admiration; and have often
lamented that your important duties would not suffer
me to cultivate a more intimate acquaintance, and
correspondence with a Gentleman of your eminent worth
and superior Talents; But knowing the duties of your
important station would interfere with your inclination to
answer me; I have forborne to gratify my real impressions
and should still have remained a silent admirer of the
Wisdom and Abilities you have exerted since your Exaltation
to the Chair of Presidential Greatness; But the impending
horrors of War are so shocking to my imagination, that
I cannot refrain myself from throwing into the treasury
of your Excellency’s Understanding my inferior mite.
While by the Belligerents of Europe you have been
driven to the summit of a tremendous precipice—
Pause—I beseech you Pause—On my knees I
entreat you to Pause—do Pause—before you
take the dreadful plunge—Do not leap—Oh leap not Sir!
to the destruction of yourself—of your friends—of the
country & the interests committed to your charge.
The maxims of true Policy to Individuals
are ever sure maxims of true policy to Nations.
When different Evils present themselves,
it is universally the best maxim to abide by
the old Adage—“Of two evils, choose the least.”
This is applicable in the present state of National affairs.
I know the evils which present themselves
from Great Britain are formidable;
But will not a Declaration of War be much more formidable?
Yes my Dear Sir.
It will take twenty years of the unexampled prosperity of
these ’til lately rising United States to remedy one single
year of this dreadful calamity; should it really take place.
View for a moment my Dear President
the desolations of Europe.
Contrast with them the prosperity of America
for the last twenty years;
before you precipitate into the dreadful Vortex.
It is more destructive than Charybdis.
It is more tremendous than Scylla.
Do not pass the Rubicon until you have
weighed all the consequences.
Remember, Dear Sir, your responsibility—you are amenable
to your Conscience—your Country—and your God.
Oh Madison! in every Act beware!
For one wrong step may spoil an Age of Care.
Although my present residence is amongst the Green
Mountains and far secluded from the existing commotions
of the Great; Yet I have not been wholly confined to
Vermont, for since I left the Seat of your Excellency’s
residence in May 1806, I have actually travelled in different
parts of the United States and the two Canadas upwards
of four thousand Miles and have not been wholly inattentive
to the popular sentiment, as well as to the sentiments
of individuals; and am absolutely certain, that should
your Excellency declare War, the confidence of a
great multitude of your sedulous friends, ultimate
admirers, and most ardent supporters, will be
forever sequestrated and can never be resuscitated.
I am confident that notwithstanding the effervescent
and vibrating effusions of some opaque assemblages,
and their versatile promises of support with their lives
and properties in a War with Great Britain; a very large
majority of the people both in the Eastern, Western, and
Northern Sections of the Union would reprobate the
measure and are wholly averse to its declaration;
And with me deplore its concomitant Miseries and can
never feel gratified with the butchery of their fellow mortals.
I know that War is the Element of European Nations,
especially Great Britain and France; it is congenial
to their feelings; it is paramount in all their actions;
their Politics are governed by it; their Prerogatives
are its offspring; and their preposterous Decrees
and Orders are its illegitimate progeny.
But Peace is the Element on which the Americans ought
ever to abide for this their cupidity cannot be too extreme.
The Cornucopia of the Moderns has been its attendant,
and if defection from its precepts should involve us in
the opposite macerating calamity, farewell to
exuberance, aggrandizement, and redundance
with every other cotemporary blessing.
The Prohibition, not to say the Obliteration of
Freedom from the Eastern Hemisphere has long
been predicted by myself; for my Travels and
observations have not been confined to America.
Their feudal System of Politics has torn and will forever
lacerate them with perpetual discord; they must be
deluged in blood by the competitors for terrain and
maritime dominion until the Mammoth is destroyed or
Leviathan drowned, and their pretensions to Universal
domination on their respective elements annihilated.
It can never be the true interest of the
United States to plunge into the most
tremendous whirlpool of European destruction.
“We had better suffer wrong than do wrong.”
Do not, Dear Sir, attempt a Warfare
with Britain unless she declare it.
Never be the aggressor; She is a Leviathan—
what are we on her element but Puisne?
The same on a different element applies to France;
she is a Mammoth, and on viewing her on
her Element view ourselves as Mice—
do not attempt a war with her unless she declare it.
Oh My Dear Sir, be careful, not to declare War yourself.
If you are crowded into a defensive War, depend upon
support, you will have it from every section of the Union:
But if you declare it yourself, before it is declared
by your opponent, though injuries more accumulated
should be heaped on those already almost insufferable;
The War will be unpopular and must terminate,
dishonorably; It will end in disgrace.
It will retard the prosperity of the Country more than
double the term of its continuance, and when the contest
has terminated, a dreary list of disconsolate Widows and
Fatherless Children may then be added to the accumulated
catalogue of the numerous dependents of an exhausted
Treasury, which cannot be replenished without enormous
loans, direct taxes, or legalized requisitions, equally
obnoxious to independent Freemen and subversive to
patriotism, while an enormous list of expenditures,
would impoverish our citizens; The procrastination
of domestic improvements would contrast the
unexampled progression of more than twenty years;
and the miseries entailed on posterity will then prompt
them to curse the inadvertence, not to say folly, of
their ancestors’ President for plunging into a Contest
productive of no manner of Good but abundance of Evil.
My Dear President, to plunge into a War without
adequate preparation would be the summit of Folly,
and allowing it to last ten years;
would Great Britain feel any better disposed to
comply with your terms of accommodations,
or the terms of your successor than she now is?
But you may lay aside all expectations of a new
election to the Presidency if you do declare War;
on this single criterion depends your support
or neglect at the ensuing Election.
I am better acquainted with the feelings of the People
than many of those sycophantic, declamatory War Hawks,
who, like Homer’s Thersites, are full of empty boasts
and impotent threats; yet in time of danger
will be noticed only to be laughed at.
These would persuade you to declare war while your real
friends will dissuade you from so destructive a measure.
Sir, it is not for want of courage nor the true interests
of this country that I am thus importunate, I know that
Columbia’s welfare or ill fate depend upon this Crisis.
No Sir, I shall carry to my Grave the mark of Freedom,
the price of Independence is sealed upon my thigh,
the high places of Battle have borne me the Testimony
that my blood has been shed in defense of my Country,
and that without orders my back was never turned
on the face my enemy nor will it be again,
if a defensive War summon me to the Service.
But I am averse to an offensive war.
What if you should conquer the two Canadas
(Quebec excepted) for Quebec cannot be taken without
more loss of blood and treasure than the Canadas are both
worth—and what if Hallowell, Portland, Saco, Kennebunk,
Wells, Portsmouth, Newbury Port, Salem, Boston, Plymouth,
Marble Head, Newport, Providence, New London, Norwich,
Newhaven Bridgeport, New York with every other Port from
New York to New Orleans should be burnt in exchange?
What would you lose? and what would you gain?
Could you treat on better terms than you can now?
No Sir No
Can War with all its hideous train
Our reconcilement prove?
Can Ships destroyed upon the main,
Or desolation on the Plain,
Or flaming roof, or bleeding vein,
Or thousands of our brethren slain,
Our injuries remove?
With every sentiment of respect I remain your most
Obedient, but not your Excellency’s flattering, servant.15
In the spring British ships began to use more forbearance with
American ships and citizens, and captains at Halifax and Bermuda
were ordered to keep clear of the American coast to avoid incidents.
Joel Barlow in Paris wrote again to Madison on May 12,
Since the date of my last letter I have by dint
of scolding got the answer which I communicate
by this occasion to the Secretary of State.
The evasions used on this occasion were curious.
In the notes to the prince Regent’s declaration,
which I enclose herewith in the Moniteur of the
8th, you will see the only answer they intended
to give to my demand of the 1st of May.
The reference made in these notes to a decree of the 28th
of April 1811, gave me occasion to ask for that decree,
which I did in a conference with the Duke on the 9th.
I told him I never had seen or heard of such a decree;
he brought it forth & read it to me, declaring that it had
been communicated to Mr. Russell & Mr. Serurier last year.
It is not in the papers of this legation, & if you have no
knowledge of it, the suspicion I have will be confirmed,
that it was created last week expressly for this occasion.
I know not in State ethics by what
name such management is called.
It was still intended not to give me a copy
of the decree, & to make the notes in the
Moniteur serve as the declaration I required.
I told him at last that I must be frank with him.
The occasion required it.
That as to the notes in the Moniteur,
they would be very good if signed by him.
That taken as the simple speculations of an editor
they would do neither good nor hurt, but given as an
answer to an official note on so solemn a subject they
would only serve in America to show how the French
government could play with the feelings of a foreign agent;
that as to arguments in favor of my demand, I could use
no more; they were all found in my note; but I must
declare to him one fact, which was that on the answer to
my demand would depend the question of a vigorous war
or a shameful accommodation with England; that I could
not tell indeed what the Emperors wish might be on that
subject, but he might depend upon what I now said,
that without such a declaration on his part & acts
conformable to it, a war against England was
impracticable; but with it, it might be regarded as infallible.
He then promised the answer & gave it as you see.16
On 18 May 1812 the 82 Republicans who met as a caucus in Congress
voted unanimously for Madison to be the Republican candidate for President.
For the vice president nominee 64 members voted
for John Langton, and 16 wanted Elbridge Gerry.
Langton declined, and Gerry became the nominee.
The next day the USS Hornet returned to New York,
and its long-awaited dispatches reached Washington three days later;
but there was no indication the British Orders in Council would change.
On May 21 the former President John Adams
in Quincy wrote this letter to Madison:
Mr. Malcom was three years in my family at Philadelphia
as my private Secretary: and during that time his conduct
was ingenuous faithful and industrious,
attentive and entirely to my satisfaction.
His Connections in New York were respectable
and his education to letters and the bar regular.
Although since the dissolution of that connection
between him and me there has been no intercourse,
and very little correspondence between us,
I have ever held him in Esteem and affection.
Though without his permission, I shall venture to enclose
his letter to me asking the favor to have it returned to me
by the post; there will be no doubt many applications
from Persons whose merits are wholly unknown to me.
In your decision I shall perfectly acquiesce,
believing it to be founded in pure integrity,
mature deliberation and sound judgment.
And now since I have ventured to write to you, I cannot
restrain myself from saying one word on another subject.
Mr. Gerry is one of the oldest patriots of the revolution,
and like most others of that character has sacrificed himself,
his fortune and his family to the cause of his Country.
He is one of the firmest pillars of that system which alone
can save this Country from disgrace and ruin;
and if he is not in some way or other supported,
but suffered to sink, his principles and measures
will feel a dangerous, if not fatal discouragement,
in all this section of the union.
As I am well aware of the delicacy of your situation,
as well as of the importance of it, I neither expect
or desire any answer to this letter, or any other
that I may have occasion hereafter to write.17
Madison on May 25 wrote this letter to Jefferson:
The enclosed letters came
under cover to me by the Hornet.
France has done nothing towards
adjusting our differences with her.
It is understood that the British & Maritime Decrees are
not in force against the U. S. and no contravention
of them can be established against her.
On the contrary positive cases rebut the allegation.
Still the manner of the French Government
betrays the design of leaving Great Britain
a pretext for enforcing her Orders in Council.
And in all other respects the grounds
of our complaints remain the same.
The utmost address has been played off on Mr. Barlow’s
wishes & hopes; inasmuch that at the Departure of the
Hornet which had been so long detained for a final answer,
without its being obtained, he looked to the return of the
Wasp which had just arrived without despair of making
her the Bearer of some satisfactory arrangement.
Our calculations differ widely.
In the meantime the business is
become more than ever puzzling.
To go to war with England and not with France
arms the federalists with new matter and
divides the Republicans, Some of whom with
the Quids make a display of impartiality.
To go to war against both presents a thousand difficulties;
above all that of shutting all the ports of the
Continent of Europe against our Cruisers who
can do little without the use of them.
It is pretty certain also that it would not
gain over the Federalists, who would turn
all those difficulties against the Administration.
The only consideration of weight in favor of
this triangular war, as it is called, is that it might
hasten through a peace with Great Britain or France:
a termination for a while at least of the obstinate
questions now depending with both.
But even this advantage is not certain.
For a prolongation of such a war might be viewed by
both Belligerents as desirable with as little reason for the
opinion, as has prevailed in the past conduct of both.18
On June 1 Congress received documents and
read Madison’s War Message behind closed doors.
The President laid out the many violations Americans had suffered
from the British because they wanted to monopolize commerce.
This is President Madison’s entire War Message:
I communicate to Congress certain Documents,
being a continuation of those heretofore laid before them
on the subject of our Affairs with Great Britain.
Without going back beyond the renewal in 1803 of the war
in which Great Britain is engaged, and omitting unrepaired
wrongs of inferior magnitude; the conduct of her
Government presents a series of acts, hostile to the
United States as an Independent and neutral nation.
British cruisers have been in the continued practice of
violating the American flag on the great highway of nations,
and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it,
not in the exercise of a belligerent right
founded on the law of nations against an enemy,
but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects.
British jurisdiction is thus extended to neutral vessels
in a situation where no laws can operate but the law of
nations, and the laws of the Country to which the vessels
belong; and a self-redress is assumed, which, if British
subjects were wrongfully detained and alone concerned,
is that substitution of force for a resort to the responsible
sovereign, which falls within the definition of War.
Could the seizure of British subjects in such cases be
regarded as within the exercise of a Belligerent right,
the acknowledged laws of war, which forbid an article
of captured property to be adjudged, without a regular
investigation before a competent Tribunal, would
imperiously demand the fairest trial, where the
sacred rights of persons were at issue.
In place of such a trial these rights are
subjected to the will of every petty commander.
The practice hence is so far from affecting British
subjects alone that, under the pretext of searching
for these, thousands of American citizens under the
safeguard of public law and of their national flag,
have been torn from their country and from
everything dear to them; have been dragged
on board ships of war of a foreign nation and
exposed under the severities of their discipline
to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes,
to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors
and to be the melancholy instruments of
taking away those of their own brethren.
Against this crying enormity, which Great Britain
would be so prompt to avenge if committed against herself,
the United States have in vain exhausted remonstrances
and expostulations, and that no proof might be wanting
of their conciliatory dispositions, and no pretext left for
a continuance of the practice, the British government
was formally assured of the readiness of the United States
to enter into arrangements such as could not be rejected
if the recovery of British subjects
were the real and the sole object.
The communication passed without effect.
British cruisers have been in the practice also
of violating the rights and the peace of our coasts.
They hover over and harass
our entering and departing commerce.
To the most insulting pretensions they have added
the most lawless proceedings in our very harbors,
and have wantonly spilt American blood
within the sanctuary of our territorial jurisdiction.
The principles and rules enforced by that nation
when a neutral nation against armed vessels of
Belligerents hovering near her coasts, and
disturbing her commerce, are well known.
When called on nevertheless by the United States to
punish the greater offenses committed by her own vessels,
her Government has bestowed on their commanders,
additional marks of honor and confidence.
Under pretended blockades without the presence of an
adequate force and sometimes without the practicability
of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in
every Sea; the great staples of our Country have been
cut off from their legitimate markets; and a destructive
blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests.
In aggravation of these predatory measures, they have
been considered as in force from the dates of their
notification; a retrospective effect being thus added,
as has been done in other important cases,
to the unlawfulness of the course pursued.
And to render the outrage the more signal these mock
blockades have been reiterated and enforced in the face
of official communications from the British Government
declaring, as the true definition of a legal Blockade “that
particular ports must be actually invested, and previous
warning given to vessels bound to them not to enter.”
Not content with these occasional expedients for laying
waste our neutral trade, the Cabinet of Great Britain
resorted at length to the sweeping system of Blockades
under the name of orders in Council; which has been
molded and managed, as might best suit its political views,
its commercial jealousies or the avidity of British cruisers.
To our remonstrances against the complicated and
transcendent injustice of this innovation the first reply was
that the orders were reluctantly adopted by Great Britain,
as a necessary retaliation on decrees of her Enemy
proclaiming a general Blockade of the British Isles
at a time when the naval force of that Enemy
dared not to issue from his own ports.
She was reminded without effect that her own prior
Blockades, unsupported by an adequate naval force,
actually applied and continued were a bar to this plea:
that executed Edicts against millions of our property
could not be retaliation on Edicts confessedly impossible
to be executed: that retaliation to be just should fall on the
party setting the guilty example, not on an innocent party,
which was not even chargeable with an acquiescence in it.
When deprived of this flimsy veil for a prohibition of our
trade with her enemy by the repeal of his prohibition of
our trade with Great Britain; her Cabinet, instead of a
corresponding repeal or a practical discontinuance of its
orders, formally avowed a determination to persist in them
against the United States until the markets of her enemy
should be laid open to British products: thus asserting on
obligation on a neutral power to require one Belligerent to
encourage by its internal regulations the trade of another
Belligerent, contradicting her own practice towards all
nations in peace as well as in war; and betraying the
insincerity of those professions, which inculcated a belief
that having resorted to her orders with regret, she was
anxious to find an occasion for putting an end to them.
Abandoning still more all respect for the neutral rights
of the United States, and for its own consistency the
British Government now demands, as prerequisites to a
repeal of its orders, as they relate to the United States,
that a formality should be observed in the repeal of the
French Decrees nowise necessary to their termination, nor
exemplified by British usage; and that the French repeal,
besides including that portion of the Decrees which operate
within a territorial jurisdiction, as well as that which
operates on the high seas against the commerce of the
United States, should not be a single and special repeal
in relation to the United States, but should be extended
to whatever other neutral nations unconnected with
them, may be affected by those Decrees.
And as an additional insult they are called on for a formal
disavowal of conditions and pretentions advanced by the
French Government for which the United States are so far
from having made themselves responsible, that in official
explanations, which have been published to the world,
and in a correspondence of the American Minister at
London with the British Minister for foreign affairs, such a
responsibility was explicitly and emphatically disclaimed.
It has become indeed sufficiently certain that the
commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed,
not as interfering with the Belligerent rights of Great Britain;
not as supplying the wants of her enemies, which she
herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly
which she covets for her own commerce and navigation.
She carries on a war against the lawful commerce of a
friend, that she may the better carry on a commerce
with an enemy; a commerce polluted by the forgeries
and perjuries, which are for the most part the only
passports by which it can succeed.
Anxious to make every experiment short of the last
resort of injured nations, the United States have withheld
from Great Britain under successive modifications the
benefits of a free intercourse with their market; the loss
of which could not but outweigh the profits accruing from
her restrictions of our commerce with other nations.
And to entitle these experiments to the more favorable
consideration, they were so framed, as to enable her to
place her adversary under the exclusive operation of them.
To these appeals her Government has been equally
inflexible; as if willing to make sacrifices of every sort,
rather than yield to the claims of justice
or renounce the errors of a false pride.
Nay, so far were the attempts carried to overcome the
attachment of the British Cabinet to its unjust Edicts,
that it received every encouragement, within the
competency of the Executive branch of our Government,
to expect that a repeal of them would be followed
by a war between the United States and France
unless the French Edicts should also be repealed.
Even this communication, although silencing
forever the plea of a disposition in the
United States to acquiesce in those Edicts,
originally the sole plea for them received no attention.
If no other proof existed of a predetermination of the
British Government against a repeal of its orders,
it might be found in the correspondence of the Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States at London and the
British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in 1810 on the question
whether the Blockade of May 1806 was considered
as in force or as not in force.
It had been ascertained that the French Government,
which urged this Blockade as the ground of its
Berlin Decree was willing in the event of its removal,
to repeal that Decree; which being followed by
alternate repeals of the other offensive Edicts,
might abolish the whole system on both sides.
This inviting opportunity for accomplishing an
object so important to the United States and
professed so often to be the desire of both the
Belligerents, was made known to the British Government.
As that Government admits that an actual application
of an adequate force is necessary to the existence
of a legal Blockade, and it was notorious that if such
a force had ever been applied, its long discontinuance
had annulled the Blockade in question; there could be
no sufficient objection on the part of Great Britain to a
formal revocation of it; and no imaginable objection to
a declaration of the fact that the Blockade did not exist.
The declaration would have been consistent with her
avowed principles of Blockade; and would have enabled
the United States to demand from France the pledged
repeal of her Decree; either with success, in which case
the way would have been opened for a general repeal
of the Belligerent Edicts; or without success, in which
case the United States would have been justified in
turning their measures exclusively against France.
The British Government would, however, neither
rescind the Blockade; nor declare its non-existence;
nor permit its nonexistence to be inferred and
affirmed by the American Plenipotentiary.
On the contrary by representing the Blockade
to be comprehended in the orders in Council,
the United States were compelled so to
regard it in their subsequent proceedings.
There was a period when a favorable change in the policy
of the British Cabinet was justly considered as established.
The Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty here
proposed an adjustment of the differences more
immediately endangering the harmony of the two Countries.
The proposition was accepted with the
promptitude and cordiality corresponding
with the invariable professions of this Government.
A foundation appeared to be laid for
a sincere and lasting reconciliation.
The prospect, however, quickly vanished.
The whole proceeding was disavowed by the British
Government without any explanation which could
at that time repress the belief that the disavowal
proceeded from a spirit of hostility to the commercial
rights and prosperity of the United States.
And it has since come into proof that at the very moment,
when the public Minister was holding the language of
friendship and inspiring confidence in the sincerity of
the negotiation with which he was charged, a secret
agent of his Government was employed in intrigues
having for their object a subversion of our Government
and a dismemberment of our happy union.
In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain towards
the United States our attention is necessarily
drawn to the warfare just renewed by the Savages
on one of our extensive frontiers; a warfare which is
known to spare neither age nor sex and to be
distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity.
It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations,
which have for some time been developing themselves
among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders
and garrisons without connecting their hostility with that
influence, and without recollecting the authenticated
examples of such interpositions heretofore furnished
by the officers and agents of that Government.
Such is the spectacle of injuries and indignities
which have been heaped on our Country: and
such the crisis which its unexampled forbearance
and conciliatory efforts have not been able to avert.
It might at least have been expected, that an
enlightened nation, if less urged by moral obligations,
or invited by friendly dispositions on the part of the
United States would have found in its true interest alone,
a sufficient motive to respect their rights and their
tranquility on the high seas, that an enlarged policy
would have favored that free and general circulation
of Commerce, in which the British nation is at all times
interested, and which in times of war is the best
alleviation of its calamities to herself, as well as to
other Belligerents; and more especially that the
British Cabinet would not for the sake of a precarious
and surreptitious intercourse with hostile markets,
have persevered in a course of measures, which
necessarily put at hazard the invaluable market of
a great and growing Country disposed to cultivate
the mutual advantages of an active commerce.
Other Councils have prevailed.
Our moderation and conciliation have had no other effect
than to encourage perseverance and to enlarge pretensions.
We behold our seafaring Citizens still the daily
victims of lawless violence committed on the
great common and high way of nations, even
within sight of the Country which owes them protection.
We behold our vessels, freighted with the products
of our soil and industry or returning with the honest
proceeds of them, wrested from their lawful destinations,
confiscated by prize courts, no longer the organs of public
law, but the instruments of arbitrary Edicts;
and their unfortunate crews dispersed and
lost or forced or inveigled in British ports into British fleets:
while arguments are employed in support of these
aggressions, which have no foundation but in a
principle equally supporting a claim to regulate
our external commerce in all cases whatsoever.
We behold in fine on the side of Great Britain a state of war
against the United States; and on the side of the
United States a state of peace towards Great Britain.
Whether the United States shall continue passive under
these progressive usurpations and these accumulating
wrongs; or opposing force to force in defense of their
national rights shall commit a just cause into the hands
of the Almighty disposer of events; avoiding all connections
which might entangle it in the contests or views of other
powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur
in an honorable re-establishment of peace and friendship
is a solemn question, which the Constitution wisely
confides to the Legislative Department of the Government.
In recommending it to their early deliberations,
I am happy in the assurance that the decision
will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic Councils
of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful Nation.
Having presented this view of the relations of the
United States with Great Britain and of the solemn
alternative growing out of them, I proceed to remark
that the communications last made to Congress
on the subject of our relations with France
will have shown that since the revocation of her Decrees,
as they violated the neutral rights of the United States,
her Government has authorized illegal captures by its
privateers and public ships: and that other outrages
have been practiced on our vessels and our Citizens.
It will have been seen also that no indemnity had been
provided or satisfactorily pledged for the extensive
spoliations committed under the violent and retrospective
orders of the French Government against the property
of our Citizens seized within the jurisdiction of France.
I abstain at this time from recommending to the
consideration of Congress definitive measures with respect
to that nation in the expectation that the result of unclosed
discussions between our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris
and the French Government will speedily enable Congress
to decide with greater advantage on the course due to the
rights, the interests, and the honor of our Country.19
On 3 June 1812 young John Calhoun of South Carolina read a war manifesto
attributed to the House Committee on Foreign Relations,
but it actually had been written by Secretary of State Monroe.
Calhoun then introduced the war bill drafted by Attorney General William Pinkney.
Monroe wanted to limit the war to the high seas, and Gallatin agreed with him;
but attempts to limit the war to the seas failed in Congress.
John Randolph in the House of Representatives argued against
what he considered to be a war of conquest.
Republicans were afraid to enact taxes to pay for the imminent war
because they did not want to endanger Madison’s re-election.
On 9 June 1812 Thomas Jefferson wrote this letter to President Madison:
I duly received your favor of the 22nd
covering the declaration of war.
It is entirely popular here, the only opinion
being that it should have been issued the moment
the season admitted the militia to enter Canada.
The federalists indeed are open mouthed
against the declaration.
But they are poor devils here, not worthy of notice.
A barrel of tar to each state South of the Potomac
will keep all in order, & that will be freely
contributed without troubling government.
To the North they will give you more trouble.
You may there have to apply the rougher
drastics of Governor Wright, hemp and confiscation.
To continue the war popular
two things are necessary mainly.
1. to stop Indian barbarities.
The conquest of Canada will do this.
2. to furnish markets for our produce,
say indeed for our flour, for tobacco is already
given up & seemingly without reluctance.
The great profits of the wheat crop have allured
everyone to it; and never was such a crop on the
ground as that which we generally begin to cut this day.
It would be mortifying to the farmer
to see such a one rot in his barn.
It would soon sicken him of war.
Nor can this be a matter of wonder or of blame on him.
Ours is the only country on earth where war is an
instantaneous and total suspension of all
the objects of his industry and support.
For carrying our produce to foreign markets our own ships,
neutral ships, & even enemy ships under neutral flags,
which I would wink at, will probably suffice.
But the coasting trade is of double importance,
because both seller & buyer are disappointed,
& both are our own citizens.
You will remember that in this trade our greatest distress
in the last war was produced by our own pilot boats taken
by the British and kept as tenders to their larger vessels.
These being the swiftest vessels on the ocean, they took
them & selected the swiftest from the whole mass.
Filled with men, they scoured everything along
shore & completely cut up that coasting business
which might otherwise have been carried on
within the range of vessels of force and draught.
Why should not we then line our coast with vessels
of pilot boat construction filled with men armed
with cannonades, and only so much larger
as to ensure the mastery of the pilot boat?
The British cannot counter work us by building
similar ones, because the fact is, however unaccountable,
that our builders alone understand that construction.
It is on our own pilot boats the British will depend,
which our larger vessels may thus retake.
These however are the ideas of a landsman only.
Mr. Hamilton’s judgment will test their soundness.
Our militia are much afraid of being
called to Norfolk at this season.
They all declare a preference of a march to Canada.
I trust however that Governor Barbour will attend to
circumstances and so apportion the service among
the counties that those acclimated by birth or
residence may perform the summer tour, and the
winter service be allotted to the upper counties.20
Many wanted war for economic reasons.
Planters in South Carolina and Georgia suffered from low prices for cotton,
and farmers in the Ohio valley had difficulty getting their produce to markets.
Southerners also wanted to take Florida from Spain,
and northerners and western expansionists hoped to get Canada.
On June 4 the House had voted for war 79-49
with all 34 Federalists and 15 Republicans in opposition.
Also about 35 Republicans abstained.
On the 17th the Senate voted 19-13 for unrestricted war.
All 39 Federalists in Congress voted against the war.
The House of Representatives approved the Senate’s amendments,
and Madison signed the declaration of war.
On 18 June 1812 President Madison and
Secretary of State Monroe issued this proclamation:
Whereas the Congress of the United States by virtue of
the constitutional authority vested in them, have declared
by their act bearing date the 18th day of the present month,
that war exists between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, and the dependences thereof, and the United
States of America and their Territories; Now therefore, I
James Madison, President of the United States of America,
do hereby Proclaim the same to all whom it may concern:
And I do especially enjoin on all persons holding Offices,
Civil or Military, under the Authority of the United States,
that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties
respectively incident thereto: And I do moreover exhort all
the good people of the United States as they love their
Country, as they value the precious heritage derived from
the virtue and valor of their fathers, as they feel the Wrongs
which have forced on them the last resort of injured
Nations, and as they consult the best means under the
blessing of Divine Providence of abridging its calamities,
that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting
Concord, in maintaining the authority and the efficacy of the
Laws; and in supporting and invigorating all the Measures
which may be adopted by the constituted authorities for
obtaining a speedy, a just and honorable peace.21
Madison’s proclamation of war against the British was announced
on June 19 and was published in the National Intelligencer on June 20.
Whereas the Congress of the United States by virtue of
the constitutional authority vested in them have declared
by their act bearing date the 18th day of the present
month, that war exists between the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependences thereof,
and the United States of America and their Territories.
Now therefore, I James Madison, President of the United
States of America do hereby Proclaim the same to all
whom it may concern: And I do especially enjoin on all
persons holding Offices, Civil or Military, under the
Authority of the United States, that they be vigilant
and zealous in discharging the duties respectively
incident thereto: And I do moreover exhort all the good
people of the United States as they love their Country,
as they value the precious heritage derived from the
virtue and valor of their fathers, as they feel the Wrongs
which have forced on them the last resort of injured
Nations, and as they consult the best means under the
blessing of Divine Providence, of abridging its calamities,
that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting
Concord, in maintaining the authority and the efficacy of the
Laws; and in supporting and invigorating all the Measures
which may be adopted by the constituted authorities for
obtaining a speedy, a just and honorable peace.22
The British government on June 23 learned that Napoleon
had finally repealed his Berlin and Milan decrees.
The British Orders in Council then lifted their orders
that the Americans were demanding.
The senior commander Henry Dearborn from Boston
wrote this letter to President Madison on 26 June 1812:
Our political opponents in and out of the
Legislature are endeavoring to inspire as general
an opposition to the measures of the General.
Government as possible, how far they will venture
toward an open resistance is uncertain nothing but
their fears will prevent their going all lengths.
It is said that they have not received so satisfactory
information from New York as they had expected.
A memorial or address to the people of the State has been
two days under discussion in the House of Representatives.
The sentiments and style of the address is calculated to
induce a general opposition to the war
and all other measures of the General Government.
They will endeavor to have Town meeting in every Town
where their party prevails, and it is understood that
County Conventions are to follow the Town meetings.
The Republicans will take measures for
counteracting those outrageous proceedings.
Many of those who have gone all lengths with the Junto
men begin to fall off and oppose those violent proceedings.
Mr. Dexter has made strong & explicit
declarations against their proceedings
and in favor of supporting the Government.
From the frequent applications I receive from the small
harbors and inlets on our extensive seacoast, I take the
liberty of suggesting the expediency of encouraging the
formation of minute Companies in the Towns & villages
on the seacoast by agreeing to furnish them with Arms
and some ammunition on condition that they should be
duly organized and engaged to hold themselves ready
to turn out on the shortest notice for the protection of
their respective Towns & those in their vicinity.
I think there would be many Companies formed on those
principles, and they would afford all the aid that would
be necessary in many places, and in larger Towns
would be very useful in cases of sudden emergencies.
The engagements ought to hold each man for the term
of three or four years at least, unless when called into
service at a distance, or they should enter into the Army.
We are in great want of gunboats on our coast.
I mean in the harbors & mouths of rivers.
It will be impracticable to give such security
& protection to many of the Towns & places
on the sea coast from New York to Passamaquadda,
as the people would be entitled to without a
large number of gunboats of different sizes.
It has been fashionable for many people to
laugh at gunboats, but they will be found on
experience to be an important part of our defense,
and many of those who have effected to laugh
at them will be very glad of their protection.
I have received no late information
from Canada or Nova Scotia.
I have not heard of the appointment
of a Commissary General.
Great inconveniencies are experienced from a
want of clothing & Blankets for the recruits.23
When the war began in June, the United States had only about
6,744 regular soldiers with little experience and 5,000 recruits in training.
So far the military academy at West Point
had graduated less than a hundred officers.
Republicans had argued in 1798 that the Constitution does
not allow state militia to fight outside the national borders.
Now Federalists and Republicans opposed to the war used this argument.
To raise an army of 10,000 men they raised the bounty
for enlistment from $12 to $31 with 160 acres of land.
They planned to add 25,000 regulars and 50,000 volunteers for one year, and
the Congress authorized the President to call up 100,000 militia for six months.
They also appropriated $1,900,000 to purchase arms and military supplies.
Americans did not know that the British had 6,000 regulars in Canada
and 2,100 Canadian auxiliaries and about 3,000 Indian allies.
The US Navy had less than a dozen seaworthy ships while the Royal Navy had
some 80 ships at Halifax and in the West Indies with nearly 700 warships at sea.
Madison approved a three-pronged invasion of Canada advised
by his Secretary of War William Eustis and General Henry Dearborn.
The native Americans called a council at Fort Wayne in June,
and older chiefs opposed to Tecumseh were for supporting
the United States in the war against the British.
Tecumseh disagreed and argued that this was the opportunity for the Indians
to unite and ally with the British to win at least a portion of the land
of their fathers that would be respected by the King.
He believed that if the country passed into the hands of the “Long Knives,”
meaning the Americans, then it would not be long before the remnants
of their tribes between the Mississippi, the Great Lakes,
and the Ohio River would be driven west.
Twice when an American envoy handed him peace pipes,
Tecumseh broke them in two.
Then he marched with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos
who supported him to Fort Malden to fight with the British.
They were joined by Wyandots, Chippewas, and Sioux,
and Black Hawk led warriors of the Sauk, Foxes, and Winnebagos.
Baltimore with 46,555 people was the third largest city
in the nation after New York and Philadelphia, and on June 20
the Federal Republican in Baltimore published by Alexander Contee Hanson
and Jacob Wagner opposed the war, angering Republicans.
The next evening a crowd of several hundred men gathered at the
newspaper office, and led by Philip Lewis they destroyed the building.
Riots went on for several weeks; but city officials refused
to call out the militia until the church was threatened.
On June 24 Secretary of War Eustis ordered General William Hull
to march to Detroit and see if he could take Fort Malden.
On June 30 President Madison sent this message to the Congress
to facilitate the appointment of more Army officers:
With a view the better to adapt to the public service
the Volunteer force contemplated by the Act passed on
the sixth day of February, I recommend to the
consideration of Congress the expediency of making
the requisite provision for the officers thereof being
commissioned by the authority of the United States.
Considering the distribution of the military forces of the
United States required by the circumstances of our country,
I recommend also to the consideration of congress
the expediency of providing for the appointment of an
additional number of General officers and of Deputies in the
Adjutant’s, Quarter Master’s, Inspector’s, and Paymaster’s
Departments of the Army; and for the employment
in cases of emergency of additional Engineers.24
Notes
1. The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series, Volume 4 5 November 1811—
9 July 1812 with a supplement 5 March 1809—19 October 1811 ed. J. C. A. Stagg
et al, p. 172-173.
2. Ibid., p. 199-202.
3. Ibid., p. 231-233.
4. Ibid., p. 235.
5. Ibid., p. 263.
6. Ibid., p. 277-278.
7. Ibid., p. 285-286.
8. Ibid., p. 286-288.
9. Ibid., p. 298-301.
10. Ibid., p. 330-331.
11. Ibid., p. 337-338.
12. Ibid., p. 345-346.
13. Ibid., p. 359-360.
14. Ibid., p. 369.
15. Ibid., p. 374-377.
16. Ibid., p. 379.
17. Ibid., p. 405-406.
18. Ibid., p. 415-416.
19. Ibid., p. 432-438.
20. Ibid., p. 519-520.
21. Ibid., p. 489-490.
22. Ibid., p. 489-490.
23. Ibid., p. 508-509.
24. Ibid., p. 521-522.