In early January 1804 the United States Senate
began debating the Louisiana Ordinance.
Secretary of State James Madison told the diplomat Robert R. Livingston that
the Floridas were not included in the Louisiana Purchase from France which
he said would have the Rio Grande, then called Rio Bravo, as the western boundary.
On January 31 Madison wrote in a long letter to Livingston
with much cypher coding (shown here in italics).
Here are the only two paragraphs that contained cypher writing:
It does not appear that in the delivery of the province by
the Spanish authorities to M. Laussat anything passed
denoting its limits either to the east the west or the north.
Nor was any step taken by M. Laussat either while
the province was in his hands or at the time of his
transferring it to ours calculated to dispossess Spain
of any part of the territory east of the Mississippi.
On the contrary in a private conference
he stated positively that no part of the Floridas
was included by the eastern boundary France
having strenuously insisted to have it extended to
the Mobile which was peremptorily refused by Spain.
We learn from M. Pinkney that the Spanish
government holds the same language to him.
To the declaration of M. Laussat however we
can oppose that of the French minister made to
you that Louisiana extended to the River Perdido
and to the Spanish government as well as to that
of France if it should havechanged its ground we
can oppose the treaties of St. Ildefonso and of
September 30, 1803 interpreted by facts and fair inferences.
The question with Spain will enter into the proceedings
of M. Monroe on his arrival at Madrid whither he will be
instructed to repair as soon as he shall have executed at
London the instructions lately transmitted to him in
relation to the impressment of seamen from American
vessels and several other points which call for just and
stipulated arrangements between the two Countries.
As the question relates to the French government the
President relies on your prudence and attention for availing
yourself of the admission by M. Marbois that Louisiana
extended to the River Perdido and for keeping the weight
of that government in our scale against that of Spain.
With respect to the western extent of Louisiana
M. Laussat held a language more satisfactory.
He considered the Rio Bravo or del Norde as far as
the 30 North latitude as its true boundary on that side.
The northern boundary we have reason to believe
was settled between France and Great Britain by
Commissioners appointed under the Treaty of Utrecht
who separated the British and French Territories
West of the Lake of the Woods by the 49 of latitude.
In support of our just claims in all these cases it is
proper that no time should be lost in collecting
the best proofs which can be obtained.
This important object, has already been
recommended generally to your attention.
It is particularly desirable that you should procure
an authenticated copy of the commercial charter
granted by Louis Fourteenth to Crozat in 1712 which
gives an outline to Louisiana favorable to our claims
at the same time that it is an evidence of the highest and
most unexceptionable authority, a copy of this charter is
annexed to the English translation of Joutel’s Journal of La
Salle’s Last Voyage, the French original not containing it.
A record of the charter doubtless exists in the archives
of the French government, and it may be expected
that an attested copy will not be refused to you.
It is not improbable that the charter or other Documents
relating to the Mississippi project a few years after may
afford some light and be attainable from the same source.
The proceedings of the Commissioners under the
Treaty of Utrecht will merit very particular research
as they promise not only a favorable northern
boundary but as they will decide an important
question involved in a convention of limits now
depending between the United States and Great Britain.
To those may be added whatever other documents may
occur to your recollection or researches including maps &c.
If the secret treaty of Paris in Seventeen hundred
& sixty two or three between France & Spain
and an entire copy of that of St. Ildefonso in
1800 can be obtained they may also be useful.
An authentication of the precise date,
at least of the former, is very important.
You will be sensible of the propriety of putting M. Monroe
in possession of all the proofs and information which you
may obtain should he take Paris in his way to Madrid
you will have the best of opportunities for the purpose….
Neither of the succeeding alternatives will increase
the balance payable by France, nor is it contemplated
that in these or any other modifications whatever the
Treasury of the United States is to be made chargeable
with more than 3,750,000 dollars; or rather with more
than so much of that sum as would satisfy the debts
to which it is subjected by the last Convention.1
Madison wrote to James Monroe on 16 February 1804
a confidential letter with much cypher writing.
In a private letter by Mr. Baring I gave you a detail
of what had passed here on the subject of etiquete.
I had hoped that no farther jars would have ensued as I
still hope that the good sense of the British government
respecting the right of the government here to fix its rules
of intercourse and the sentiments and manners of the
country to which they ought to be adapted will give the
proper instructions for preventing like incidents in future.
In the meantime a fresh circumstance
has taken place which calls for explanation.
The President desirous of keeping open for cordial
civilities whatever channels the scruples of Master
Merry might not have closed asked me what these
were understood to be and particularly whether he
would come and take friendly and familiar dinners
with him I undertook to feel his pulse through some
hand that would do it the least impropriety.
From the information obtained I inferred that
an invitation would be readily accepted and
with the less doubt as he had dined with me
(his lady declining) after the offence originally taken.
The invitation was accordingly sent and terminated
in the note from him to me & my answer herewith
enclosed I need not comment on this display of diplomatic
superstition, truly extraordinary in this age and country.
We are willing to refer it to the personal character of
a man accustomed to see importance in such trifles
and over cautious against displeasing his government
by surrendering the minutest of his or its pretentions.
What we apprehend is that with these causes may
be mingled a jealousy of our disposition toward
England and that the mortifications which he has
inflicted on himself are to be set down to that account.
In fact it is known that this jealousy particularly since
the final adjustment with France exists or is affected
in a high degree and will doubtless give its color to the
correspondence of the legation with its government.
To apply an antidote to this poison will
require your vigilant and prudent attention.
It can scarcely be believed that the British Government
will not at once see the folly committed by its
representative especially in the last scene of the
farce and that it will set him to right in that respect.
But it may listen with a different ear to suggestions
that the U. S. having now less need of the friendship of
Britain may be yielding to a latent enmity toward her.
The best of all proofs to the contrary would be
the confidential communications you possess,
if it were not an improper condescension to
disclose them for such a purpose.
Next to that is the tenor of our measures, and the
dictates of our obvious policy; on an appeal to both
of which you may found the strongest assurances that
the Government of the U. S. is sincerely and anxiously
disposed to cultivate harmony between the two nations.
The President wishes you to lose no opportunity and to
spare no pains that may be necessary to satisfy the British
Administration on this head and to prevent or efface any
different impressions which may be transmitted from hence.
I collect that the cavil at the pêle mêle here
established turns much on the alleged degradation
of ministers and envoys to a level with charges.
The truth is, and I have so told Merry, that this is not
the idea; That the President did not mean to decide
anything as to their comparative grades or importance;
that these would be estimated as heretofore; that
among themselves they might fix their own ceremonies,
and that even at the presidents table they might seat
themselves in any subordination they pleased.
All he meant was that no seats were to be
designated for them, nor the order in which they
might happen to sit to be any criterion of the respect
paid to their respective commissions or Countries.
On public occasions, such as Inaugural speech &c.
the Heads of Departments with foreign Ministers,
and others invited on the part of the Government would
be in the same pêle mêle within the space assigned them.
It may not be remiss to recollect that under the Old
Congress, as I understand, and even in the ceremonies
attending the introduction of the new Governments
the foreign ministers were placed according to the
order in which their Governments acknowledged
by Treaties the Independence of the United States.
In this point of view the pêle mêle is favorable
both to Great Britain and to Spain.
I have, I believe, already told you that the
President has discontinued the handing first to
the table the wife of a head of department applying
the general rule of pêle mêle to that as to other cases.
The Marquis d Yrujo joined with Merry in refusing
an invitation from the president and has throughout
made a common cause with him not however
approving all the grounds taken by the latter.
His case is indeed different and not a little awkward;
having acquiesced for nearly three years in the
practice against which he now revolts.
Pichon being a charge only was not invited into
the pretentions of the two plenipotentiaries.
He blames their contumacy, but I find he has
reported the affair to his government which is
not likely to patronize the cause of Merry & Yrujo.2
On 19 March 1804 Madison wrote in a letter to Carlos Martínez de Yrujo,
the Spanish minister to the United States,
That admitting the Section to embrace by necessary
construction, Waters and places Southward of the
boundary established between the United States and
Spain by their Treaty of 1795, the United States have
acquired by their Treaty of April 30th 1803 with the
French Republic, founded expressly on that of October
1st 1800 between Spain and the latter a just and legal
title to the Province of Louisiana, which as described in
the said Treaties is understood to extend Eastwardly to the
River Perdido, and consequently to embrace all the Waters
and places necessarily embraced by such a construction.
Whatever negotiations or further explanations may
be necessary on the present occasion with His Catholic
Majesty will be conducted on the part of the United
States through their Diplomatic Agency at Madrid.
The President has been led by His High respect for his
Catholic Majesty to charge me with these candid remarks,
in consequence of your representations; notwithstanding the
terms in which you have allowed yourself to convey them.
The same respect for His Catholic Majesty, and an anxious
regard to the harmony between Spain and the United
States, induces him not to shut the Door against any
further communications with you, which the mutual interest
of the two nations may require; but it is left open on the
indispensable condition that the language of Decorum,
and the deference which is not more due to the
Government of the United States, than it must
be deemed conformable to the sentiments and
self-respect of your own, be not again forgotten.2
Yrujo protested the terms of the Louisiana Purchase, and he moved
to Philadelphia without notifying Secretary of State Madison.
Yrujo wrote to President Jefferson complaining about Madison’s behavior.
Madison instructed James Monroe in Spain to demand Yrujo’s recall.
When Yrujo returned in 1806, Madison ordered his expulsion.
Madison wrote another long letter to Livingston on 31 March 1804
that had only these four paragraphs with cypher writing:
In mine of January 31 I informed you that Louisiana had
been Transferred by the French Commissioner to our
Commissioners on the 20th of December, that nothing had
officially passed on the occasion concerning the boundaries
of the ceded Territory; but that Mr. Laussat had
confidentially signified that it did not comprehend any part
of West Florida; adding at the same time that it extended
westwardly to the Rio Bravo otherwise called Rio del Norde.
Orders were accordingly obtained from the Spanish
authority for the Delivery of all the posts on the West side
of the Mississippi as well as on the Island of New Orleans.
With respect to the Posts in West Florida
orders for the delivery were neither offered
to nor demanded by our Commissioners.
No instructions have in fact been ever
given them to make the demand.
This silence on the part of the Executive was deemed
eligible first because it was foreseen that the demand
would not only be rejected by the Spanish authority at
New Orleans which had in an official publication limited
the cession westwardly by the Mississippi and the island
of New Orleans but was apprehended as has turned out
that the French commissioner might not be ready to
support the demand and might even be disposed to
second the Spanish opposition to it secondly because
in the latter of these cases a serious check would be given
to our title and in either of them a premature dilemma
would result between an overt submission to the refusal
and a resort to force thirdly because mere silence would
be no bar to a plea at any time that a delivery of a part,
particularly of the Seat of the Government, was a virtual
delivery of the whole; while in the meantime we could
ascertain the views and claim the interposition of the
French government and avail ourselves of that and any
other favorable circumstances for effecting an amicable
adjustment of the question with the Government of Spain.
In this state of things it was deemed proper by Congress
in making the regulations necessary for the collection of
Revenue in the ceded Territory, and guarding against the
new danger of smuggling into the United States through
the channels opened by it to include a provision for the
case of West Florida by vesting in the President a power
which his discretion might accommodate to events.
This provision is contained in the 11th taken in connection
with the 4th Section of the Act herewith enclosed.
The Act had been many Weeks depending in Congress
with these Sections word for word in it; the bill had been
printed as soon as reported by the Committee for the
use of the Members, and as two copies are by a usage
of politeness always allotted for each Foreign Minister
here, it must in all probability have been known to
the Marquis d’Yrujo in an early stage of its progress.
If it was not, it marks much less of that zealous
vigilance over the concerns of his sovereign than
he now makes the plea for his intemperate conduct.
For some days even after the Act was published
in the Gazette of this City he was silent.
At length however he called at the Office of State with the
Gazette in his hand and entered into a very angry comment
on the 11th Section, which was answered by remarks
(some of which it would seem from his written allusion
to them were not well understood) calculated to assuage
his dissatisfaction with the law, as far as was consistent
with a candid declaration to him that we considered all of
West Florida Westward of the Perdido as clearly ours by
the Treaty of April 30th 1803 and that of St. Ildefonso.
The conversation ended as might be inferred from
his letters which followed it on the 7th & 17th instant,
of which copies are herewith enclosed, as are also
copies of my answer of ? and of his reply of ? .
You will see by this correspondence the footing on which
a rudeness which no government can tolerate has placed
him with this government and the view of it which must
be unavoidably conveyed to our minister at Madrid.
It may be of some importance also that
it be not misconceived where you are.
But the correspondence is chiefly of importance
as it suggests the earnestness with which Spain
is likely to contest our construction of the treaties
of cession and the Spanish reasoning which will be
employed against it and consequently as it urges
the expediency of cultivating the disposition of the
French government to take our side of the question.
To this she is bound no less by sound policy,
than by a regard to right….
Mr. Merry has formally complained of the
expressions in your printed memorial which were
construed into ill will toward Great Britain and
an undue partiality to the French government.
He said that he was expressly instructed by his government
to make this complaint that the memorial was viewed by it
in a very serious light and that it was expected from the
candor of the American government and the relations
subsisting between the two nations that the unfriendly
sentiments expressed in the memorial if not authorized by
instructions as was doubtless the case would be disavowed.
He admitted that the memorial might not be an official
paper or an authenticated publication but dwelt on
the notoriety of its author and on its tendency as
an ostensible evidence of the spirit and views of so
important and so maritime a power as the United
States to excite animosity in other nations against
Great Britain and to wound her essential interests.
He mentioned several circumstances known to
himself while at Paris among others, conversations
with you on the subject of the memorial which
established the fact that it was written by you.
If I did not mistake him he said that the fact was informally
acknowledged to him by yourself although you disowned
it in an official point of view in reply it was on the day
following observed to him by the direction of the president
that the sentiments of the United States and of their
Government towards Great Britain were sincerely friendly,
according to the assurances which had been given to him,
and otherwise communicated; that we wished to cultivate
the friendship between the two Countries, as important to
ours as well as to his, that although we wished to maintain
friendship at the same time with France, and with all other
Nations, we entertained no sentiments towards her or any
other Nation, that could lessen the confidence of Great
Britain in the equal sincerity of our friendship for her or
in our strict impartiality in discharging every duty which
belonged to us as a Neutral Nation; that no instruction could
therefore have been given to any functionary of the United
States to say or do anything unfriendly or disrespectful to
Great Britain that the memorial in question if written by you
was a private and not official document that the reasoning
employed in it could have been intended merely to reconcile
the French government to the objects of the writer, not to
injure or offend Great Britain that as far as the memorial
could be supposed to have a tendency to either it resulted
solely from its publication a circumstance which there was
every reason to believe had been without your sanction and
must have been followed by your disapprobation and regret.
Mr. Merry after repeating the sensibility of his government
to the incident of which he complained and the importance
attached to it expressed much satisfaction at the explicit
and friendly explanation he had heard and his confidence
that the favorable report which he should make of it
would be equally satisfactory to his government.
From this view of the matter you will be sensible of the
regret excited by your permission to the French government
mentioned in your letter of December 11 to publish the
memorial as attributed to you a publication of it by the
French government with a reference to you as the author
and without any denial on your part will doubtless be
represented by the British government as having all the
authenticity and effect of a direct publication by yourself
as well as the appearance moreover of some sort of
collusion with the French government against the British
government and it may be fairly suspected that one object
at least of the former in endeavoring to connect your name
with the publication has been to engender or foster in the
latter a distrust and ill humor towards the United States.
You will infer from these observations the wish of the
President that if no irrevocable step should have been taken
in the case, the French Government may be induced in the
manner you may find most delicate to withdraw its request
and thereby relieve the government of the United States
from the necessity of further explanations to the British
government which will be the more disagreeable as it
may be the more difficult to make them satisfactory.3
On 10 April 1804 Madison wrote seven letters including two to
William C. C. Claiborne, and in the one to Charles Pinckney he wrote,
On the arrival of Mr. Monroe he will join you in the
discussion, and the provision due to our Citizens
may perhaps be incorporated with the principal
negotiations which will then be undertaken.
In the mean time you will be under no restraint from
taking advantage of any favorable change in the disposition
of the Spanish Government for obtaining justice from it.
This is the more to be desired as it will simplify the
transaction committed jointly to yourself and Mr. Monroe,
and leave applicable to other contested cases any sum
that may be stipulated by the United States in
that transaction and which will probably be
inadequate to the aggregate of the cases….
The demand of the Spanish Government that the
trade from the United States to St. Domingo should
be prohibited, which is the subject of the first
correspondence, was of so extraordinary a nature
that it was thought to justify and require every
observation which is contained in the answers to it.
If its minister had not so explicitly disclaimed any
pretention to speak the purposes of the principal
nations in Europe having West India Colonies,
copies of his letter with my answer would have
been communicated to Mr. Merry and Mr. Pichon.
As it was, it was thought not improper to make
both those Ministers generally and verbally
acquainted with what had passed on the occasion.
As the Marquis D’Yrujo will doubtless transmit this
correspondence to his government, it is proper that
you should possess it in order that you may understand
its ideas on this subject and be the better able in
combating them to pursue those of your own Government.
Spain must never be permitted to suppose that she will
not be considered by the United States as responsible for
whatever proceedings under her authority may be forbidden
by the law of nations and not justified by Treaties….
According to information already received many vessels
belonging to Citizens of the United States have suffered
from irregularities in the West Indies in which Spanish
authorities have in some way or other participated and
for which of course redress will lie against the Spanish
government; and new cases are daily added.
As soon as the requisite statements can be made of them,
they will form a ground for claiming just reparation.
In the meantime you will represent generally to that
Government the illegal and unfriendly practice which exists,
and the right which the United States have to expect
from the justice of His Catholic Majesty and his regard
to the friendship and harmony of the two nations,
immediate instructions to his officers in the West Indies
which may put an end to the practice….
In furnishing you with the arguments which
support our title to part of West Florida, it is
not meant to lead you into any discussions
on that subject with the Spanish Government
much less to authorize any negotiations
relative to the Floridas without the
arrival or advice of Mr. Monroe.4
On April 15 Madison in a letter to James Monroe suggested in detail
how the issues between Spain and the United States could be settled.
He also proposed how they could respect the
choices of the Indian tribes with these two articles:
§. 3. The Indian tribes within the said limits
shall not be considered as subject to or
exclusively connected with either party.
Citizens of the United States and Spanish subjects shall
be equally free to trade with them and to sojourn among
them as far as may be necessary for that purpose;
and each of the parties agrees to restrain by all proper
and requisite means its respective citizens and subjects
from exciting the Indians whether within or without the
said limits from committing hostilities or aggressions of
any sort on the subjects or Citizens of the other party.
The parties agree moreover, each of them
in all public transactions and communications
with Indians to promote in them a disposition to
live in peace and friendship with the other party.
§n 4. It shall be free for Indians now within the Territories
of either of the parties to remove to, and settle within
the said limits without restraint from the other party;
and either party may promote such a change of settlement
by Indians within its Territories; taking due care not to
make it an occasion of War among the Indians, or of
animosities in any of them against the other party.5
President Thomas Jefferson on 30 May 1804 issued this proclamation:
Whereas by an act of Congress authority has been
given to the President of the United States, whenever
he shall deem it expedient, to erect the shores, waters,
and inlets of the bay and river of Mobile, and of the other
rivers, creeks, inlets, and bays emptying into the Gulf of
Mexico east of the said river Mobile and west thereof to
the Pascagoula, inclusive, into a separable district for the
collection of duties on imports and tonnage; and to
establish such place within the same as he shall deem
it expedient to be the port of entry and delivery for such
district; and to designate such other places within the same
district, not exceeding two, to be ports of delivery only:
Now know ye that I, Thomas Jefferson,
President of the United States, do hereby
decide that all the above-mentioned shores,
waters, inlets, creeks, and rivers lying within
the boundaries of the United States shall constitute
and form a separate district, to be denominated
“the district of Mobile;” and do also designate
Fort Stoddert, within the district aforesaid, to be
the port of entry and delivery for the said district.6
On July 21 Madison in a letter to James Monroe wrote,
Our affairs continue on a prosperous train.
The tide of opinion is more & more
favorable to the Administration.
The Legislature of New Hampshire
has completely changed its majority.
In Massachusetts parties are nearly in equilibrio.
Even in Connecticut the spirit of opposition,
in spite of all the exertions to keep it up,
daily languishes in the Mass of the Society.
The vote of Tennessee, whose Legislature meets tomorrow,
will if in favor of the amendment to the Constitution,
as is expected, give it the necessary sanction.
If we can avoid the snares which our folly or
foreign arts may spread for our peace, we can
scarcely fail to flourish, and to effect by degrees
more of concord than has for some years been seen
or thought practicable in the great body of the nation.
We have had a most disastrous season
for our Wheat Crops.
The excess of wet weather has destroyed
more than half of them.
I hope our neighborhood has not been
among the greatest sufferers.
But the injury has been everywhere great
both to the quantity & quality.
It is too soon in the year to speak of
the Tobacco & Indian Corn.
The newspapers which you receive will give you
the adventure between Burr & Hamilton.
You will readily understand the different uses
to which the event is turned.
Mr. Merry & Mr. Pichon are both
in Philadelphia at present.
The latter with his lady proposes to pass
some time with us in Orange during our recess.
Mrs. Pichon is in need of every consolation
for the loss of her only child about a year old.
Mr. Merry is perhaps kept as yet a little
distant by the scruples of Etiquette.
I invited him & his lady to make us a visit also,
& notwithstanding the public ceremony interposed
by him to official civilities, I should gladly have
drawn him into the circle of private hospitality.
He has never dropped a word
on the subject of etiquette latterly.
I suspect that his Government has been silent and left
him to all the embarrassment resulting from that cause.
He is at bottom a very worthy man & easy to do
business with; except that he is excessively cautious,
perhaps the more under the fluctuations at this
moment incident to the British Cabinet.7
On 18 August 1804 Madison in a letter to Jefferson wrote,
Among those now enclosed is a renewal of Pichon’s
complaints which strengthens your observations
in the close of yours of the last date.
He is well founded in the view he takes of
the abuse made by the British ships of their
connection with the Harbor of New York.
He exacts too much however in requiring our effective
“surveillance” over the jurisdictional limit of the United
States which in the extent from St. Croix to St. Mary
would be impossible, & if possible call for a force &
expense inconsistent with our whole system of policy.
Such a surveillance even over the limit connected with
all our numerous harbors would exceed our reasonable
obligation and render an exclusion of Belligerent ships
altogether the more eligible horn of the dilemma.
Nor would even this course avoid all difficulty;
for questions might still arise whether certain
acts were committed within or within the distance
of a league from the shore, and without a force
everywhere, the prohibition of our ports &c. might be
insulted as is now that of the general law of Nations.
These observations are not meant to invalidate the
policy of that degree of force which is contemplated
for the defense of our ports & coasts.
Such a provision as a reasonable effort to maintain
our neutral character will be a satisfactory answer
to such of the Belligerent nations as are not
unreasonable in their complaints & expectations.8
In the 1804 elections the Republicans easily re-elected popular
President Thomas Jefferson, and he won with 162 electoral votes to 14
for the Federalist presidential candidate Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina
who won only Connecticut and Delaware with two electoral votes from Maryland
and for Vice President Rufus King of New York who was the US Minister in Britain.
The Republicans chose the older Governor George Clinton
of New York to be Vice President.
In the Senate the Democratic Republicans took two more seats
from the Federalists to increase their majority to 27 to 7.
In the House of Representatives the Republicans gained 11 more seats
from the Federalists, and they dominated with 114 to 28.
On 6 March 1805 Madison wrote in a letter to James Monroe:
The procrastinations of the British Ministry in meeting you
effectively on the subjects proposed in your project for a
Convention, betray a repugnance to some of them, and
a spirit of evasion, inauspicious to a satisfactory result.
Still your conduct was prudent in winking at
this dilatory policy and keeping the way open
for a fair and friendly experiment on your
return from Madrid, which it is presumed will
have taken place before this will reach London.
The experience of every day shows more and more the
obligation on both sides, to enter seriously on the means
of guarding the harmony of the two countries against the
dangers with which it is threatened by a perseverance of
Great Britain in her irregularities on the high seas, and
particularly in the impressments from American vessels.
The extent in which these have taken place since the
commencement of the War will be seen by the enclosed
report required from this Department by a vote of the
House of Representatives, and the call for it while
negotiations on the subject were understood
to be in train is itself a proof of the public
sensibility to those aggressions on the security
of our citizens and the rights of our flag.
A further proof will be seen in the motion also enclosed,
which was made by Mr. Crowninshield, and which
will probably be revived at the next Session.
This motion with his remarks on it appear very generally
in the Newspapers with comments proceeding from a
coincidence of the sensibility out of doors with that within.
A still stronger proof of impatience under this evil
will be found in the proceedings authorized by an Act
of Congress just passed and which is likewise enclosed,
against British Officers committing on the high seas
trespasses or torts on board American vessels;
offenses manifestly including cases of impressment.
In communicating these circumstances it will
occur to you that while they may be allowed to
proclaim the growing sensibility of the United States
on the subject of impressments, they ought by
proper explanations and assurances to be guarded
against a misconstruction into marks of illiberal
or hostile sentiments towards Great Britain.
The truth is, and it may be so stated by you, that
this practice of impressments aggravated by so many
provoking incidents has been so long continued, and
so often in vain remonstrated against that without
more encouragement than yet appears to expect
speedy redress from the British Government, the
United States are in a manner driven to the necessity of
seeking for some remedy dependent on themselves alone.
But it is no less true that they are warmly disposed to
cherish all the friendly relations subsisting with Great
Britain; that they wish to see that necessity banished
by just and prudent arrangements between the two
Governments; and that with this view you were instructed
to open the negotiations which are now depending.
It is impossible for the British Government
to doubt the sincerity of these sentiments.
The forbearance of the United States year after year and
war after war to avail themselves of those obvious means
which without violating their national obligations of any sort
would appeal in the strongest manner to the interest of
Great Britain is of itself a sufficient demonstration of the
amicable spirit which has directed their public councils.
This spirit is sufficiently manifested also, by
the propositions which have been lately made
through you and by the patience and cordiality
with which you have conducted the negotiation.
I might add, as a further proof to the same effect,
that notwithstanding the refusal of which we have official
information, from Glasgow and Liverpool particularly, to
restore American seamen deserting their ships in British
ports, the laws of many of the states have been left
without interruption to restore British deserters.
One of the states, Virginia, has even at the last Session
of its Legislature passed an act for the express purpose
of restoring such deserters; which deserves the more
attention, as it was done in the midst of irritations
resulting from the multiplied irregularities committed
by British ships in the American seas.
Mr. Merry has expressed some inquietude with respect to
the clause in the Act above referred to, which animadverts
on British trespasses on board American vessels; and his
language on several late occasions has strongly opposed
the expectation that Great Britain will ever relinquish her
practice of taking her own subjects out of neutral vessels.
I did not conceal from him my opinion that the terms
“trespass &c” would be applicable to the impressment
of British subjects as well as others, or that the
United States would never accede to that practice.
I observed to him that every preceding administration
had maintained the same doctrine with the present on
that point, and that such were the ideas and feelings
of the nation on it, that no administration would dare
so far to surrender the rights of the American flag.
He expressed dissatisfaction also, at the section
which requires certain compliances on the part
of British ships of War entering our harbors with
arrangements to be prescribed by the Collectors.
He did not deny the right of the Nation to make what
rules it might please in such cases; but apprehended
that some of them were such as the Commanders might
deem incompatible with their just pretensions, especially
when subjecting them to the discretion of so subaltern
an authority as that of the Collectors; and consequently
that the law would have the unfriendly effect of excluding
British ships of War altogether from American ports.
He was reminded in reply that the Collectors were
according to the terms of the section to be guided
in the exercise of their power by the directions of
the President; and it was not only to be presumed,
but he might be particularly assured, that the
directions given would be consistent with the usages
due to public ships and with the respect entertained
for nations in amity with the United States.
He asked whether in transmitting the Act to his
government, as his duty would require, he might add
the explanation and Assurances he had heard from me.
I answered that without having received any
particular authority for that purpose from the
President, I could safely undertake that what
I had stated was conformable to his sentiments.
Enclosed is another Act of Congress
restraining and regulating the arming of
private vessels by American Citizens.
This act was occasioned by the abuse made of such
armaments in forcing a trade, even in contraband of war
with the Island of St Domingo; and by the representations
made on the subject of that trade by the French Chargè
des Affaires and Minister here, and by the British Minister
with respect to abuses which had resulted or might result
from such armaments in cases injurious to Great Britain.
A report of these representations as made
to the President is herewith enclosed.
The act in substituting a security against the unlawful
use of the armaments in place of an absolute prohibition
of them is not only consistent with the obligations of
a neutral nation, but conformable to the laws and
ordinances of Great Britain and France themselves,
and is consequently free from objections by either.
The interposition of the Government, though claimed
in behalf both of Great Britain and of France,
was most pressed in behalf of the latter.
Yet the measure, particularly as it relates to the shipment of
contraband Articles for the West Indies, is likely to operate
much more conveniently for Great Britain than for France,
who cannot like Great Britain otherwise ensure a supply
of these articles for the defense of her Colonies.
In the project which you have offered to the British
Government I observe you have subjoined a clause
for securing respect to certificates of citizenship.
The effect of this clause, taken as it ought to be & as
was doubtless intended in context with the preceding
clause, is limited to the case provided for in that clause.
Still it may be well in order to guard against the
possibility of its being turned into a pretext for
requiring such certificates in other cases, that
a proviso for the purpose be added, or that
words of equivalent restriction be inserted.
I find also that you have considered it as
expedient to drop altogether the 4th Article
contained in the project transmitted to you.
It would certainly be better to do this than to listen
to such an Article concerning provisions as Sweden was
induced by the little interest she has in that branch of trade,
to admit into her late Treaty with Great Britain.
It is certainly in a general view ineligible also to strengthen
by positive stipulations the doctrine which subjects to
confiscation enemies’ property in neutral vessels.
It appears to the President nevertheless that this
consideration is outweighed by the great advantages
which would be gained by the article and by the sanction
which the United States have already given to that doctrine.
It can scarcely be presumed that France would complain
of such an article when seen in its real shape.
The immunity given to naval stores, and the
security given to the trade of her Colonies, including
the supplies essential to them, would seem to render
such an Article particularly desirable to her.
For this reason among others it is not probable that the
British Government would have ever acceded to the article
even as making a part of the general arrangement, and
more so that it will be rejected on its intrinsic merits.
I have thought it proper however, to make you
acquainted with the view which the President
has of the subject, that you may pursue it as
far as any opportunity may present itself.
Another subject requiring your attention is
pointed at by the Resolutions of the Senate moved
by General Smith on the subject of a British Tax
on exports under the name of a Convoy duty.
A copy of the Resolution is enclosed.
A duty under that name was first laid in the year 1798.
It then amounted to ½ of one percent on exports
to Europe; and one percent on exports to other places,
and consequently to the United States.
The discrimination being evidently contrary to the
Treaty then in force became a subject of discussion
between Mr. King and the British Ministry.
His letters to the Secretary of State and to Lord Grenville
explain the objections urged by him and the pretexts
in support of the measure alleged by them.
The subject was resumed in my letter of
5th March 1804 to Mr. King with a copy of which
you have been already furnished.
It was received by Mr. Gore during the absence
of Mr. King on the Continent, and if any occasion
was found proper by either for repeating the remonstrance
against the duty, it appears to have been without effect.
While the Treaty was in force the discrimination
was unquestionably a violation of its faith.
When the war ceased, it lost the pretext that it was
the price of the Convoy, which giving a larger protection
to the American than to the European trade, justified
a higher price for the former than for the latter.
Even during war the exports are generally made as
American property and in American vessels, and
therefore with a few exceptions only a convoy which would
subject them to condemnation from which they
would otherwise be free, would be not a benefit but an injury.
Since the expiration of the Treaty, the discrimination as well
as the duty itself can be combated by no other arguments
than those, which in the document referred to are drawn
from justice, friendship and sound policy; including the
tendency of the measure to produce a discontinuance of
the liberal but unavailing example given to Great Britain by
the regulations of commerce on our side, and a recurrence
to such counteracting measures as are probably
contemplated by the mover of the Resolutions of the Senate.
All these arguments gain strength in proportion
to the augmentations which the evil has latterly received;
it being now stated that the duty amounts to 4 percent
on the exports to the United States.
These, according to Cockes answer to Sheffield
amounted in the year 1801 to about 7 ½ Millions
sterling and therefore levy a tax on the
United States of about 1,300,000 dollars.
From this is indeed to be deducted a sum proportioned
to the amount of re-exportations from the United States.
But on the other hand, is to be added the
increase of the exports since the year 1801
which probably exceed the re-exportations.
With the aid of these communications and remarks
you will be at no loss for the views of the subject most
proper to be presented to the British Government in
order to promote the object of the Resolutions; and the
resolutions themselves ought powerfully to second your
efforts, if the British Government feels the same desire
as actuates the United States to confirm the friendship and
Confidence on both sides by a greater conformity on that
side to the spirit of the Commercial regulations on this.
I have referred above to the enclosed copy of the motion
made by Mr. Crowninshield in the House of Representatives.
The part of it which has relation to the trade with the
West Indies was suggested as appears in his introductory
observations by the late proclamations of the British
West India Governors, excluding from that trade vessels
of the United States and certain Articles of our
exportations particularly fish even in British vessels.
These regulations are to be ascribed partly to the
attachment of the present administration in Great Britain
to the Colonial and navigation system, partly to the
interested representations of certain merchants and
others residing in the British provinces on the Continent.
Without entering at large into the policy on which the
Colonial restrictions are founded, it may be observed
that no crisis could be more ineligible for enforcing them,
than the present, because at none more than the present,
have the West Indies been absolutely dependent on the
United States for the supplies essential to their existence.
It is evident in fact that the United States by asserting the
principle of a reasonable reciprocity, such as is admitted
on the trade with the European ports of Great Britain,
and as is admitted even in the Colonial trade of other
European Nations, so far at least as respects the vessels
employed in the trade, might reduce the British Government
at once to the dilemma of relaxing her regulations or of
sacrificing her Colonies: and with respect to the interdict
of supplies from the United States of articles necessary
to the subsistence and prosperity of the West Indies,
in order to force the growth and prosperity of the
Continental provinces of Nova Scotia &c; what can be
more unjust than thus to impoverish one part of the foreign
dominions which is considered as a source of wealth and
power to the parent country, not with a view to favor the
parent country but to favor another part of its foreign
dominions, which is rather expensive than profitable to it?
What can be more preposterous than thus at the
expense of Islands which not only contribute to the
Revenue, commerce and navigation of the parent state,
but can be secured in their dependence by that naval
ascendency which they aid, to foster unproductive
establishments which from local causes must eventually
detach themselves from the parent state and the sooner
in proportion as their growth may be stimulated.
Considerations, such as these ought to have weight with
the British Government and may very properly enter into
frank conversations with its Ministry on favorable occasions.
However repugnant that Government may be to a
departure from its system in the extent contemplated
by Mr. Crowninshields’ motion, it may at least be expected
that the trade as opened in former wars will not be refused
under circumstances which in the present particularly
demand it: it may be hoped that the way will be prepared
for some permanent arrangement on this subject between
the two nations which will be conformable to equity,
to reciprocity and to their mutual advantage.9
Madison on 27 March 1805 wrote this letter to President Jefferson:
I received on Monday evening your favor
of March 23 with the return of Armstrong’s
&Monroe’s letters first sent you.
I cannot entirely despair that Spain notwithstanding
the support given by France to her claim to West Florida
may yield to our proposed arrangement, partly from
its intrinsic value to her, partly from an apprehension
of the interference of Great Britain; and that this latter
consider may, as soon as France despairs of her
pecuniary object, transfer her weight into our scale.
If she should persist in disavowing her right to sell
West Florida to the U.S. and above all can prove it
to have been the mutual understanding with Spain
that West Florida was no part of Louisiana, it will place
our claim on very different ground, such probably as
would not be approved by the World, and such certainly
as would not with that approbation be maintained by force.
If our right be good against Spain at all, it must be
supported by those rigid maxims of technical law, which
have little weight in national questions generally and none
at all when opposed to the principles of universal equity.
The world would decide that France having sold us the
territory of a third party, which she had no right to sell,
that party having even remonstrated against the whole
transaction, the right of the U.S. was limited to a demand
on France to procure & convey the territory, or to remit
pro tanto the price or to dissolve the bargain altogether.
I am pleased to find that Talleyrand’s letter
is silent as to the Western Boundary.
This circumstance is the more important as Monroe’s
letter to which Talleyrand’s is an answer, expressly
names the Rio Bravo as the Western limit of our claim.
The importance of some arrangement with Spain
opening the Mobile to our trade is sufficiently urged
as in every event to be seriously pressed in the
instructions already in the hands of Monroe.
Enclosed are the letters from Cathalan which were sent in
for perusal—a paper not before received from Monroe—a
letter from Charles Pinckney—and two from Jarvis with their
enclosures, except the letters from the forger of draughts in
Preble’s name, which have been put into the hands of the
Secretary of the Navy, & a letter from Dr. Lattimore.10
On 9 April 1805 Madison informed the British Minister Anthony Merry
of the Americans that the British Navy had impressed into involuntary service.
I have the Honor to enclose Copies of the respective
Depositions of John Gilpin and Benjamin M. Smith,
concerning the Impressment of Martin George from
the Schooner Henrietta of Alexandria, and of Elisha Morris
and Peter Douglass from the Brig Traveler of Providence
by the British Sloop of War Busy, Captain Byam; both cases
being attended with Circumstances of high Aggravation.
The Busy, as you may know, Sir, lately arrived and
anchored nearly opposite the City of New York;
and Information having been given on oath to
the Deputy Mayor in the Absence of the Mayor,
that she had on board a number of impressed Men,
who were Citizens of the United States, being the
greater Part of the Crew of the Ship Manhattan
of New York, which had been previously captured
and sent to Bermuda by the Busy, the Correspondence,
Copies of which are enclosed, took Place between the
Deputy Mayor and the British Consul General Mr. Barclay.
That the Courtesy of an Application to the Consul General
was used, considering the number of our Citizens Known
to be detained on board the Busy and her Position at
the Time cannot fail to prove to you, how habitually
none but the mildest Measures are resorted to against
those who hold the Commissions of His Britannic
Majesty, and the Reluctance with which such a
Course would be changed when it is compelled.
But, Sir, this Forbearance was certainly carried
to the utmost Limit after the unsatisfactory Letter
of Mr. Barclay of the 7th of March, and after the
Deputy Mayor had received Intelligence, that the
Busy was about to sail without releasing the Men.
In that Letter you will be surprised to find Mr. Barclay
the Medium of an overture to commute the forcible
Detention of Citizens of the United States in their
own Country by a foreign Officer for a Release of the
Consequences of a Capture which both himself and the
officer must have been aware had been rashly made
by the latter; and this Surprise will not admit of a
Diminution, when their Detention is in the same Letter
attempted to be justified by the Request of the Charterers of
the Manhattan, and by the Consideration that the impressed
Men were obligated to return in her, added to the alleged
Responsibility of Captain Byam to enable them to do so.
It would be obvious, that if, as is admitted, there was no
Room for the Detention of the Manhattan, after her Arrival
at Bermuda, and that the only Portion of the Adventure
deemed suspicious is Part of the Cargo, and as the Capture
was made “a little to the Northward of Bermuda” a greater
Respect for the Interest of the Concern would have been
manifested by not bringing the Men away from their Ship.
It is equally evident that if the Charterers of the Manhattan
could have authorized Captain Byam to Keep them on board
the Busy, in order to their being hereafter put on board their
own Ship, the Period of the constrained Service would have
been doubled, or the Hope of Release from the Busy
altogether frustrated, so far as might depend upon
Captain Byam, whose Sense of Justice neither restrained
him from taking the Men from the Henrietta and Traveler,
with their Protections in their Hands, and doubtless
others also as his sailing Master avowed to Captain Gilpin,
was the Case; nor induced him to put them on shore
with the Crew of the Manhattan at New York.
How far the Disposition of such an officer to comply with
what was represented to be intended with Respect to the
Crew of the Manhattan could be relied upon, must be
evident: and considering the Incompatibility of such a
Conduct as his has been with the Spirit of Amity between
the Two Nations and its Tendency to exasperate the public
Feelings in the United States, always alive on the Subject
of Impressments, it might be deemed no more than Justice,
that his Government should by animadverting upon it in
the Manner it merits secure us from a Repetition.
The Principles laid down by Mr. Barclay are in other
Respects such as if admitted, would exceedingly
derogate from the Respect, which every
Independent Government owes to itself.
The United States cannot accede to the Claim of any Nation
to take from their Vessels on the high Seas any Description
of Persons excepting Soldiers in the actual Service of an
Enemy; their Seamen are not bound to have written or
other Evidence of their being Citizens, when at Sea in their
own Vessels, any more than those of Great Britain are
bound to have it or actually provide themselves with it:
much less is it necessary to prove a Person to be a Citizen
of the United States, who having been impressed at Sea out
an American Vessel, happens to be brought back in a
foreign Ship of War: and still less is it necessary to prove
that he is not a British Subject, which besides shifting the
Burden of Proof from those on whom according to general
Principles it ought to rest, and implying the Proof of a
Negative, would authorize the general Practice of
Impressment and the inadmissible Pretention that British
Seamen voluntarily engaging on board our Merchant
Vessels, might not be as much kept to their Engagements
as American Seamen engaging on board British Ships of
War are constantly held to theirs’ with the acknowledged
Sanction of the British Government, though the Citizens of
the United States cannot enter into foreign belligerent
Service without violating the Laws of their Country.
But the Reverse of all this is deducible from the
Observations of Mr. Barclay; and it was the more necessary
to state with Precision how far they were opposed by the
Sentiments of this Government, as the Deputy Mayor, who
from the Emergency of the Case, could not act under
express Instructions from the National Executive, has given
Occasion for an Inference, which was drawn by Mr. Barclay,
of a Concession of the double Right in British Commanders,
first to decide who are British Subjects on board American
Vessels, and then to transfer them by Force to their own.
I am sorry to be obliged, before I close this Letter,
to notice a very unexpected and unwarranted
assertion made by Mr. Barclay that there are
as many British Subjects clothed with Certificates
from our Custom Houses as Americans; an Assertion in
itself so manifestly incredible and disrespectful that it may
be safely left for its Comment to your own Candor.11
On 6 June 1805 Madison wrote in a letter to
John Armstrong, the minister in France,
I have the pleasure to observe to you that the President
entirely approves the just and dignified answer given to the
venal suggestions emanating from the French functionaries
as explained in your letter of the 24th of December.
The United States owe it to the world as well as to
themselves, to let the example of one Government
at least protest against the corruption which prevails.
If the merit of this honest policy were questionable,
interest alone ought to be a sufficient recommendation of it.
It is impossible that the destinies of any nation
more than of an individual can be injured by
an adherence to the maxims of virtue.
To suppose it would be to arraign
the justice of Heaven and the order of nature.
While we proceed therefore in the plain path
which those maxims prescribe, we have the best of
securities that we shall in the end be found wiser
than those crooked politicians, who regarding
the scruples of morality as a weakness in the
management of public affairs, place their wisdom in
making the vices of others the instruments of their own.
Previous to the receipt of your last letters enclosing
copies of your two to Mr. Monroe, the communication from
Madrid, had given us a view of the unfavorable posture which
the negotiation with Spain was taking.
The extract now enclosed of the answer, which is gone
to Madrid, will show the turn which it is thought most
expedient to give to the negotiation, in case its general
object should fail, and will enable you to manage your
communications with the French Government with a
more distinct reference to the course of things at Madrid.
This is the more necessary, as it is evident that
the Spanish Government must derive its boldness
and its obstinacy from the French Cabinet.
The part which France takes in our controversies
with Spain is not a little extraordinary.
That she should wish well to her ally, and even
lean towards her in the terms of an adjustment with
the United States, was perhaps to be expected.
But that she should take side wholly with Spain
and stimulate pretensions which threatening the
peace of the two Countries might end in placing
the United States on the side of Great Britain with
resentments turned against France as the real source
of their disappointment this is more than was to be
expected and more than can easily be explained.
If the Imperial cabinet be regardless of the weight which
this Country could add to the British scale it is a proof that
the prospects in Europe are extremely flattering to its views.
If the object be, as you finally conjecture, and as
on the whole seems least improbable merely to
convert the negotiations with Spain into a pecuniary
job for France and her agents the speculation
although pushed with a singular temerity, may
finally be abandoned under a despair of success,
and yield to the obvious policy of promoting equitable
arrangements between Spain and the United States.12
Madison on 2 August 1805 wrote in a letter to Jefferson,
Having passed Dulton on the road, I have received
the dispatches from Monroe & Pinkney under the
delay of their coming hither from Washington.
You will have received copies from Washington,
according to instructions I left there.
The business at Madrid has had an awkward termination,
and if nothing, as may be expected, particularly
in the absence of the Emperor, should alleviate
it at Paris, involves some serious questions.
After the parade of a Mission Extry. a refusal
of all our overtures in a haughty tone, without
any offer of other terms, and a perseverance in
withdrawing a stipulated provision for claims
admitted to be just, without ex post facto conditions
manifestly unreasonable & inadmissible, form a strong
appeal to the honor & sensibility of this Country.
I find that, as was apprehended from the tenor of former
communications, the military status quo in the Controverted
districts, the navigation of the rivers running through West
Florida, and the spoliations subsequent to the Convention
of 1802 have never had a place in the discussions.
Bowdoin may perhaps be instructed, consistently
with what has passed, to propose a suspension of
the territorial questions, the deposit, and the French
spoliations, on condition that those points be yielded,
with an incorporation of the Convention of 1802
with a provision for the subsequent claims.
This is the utmost within the Executive purview.
If this experiment should fail, the question with the
Legislature must be whether or not resort is to be
had to force, to what extent, and in what mode.
Perhaps the instructions to Bowdoin would
be improved by including the idea of transferring
the sequel of the business hither.
This would have the appearance of an advance on the
part of Spain, the more so as it would be attended with a
new Mission to this Country, and would be most convenient
for us also, if not made by Spain a pretext for delay.
It will be important to hear from Monroe,
after his interviews at Paris.
It is not impossible, if he should make an impression there,
that without some remedy a rupture will be unavoidable,
that an offer of mediation, or a promise of less formal
interposition, may be given; And it will merit consideration,
in what way, either should be met.
Monroe talks as if he might take a trip from London home.
If he comes, with a proper option to remain or return as
may be thought proper, and so as not too much to commit
the Government or himself, the trip may perhaps produce
political speculations abroad that may do no harm.13
Jefferson wrote this letter to Madison two days later on August 4:
On my return from Bedford two days ago I received your
favor of July 24 and learned with sincere regret that
Mrs. Madison’s situation required her going to Philadelphia.
I suppose the choice between Physic
& Baynham was well weighed.
I hope the result will be speedy & salutary, and that we
shall see you in this quarter before the season passes over.
A letter from Charles Pinckney of May 22 informs me
that Spain refuses to settle a limit & perseveres
in withholding the ratification of the convention.
He says not a word of the status quo,
from which I conclude it has not been proposed.
I observe by the papers that Dulton is arrived with the
public dispatches from which we shall know the particulars.
I think the status quo, if not already proposed,
should be immediately offered through Bowdoin
Should it even be refused, the refusal to settle a
limit is not of itself a sufficient cause of war, nor is
the withholding a ratification worthy of such a redress.
Yet these acts show a purpose both in Spain
& France against which we ought to provide
before the conclusion of a peace.
I think therefore we should take into consideration whether
we ought not immediately to propose to England an
eventual treaty of alliance, to come into force whenever
(within years) a war shall take place with Spain or France.
It may be proper for the ensuing Congress to make
some preparations for such an event, and it should
be in our power to show we have done the same.
This for your consideration.
Mr. Wagner writes me that two black convicts
from Surinam are landed at Philadelphia.
Being on the spot you will have a better opportunity
of judging what should be done with them.
To me it seems best that we should send them to England
with a proper representation against such a measure.
If the transportation is not within any of the regular
appropriations, it will come properly on the contingent fund.
If the law does not stand in the way of such an act, & you
think as I do, it may be immediately carried into execution.
Accept for Mrs. Madison & yourself my affectionate
salutations & assurances of constant esteem & respect.14
Jefferson on August 7 wrote to Madison this short letter:
On a view of our affairs with Spain, presented me in a
letter from Charles Pinckney, I wrote you on the 23rd of
July that I thought we should offer them the status quo but
immediately propose a provisional alliance with England.
I have not yet received the whole correspondence.
But the portion of the papers, now enclosed to you,
confirm me in the opinion of the expediency of a treaty with
England, but make the offer of the status quo more doubtful.
The correspondence will probably
throw light on that question.
From the papers already received I infer a confident
reliance on the part of Spain on the omnipotence of
Bonaparte, but a desire of procrastination till peace
in Europe shall leave us without an ally.
General Dearborne has seen all the papers.
I will ask the favor of you to communicate them
to Mr. Gallatin & Mr. Smith—from Mr. Gallatin
I shall ask his first opinions, preparatory to the
stating formal questions for our ultimate decision.
I am in hopes you can make it convenient on your
return to see & consult with Mr. Smith & General
Dearborne, unless the latter should be come
on here, where I can do it myself.
On the receipt of your own ideas, Mr. Smith’s and
the other gentlemen I shall be able to form points
for our final consideration & determination.
I enclose you some communications
from the Mediterranean.
They show Barron’s understanding in a very favorable view.
When you shall have perused them, be so good
as to enclose them to the Secretary of the Navy.
Accept my fervent wishes for the speedy recovery
of Mrs. Madison, and your speedy visit to this quarter.15
In a letter to President Jefferson on 20 August 1805 Madison wrote,
Your two favors of the 4 & 7th instant
have come duly to hand.
Letters from Charles Pinkney to the 10th of June
have been forwarded to You through Washington.
They confirm the idea that Spain emboldened by France
is speculating on the presumed aversion of this Country
to war and to the military connection with Great Britain.
They show at the same time that Spain herself
not only does not gain at war but wishes to
cover the unfriendly posture of things, with
the appearances of an undiminished harmony.
This idea is confirmed by the behavior
of the Spanish functionaries here.
Yrujo particularly has multiplied his attentions,
and with an air of cordiality which I should
have thought it not easy for him to assume.
By associating us with the Governor in an
invitation to dinner, and by the manner of it a
refusal was rendered unavoidable without giving
it a point & the occasion an importance not due to it.
I enclose the copy of a letter which I have since been
obliged to write to him, the tone of which he will probably
regard as too hard for that of our late intercourse.
He has not yet answered it; and I have not seen him
since he received it; I enclose also a letter from Turreau.
Shall it be answered or not,
and if answered in what point of view.
I shall endeavor to see Mr. Smith on my return
and have sent him the dispatches from Madrid.
My present view of our affairs with Spain suggests the
expediency of such provisional measures as are within the
Executive Authority, and when Congress meets, of such an
extension of them as will prevent or meet an actual rupture.
It deserves consideration also whether with a
view to all the Belligerent powers, the supply of
their Colonies from the United States ought not
to be made to depend on commercial justice.
Bowdoin I think should be instructed to let Spain
understand the absolute necessity of a status quo,
and the use of the Mobile, if not of an arbitration of
acknowledged spoliations; but without any formal
proposition or negotiation, which if expected would be the
more mortifying to this Country, & would not leave the
ultimate question as free to Congress as it ought to be.
The conduct towards Great Britain
is delicate as it is important.
No engagement Can be expected from her if not reciprocal;
and if reciprocal, would put us at once into the war.
She would certainly not stipulate to continue the war
for a given period without a stipulation on our
part that within that period we would join in it.
I think therefore that no formal proposition
ought to be made on the subject.
If the war goes on, the time will always be suitable for it.
If peace is within her reach & her deliberations, we can
only let the state of things between their Country & Spain
have their natural influence on her councils.
For this purpose frank but informal explanations of it ought
to be made; without commitments on our side, but with
every preparation for a hostile event short of them.
This course will have the further advantage
of an appeal in a new form to the policy of Spain
& France, from whom the growing communications
with Great Britain would not be concealed.
An eventual alliance with Great Britain if attainable from
her without inadmissible conditions, would be for us the
best of all possible measures; but I do not see the least
chance of laying her under obligations to be called into force
at our will without correspondent obligations on our part.
I have kept so much from conversation
on the politics of this State, that I cannot
give any very precise account of them.
It is much to be feared that the mutual repulsion
between the two immediate parties, will drive them
both into extremes of doctrines as well as animosity.
Symptoms of these are showing themselves in the
reasonings & language they oppose to each other.
The federal party are not as yet
settled in their plan of operations.
Some are ready to support McKean as a barrier against the
tendency they apprehend in the views of his adversaries.
Others are disposed to withhold their votes from him,
through personal & political dislike.
And others taking a middle course are willing
to join the Governors party on condition of
obtaining some share in the Legislature election.
The event of the contest is uncertain.
Both sides seem to be equally confident.
Those most capable of a cool estimate seem to think
that at this moment the Governors party is the stronger;
but that the other is gaining ground.
We have now been here three weeks
without being able to fix the time of departure.
I have every reason to believe that Mrs. Madison is in the
sure road to perfect recovery; but it proceeds as yet slowly.
The Aurora of this date gives
the true state of her yellow fever.16
On 14 September 1805 Madison wrote this letter to President Jefferson:
I enclose herewith sundry communications
which I received yesterday.
One of them is from Monroe at Paris,
who appears by a letter from Erving to have
arrived at London the latter end of July.
A letter from Armstrong went for you by the last mail.
He seems to have moderated the scope
of his former advice as to Spain.
In that now given, there is in my judgment, great solidity.
If force should be necessary on our part,
it can in no way be so justly or usefully
employed as in maintaining the status quo.
The efficacy of an embargo also cannot be doubted.
Indeed, if a commercial weapon can be properly
shaped for the Executive hand, it is more & more
apparent to me that it can force all the nations having
colonies in this quarter of the Globe to respect our rights.
You will find in Erving’s letters new marks of his talents.
I enclose also a sample of wheat
from Buenos Ayres, another from Chili,
and a sample of Barley from Galicia in Spain.
The Wheat from Buenos Ayres I observe
is weevil-eaten, and the paper when opened
contained a number of the insects.
If these are not known at Buenos Ayres, and the wheat,
as I presume, was in this sample immediately from that
province, it is a proof that the egg, if laid in the green state
of the wheat, is also laid after it has been gathered.
This fact however has been
otherwise established, I believe.
The whole was sent me by the Marquis d’Yrujo to be
forwarded to you.
I have sent what he marked for myself
to a careful gentleman in Orange;
so that there will be two chances for the experiment.
The Marquis received dispatches
by the vessel which brought Moreau.
I did not doubt that they communicated his recall
and the demand of it; till I was told by Merry
a few days ago, that the Marquis signified to him
that he should pass the next winter in Washington.
Perhaps this may be a finesse, though I see no object for it.
Mr. & Mrs. Merry left Bush hill a few days ago, and are
now at the Buck tavern about 11 miles on the Lancaster road,
where she is sick with an intermittent,
with which she was seized at Bush hill.
Her maid was so ill that it was suspected
hers was a case of yellow fever.
It turns out to have been a violent bilious fever only,
and she is on the recovery.
Merry himself is at length discharged
by Dr. Physic as fundamentally cured.
The fever began to show itself in so many parts
of the City, & so far westwardly, that we thought
it prudent to retire from the scene; the more so
as it was probable that a removal would be forced,
before my wife would be ready to depart altogether, and
it was becoming very difficult to find in the neighborhood
quarters unoccupied by fugitives from the City.
We were so lucky as to get rooms at this place, a day later
and we should have been anticipated by others.
How long we shall be detained here is uncertain.
Mrs. M’s complaint has varied its aspect so often,
that although it seems now to be superficial & slight,
it is not subject to any exact computation of time.
If there be no retrograde perverseness hereafter,
we are promised by appearances that she will
be entirely well in a few days.
The fever rages severely in Southwark
and is very deadly.
The cases in the city are as yet not perhaps very numerous.
But no reliance is to be put in the
accuracy of the statements published.
There were certainly cases in 8th Street
two weeks ago which were never published.
In the meantime the Medical corps continues
split into opposite & obstinate opinions
on the question whether it be or be not contagious.
Each side puzzles itself with its own theory,
and the other side with facts which
the theory of the other does not explain.
There is little probability therefore
that the discord is near its term.
The facts, indeed, which alone can decide the theory,
are often so equivocal as to be construed
into proofs on both sides.
I brought with me from Washington the subject I had
undertaken before you left it; I mean the new principle
that a trade not open in peace, cannot be opened
by a nation at war to neutral nations; a principle
that threatens more loss & vexation to neutrals
than all the other belligerent claims put together.
I had hoped that I should find leisure in Philadelphia to
pursue the subject & with the greater success, as some
books not at Washington would be within my reach.
In the latter particular I have not been entirely disappointed.
But such were the interruptions of visits of civility & of
business, that with the heat of the weather, & the
necessary correspondence from day to day with the office,
I could make but little progress, particularly during
the first three or four weeks after my arrival.
I find my situation here more favorable,
and am endeavoring to take advantage of it.
I shall in fact before I leave it, have a very
considerable mass of matter, but it will be
truly a rudis indigestaque moles.
From the authorities of the best Jurists, from a pretty
thorough examination of Treaties, especially British
Treaties, from the principles and practice of all other
maritime nations, from the example of Great Britain herself,
in her laws & colonial regulations, and from a view of the
arbitrary & contradictory decisions of her Admiralty.17
Jefferson while near Philadelphia on 18 September 1805
wrote this short letter to Madison,
I return you Monroe’s letter most of the views
of which appear to me very sound, & especially
that which shows a measure which would engage
France to compromise our difference rather than
to take part in it and correct the dangerous error that
we are a people whom no injuries can provoke to war.
No further intelligence being now expected on this
subject, & some measures growing out of it requiring
as early consideration as possible, I have asked
of our colleagues a cabinet meeting at Washington
on the 4th of October at 12 o’clock, where I hope
Mrs. Madison’s situation will permit you to be,
although I despair of its admitting your visit to Orange.
It is most unfortunate that Monroe
should be coming home so precipitately.
I cannot but hope that Bonaparte’s return to Paris
about the 13th of July would find & detain him
there till it would be too late to get to England
& wind up there in time to arrive here before winter.18
Madison on 24 September 1805 wrote to
James Monroe about British naval policies.
The decision in the Admiralty Courts of Great Britain
disallowing the sufficiency of landing, and paying
duties on Colonial produce of belligerent Colonies,
re-exported from ports of the U.S. to protect the
produce against the British Cruisers & Courts
has spread great alarm among merchants & has
had a grievous effect on the rate of insurance.
From the great amount of property afloat subject
to this new & shameful depredation, a dreadful
scene of distress may ensue to our Commerce.
The subject was brought to attention by the case
of the Aurora, which gave rise to the observations
& instructions contained in my letter of 12 April last.
I omitted in that letter to refer you to a case in
Blackstone’s reports, where Lord Mansfield says that
it was a rule settled by the Lords of appeal, that a
transhipment off a neutral port was equivalent to the
landing of goods from an enemy’s colony, and that in
the case of a landing there could be no color for seizure.
As Mr. King’s correspondence may not be in London
I think it not amiss to remind you of what passed
with the British Government in 1801 in consequence
of such seizures as are now sanctioned.
A copy of the doctrine transmitted by the
Government to the vice admiralty Courts
as the law for their guidance is enclosed.
If such a condemnation out of their own mouths
has no effect, all reasonings will be lost; and absolute
submission or some other resort in vindication of our
neutral rights will be the only alternative left.
I hope you will have received the instructions
above referred to, and that your interposition
will have had a good effect.
I am engaged in a pretty thorough investigation
of the original principle to which so many shapes
are given, namely, that “a trade not open in peace
is not lawful in war,” and shall furnish you with the
result as soon as my researches are digested.
If I am not greatly deceived, it will appear that the
principle is not only against the law of nations, but one
which Great Britain is precluded from assuming by the
most conclusive facts & arguments derived from herself.
It is wonderful that so much silence has prevailed
among the neutral authors on this subject.
I find scarcely one that has touched on it; even since
the predatory effects have been known to the world.
If you can collect any publications which can aid in detecting
& exposing the imposture, be so good as to send them.19
On September 30 Madison in this trying time
wrote this letter to President Jefferson:
I duly received your favor of ? from which
I learn your purpose of meeting the Heads of
Departments in consultation on the 4th of October.
It is no little mortification that it will not
be in my power to obey the summons.
Mrs. Madison’s afflicted knee which has already detained
me so long, though I trust perfectly healed, is in so tender
a state, and the whole limb so extremely feeble, that she
could not be put on the journey for some days to come
without a manifest risk, the more to be avoided on the road,
as she would be out of the reach of the necessary aid.
If it were possible to place her in such a situation here
as would justify my leaving her, I should not hesitate
to set out without her and either return or send for her.
But no such situation can be found out of the City, and
there the attempt is forbidden by the existing fever which
is understood too to be growing considerably worse.
There is another obstacle in my way which
will oblige me to wait a few days longer.
On the whole I shall not be able to
set out before Thursday or Friday.
I shall make it the first of those days if possible & shall be
as expeditious on the journey as circumstances will permit.
Since I received your letter, I have turned in my
thoughts the several subjects which at the present
moment press on the attention of the Executive.
With respect to Great Britain I think we ought to
go as far into an understanding on the subject of an
eventual coalition in the war, as will not preclude us
from an intermediate adjustment if attainable with Spain.
I see not however much chance that she will positively
bind herself not to make peace while we refuse to
bind ourselves positively to make war; unless indeed
some positive advantage were yielded on our part
in lieu of an engagement to enter into the war.
No such advantage as yet occurs, as would
be admissible to us and satisfactory to her.
At Paris I think Armstrong ought to receive
instructions to extinguish in the French Government
every hope of turning our controversy with Spain into
a French job public or private, to leave them under
apprehensions of an eventual connection between the
U.S. & Great Britain and to take advantage of any change
in the French Cabinet favorable to our objects with Spain.
As to Spain herself our question is whether
Bowdoin ought to proceed or not to Madrid.
My opinion is that his trip to Great Britain was fortunate,
and that the effect of it will be aided by his keeping
aloof until occurrences shall invite him to Spain.
I think it will be expedient not even to
order Ewing thither for the present.
The nicest question however is whether any
or what step should be taking for a communication
with the Spanish Government on the points
not embraced by the late negotiation.
On this question my reflections disapprove of any step
whatever, other than such as may fall within the path to
be marked out for Armstrong; or as may lie in the sphere
of Claiborne’s intercourse with the Marquis de Calvo.
Perhaps the last may be the best opportunity
of all for conveying to Spain the impressions
we wish without committing the Government
in any respect more than may be advisable.
In general it seems to me proper that Claiborne should
hold a pretty strong language in all cases, and particularly
that he should go every length the law will warrant
against Morales & his project of selling lands.
If Congress should be not indisposed, proceedings
may be authorized that will be perfectly
effectual on that as well as other points.
But before their meeting, there will be time
to consider more fully what ought to be
suggested for their consideration.
The Merchants are much alarmed at the late
decisions in Great Britain against their trade.
It is conjectured that several millions of property are afloat,
subject to capture under the doctrine now enforced.
Accept assurances of my constant
& most respectful attachment.20
On October 11 President Jefferson wrote this short letter to Madison:
The only questions which press on the Executive
for decision are Whether we shall enter into a
provisional alliance with England to come into force
only in the event that during the present war
we become engaged in war with France?
leaving the declaration of the casus federis ultimately to us.
Whether we shall send away Yrujo, Casacalvo, Morales?
Whether we shall instruct Bowdoin
not to go to Madrid till further orders?
but we are all of opinion that the first of these
questions is too important & too difficult to be decided
but on the fullest consideration in which your
aid & counsel should be waited for.
I sincerely regret the cause of your absence from
this place and hope it will soon be removed;
but it is one of those contingencies from the effects
of which even the march of public affairs cannot be exempt.
Perhaps it would not be amiss to instruct Bowdoin
to await at London further orders; because
if we conclude afterwards that he should proceed,
this may follow the other instruction without delay.
I am glad we did not intermeddle with Armstrong’s
decision against the Insurance companies.
I am told these companies have a
great mixture of English subscribers.
If so, the question becomes affected by the partnership.
What is become of our hermitage?
As you are in the neighborhood of Butler I presume the
claim upon us could be easily settled & apportioned.21
Secretary of State Madison wrote this letter to Jefferson on 16 October 1805:
I received duly your favor of the 11th at this place, where
I am still very painfully detained by the situation of Mrs. M.
The appearance of her knee is still equivocal; I am afraid
discouraging as to a very prompt and complete cure.
I am the less able however to pronounce on this point,
as the Dr. has been prevented by indisposition
from seeing his patient for several days,
and I cannot be guided by his judgment.
We expect he will visit her tomorrow.
I am not the less distressed by this uncertainty in
consequence of the indulgent manner in which
you regard my absence; but it would have been
a great alleviation to me if my absence had
not suspended important questions, on which
my aid would have been so inconsiderable.
The suspension however I hope will not be continued
if circumstances should press for early decisions.
The latest accounts from Europe may perhaps
suggest a little delay with respect to any
provisional arrangements with England.
Considering the probability of an extension of the war
against France and the influence that may have on her
temper towards the U.S: the uncertainty of effecting
with England such a shape for an arrangement as alone
would be admissible, and the possible effects elsewhere
of abortive overtures to her, I think it very questionable
whether a little delay may not be expedient, especially
as in the meantime the English pulse will be somewhat
felt by the discussions now on foot by Mr. Monroe.
With respect to Morales, my idea is that he should be
instantly ordered off, if Claiborne has the legal power
necessary; to which ought to be added perhaps some
public admonition against the purchase of lands from him.
Casa Calvo has more of personal claim to indulgence.
I lean to the opinion nevertheless that he should
receive notice also to depart; unless Claiborne
should be very decided in thinking his stay useful.
The stronger his personal claim to indulgence may be,
the stronger would be the manifestation of the
public sentiment producing his dismission.
Yrujo’s case involves some delicate considerations.
The harshness of his recall, as made by our Ministers,
and then the footing of a voluntary return
on which his leaving the U. S. was put,
seem to suggest a degree of forbearance.
On the other hand the necessity of some marked
displeasure at the Spanish Conduct, a necessity
produced as is believed by his own mischievous
agency, and the indelicacy of his obtruding his
functions here, if that should be the case, plead
strongly for peremptory measures towards him.
As it is not yet formally known, that he has heard
from his Government in consequence of the letter
of recall, although rendered pretty certain by a
recurrence to dates, it may be well perhaps to see
whether he manifests a purpose of remaining here.
If he should, the question will arise whether he
shall receive notice that his departure was expected,
or that he can no longer be received as the organ
of communication with his Government.
Through private channels I collect that he proposes
to be at Washington the ensuing winter.
The idea is also given out by his family
that they are to go to Spain.
It cannot be long before some occasion will
arise for knowing his real intentions, and
therefore for expressing those of the Executive.
As to Bowdoin I think it clear he ought to remain in
England for the present, and if Erving should have not
proceeded to Madrid, I think he also should remain there.
Pinckney if, as is to be wished & his last letter promised,
he should have left Spain, will have named Young or
someone else, to be the shadow of a representative and
if should have named no one, perhaps so much the better.
If you think it proper that Mr. Wagner should write
to Bowdoin or Claiborne or both, he will on an intimation
of what you wish to be said, write letters of which
he is very capable, either in his own name referring
to my absence, or to be sent hither for my signature.
I find it necessary to mention, what I thought
I had done before, that on receiving your sanction,
I intimated to Armstrong the opinion here that Insurers
stood in the shoes of the insured under the Convention.
I was particularly careful however to use terms
that would not commit the Government on the question
of a mixture of British subjects in the transaction.
The question had occurred to me on reading the papers
concerning the New Jersey, and I suggested it
to Mr. Dallas, who confirmed the fact of such a mixture.
It appeared to me however, that it was best not
to bring the matter into view by countenancing
a different decision in a particular case, from
what had taken place in similar cases.
Probably ⅘ of the payments under the Convention
involve the question.
I wrote long ago to Gelston to send me the
precise amount of what is due on the Hermitage,
with a promise to remit the money.
I have not yet received an answer, which I ascribe
to the confusion produced in New York by the fever.
In the same manner I explain his not having
forwarded the wine to Washington.
I enclose a letter &c from Truxton which explains itself.
Also one from Fraissinet, with a recommendation
of him for Consul at Martinique.
I explained the obstacle to the appointment of a Consul.
He was not altogether unaware of it, but seemed to think
that an informal Agency at least would not be offensive,
but otherwise, and would be very useful.
I believe he would suit very well for such a purpose,
probably better than any other to be had; and it is
possible that Turreau might give some sort of sanction.
Prudent guardians of our affairs in the West Indies
would probably prevent much loss to individuals,
and much perplexity to the Government.
If you think the proposition in this case admissible,
and that it ought to depend on Turreau,
Wagner could communicate with Petry on the subject
unless any other mode of ascertaining the disposition
in that quarter be thought better.
I put under the same cover with this the last letters
from Monroe, which you will please to send
to the office when You think proper.
I am sorry he did not transmit copies of
the law opinions given him by Lord Mulgrave.22
President Jefferson on 23 October 1805 in this short letter
to Madison discussed some diplomatic decisions:
Yours of the 20th came to hand last night.
I sincerely regret that Mrs. Madison is not likely
to be able to come on so soon as had been hoped.
The probability of an extensive war on the
continent of Europe strengthening every day
for some time past is now almost certain.
This gives us our great desideratum, time.
In truth it places us quite at our ease.
We are certain of one year of campaigning at least, and
one other year of negotiation for their peace arrangements.
Should we be now forced into war, it is become much more
questionable than it was, whether we should not pursue it
unembarrassed by any alliance & free to retire from it
whenever we can obtain our separate terms.
It gives us time too to make another
effort for peaceable settlement.
Where shall this be done?
Not at Madrid certainly.
At Paris: through Armstrong, or Armstrong &
Monroe as negotiators, France as the Mediator,
the price of the Floridas as the means.
We need not care who gets that: and an
enlargement of the sum we had thought of may
be the bait to France, while the Guadaloupe as
the Western boundary may be the soother of Spain
providing for our spoliated citizens in some effectual way.
We may announce to France that determined not to ask
justice of Spain again, yet desirous of making one other
effort to preserve peace, we are willing to see whether
her interposition can obtain it on terms which we
think just; that no delay however can be admitted,
& that in the meantime should Spain attempt to
change the status quo, we shall repel force by force,
without undertaking other active hostilities till
we see what may be the issue of her interference.
I hazard my own ideas merely for your consideration:
the present state of things does not so far press as to
render it necessary for you to do violence to your
feelings by prematurely leaving Mrs. Madison.23
President Jefferson on November 22 sent Madison a draft of
his annual message to Congress and asked for his suggestions.
Two days later Madison sent a few minor revisions he recommended.
Notes
1. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, 31 January 1804 (Online).
2. From James Madison to Carlos Martínez de Yrujo, 19 March 1804 (Online).
3. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, 31 March 1804 (Online).
4. From James Madison to Charles Pinckney, 10 April 1804 (Online).
5. From James Madison to James Monroe, 15 April 1804 (Online).
6. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908
ed. James D. Richardson, Volume I, p. 369.
7. From James Madison to James Monroe, 21 July 1804 (Online).
8. From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 18 August 1804 (Online).
9. From James Madison to James Monroe, 6 March 1805 (Online).
10. From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 27 March 1805 (Online).
11. From James Madison to Anthony Merry, 9 April 1805 (Online).
12. From James Madison to John Armstrong, 6 June 1805 (Online).
13. From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 2 August 1805 (Online).
14. To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 4 August 1805 (Online).
15. From Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 7 August 1805 (Online).
16. To Thomas Jefferson from James Madison, 20 August 1805 (Online).
17. From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 14 September 1805 (Online).
18. To Thomas Jefferson from James Madison, 18 September 1805 (Online).
19. From James Madison to James Monroe, 24 September 1805 (Online).
20. To Thomas Jefferson from James Madison, 30 September 1805 (Online).
21. To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 11 October 1805 (Online).
22. From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 16 October 1805 (Online).
23. To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 23 October 1805 (Online).