Newly elected President Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated on 4 March 1801,
and he said, “We are all Republicans: we are all Federalists.”1
On March 3 President John Adams had completed his appointment
of 23 new federal judges who were called “midnight judges.”
President Jefferson advised James Madison that some of the judges’
commissions that were not delivered would be withheld.
This led to the famous lawsuit of Marbury v. Madison in 1803.
Jefferson nominated James Madison to be Secretary of State on March 5.
Madison’s father had died recently, and the son was not feeling well.
Jefferson visited Madison on April 3.
That day the new President wrote to the United States Congress
asking them to repeal the law creating the new circuit judgeships.
Madison traveled by carriage to the new Federal City that was
named Washington, and he felt better when he arrived there on May 1.
Jefferson had appointed him Secretary of State, and Madison assumed
the office on May 2 with eight clerks that the Federalists had provided.
The President allowed him and his wife Dolley to stay with him for three weeks
in the lavish President’s House, and she provided hospitality for guests.
Madison realized that with his public duties that he
would have to postpone his private correspondence.
In the next 16 years as Secretary of State and then as President he would
receive
thousands of reports and letters and would write hundreds of official policies.
He would be aided by several clerks.
Madison would be Jefferson’s closest advisor.
Jefferson after his presidency wrote,
Mr. Madison is justly entitled to his full share
of the measures of my administration.
Our principles were the same, and we never
differed sensibly in the application of them.2
On May 21 Secretary of State Madison sent a circular to the consuls in the
Mediterranean region that a United States “squadron of three frigates and a
sloop of war” would be arriving to warn the pasha of Tripoli.
A few American ships began a blockade of Tripoli in July,
and on August 1 the USS Enterprise nearly sank the ship Tripoli.
A small war to curtail piracy had begun.
James Madison retreated once more to his farm
and stayed there from July until October.
President Jefferson in September appointed
Robert R. Livingston the ambassador to France.
Madison staying at his farms during two summer months each year
would become a tradition for the next 16 years.
Jefferson would also do that during his 8 years as President.
Madison relied on his overseer to take care of his farm during the other months.
Jefferson and Madison agreed to maintain several of the competent
Federalists who were part of the patronage in the administration.
Livingston landed in France in November, and he learned that Napoleon
was
preparing 40,000 French soldiers to invade Saint-Domingue in the West Indies.
Madison in July ordered the case against William Duane for libeling the
United States Senate dismissed because it violated the Constitution.
John Adams had ordered most of the Navy ships sold,
and Jefferson gladly accepted that.
He planned to replace about half the Federalists, balancing the patronage.
The President sent the draft of his first annual message to Congress to
Madison for his suggestions, and he advised changing several paragraphs.
He sent it to the new Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, and they removed
the statement that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional to avoid controversy.
The policy of Jefferson and Gallatin was low taxes and even less spending.
The first two Presidents Washington and Adams had adopted the
European strategy of paying annual tribute to North African officials in order
to prevent piracy, and they currently were behind
by three years on their payments to Algiers.
The members of the cabinet agreed to pay the Dey of Algiers,
and Madison ordered sending sugar, coffee, pepper, and various other items to Algiers.
He also sent four warships to the Mediterranean Sea.
The Pasha of Tripoli declared war by tearing down the American flagpole,
and the Jefferson administration ordered their frigates prepared.
Madison notified them that a law limited hostile ships to 24 hours
in a port that Secretary of State Jefferson had accepted in 1793.
When Madison issued orders, he would write, “The President has decided.”
He and Jefferson were the best of friends and worked together.
The French colony of St. Domingue became an issue when
General Toussaint Louverture led a slave revolt on the Haiti side of the island
by 500,000 Africans against about 50,000 Europeans and 50,000 mulattoes.
During the naval war against the French the Adams
administration
had sent Dr. Edward Stevens to advise Toussaint.
Stevens would leave in the summer.
Tobias Lear had been George Washington’s private secretary,
and he replaced Stevens in June.
He was advised to follow the law of nations, treaties, and
St. Domingo’s regulations to protect American commerce.
Madison wrote that the United States only wanted to continue commerce there.
Louis-André Pichon served as France’s chargé d’affaires from 1801 to 1804.
President Jefferson surprised him by saying,
But for this joint action to be complete and effective
it would be necessary that you make peace with England.
Then nothing would be easier than to supply everything
for your army and navy, and to starve out Toussaint.3
France wanted to control New Orleans, and Pichon noted that
the population of Kentucky had increased to 250,000, and
they were shipping much produce by rivers and through New Orleans.
Madison wrote to Rufus King who as ambassador
in England was trying to improve Jay’s Treaty.
From 26 March 1801 to May 1 King had written ten letters to James Madison.
On June 15 Madison wrote this to Rufus King:
Your communications by Mr. Sitgreaves on the subject
of the proposed conversion of the claims against the
United States under the 6th Article of the Treaty of 1794
into a definite sum have been duly received and taken
into consideration by the President.
Although there may be good ground to contest the real
justice of the amount of Debt which will be assumed by
such a stipulation, yet considering all the actual
circumstances which are now to be taken into view,
allowing particularly due weight to the advantage of
substituting an amicable and final adjustment of the
controversy, in place of the apparent improbability
of obtaining any proper amendment of the 6th Article,
and of all the demands, embarrassments and uncertainties
incident to its present form, before a tribunal composed
as is the board of Commissioners under it, the President
has determined on the expediency of your pursuing
into effect the negotiation in which you are engaged.
It is his express instruction, however, that no
encouragement be given to pretensions on the British
side by carrying into the negotiation a sum higher
than that of six hundred thousand pounds as mentioned
in your No. 6 of the 7th of March last, and that no sum
beyond that be finally admitted into the commutation.
It is taken for granted that in case the claims against the
United States be liquidated into a net sum, there will be no
difficulty in so arranging it as to be applicable to the
payment of the indemnification awarded from time to time
under the seventh article of the treaty in favor of our
citizens, whose claims according to an estimate of Mr.
Samuel Cabot of May 9th 1798 amount to £1,250,000.
Such an arrangement must be the less objectionable,
as a discharge of the debt by instalments would no doubt
be the alternative mode, and it will have the advantage
of putting aside all possible inducement to delay the
award of indemnifications with a view to avoid the
immediate advances of money necessary to satisfy them.
The President considers it as a matter of course also,
that an adjustment of the controversies under the 6th Article
will be followed by an instant renewal of the proceedings
under the seventh article, and by every reasonable
exertion for hastening them to a just conclusion.
A number of your letters hitherto received
remain to be acknowledged: But the subject of
the dispatches by Mr. Sitgreaves has appeared
to claim an answer, distinct, and without delay.
I cannot but briefly add, however, that we have
the mortification to find, that notwithstanding all
the forbearances and endeavors of the United States
for the establishment of just and friendly relations
with Great Britain, accounts continue to arrive from
different quarters, of accumulating trespasses on
our commerce and neutral rights.
This is particularly the case not only with respect
to the Bahama Islands but to Jamaica.
Mr. Savage under date of 11th April last, states that
“since the 15th January, thirty vessels which appear
to be American property, have been detained and
brought into this Port, and from the best information
I have been able to obtain from the several Masters
their value has been computed by me at the enormous
sum of seven hundred and sixteen thousand dollars;
some few have been acquitted after being decreed to
pay both Relators and Defendants’ costs, which upon the
smallest calculation is never less than fifteen hundred
dollars, and in some instances three times the sum.”
It will be an agreeable circumstance if the result of
your correspondence with the British Ministry shall be
found to mitigate these outrages; it being the sincere
desire of the United States and of their government to
see every obstacle removed to that entire confidence,
harmony and good will between the two countries,
which can be firmly established on no other foundations
than those of reciprocal justice and respect.4
Madison wrote a much longer letter to Rufus King
on 24 July 1801 that concluded with this:
No time was lost in presenting more particularly to the
attention of the President, your letter of June 1st stating
the interview with Lord H.—— in which he communicated
to you for the information of the President the orders
given at the British ports in the Mediterranean in favor
of the American squadron sent into that sea.
The President has received this communication with a lively
satisfaction and charges you to assure his British Majesty,
that he feels all the value of the good offices he has been
pleased to interpose, both as they afford a seasonable
accommodation to the little squadron dispatched for the
protection of our Mediterranean trade; and as they are
a pledge of those friendly sentiments and that liberal
policy which the United States sincerely wish to be
reciprocal and perpetual between the two nations.
The cession of Louisiana from Spain to France,
as intimated in your letter of 29 March had been
previously mentioned from several quarters,
and has since been repeated from others as an
arrangement believed to have taken place.
Although no official or regular confirmation of the fact
has been received, it is more than a probability and
has been the subject of instructions to Mr. Pinckney,
the Minister of the United States at Madrid, as it will
also be to Mr. Livingston, the Minister going to Paris.
They will both make use of the proper means to prevent
a change of our Southern and South Western neighbors,
that is to say the means of peace and persuasion.
Should Great Britain interpose her projects
also in that quarter, the scene will become
more interesting and require still greater
circumspection on the part of the United States.
You will doubtless be always awake to circumstances
which may indicate her views and will lose no time
in making them known to the President.
Considering the facility with which her extensive navy can
present itself in our Front, that she already flanks us on
the North, and that if possessed of the Spanish territories
contiguous to us, she might soon have a range of
settlements in our rear, as well as flank us on the South
also, it is certainly not without reason that she is the last
of neighbors that would be agreeable to the United States.
It will be agreeable and may be useful for you
to know that the seasons on which our Summer
harvests depended, have been uncommonly favorable;
and particularly that the crops of wheat throughout the
United States are estimated to exceed by
one half the produce of any preceding year at the same time
that the quality is also uncommonly excellent.5
President Jefferson on 28 August 1801 wrote
this letter to Secretary of State Madison:
I enclose with those papers, for perusal, a letter &
memorial from a Mr. Joseph Allen Smith, of whom
I know nothing more than these papers inform me.
You will be sensible that in his assumption of diplomatic
functions he has not shown much diplomatic subtlety.
He seems not afraid of Logan’s law in our hands.
Of Mr. Starke’s application for the attorney’s place of
Mississippi I recollect nothing; and not having here my
bundle of applications for office I can ascertain nothing.
But I am persuaded he has not applied to me; &
consequently it must have been to our predecessors.
This would afford a reason the more for enquiries
concerning him before we decide about him.
This shall be reserved for conversation when we meet.
I feel a scruple at signing the recital of a
falsehood in the Exequatur for Olsen, to wit,
“the having seen his commission.”
It would bind us to admit his credentials let them be
what they will; and be an useless departure from fact.
I think with you that he desires much less, & what is
perfectly admissible; & consequently that it would be better
to write him a very civil letter yielding exactly what he asks.
What are the delays in the performance of our
stipulations of which the Bey of Tunis & Eaton complain?
I thought we had not only complied with the treaty
but were doing considerably more.
I have read Eaton’s correspondence and form
a very respectable opinion of his understanding.
I should be disposed to do so too of his honesty:
but how to these two qualities can we reconcile
his extraordinary mission of this vessel?
If nothing sinister appears on the enquiry Mr. Wagner
is making, he should be made to understand that
the administration will not admit such unauthorized
& useless waste of the public money.
As to the cattle & timber, I would leave them
to be sent or not by those charged with them.
I am an enemy to all these
douceurs, tributes & humiliations.
What the laws impose on us let us
execute faithfully; but nothing more.
I think it would be well to engage Mr. Wagner
(who is fully competent to it) to make up, for the eye
of Congress a full statement of every expense which our
transactions with the Barbary powers has occasioned,
& of what we still owe, that they may be enabled to decide
on a full view of the subject what course they will pursue.
I know that nothing will stop the eternal increase of demand
from these pirates but the presence of an armed force,
and it will be more economical & more honorable to use
the same means at once for suppressing their insolencies.
I think with you we had better send by Eaton’s vessel
the powder & ball wanting for Algiers.
I have received information through a single hand
from one of Bainbridge’s lieutenants, that Bainbridge
himself connived at the pretended impressment of the
George Washington, & perhaps received a douceur.
As soon as we hear of any actual hostility by Tripoli,
I think Cathcart should be sent to Algiers,
& Obrian permitted to retire.
These two men have completely shown
themselves to be what I conceived of them
on a pretty full acquaintance in Philadelphia.
Would it not be well to instruct our agents resident
where there have been British admiralty courts to
collect all the cases, which can be authenticated
of the enormities of those courts?
I am persuaded it must be the groundwork of a demand
on our part of stipulations from that country entirely
novel in their nature, and which nothing but the
disgrace of their proceedings can extort from them.
But they are indispensably necessary for us.
We are surely never more to submit
to such ruinous degradations again.6
When Madison was visiting Jefferson at Monticello in September,
they agreed on an honorable policy of neutrality
in all transactions with foreign nations.
The war between Britain and France ended in December 1801.
On 22 January 1801 the United States Congress repealed the Judiciary Act
by which Adams had appointed many new federal judges in his last days as President.
The Senate barely passed it 16-15, and the House approved the repeal 59-32.
The legislators also revived the liberal naturalization law that Madison had written in 1795.
On 7 April 1802 Secretary of State James Madison wrote
this letter to the American ambassador Rufus King in England,
That of January 93 was accompanied by the
Convention entered into with the British Minister on
the subject of the VIth article of the Treaty of 1794.
It was laid before the Senate as soon as the documents
proper to be communicated along with it could be prepared
and was taken up there as soon as some particular
subjects before the House were disposed of.
I have delayed this letter to the last moment allowed by the
Packet in the hope of being able to let you know the result.
No vote however having yet been taken, I can
only say in general that the delay is not to be
regarded as any omen unfavorable to the transaction,
and that the best informed conjectures seem to be
that it will be agreed to without dissent.
In the meantime it will be a satisfaction to you to know
that your judgment and success in managing the negotiation
has received the entire approbation of the President.
The readiness with which the British Government has
undertaken a revision of the countervailing regulation
has a favorable aspect on the friendly relations between
the two countries, and it is hoped will be followed by other
proofs of respect for our just and reasonable expectations.
The zeal with which you have espoused this object, and
the cogent representations used in support of it, have also
merited and received the approbation of the President.
By republications here from London papers of later date
than your letters, I find that a Bill had actually been
introduced into the House of Commons on the plan desired.
It is to be wished that it may pass into a law and arrive
here in time to give a shape to the Act of Congress,
precisely coinciding with it; otherwise there may be
danger of some variance in the mutual conditions
which will suspend the effect of both till one or
both of the Legislatures shall be reassembled.
For a considerable time past the proposition on this subject
made in Congress by General Smith has slept on the table.
He did not wish to press it against a mercantile
current that appeared to set against it.
There is reason to believe that owing to ignorance and
jealousy, this current has not even yet entirely ceased.
The case is too plain however to be long misunderstood,
and appeals too strong an interest to be long unfelt.
The acknowledgement on the part of Great Britain
of the inequality of the measure complained of,
and her consent to rectify it, will co-operate
strongly in placing the subject in its true light.
I understand that the attention of Congress will be
immediately recalled to it; and if it should still be
opposed, the very singular phenomenon will be
exhibited of a perseverance in error at the expense
of interest on one side, after the interest of the
other has yielded to the force of truth and justice.
The just claim of the United States to reciprocity
in the intercourse with the British West India and other
Colonies has not been lost sight of by the President.
But it was not foreseen that the British Government
would so soon be disposed to hearken to it;
and it was not thought prudent to mingle
demands which might embarrass each other.
We learn with much satisfaction that you have found the
crisis so favorable for bringing this subject before the
British Government, and I am authorized to assure you,
that instead of crossing the views of the President in
the steps you have taken in relation to it, you could
not have more satisfactorily have promoted them.
The manner and degree in which the object is to be
pursued he leaves to your discretion informed as it will
be by indications on the spot; and guided by the general
policy of the United States, which having no objects not
warranted by reason and right will rely as long as possible
for the attainment of them on seasonable appeals to the
interest, the justice and the friendship of others.
In this policy the President most sincerely concurs,
and sees therefore with particular pleasure
every successful result of it.
The late conduct of the British Government
towards this Country seems to authorize some
confidence that it begins to understand better
both its own interest and the American character.
And you may on all proper occasions give assurances that
it will find in the President a disposition to meet its friendly
advances in a manner that will strengthen the good will and
extend the useful intercourse between the two countries.
I observe that the Lord Chancellor has
assured you that the Maryland claim to
the Bank Stock shall be speedily decided.
This is a subject which was particularly pressed in my
last letter: and I am led by the sensibility to it in the
State of Maryland to repeat my wish that the exertions
which you are making may be completely successful.7
The diplomat Robert R. Livingston arrived in Paris on 6 December 1801.
On 18 April 1802 Jefferson wrote in a letter to Livingston,
The cession of Louisiana & the Floridas by Spain
to France works most sorely on the U. S. on this
subject the Secretary of state has written to you fully.
Yet I cannot forbear recurring to it personally,
so deep is the impression it makes in my mind.
It completely reverses all the political relations of the
U. S. and will form a new epoch in our political course.
Of all nations of any consideration France is the one
which hitherto has offered the fewest points on which
we could have any conflict of right, and the most
points of a communion of interests.
From these causes we have ever looked to her
as our natural friend, as one with which we
never could have an occasion of difference.
Her growth therefore we viewed as our own,
her misfortunes ours.
There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor
of which is our natural & habitual enemy.
It is New Orleans, through which the produce
of three eighths of our territory must pass to
market, and from its fertility it will ere long
yield more than half of our whole produce
and contain more than half our inhabitants.
France placing herself in that door
assumes to us the attitude of defiance.
Spain might have retained it quietly for years.
Her pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would induce
her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession
of the place would be hardly felt by us, and it would not
perhaps be very long before some circumstance might
arise which might make the cession of it to us the
price of something of more worth to her.
Not so can it ever be in the hands of France.
The impetuosity of her temper, the energy & restlessness
of her character, placed in a point of eternal friction with us,
and our character, which though quiet, & loving peace &
the pursuit of wealth, is high minded, despising wealth
in competition with insult or injury, enterprising & energetic
as any nation on earth, these circumstances render it
impossible that France and the U. S. can continue long
friends when they meet in so irritable a position.
They as well as we must be blind if they do not see this;
and we must be very improvident if we do not begin
to make arrangements on that hypothesis.
The day that France takes possession of New Orleans
fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever
within her low water mark.
It seals the union of two nations who in conjunction
can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean.
From that moment we must marry ourselves
to the British fleet & nation.
We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force,
for which our resources place us on very high ground:
and having formed and cemented together a power
which may render reinforcement of her settlements
here impossible to France, make the first cannon which
shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any
settlement she may have made, and for holding the two
continents of America in sequestration for the common
purposes of the United British & American nations.
This is not a state of things we seek or desire.
It is one which this measure, if adopted by France,
forces on us, as necessarily as any other cause,
by the laws of nature, brings on it’s necessary effect.
It is not from a fear of France that we
deprecate this measure proposed by her.
For however greater her force is than ours
compared in the abstract, it is nothing in comparison
of ours when to be exerted on our soil.
But it is from a sincere love of peace, and a firm
persuasion that bound to France by the interests and
the strong sympathies still existing in the minds of our
citizens, and holding relative positions which ensure their
continuance we are secure of a long course of peace.
Whereas the change of friends, which will be rendered
necessary if France changes that position, embarks us
necessarily as a belligerent power in the first war of Europe.
In that case France will have held possession of
New Orleans during the interval of a peace, long or short,
at the end of which it will be wrested from her.
Will this short-lived possession have been
an equivalent to her for the transfer of such
a weight into the scale of her enemy?
Will not the amalgamation of a young, thriving nation
continue to that enemy the health & force which
are at present so evidently on the decline?
And will a few years possession of New Orleans
add equally to the strength of France?
She may say she needs Louisiana
for the supply of her West Indies.
She does not need it in time of peace,
and in war she could not depend on them
because they would be so easily intercepted.
I should suppose that all these considerations
might in some proper form be brought into
view of the government of France.
Though stated by us, it ought not to give offense;
because we do not bring them forward as a menace,
but as consequences not controllable by us,
but inevitable from the course of things.
We mention them not as things which we desire
by any means, but as things we deprecate;
and we beseech a friend to look forward and
to prevent them for our common interests.
If France considers Louisiana however as indispensable
for her views she might perhaps be willing to look about
for arrangements which might reconcile it to our interests.
If anything could do this it would be the ceding to us
the island of New Orleans and the Floridas.
This would certainly in a great degree remove
the causes of jarring & irritation between us,
and perhaps for such a length of time as might
produce other means of making the measure
permanently conciliatory to our interests & friendships.
It would at any rate relieve us from the necessity of taking
immediate measures for countervailing such an operation
by arrangements in another quarter.
But still we should consider New Orleans &
the Floridas as no equivalent for the risk of
a quarrel with France produced by her vicinage.
I have no doubt you have urged these considerations on
every proper occasion with the government where you are.
They are such as must have effect
if you can find the means of producing
thorough reflection on them by that government.
The idea here is that the troops sent to
St. Domingo were to proceed to Louisiana
after finishing their work in that island.
If this were the arrangement, it will give you
time to return again & again to the charge.
For the conquest of St. Domingo will not be a short work.
It will take considerable time and
wear down a great number of soldiers.
Every eye in the U. S. is now fixed
on this affair of Louisiana.
Perhaps nothing since the revolutionary war has
produced more uneasy sensations through the body
of the nation notwithstanding temporary bickering
have taken place with France, she has still a strong
hold on the affections of our citizens generally.
I have thought it not amiss, by way of
supplement to the letters of the Secretary of state,
to write you this private one to impress you
with the importance we affix to this transaction.
I pray you to cherish Dupont.
He has the best dispositions for the continuance
of friendship between the two nations, and perhaps
you may be able to make a good use of him.8
Secretary of State Madison on April 26 wrote this short but important letter
to President Jefferson on Georgia’s sale of land to the United States
that would eventually become the states of Alabama and Mississippi:
We have the Honor to enclose a copy of an
Agreement entered into between the Commissioners
of the United States and those of Georgia in pursuance
of the Act entitled “An Act supplemental to the Act entitled
’An Act for an amicable settlement of Limits, with the
State of Georgia; and authorizing The Establishment
of a Government in the Mississippi Territory.’”
The nature & Importance of the Transaction have
induced the insertion of a clause, which renders it
necessary that the Subject should be communicated
to Congress during their present Session.9
Jefferson’s cousin John Randolph of Roanoke severely criticized the Jefferson
administration and Madison for this transaction, and he became their political enemy.
On 1 May 1802 Madison wrote again to Livingston
in France urging the purchase of Louisiana territory,
The conduct of the French Government in paying so
little attention to its obligations under the Treaty, in
neglecting its debts to our citizens, in giving no answers
to your complaints and expostulations, which you say
is the case with those of other foreign Ministers also,
and particularly in its reserve as to Louisiana, which
tacitly contradicts the language first held to you by the
Minister of Foreign Relations, gives tokens as little
auspicious to the true interests of France herself,
as to the Rights and the just objects of the United States.
We have the better ground to complain
of this conduct, as it is so much at variance
with the example given by the Government here.
The appropriation was no sooner carried through the
Legislative forms, than the settlement of French claims
under the Treaty commenced; and with the advantage
of every facility that could be afforded on our part in
ascertaining them; And as Mr. Pichon was authorized to
receive those due to individuals not applying, the whole
amount has been already discharged, excepting in a
very few cases which may require further examination.
The claims were liquidated according to the net proceeds
of the sales, as heretofore intimated to you, although it is
still believed that restitution according to the gross amount
or value at the time of capture, not only would be more
favorable to the United States but more just in itself.
The payment to Mr. Pichon without a special Power from
the claimants was by no means the choice of the President,
but was so much pressed, as a test of the disposition of this
Country towards the French Republic at a critical moment,
that it could not be properly refused.
The sum received by him is $140,841–25 Cents.
That paid to individuals is $74,667–41.
It is proper to observe to you that in all cases where
sales were made by the American Captors prior to the
date of the Convention without the trial and condemnation
requisite, we have admitted the title to restitution without
regarding the lapse of time between the capture and the
Convention, or making a question how far cases of that
description were within the contemplation of the instrument.
You will of course avail yourself of this proceeding on the
part of the United States to enforce a correspondent
rule in their favor in case a different one should be
contended for by the French Government.
You will not fail to insist also, if occasion should require,
that in cases where the time allowed for appeals, had not
run out at the date of the Convention, it could not be
necessary for the claimants afterwards to enter appeals.
The Convention by recognizing all claims not barred by
final condemnation at its date, evidently rescued them
from all further subjection to judicial investigation.
The Cession of Louisiana to France becomes daily
more and more a source of painful apprehensions.
Notwithstanding the Treaty of March 1801, and
notwithstanding the general belief in France on the
subject, and the accounts from St. Domingo that part
of the armament sent to that island were eventually
destined for Louisiana, a hope was still drawn from
your early conversations with Mr. Talleyrand that the
French Government did not mean to pursue the object.
Since the receipt of your last communications,
no hope remains but from the accumulating
difficulties of going through with the undertaking,
and from the conviction you may be able to impress,
that it must have an instant and powerful effect in changing
the relations between France and the United States.
The change is obvious, and the more it can be
developed in candid and friendly appeals to the
reflections of the French Government, the more
it will urge it to revise and abandon the project.
A mere neighborhood could not be friendly to the
harmony which both countries have so much an
interest in cherishing: but if a possession of the mouth
of the Mississippi is to be added to other causes
of discord, the worst events are to be apprehended.
You will consequently spare no efforts that will
consist with prudence and dignity to lead the
Councils of France to proper views of this subject
and to an abandonment of her present purpose.
You will also pursue by prudent means the enquiry
into the extent of the Cession, particularly whether
it includes the Floridas as well as New Orleans; and
endeavor to ascertain the price at which these if included
in the Cession would be yielded to the United States.
I cannot in the present state of things be more particular on
this head, than to observe that in every view it would be
a most precious acquisition, and that as far as the terms
could be satisfied by charging on the acquisition itself,
the restitutions and other debts to American Citizens, great
liberality would doubtless be indulged by this Government.
The President wishes you to devote every
attention to this object and to be frequent and
particular in your communications relating to it.
According to the latest accounts from St. Domingo
the French troops had been considerably successful in
dispersing the Blacks, but it is uncertain how long the War
there may be protracted by the irregular enterprises of the
latter and by the advantages they derive from the climate.
You will have found from the Newspapers, that much
irritation and perplexity were the consequence of ill
conduct on the part of the French Commander on his
arrival, met as we learn from Mr. Lear by a conduct not
less blamable on the part of the Americans trading there.
To the other errors of General Le Clerc he has lately
revoked the permission given to Mr. Lear to exercise the
functions of Commercial Agent, alleging for a reason that
he had no authority for granting the permission and had
inconsiderately taken the step in the hurry of his arrival.
He acknowledged at the same time that he had been
led to consider Mr. Lear as rendered justly obnoxious
to him by throwing discredit on his Bills and promoting
irritations between the French and the Americans.
In this view of Mr. Lear’s conduct Le Clerc must have
been grossly misled by calumnies and intrigues,
for the conduct of Mr. Lear has been in every
respect highly meritorious, for the prudence, the
moderation, the candor and conciliatory tone of it.
Of this Le Clerc may be expected to be by degrees
satisfied, as Mr. Pichon already is; and so far the
evil may be mitigated; but with various other
circumstances connected with the transactions
at St Domingo, it has been unfavorable to the kind
sensations which it has been our endeavor to cherish.
You will remark also in the Newspapers that the idea
of a visit from the French fleet and of pecuniary succors
from the Government of the United States has excited
not a little sensibility in some quarters of the Union.
It was at one time the purpose of Admiral Villaret to come
to this Country with part of his fleet, and as it was feared
that he would come without money or credit to obtain
supplies for even the first wants, it was anticipated that
applications would be made for a Loan in some form
or other from the Government of the United States.
The fleet however has not arrived and is understood
not to be coming, and no application has in fact been
made for pecuniary facilities other than that of
purchasing for purposes of the United States in Europe,
bills drawn on the French Government; which
application was rejected for reasons sufficiently obvious.
It is now said that the Batavian part of the fleet is destined
to the Chesapeake and will probably arrive in a few days….
P. S. I have communicated to the President
your wish to make a visit to England and have
the pleasure to inform you of his consent.
He leaves the time and the duration of your absence to
your own judgment, assuring himself that both will be in
due subordination to the important duties of your station.10
Madison on May 11 wrote this letter to
Ambassador Charles Pinckney who was in Spain.
We are still without a line from you since your
arrival at Madrid and feel an increasing solicitude
to hear from you on the subject of Louisiana.
The latest information from Paris has confirmed the fact
that it was ceded by a Treaty prior to that of March 1801;
and notwithstanding the virtual denial of the Cession in the
early conversations between Mr. Livingston and the Minister
of Foreign relations, a refusal of any explanations at
present, seems to admit that the Cession has taken place.
Still there are chances of obtaining
a reversal of the transaction.
The repugnance of the United States to it is and will be
pressed in a manner that cannot be without some effect.
It is known that most of the French statesmen
best informed on the subject disapprove of it.
The pecuniary difficulties of the French Government must
also be felt as a check; while the prospect of a protracted
and expensive war in St. Domingo must form a very
powerful obstacle to the execution of the project.
The Counsels of England appear to
have been torpid on this occasion.
Whether it proceed from an unwillingness to risk
a fresh altercation with France, or from a hope
that such a neighborhood between France and
the United States would lead to collisions which might
be turned to her advantage is more than I can decide.
The latter consideration might justly have great weight
with her, but as her eyes may be more readily turned
to the immediate and certain purposes to be answered
to her rival, it is to be presumed that the policy of
England will contribute to thwart the acquisition.
What the intentions of Spain may be,
we wait to learn from you.
Verbal information from unofficial sources
has led us to infer that she disowns the instrument
of Cession and will vigorously oppose it.
Should the Cession actually fail from this or any other cause,
and Spain retain New Orleans and the Floridas, I repeat to
you the wish of the President that every effort and address
be employed to obtain the arrangement by which the
Territory on the East side of the Mississippi including
New Orleans may be ceded to the United States,
and the Mississippi made a common boundary with
a common use of its navigation for them and Spain.
The inducements to be held out to Spain were
intimated in your original instructions on this point.
I am charged by the President now to add that
you may not only receive and transmit a proposition
of guaranty of her territory beyond the Mississippi,
as a condition of her ceding to the United States
the Territory including New Orleans on this side,
but in case it be necessary may make the proposition
yourself in the forms required by our Constitution.
You will infer from this enlargement of your authority,
how much importance is attached to the object in question,
as securing a precious acquisition to the United States,
as well as a natural and quiet boundary with Spain;
and will derive from this consideration additional motives to
discharge with a prudent zeal the task committed to you.11
On 14 August 1802 Madison wrote this to Jefferson:
I read last evening your two favors of the 9 & 13th.
Before I left Washington I wrote to Simpson approving
his refusal of passports in the cases required by
the Emperor, and understood that the instructions
from the Navy Department to Commodore Morris
were founded on the same principle.
It is to be inferred therefore that we are no longer
on a footing of amity with Morocco: and I had
accordingly retained your letter and concurred in the
provisional step taken for stopping the Gun carriages.
As it is possible however that things may take a more
favorable turn in that quarter, I have desired Mr. Brent
to forward with the quickest attention whatever accounts
may arrive and also to let me know the day as soon as
it can be done on which the General Greene is to sail.
Should it be found that peace with Morocco cannot
be preserved or restored without the concession
demanded by him, my opinion decides that
hostility is a less evil than so degrading an
abandonment of the ground rightfully taken by us.
As a consequence of this opinion, I concur in that which
your query intimates, that neither of the frigates in the
Mediterranean in a condition to remain ought to be recalled.
I should prefer if circumstances admitted that the
force there ought rather to be increased, and with
the greater reason as the blunder of McNeil may
endanger the footing on which we stand with Tunis.
May it not be proper as soon as authentic information
of this occurrence comes to hand that something
of a healing nature should be said from the
Government to the Bey in addition to the explanations
which will no doubt be made from the naval commander.
The letter from Law the District Judge of Connecticut,
was preceded by one to me from a Commissioner of
Bankruptcy at Boston representing the objection of
Davis the District Judge there to proceed without
such a notification as is proposed by Law.
Viewing as you do the Commission itself
as the most authentic of all notifications,
I did not give any answer, presuming that the scruples
of the Judge would yield to further reflection.
The letter from Law shall be answered
to the effect which you suggest.
Among the papers now enclosed are
applications from the Merchants of Boston
& Philadelphia for an interposition in behalf
of their vessels &c detained in Spanish America.
This is a delicate subject and must be so handled as well for
their interest as for the honor & dignity of the Government.
I suppose they may be told that Spain does not
object to a Board for deciding on our complaints
& that Mr. President will endeavor to give it
latitude enough for all just cases.
The sending a public ship, as suggested by
Fitzsimmons seems to have no National object,
and to be of an injurious tendency.12
The minister Livingston in Paris learned that the Floridas were
not included in Spain’s secret cession of Louisiana to France,
and on September 1 he wrote to Madison a letter that began:
I yesterday made several propositions to
the Minister on the subject of Louisiana.
He told me frankly that every offer was premature
that the French Government had determined to
take possession first—so that you must consider
the business as absolutely determined on.
The armament is what I have already mentioned
and will be ready in about six weeks.
I have every reason to believe the Floridas are not included.
They will for the present at least
remain in the hands of Spain.
There never was a government in which
less could be done by negotiation than here.
There is no people, no legislature, no counselors;
one man is everything—he seldom asks advice
and never hears it unasked—his ministers are mere
clerks & his legislature & counselors parade of officers.13
Madison answered seven letters from Robert R. Livingston
with this one on 15 October 1802:
On my return from Virginia after an absence of
two Months, I found here your letter of July 30th.
Those of May 10, 12, 20, 28 June 8th & July 3rd
had been previously received.
The zeal and energy with which you are urging on
the French Government a fair construction and fulfilment
of the Convention, and a discharge of all our just demands,
render it unnecessary to repeat to you our anxiety that
the example of good faith given by the United States
should not remain without a satisfactory reciprocity.
The precise tone in your communications
most likely to favor this result, can best
be decided by your own judgment.
In a general view the soundest policy evidently
prescribes one that will cherish whatever good
will or confidence may be felt towards the
United States, and that will charge on that side
the blame of any failure in the pursuit of our objects.
It must be left to your own decision also how far
a direct resort to the Head of the Government
may promise better success than the ordinary
channels of communicating with him.
The delays and obstacles met with in the latter recommend
the experiment, if there be no objections to it drawn from
usage or other considerations not perceived at this distance.
The experiment, which will of course be made with
as little danger as possible of needless umbrage to
the intermediate Organ, may at least lead to a
knowledge of the ground finally meant to be taken
by the Chief Consul; and to which the further
instructions of the President must be accommodated.
The suspense which has taken place in relation to
Louisiana and the Floridas is favorable to the efforts for
diverting the French Government from its unwise project.
Whether we regard the sentiments prevailing in this Country
on the subject or the striking tendencies of the project itself,
no pains ought to be spared for putting an end to it.
If the occasion can be so improved as to obtain for
the United States on convenient terms New Orleans
and Florida, the happiest of issues will be given
to one of the most perplexing of occurrences.
I postpone more particular remarks on this subject until
the President shall know the impressions on the French
Councils, resulting from the views of it to which you will be
led by the dispatches of which Mr. Dupont was the bearer.
The answer to your note on the case of
Captains Rodgers and Davidson is by no
means such as there was a right to expect.
General Le Clerc having himself stated the reasons on
which he proceeded, other and better reasons could
not be presumed; and it seems impossible not to regard
his reasons rather as an insult than a justification.
My letter of July 6 will renew this subject: and it is
to be hoped that a reconsideration by the French
Government will do more justice to it.
The President authorizes you in reply to the note of July
30 from the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Helvetic Republic,
to assure him of the particular satisfaction with which the
Government of the United States learns that tranquility has
been regained, and an acceptable Constitution organized
by a nation, so long and so justly admired for its many
virtuous examples; and that the United States will cultivate
with emulation all those benevolent sentiments and friendly
dispositions, which the Government of the Helvetic Republic
has expressed towards them and which ought to bind
together nations having otherwise the fewest relations.
The breach, presumed to be inadvertent, of the Treaty
between the United States and the now Batavian Republic,
to which you refer, was some time ago
intimated by our Consul at Amsterdam.
A correction of the abuse will be claimed as
soon as some further information, daily expected,
with respect to the footing of our trade and
navigation with that Country shall be received.
The resignation of Mr. Sumter having been received
the President allows you to appoint a private Secretary.
The case of Mr. De Vienne is wholly beyond
the compass of the Executive authority.
Congress alone can decide on it.14
In November 1802 news reached Washington that the Spanish Intendent
Morales
ordered the port of New Orleans closed to all ships except Spanish vessels,
and they prohibited depositing American products.
Madison on November 22 wrote in a letter to John Adams,
Being informed that our Mediterranean Passports and
papers of navigation have been recently counterfeited
and used by persons not entitled to them, and being
referred to you for explanations respecting it, permit me
to request you to make a deposition reciting your
knowledge of the subject as circumstantially as may
be and especially what you know respecting the interest
Mr. Willis the American Consul at Barcelona, is supposed
to have had in a ship under American colors called the
Pomona of New Port, and which carried such a counterfeit
passport in July last; also whether the plate for the
passport was cut at Barcelona and the false
impression there originally issued and by whom.
To enable the Government to give a speedy check
to this abuse, you will see the necessity of transmitting
the deposition to me as soon as convenient.15
Madison was also surprised in November when he learned that the
Spanish Intendant at New Orleans closed the port to American trade
which violated the treaty between the United States and Spain in 1795.
At the same time Spain transferred ownership of New Orleans to France.
Madison on 27 November wrote this letter to the
ambassador Charles Pinckney who was in Madrid.
Your dispatches by Mr. Codman were delivered
by him two days ago; but being voluminous, and
the documents in the Spanish language, not yet fully
translated, I am not able at present to convey to
you the sentiments of the President on the subject.
My letter of October 25th will have explained to you the
scope of our claims on the Spanish Government; and I now
only repeat the confidence entertained that as far as your
success in the Convention has not corresponded therewith,
your efforts will be renewed to bring about a supplemental
provision; particularly in behalf of our citizens whose losses
proceeded from aliens within Spanish responsibility.
A letter from a confidential citizen at New Orleans,
of which a copy is enclosed, has just informed us, that
the Intendant at that place by a proclamation from which
an extract is also enclosed, had prohibited the deposit of
American effects stipulated by the Treaty of 1795; and as
the letter is interpreted, that the river was also shut against
the external commerce of the United States from that port.
Whether it be the fact or not that this latter prohibition has
also taken place, it is evident that the useful navigation of
the Mississippi so essentially depends on a suitable
depositary for the articles of commerce that a privation
of the latter is equivalent to a privation of both.
This proceeding is so direct and palpable a
violation of the Treaty of 1795, that in candor
it is to be imputed rather to the Intendant solely,
than to instructions of his Government.
The Spanish Minister takes pains to impress
this belief, and it is favored by private accounts
from New Orleans, mentioning that the
Governor did not concur with the Intendant.
But from whatever source the measure may
have proceeded, the President expects that the
Spanish Government will neither lose a moment
in countermanding it nor hesitate to repair
every damage which may result from it.
You are aware of the sensibility of our
Western citizens to such an occurrence.
This sensibility is justified by
the interest they have at stake.
The Mississippi is to them everything.
It is the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac
and all the navigable rivers of the Atlantic
States formed into one stream.
The produce exported through that channel last year
amounted to $1,622,672 from the Districts of Kentucky
and Mississippi only and will probably be fifty Per Cent
more this year (from the whole Western Country Kentucky
alone has exported for the 1st half of this year $591,432
in value) a great part of which is now or shortly will be
afloat for New Orleans and consequently exposed to
the effects of this extraordinary exercise of power.
While you presume therefore in your representations
to the Spanish Government, that the conduct of its
officer is no less contrary to its intentions, than it is
to its good faith, you will take care to express the
strongest confidence, that the breach of the Treaty
will be repaired in every way which justice and a
regard for a friendly neighborhood may require.
I have communicated the information received
from New Orleans to the Chevalier D’Yrujo,
with a view to obtain his immediate interposition
as you will find by the enclosed copy of a letter to him.
He readily undertakes to use it with all the
effect he can give it by writing immediately on
the subject to the local authority at New Orleans.
I shall write at the same time to Mr. Hulings, who will
enforce as far as he may have an opportunity the
motives for recalling the unwarrantable prohibitions.
It is to be hoped that the Intendant will be led to see the
error which he has committed, and to correct it before
a very great share of its mischief will have happened.
Should he prove as obstinate as he has been ignorant
or wicked, nothing can temper the irritation and
indignation of the Western Country, but a persuasion
that the energy of their own Government will obtain
from the justice of that of Spain the most ample redress.
It has long been manifest, that while the injuries to the
United States, so frequently occurring from the Colonial
officers scattered over our hemisphere and in our
neighborhood can only be repaired by a resort to their
respective Sovereigns in Europe, that it will be impossible
to guard against the most serious inconveniences.
The instance before us strikes with peculiar force
and presents an occasion on which you may
advantageously suggest to the Spanish Government
the expediency of placing in their Minister on the Spot an
authority to control or correct the mischievous proceedings
of their Colonial Officers towards our citizens; without which
any one of fifteen or twenty individuals, not always among
either the wisest or best of men, may at any time threaten
the good understanding of the two Countries.
The distance between the United States and the old
Continent, and the mortifying delays of explanations and
negotiations across the Atlantic on emergencies in our
neighborhood render such a provision indispensable, and it
cannot be long before all the Governments of Europe having
American Colonies must see the policy of making it.16
On 16 December 1802 Madison wrote in a letter to Robert Livingston,
I am induced by the very favorable information
given me of the promising merits of Mr. Cabell,
the young gentleman who will hand you this to
ask the favor of your friendly attentions to him.
He visits France I understand partly on
account of his health, but with a laudable
view also to the advantage of his mind.
On the supposition that he will proceed
with little delay from Bordeaux the port
for which he will sail to Paris, I shall make
him the Bearer of some of the late newspapers.
The one of this morning containing the
message of the President is enclosed.
The date of it will suggest that Congress cannot have
entered as yet into the business of the Session.
I enclose also a late proceeding of the Legislature
of Kentucky, occasioned by the breach of the
Treaty with Spain by the Intendant at
New Orleans in an article which is connected
with the strongest feelings of the Western Country.
The assurances of Mr. Yrujo with other evidence
make it pretty certain that the measure of the Intendant
was not warranted by orders from his Government,
and it is hoped that the interpositions for correcting it
will succeed before much injury will have ensued.
The excitement however which it has produced
ought to admonish the Holders whoever they may be,
of the Mouth of the Mississippi, that justice, ample
justice to the Western Citizens of the United States,
is the only tenure of peace with this Country.
There are now or in two years will be not less than
200,000 Militia on the waters of the Mississippi, every
man of whom would march at a Minutes warning to
remove obstructions from that outlet to the Sea, every
man of whom regards the free use of that river as a
natural & indefeasible right and is conscious of the
physical force that can at any time give effect to it.
This consideration ought not to be overlooked by
France and would be alone sufficient if allowed its
due weight to cure the phrensy which covets Louisiana.
Other considerations however seem likely
to co-operate for the same purpose.
According to the latest accounts from St. Domingo
& her other West Indies Islands, they must be lost
to her without large & speedy reinforcements.
And if the indications which cross the Atlantic
are just, a renewal of the war in Europe is not
an improbable event and will be the more critical
to the Chief Consul, as he has at once provoked it
by his external measures and made no provision
for it by measures of credit or economy at home.
We are anxious to learn how far the project of
Louisiana may be shaken by any of these or
other causes, as well as the decision on the
favorable report made to the French Government
on the subject of American claims of every sort.
Until something further is known on these points,
there is nothing to be added to the Official explanations
which I have already from time to time transmitted.
The elections for the next Congress
are over in most of the States.
The tide of republicanism has run stronger than was
anticipated, and shows the more fully the spirit of the
Community as it has been resisted by the most impetuous
efforts of the minority and particularly by every species
of Newspaper artifice in a spirit & style without example.
The Convention with Spain on the subject
of spoliations is now before the Senate.
I have not learned the impression with which it is received.
You have known without doubt from Mr. King
himself his purpose of coming home in the Spring.
The President has not yet fixed on his successor.17
In December 1802 James Madison sent James Monroe, who was no longer
Governor of Virginia, back to France to assist Robert R. Livingston.
On 2 March 1803 Madison wrote a very long letter to both of them which is
worth quoting because it would prepare the way for the fabulous Louisiana Purchase.
You will herewith receive a Commission and letters
of Credence, one of you as Minister Plenipotentiary,
the other as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, to
treat with the Government of the French Republic on the
Subject of the Mississippi and the Territories Eastward
thereof and without the limits of the United States.
The object in view is to procure by just and satisfactory
arrangements a Cession to the United States of New
Orleans and of West and East Florida, or as much thereof
as the actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with.
The French Republic is understood to have become the
proprietor by a Cession from Spain in the Year 1800 of New
Orleans, as part of Louisiana, if not of the Floridas also.
If the Floridas should not have been then
included in the Cession, it is not improbable
that they will have been since added to it.
It is foreseen that you may have considerable difficulty
in overcoming the repugnance and the prejudices of the
French Government against a transfer to the United States
of so important a part of the acquisition.
The apparent solicitude and exertions amidst many
embarrassing circumstances to carry into effect the
Cession made to the French Republic, the reserve so
long used on this subject by the French Government
in its communications with the Minister of the United
States at Paris and the declaration finally made by
the French Minister of foreign Relations, that it was
meant to take possession before any overtures from
the United States would be discussed, show the importance
which is attached to the Territories in question.
On the other hand, as the United States have the
Strongest motives of interest and of a pacific policy
to seek by just means the establishment of the Mississippi
down to its mouth as their boundary, so there are
considerations which urge on France a concurrence
in so natural and so convenient an arrangement.
Notwithstanding the circumstances which have been
thought to indicate in the French Government designs
of unjust encroachment and even direct hostility on the
United States, it is scarcely possible to reconcile a policy
of that sort with any motives which can be presumed
to sway either the Government or the Nation.
To say nothing of the assurances given both by the French
Minister at Paris and by the Spanish Minister at Madrid,
that the Cession by Spain to France was understood to carry
with it all the conditions stipulated by the former to the
United States; the manifest tendency of hostile measures
against the United States to connect their Councils and
their Colossal growth with the great and formidable rival
of France can neither escape her discernment nor be
disregarded by her prudence, and might alone be expected
to produce very different views in her Government.
On the supposition that the French Government does
not mean to force or to court war with the United States;
but on the contrary, that it sees the interest which
France has in cultivating their neutrality and amity,
the dangers to so desirable a relation between the two
Countries which lurk under a neighborhood modified
as is that of Spain at present, must have great weight in
recommending the change which you will have to propose.
These dangers have been always sufficiently evident;
and have moreover been repeatedly suggested
by collisions between the stipulated rights or
reasonable expectations of the United States
and the Spanish jurisdiction at New Orleans.
But they have been brought more strikingly into view
by the late proceeding of the Intendant at that place.
The sensibility and unanimity in our nation which have
appeared on this occasion must convince France that
friendship and peace with us must be precarious until the
Mississippi shall be made the boundary between the United
States and Louisiana; and consequently render the present
moment favorable to the object with which you are charged.
The time chosen for this experiment is pointed out also
by other important considerations: The instability of the
peace of Europe, the attitude taken by Great Britain, the
languishing state of the French finances and the absolute
necessity of either abandoning the West India Islands or
of sending thither large armaments at great expense all
contribute at the present crisis to prepare in the French
Government a disposition to listen to an arrangement which
will at once dry up one source of foreign controversy and
furnish some aid in struggling with internal embarrassments.
It is to be added that the overtures committed to you
coincide in great measure with the ideas of the person
through whom the letter from the President of April 30th
1802 was conveyed to Mr. Livingston, and who is
presumed to have gained some insight into the
present sentiments of the French cabinet.
Among the considerations which have led the
French Government into the project of regaining
from Spain the Province of Louisiana, and which
you may find it necessary to meet in your discussions
the following suggests themselves as highly probable:
1st. A jealousy of the Atlantic States as leaning
to a coalition with Great Britain not consistent with
neutrality & amity towards France; and a belief that
by holding the key to the commerce of the Mississippi,
she will be able to command the interests and attachments
of the Western portion of the United States; and thereby
either control the Atlantic portion also; or if that cannot
be done, to seduce the former into a separate
Government and a close alliance with herself.
In each of these particulars the
calculation is founded in error.
It is not true that the Atlantic States lean
towards any connection with Great Britain
inconsistent with their amicable relations to France.
Their dispositions and their interests equally prescribe
to them amity and impartiality to both of those Nations.
If a departure from this simple and salutary line
of policy should take place, the causes of it will
be found in the unjust or unfriendly conduct
experienced from one or other of them.
In general it may be remarked, that there are as
many points on which the interests and views of the
United States and of Great Britain may not be thought
to coincide as can be discovered in relation to France.
If less harmony and confidence should therefore prevail
between France and the United States than may be
maintained between Great Britain and the United States,
the difference will lie not in the want of motives
drawn from the mutual advantage of the two Nations,
but in the want of favorable dispositions in the
Governments of one or other of them.
That the blame in this respect will not justly
fall on the Government of the United States
is sufficiently demonstrated by the Mission
and the objects with which you are now charged.
The French Government is not less mistaken if it supposes
that the Western part of the United States can be withdrawn
from their present union with the Atlantic part into a
separate Government closely allied with France.
Our Western fellow Citizens are bound to the union
not only by the ties of kindred and affection which for
a long time will derive strength from the stream of
emigration peopling that region; but by two considerations
which flow from clear and essential interests.
One of these considerations is the passage through
the Atlantic ports of the foreign Merchandize consumed
by the Western Inhabitants and the payments thence
made to a Treasury in which they would lose their
participation by erecting a separate Government.
The bulky productions of the Western Country may
continue to pass down the Mississippi; but the difficulties
of the ascending Navigation of that river, however free
it may be made, will cause the imports for
consumption to pass through the Atlantic States.
This is the course through which they are now received;
nor will the impost to which they will be
subject change the course, even if the
passage up the Mississippi should be duty free.
It will not equal the difference in
the freight through the latter channel.
It is true that mechanical and other improvements in
the navigation of the Mississippi may lessen the labor
and expense of ascending the stream; but it is not in
the least probable that savings of this sort will keep
pace with the improvements in Canals and Roads
by which the present course of imports will be favored.
Let it be added that the loss of the contributions thus made
to a foreign Treasury would be accompanied with the
necessity of providing by less convenient revenues for the
expense of a separate Government, and of the defensive
precautions required by the change of situation.
The other of these considerations results from the
insecurity to which the trade from the Mississippi
would be exposed by such a revolution in the
Western part of the United States.
A connection of the Western People as a separate
State with France implies a connection between
the Atlantic States and Great Britain.
It is found from long experience that France and
Great Britain are nearly half their time at War.
The case would be the same with their allies.
During nearly one half the time, therefore, the trade
of the Western Country from the Mississippi would
have no protection but that of France and would
suffer all the interruptions which Nations having
the command of the sea could inflict on it.
It will be the more impossible for France to draw
the Western Country under her influence by conciliatory
regulations of the trade through the Mississippi;
because regulations which would be regarded by
her as liberal, and claiming returns of gratitude would
be viewed on the other side as falling short of justice.
If this should not be at first the case, it soon would be so.
The Western people believe, as do their Atlantic brethren,
that they have a natural and indefeasible right
to trade freely through the Mississippi.
They are conscious of their power to enforce
this right against any Nation whatever.
With these ideas in their minds it is evident that France
will not be able to excite either a sense of favor or of fear
that would establish an ascendency over them.
On the contrary, it is more than probable that the
different views of their respective rights would quickly
lead to disappointments and disgusts on both sides,
and thence to collisions and controversies
fatal to the harmony of the two Nations.
To guard against these consequences is a primary motive
with the United States in wishing the arrangement proposed.
As France has equal reason to guard against them, she
ought to feel an equal motive to concur in the arrangement.
2nd. The advancement of the commerce of France by
an establishment on the Mississippi has doubtless great
weight with her Government in espousing this project.
The commerce through the Mississippi will consist
1st of that of the United States,
2nd of that of the adjacent Territories
to be acquired by France.
The first is now and must for ages
continue the principal commerce.
As far as the faculties of France will enable her
to share in it, the article to be proposed to her
on the part of the United States on that subject
promises every advantage she can desire.
It is a fair calculation that under the proposed arrangement,
her Commercial opportunities would be extended
rather than diminished; inasmuch as our present
right of deposit gives her the same competitors
as she would then have, and the effect of the
more rapid settlement of the Western Country
consequent on that arrangement would proportionally
augment the mass of Commerce to be shared by her.
The other portion of Commerce with the
exception of the Island of New Orleans and
the contiguous ports of West Florida, depends
on the Territory Westward of the Mississippi.
With respect to this portion it will be little affected
by the cession desired by the United States.
The footing proposed for her commerce on the shore
to be ceded gives it every advantage she could
reasonably wish during a period within which
she will be able to provide every requisite establishment
on the right shore; which according to the best information,
possesses the same facilities for such establishments
as are found on the Island of New Orleans itself.
These circumstances essentially distinguish the
situation of the French Commerce in the Mississippi
after a Cession of New Orleans to the United States
from the situation of the Commerce of the United States,
without such a Cession their right of deposit being so
much more circumscribed and their Territory on the
Mississippi not reaching low enough for a Commercial
establishment on the shore within their present limits.
There remains to be considered
the commerce of the ports in the Floridas.
With respect to this branch the advantages
which will be secured to France by the
proposed arrangement ought to be satisfactory.
She will here also derive a greater share from the increase,
which will be given by a more rapid settlement of a fertile
Territory to the exports and imports through those ports,
than she would obtain from any restrictive use
she could make of those ports as her own property.
But this is not all.
The United States have a just claim to the use of the Rivers
which pass from their Territories through the Floridas.
They found their claim on like principles with those
which supported their claim to the use of the Mississippi.
If the length of these Rivers be not in the same proportion
with that of the Mississippi, the difference is balanced
by the circumstance that both banks in the
former case belong to the United States.
With a view to permanent harmony between the
two Nations, a Cession of the Floridas, is particularly
to be desired, as obviating serious controversies that
might otherwise grow even out of the regulations
however liberal in the opinion of France, which
she may establish at the Mouths of those rivers.
One of the Rivers, the Mobile, is said to be at present
navigable for 400 Miles above the 31° of Latitude,
and the navigation may no doubt be opened still further.
On all of them the Country within the boundary
of the United States, though otherwise
between that and the sea is fertile.
Settlements on it are beginning, and the people have
already called on the Government to procure
the proper outlets to foreign Markets.
The President accordingly gave some time ago the proper
instructions to the Minister of the United States at Madrid.
In fact our free communication with the Sea through those
channels is so natural, so reasonable, and so essential, that
eventually it must take place, and in prudence therefore
ought to be amicably and effectually adjusted without delay.
3. A further object with France may be to form a
Colonial establishment having a convenient relation
to her West India Islands and forming an
independent Source of supplies for them.
This object ought to weigh but little against the Cession
we wish to obtain for two reasons:
1st because the Country which the Cession will leave in
her hands on the right side of the Mississippi is capable of
employing more than all the faculties she can spare for
such an object and of yielding all the supplies which
she could expect or wish from such an establishment:
2nd because in times of general peace she will be sure
of receiving whatever supplies her Islands may want
from the United States; and even through the Mississippi
if more convenient to her; because in times of peace with
the United States, though of War with Great Britain,
the same sources will be open to her while her own
would be interrupted; and because in case of War
with the United States, which is not likely to happen
without a concurrent war with Great Britain (the only case in
which she could need a distinct fund of supplies)
the entire command of the Sea and of the trade
through the Mississippi would be against her
and would cut off the source in question.
She would consequently never need the aid of her new
Colony, but when she could make little or no use of it.
There may be other objects with France in
the projected acquisition; but they are probably
such as would be either satisfied by a reservation
to herself of the Country on the right side of the Mississippi,
or are of too subordinate a character to prevail against
the plan of adjustment we have in view; in case
other difficulties in the way of it can be overcome.
The principles and outlines of this plan are as follows viz:I.
France cedes to the United States forever the
territory East of the River Mississippi comprehending
the two Floridas, the Island of New Orleans and
the Islands lying to the North and East of that channel
of the said River which is commonly called the South-pass,
together with all such other Islands as appertain to
either West or East Florida; France reserving to herself
all her territory on the West side of the Mississippi.II.
The boundary between the territory ceded and
reserved by France shall be a continuation of that
already defined above the thirty-first degree of
North Latitude, viz. the middle of the channel or
bed of the River through the said South Pass to the sea.
The navigation of the River Mississippi in its whole breadth
from its source to the Ocean and in all its passages to
and from the same shall be equally free and common to
citizens of the United States and of the French Republic.III.
The vessels and citizens of the French Republic
may exercise commerce to and at such places
on their respective shores below the said thirty-first
degree of North Latitude as may be allowed for that
use by the parties to their respective citizens and vessels.
And it is agreed that no other nation shall be allowed to
exercise commerce to or at the same or any other places on
either shore below the said thirty-first degree of Latitude.
For the term of ten years to be computed from the
exchange of the ratifications hereof the citizens, vessels
and merchandizes of the United States and of France shall
be subject to no other duties on their respective shores
below the said thirty-first degree of latitude than are
imposed on their own citizens, vessels and merchandizes.
No duty whatever shall, after the expiration of ten years,
be laid on articles the growth or manufacture of the
United States or of the ceded territory exported through
the Mississippi in French vessels; so long as such articles
so exported in vessels of the United States shall be
exempt from duty: nor shall French vessels exporting
such articles ever afterwards be subject to pay
a higher duty than vessels of the United States.IV.
The citizens of France may for the term of ten years
deposit their effects at New Orleans and at such other
places on the ceded shore of the Mississippi, as are allowed
for the commerce of the United States without paying
any other duty than a fair price for the hire of stores.V.
In the ports and commerce of West and East Florida,
France shall never be on a worse footing than the most
favored nation; and for the term of ten years, her vessels
and merchandize shall be subject therein to no higher
duties than are paid by those of the United States.
Articles of the growth and manufacture of the
United States and of the ceded territory exported
in French vessels from any port in West or East Florida
shall be exempt from duty as long as vessels
of the United States shall enjoy this exemption.Article VI.
The United States in consideration of the cession of
territory made by this treaty shall pay to France thirty
millions of livres tournois, in the manner following, viz.
They shall pay 6 millions of livres tournois immediately
on the exchange of the ratifications hereof: they shall
assume in such order of priority as the Government
of the United States may approve, the payment of claims,
which have been or may be acknowledged by the
French Republic to be due to American citizens,
or so much thereof as with the payment to be made
on the exchange of ratifications will not exceed the
sum of 7 and in case a balance should remain due
after such payment and assumption, the same shall be paid
at the end of one year from the final liquidation of the claims
hereby assumed, which shall be payable in three equal
annual payments, the first of which is to take place one year
after the exchange of ratifications; they shall bear interest
at the rate of six per cent per annum from the dates of
such intended payments until they shall be discharged.
All the above mentioned payments shall be made at the
Treasury of the United States and at the rate of
one dollar and ten cents for every six livres tournois.VII.
To incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded
territory with the citizens of the United States on an
equal footing, being a provision which cannot now
be made, it is to be expected from the character
and policy of the United States that such incorporation
will take place without unnecessary delay.
In the meantime they shall be secure in their persons
and property and in the free enjoyment of their religion.Observations on the plan.
1st. As the Cession to be made by France in this case
must rest on the Cession made to her by Spain, it might
be proper that Spain should be a party to the transaction.
The objections however to delay require that nothing more
be asked on our part, than either an exhibition and recital of
the Treaty between France and Spain; or an engagement on
the part of France, that the accession of Spain will be given.
Nor will it be advisable to insist even on this much,
if attended with difficulty or delay unless
there be ground to suppose that Spain will
contest the validity of the transaction.
2nd. The plan takes for granted also that the Treaty
of 1795 between the United States and Spain is to lose
none of its force in behalf of the former by any
transactions whatever between the latter and France.
No change it is evident will be or can be admitted
to be produced in that Treaty or in the arrangements
carried into effect under it, further than it may be
superseded by stipulations between the United States
and France, who will stand in the place of Spain.
It will not be amiss to insist on an express recognition
of this by France as an effectual bar against pretexts
of any sort not compatible with the stipulations of Spain.
3rd. The first of the articles proposed in defining
the Cession refers to the South pass of the Mississippi
and to the Islands North and East of that channel.
As this is the most navigable of the several channels,
as well as the most direct course to the sea,
it is expected that it will not be objected to.
It is of the greater importance to make it the boundary,
because several Islands will be thereby acquired,
one of which is said to command this channel,
and to be already fortified.
The article expressly includes also the
Islands appertaining to the Floridas.
To this there can be no objection.
The Islands within six leagues of the shore are
the subject of a British proclamation in the year
1763 subsequent to the Cession of the Floridas to
Great Britain by France, which is not known to have
been ever called in question by either France or Spain.
The 2nd Article requires no particular observations.
Article 3rd is one whose import may be
expected to undergo the severest scrutiny.
The modification to be desired is that which, while it
provides for the interest of the United States will be
acceptable to France and will give no just ground of
complaint and the least of discontent to Great Britain.
The present form of the article ought and probably
will be satisfactory to France; first because it secures
to her all the commercial advantages in the river which
she can well desire; secondly, because it leaves her
free to contest the mere navigation of the river
by Great Britain without the consent of France.
The article also in its present form violates no right
of Great Britain nor can she reasonably expect of the
United States that they will contend beyond their
obligation for her interest at the expense of their own.
As far as Great Britain can claim the use of the
river under her treaties with us or by virtue of
contiguous territory, the silence of the Article
on that subject leaves the claim unaffected.
As far again as she is entitled under the treaty of 1794
to the use of our bank of the Mississippi above the 31st
degree of North latitude, her title will be equally entire.
The article stipulates against her only
in its exclusion of her commerce from the
bank to be ceded below our present limits.
To this she cannot of right object:
1st because the territory not belonging
to the United States at the date of our Treaty
with her is not included in its stipulations;
2nd because the privileges to be enjoyed
by France are for a consideration which
Great Britain has not given and cannot give;
3rdly because the exclusion in this case, being
a condition on which the Territory will be ceded and
accepted, the right to communicate the privilege to Great
Britain will never have been vested in the United States.
But although these reasons fully justify the article in its
relation to Great Britain, it will be advisable before it be
proposed, to feel the pulse of the French Government with
respect to a stipulation that each of the parties may without
the consent of the other, admit whomsoever it pleases to
navigate the river and trade with their respective Shores
on the same terms as in other parts of France and the
United States; and as far as the disposition of that
Government will concur to vary the proposition accordingly.
It is not probable that this concurrence will be given;
but the trial to obtain it will not only manifest
a friendly regard to the Wishes of Great Britain,
and if successful furnish a future price for privileges within
her grant; but it is a just attention to the interests of our
Western fellow citizens, whose commerce will not otherwise
be on an equal footing with that of the Atlantic States.
Should France not only refuse any such change in the
Article, but insist on a recognition of her right to exclude
all nations other than the United States from navigating
the Mississippi; it may be observed to her, that a positive
stipulation to that effect might subject us to the charge
of intermeddling with and prejudging questions existing
merely between her and Great Britain; that the silence
of the Article is sufficient; that as Great Britain never
asserted a claim on this subject against Spain, it is not
to be presumed that she will assert it against France on
her taking the place of Spain; that if the claim should be
asserted, the treaties between the United States and
Great Britain will have no connection with it, the
United States having in those treaties given their separate
consent only to the use of the river by Great Britain, leaving
her to seek whatever other consent may be necessary.
If, notwithstanding such expostulations as these,
France shall inflexibly insist on an express recognition
to the above effect, it will be better to acquiesce in it,
than to lose the opportunity of fixing an arrangement
in other respects satisfactory; taking care to put
the recognition into a form not inconsistent with
our treaties with Great Britain, or with an explanatory
article that may not improbably be desired by her.
In truth it must be admitted that France
as holding one bank, may exclude from the use of
the river any nation not more connected with it
by territory than Great Britain is understood to be.
As a river where both its banks are owned by one nation,
belongs exclusively to that nation; it is clear that
when the territory on one side is owned by one nation,
and on the other side by another nation, the river
belongs equally to both in exclusion of all others.
There are two modes by which an equal right may be
exercised; the one by a negative in each on the use of
the river by any other nation except the joint proprietor;
the other by allowing each to grant the use of the river to
other nations without the consent of the joint proprietor.
The latter mode would be preferable to the United States.
But if it be found absolutely inadmissible to France,
the former must in point of expediency, since it may
in point of right be admitted by the United States.
Great Britain will have the less reason to be dissatisfied
on this account, as she has never asserted against Spain,
a right of entering and navigating the Mississippi, nor
has either she or the United States ever founded on
the treaties between them, a claim to the interposition of
the other party in any respect; although the river has been
constantly shut against Great Britain from the year 1783 to
the present moment and was not opened to the United
States until 1795, the year of their treaty with Spain.
It is possible also that France may refuse to the United
States the same commercial use of her shores, as she will
require for herself on these ceded to the United States.
In this case it will be better to relinquish a
reciprocity than to frustrate the negotiation.
If the United States held in their own right the shore
to be ceded to them, the commercial use of it allowed
to France would render a reciprocal use of her shore
by the United States an indispensable condition.
But as France may if she chooses, reserve to herself
the commercial use of the ceded shore as a condition
of the cession the claim of the United States to the like
use of her shore would not be supported by the principle
of reciprocity and may therefore without violating
that principle be waved in the transaction.
The article limits to ten years the equality
of French citizens, vessels and Merchandizes
with those of the United States.
Should a longer period be insisted on, it may be yielded.
The limitation may even be struck out, if made
essential by France, but a limitation in this case
is so desirable that it is to be particularly pressed,
and the shorter the period the better.
Art IV. The right of deposit provided for in this
article will accommodate the commerce of France
to and from her own side of the river until an
emporium shall be established on that side, which
it is well known will admit of a convenient one.
The right is limited to ten years, because such an
establishment may within that period be formed by her.
Should a longer period be required, it may be allowed;
especially as the use of such a deposit would probably
fall within the general regulations of our commerce there.
At the same time, as it will be better that it should
rest on our own regulations than on a stipulation,
it will be proper to insert a limitation of time,
if France can be induced to acquiesce in it.
Art V. This article makes a reasonable provision for the
commerce of France in the ports of West and East Florida.
If the limitation to ten years of its being on the same
footing with that of the United States should form
an insuperable objection, the term may be enlarged.
But it is much to be wished that the privilege
may not in this case be made perpetual.
Art VI. The pecuniary consideration to be offered
for the territories in question is stated in article VI.
You will of course favor the United States
as much as possible, both in the amount
and modifications of the payments.
There is some reason to believe that the gross sum
expressed in the article has occurred to the French
Government and is as much as will be finally insisted on.
It is possible that less may be accepted, and the
negotiation ought to be adapted to that supposition.
Should a greater sum be made an ultimatum
on the part of France, the President has made
up his mind to go as far as fifty millions of
livres tournois, rather than lose the main object.
Every struggle however is to be made against
such an augmentation of the price that will
consist with an ultimate acquiescence in it.
The payment to be made immediately on the
exchange of ratifications is left blank; because
it cannot be foreseen either what the gross sum
or the assumed debts will be; or how far a reduction
of the gross sum may be influenced by the anticipated
payments provided for by the act of Congress herewith
communicated and by the authorization of the President
and Secretary of the Treasury endorsed thereon.
This provision has been made with a view to enable you
to take advantage of the urgency of the French government
for money, which may be such as to overcome their
repugnance to part with what we want and to induce
them to part with it on lower terms in case a payment
can be made before the exchange of ratifications.
The letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the
Secretary of State, of which a copy is herewith enclosed,
will explain the manner in which this advance of the ten
millions of livres, or so much thereof as may be necessary,
will be raised most conveniently for the United States.
It only remains here to point out the condition
or event on which the advance may be made.
It will be essential that the Convention be ratified
by the French Government before any such
advance be made; and it may be further required,
in addition to the stipulation to transfer possession
of the ceded territory as soon as possible, that
the orders for the purpose from the competent source,
be actually and immediately put into your hands.
It will be proper also to provide for the repayment
of the advance in the event of a refusal of
the United States to ratify the Convention.
It is apprehended that the French Government will feel no
repugnance to our designating the classes of claims and
debts, which embracing more equitable considerations than
the rest, we may believe entitled to a priority of payment.
It is probable therefore that the clause of the VI article,
referring it to our discretion may be safely insisted upon.
We think the following classification
such as ought to be adopted by ourselves:
1st. Claims under the fourth article
of the Convention of September 1800.
2nd. Forced contracts or sales imposed
upon our citizens by French authorities; and
3rd. Voluntary contracts, which have been
suffered to remain unfulfilled by them.
Where our citizens have become creditors of
the French Government in consequence of
agencies or appointments derived from it, the
United States are under no particular obligation
to patronize their claims, and therefore no sacrifice of any
sort in their behalf ought to be made in the arrangement.
As far as this class of claimants can be embraced, without
embarrassing the negotiation, or influencing in any respect
the demands or expectations of the French Government,
it will not be improper to admit them into the provision.
It is not probable however, that such a deduction from the
sum ultimately to be received by the French government
will be permitted without some equivalent accommodation
to its interests at the expense of the United States.
The claims of Mr. Beaumarchais and several
other French individuals on our government,
founded upon antiquated or irrelevant grounds,
although they may be attempted to be included
in this negotiation, have no connection with it.
The American Government is distinguished for
its just regard to the rights of Foreigners,
and does not require those of individuals to
become subjects of treaty in order to be admitted.
Besides, their discussion involves a variety
of minute topics with which you may fairly
declare yourselves to be unacquainted.
Should it appear, however, in the course of the negotiation,
that so much stress is laid on this point, that without
some accommodation your success will be endangered,
it will be allowable to bind the United States for the
payment of one million of livres tournois to the
representatives of Beaumarchais, heretofore
deducted from his accounts against them; the French
government declaring the same never to have been
advanced to him on account of the United States.
Art. VII is suggested by the respect due to the
rights of the people inhabiting the ceded territory,
and by the delay which may be found in constituting
them a regular and integral portion of the union.
A full respect for their rights might require their consent
to the Act of Cession; and if the French Government should
be disposed to concur in any proper mode of obtaining it,
the provision would be honorable to both nations.
There is no doubt that the inhabitants would readily
agree to the proposed transfer of their allegiance.
It is hoped that the idea of a guarantee of the country
reserved to France may not be brought into the negotiation.
Should France propose such a stipulation it will be expedient
to evade it if possible, as more likely to be a source of
disagreeable questions between the parties concerning the
actual casus foederis, than of real advantage to France.
It is not in the least probable that Louisiana, in the hands of
that nation will be attacked by any other while it is in the
relations to the United States on which the guarantee would
be founded; whereas nothing is more probable than some
difference of opinion as to the circumstances and the degree
of danger necessary to put the stipulation in force.
There will be the less reason in the demand of such
an article, as the United States would set little value
on a guarantee of any part of their territory, and
consequently there would be no just reciprocity in it.
Should France notwithstanding these considerations make a
guarantee an essential point, it will be better to accede to it,
than to abandon the object of the negotiation; mitigating the
evil as much as possible by requiring for the casus federis a
great and manifest danger threatened to the territory
guaranteed and by substituting for an indefinite succor,
or even a definite succor in military force, a fixed sum
of money payable at the Treasury of the United States.
It is difficult to name the precise sum which is
in no posture of the business to be exceeded,
but it can scarcely be presumed that more than
about two million dollars to be paid annually during
the existence of the danger will be insisted on.
Should it be unavoidable to stipulate troops in place
of money, it will be prudent to settle the details
with as much precision as possible, that there
may be no room for controversy either with France
or with her enemy on the fulfilment of the stipulation.
The instructions thus far given suppose that France
may be willing to cede to the United States the whole
of the Island of New Orleans and both the Floridas.
As she may be inclined to dispose of a part or parts, and
of such only it is proper for you to know that the Floridas
together are estimated at ¼ the value of the whole Island
of New Orleans, and East Florida at ½ that of West Florida.
In case of a partial Cession it is expected that the
regulations of every other kind, so far as they are onerous
to the United States, will be more favorably modified.
Should France refuse to cede the whole of the Island,
as large a portion as she can be prevailed on to part with,
may be accepted; should no considerable portion of it be
attainable, it will still be of vast importance to get a
jurisdiction over space enough for a large commercial
town and its appurtenances on the banks of the river
and as little remote from the Mouth of the river as may be.
A right to choose the place would be better
than a designation of it in the Treaty.
Should it be impossible to procure a complete jurisdiction
over any convenient spot whatever, it will only remain to
explain and improve the present right of deposit by adding
thereto the express privilege of holding real estate for
commercial purposes of providing hospitals, of having
Consuls residing there, and other Agents who may be
authorized to authenticate and deliver all documents
requisite for Vessels belonging to and engaged in the trade
of the United States to and from the place of deposit.
The United States cannot remain satisfied, nor the
Western people be kept patient under the restrictions
which the existing Treaty with Spain authorizes.
Should a Cession of the Floridas not be attainable, your
attention will also be due to the establishment of suitable
deposits at the mouths of the Rivers passing from the
United States through the Floridas, as well as of the free
navigation of those rivers by Citizens of the United States.
What has been above suggested in relation to the
Mississippi and the deposit on its banks is applicable
to the other rivers: and additional hints relative to
them all may be derived from the letter of which
a copy is enclosed from the Consul at New Orleans.
It has been long manifest that while the injuries to the
United States so frequently occurring from the Colonial
Officers scattered over our hemisphere and in our
neighborhood can only be repaired by a resort to their
respective Governments in Europe, that it will be impossible
to guard against the most serious inconveniences.
The late events at New Orleans strongly manifest
the necessity of placing a power somewhere nearer
to us, capable of correcting and controlling the
mischievous proceedings of such Officers towards
our Citizens without which a few individuals not
always among the wisest or best of men may at any time
threaten the good understanding of the two Nations.
The distance between the United States and the
old Continent and the mortifying delays of
explanations and negotiations across the Atlantic
on emergencies in our neighborhood render such a
provision indispensable, and it cannot be long before
all the Governments of Europe having American
Colonies must see the necessity of making it.
This object therefore will likewise
claim your special attention.
It only remains to suggest that considering the possibility
of some intermediate violence between Citizens of the
United States, and the French or Spaniards in consequence
of the interruption of our right of deposit, and the probability
that considerable damages will have been occasioned by
that measure to Citizens of the United States, it will be
proper that indemnification in the latter case be provided
for, and that in the former, it shall not be taken on
either side as a ground or pretext for hostilities.
These instructions, though as full as
they could be conveniently made, will
necessarily leave much to your discretion.
For the proper exercise of it, the President relies on your
information, your judgment, and your fidelity to the rights,
the interests and the dignity of your Country.18
Robert R. Livingston from 30 May 1801 to 18 January 1806 sent
no less
than 109 letters to Secretary of State Madison and 12 more by 8 January 1810.
On 18 January 1803 Secretary of State Madison
wrote to Robert R. Livingston in France.
(Portions in italics indicate those words were in a secret code.)
My letters of December 23rd and January 3rd
communicated the information which had been
received at those dates, relating to the violation
at New Orleans of our treaty with Spain; together
with what had then passed between the House of
Representatives and the Executive on the subject.
I now enclose a subsequent resolution
of that Branch of the Legislature.
Such of the debates connected with it, as took place
with open doors will be seen in the News Papers
which it is expected will be forwarded by the
Collector at New York by the present opportunity.
In these debates, as well as in indications from the press,
you will perceive, as you would readily suppose, that the
Cession of Louisiana to France has been associated as a
ground of much solicitude with the affair at New Orleans.
Such indeed has been the impulse given to the public mind
by these events that every branch of the Government
has felt the obligation of taking the measures most likely,
not only to re-establish our present rights,
but to promote arrangements by which they
may be enlarged and more effectually secured.
In deliberating on this subject it has appeared to
the President that the importance of the crisis called
for the experiment of an extraordinary Mission carrying
with it the weight attached to such a measure, as well
as the advantage of a more thorough knowledge
of the views of the Government and the sensibility
of the Public than could be otherwise conveyed.
He has accordingly selected for this service with the
approbation of the Senate, Mr. Monroe, formerly our
Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris and lately Governor
of the State of Virginia, who will be joined with yourself
in a Commission extraordinary to treat with the French
Republic; and with Mr. Pinckney in a like Commission,
to treat if necessary with the Spanish Government.
The President has been careful on this occasion to
guard effectually against any possible misconstruction,
in relation to yourself by expressing in his message to
the Senate his undiminished confidence in the ordinary
representation of the United States; and by referring
the advantages of the additional Mission to
considerations perfectly consistent therewith.
Mr. Monroe will be the bearer of the Instructions
under which you are jointly to negotiate.
The object of them will be to procure a cession of
New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States and
consequently the establishment of the Mississippi as the
boundary between the United States and Louisiana.
In order to draw the French government into the
measure a sum of money will make part of our
propositions to which will be added such regulations
of the commerce of that river and of the others entering
the Gulf of Mexico as ought to be satisfactory to France.
From a letter received by the President from
the respectable person alluded to in my last
it is inferred with probability that the French
government is not averse to treat on those grounds.
And such a disposition must be strengthened
by the circumstances of the present moment.
I have thought it proper to communicate thus much to
you without waiting for the departure of Mr. Monroe,
who will not be able to sail for two weeks or perhaps more.
I need not suggest to you that in disclosing this diplomatic
arrangement to the French Government and preparing
the way for the object of it, the utmost care is to be
used in repressing extravagant anticipations of the
terms to be offered by the United States; particularly
of the sum of money to be thrown into the transaction.
The ultimatum on this point will be settled before the
departure of Mr. Monroe and will be communicated by him.
The sum hinted at in the letter to the president
above referred to is thirty million livres.
If a less will not do we are prepared to meet it,
but it is hoped that less will do and that the
prospect of accommodation will concur with other
motives in postponing the expedition to Louisiana.
For the present I barely remark, that a proposition made
to Congress with shut doors is under consideration which
if agreed to will authorize a payment of about ten millions
of livres under arrangements of time and place that may
be so convenient to the French government as to invite
a prompt as well as favorable decision in the case.
The sum to which the proposition is limited and
which will probably not be effectually concealed
may at the same time assist in keeping down the
pecuniary expectations of the French cabinet.
Your letter of November 10th with one from
Mr. Sumter of South Carolina have been received.
As no mention is made of the disastrous state of
St. Domingo, we conclude that it was not then known at
Paris and ascribe to that ignorance the adherence to the
plan of sending troops to take possession of Louisiana.
If the French Government do not mean to
abandon the reduction of that Island, it is certain
that troops cannot be spared for the other object.
The language held by General Victor, as communicated
to you claims attention and would be entitled to much
more, if the imputation to the French Government
under present circumstances of views which would
force an unnecessary War with the United States
could be reconciled with any motive whatever
sufficient to account for such an infatuation.19
James Monroe had been confirmed as a minister to France on 12 January 1803.
He and his family sailed on March 9 and arrived in France on April 8.
Madison helped him financially by buying tableware
from him and helped him pay off his debts.
Robert Livingston was not pleased that Monroe was coming, and he tried to make
a deal with France’s Foreign Minister Tallyrand before Monroe got there.
Secretary of State Madison wrote this to Monroe on May 1:
We have just received the Message of
his British Majesty which is represented
as the signal of a certain rupture with France.
From the positions taken by the parties, both diplomatic
& military, such an event seems scarcely avoidable.
I hope we shall be wise enough to shun
their follies and fortunate enough to turn
them by honest means to our just interests.
You will probably have arrived
very critically for the purpose.
The orders from Spain for the restoration of
the deposit has had a good effect every way.
We are told at the same time in the very words
of the article, that in the Cession of Louisiana,
our rights under the Treaty of 95 are saved.
On the 1st of April Laussat the Prefect was at New Orleans,
and the late Governor Casa Calvo was expected in a few
days from Havana to deliver possession to the French.
Whether this measure will be delayed for the arrival of the
Captain General, or what may result to it from other causes
can be better understood with you than here.
Laussat professes to be kindly disposed and
undertakes to affirm that the French Government
had nothing to do in the arrest of the deposit by
the Spanish officer, and that if he had been then
in authority, no such thing would have happened.
He does not admit that he has any authority
to meddle in any way at present,
and gives this answer to Pichon’s exhortation.
The Intendant had declined in like manner
to obey the advice of Yrujo.
The last more peremptory interpositions of their
Ministers had not arrived; and the importance of
them is now superseded by the orders from Spain.
The attention here is much alive to the transfer of
the Country to France; and it becomes her, if she
wishes to be on cordial terms with us to proceed in
every step with strict justice and exemplary frankness.
The elections in New York, as far as known,
have issued as heretofore.
In Virginia there will certainly be two &
possibly three members of the Anti-party.
In New England the tide has run strongly in that channel,
but under impulses temporary & artificial.
In General our prospects are bright.
Excepting the case of Louisiana,
there is scarcely a cloud in them.
Remove that, and the possibility of our being
embarrassed by the war of others, and our
Country will be what has been so often applied
to another, the admiration & envy of the world.20
After Napoleon read the London newspapers of April 7,
he told his Finance Minister François Marbois,
I renounce Louisiana.
It is not only New Orleans that I mean to cede;
it is the whole colony, reserving none of it….
The London cabinet is informed of the
resolutions taken at Washington.21
On 11 April 1803 the French Foreign Minister Tallyrand asked
Livingston if the United States wanted all of Louisiana.
Marbois suggested a high price and said he would reduce it to
80 million francs including 20 million to pay for America’s war claims.
Livingston and Monroe countered by offering 50 million francs including war claims.
Marbois advised them that Napoleon might reject that, and eventually the
Americans
accepted the Marbois offer which was equal to $11,250,000 in redeemable stock.
France would get 20 million francs in American
treasury notes to pay off the American creditors.
The bankers would then pay France $9,750,000
and make a profit of about $2,500,000 according to Gallatin.
They signed the treaty on May 1, and on May 13 Livingston
and Monroe in a letter to Madison wrote,
Before the negotiation commenced, we were apprised
that the first Consul had decided to offer to the United States
by sale the whole of Louisiana & not a part of it.
We found in the outset that this information was correct;
so that we had to decide as a previous question
whether we would treat for the whole or jeopardize,
if not abandon the hope of acquiring any part.
On that point we did not long hesitate
but proceeded to treat for the whole.
We were persuaded that by so doing, it might be
possible if more desirable to conclude eventually
a Treaty for a part, since being thus possessed
of the subject, it might be easy in discussion at
least to lead from a view of the whole to that
of a part and with some advantages peculiar
to a negotiation on so great a scale.
By treating for the whole, whereby we should
be enabled to ascertain the idea which was
entertained by this Government of its value;
we should also be able to form some estimate
of that which was affixed to the value of its parts.
It was too probable that a less sum would be asked for the
whole, if sold entire to a single Purchaser, a friendly Power
who was able to pay for it, and whom it might be disposed
to accommodate at the present juncture, than if it should
be sold in parcels, either to several Powers or Companies
of Individuals: it was equally so, if this Government
should be finally prevailed on to sell us a part, that some
regard would be paid in the price asked for it, to that
which was demanded for the whole; lastly, by treating
for the whole, whereby the attention of this Government
would be drawn to the United States, as the sole
Purchasers, we might prevent the interference of other
Powers, as also that of Individuals, which might prove
equally injurious in regard to the price asked for it,
whether we acquired the whole or any part of the Territory.
We found, however, as we advanced in the negotiation,
that Mr. Marbois was absolutely restricted to the
disposition of the whole; that he would treat for no less
portion, and of Course that it was useless to urge it.
On mature consideration therefore we finally concluded a
Treaty on the best terms we could obtain for the whole.22
On May 23 James Monroe wrote to Madison that he believed that
West Florida was included in the purchase of the Louisiana Territory,
and he offered to go back to Madrid to negotiate for East Florida.
News of the deal reached Washington on July 14.
Madison on July 29 wrote this letter to Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe.
(Italicized words were put into a secret code.)
Your dispatches including the Treaty and two
Conventions signed with a French Plenipotentiary
on the 30th of April were safely delivered on the 14th
by Mr. Hughes, to whose care you had committed them.
In concurring with the disposition of the French
Government to treat for the whole of Louisiana
although the western part of it was not embraced
by your powers you were justified by the solid reasons
which you give for it; and I am charged by the President
to express to you his entire approbation of your so doing.
This approbation is in no respect precluded by
the silence of your commission and instructions.
When these were made out, the object of the
most sanguine was limited to the establishment
of the Mississippi as our boundary.
It was not presumed that more could be sought
by the United States either with a chance of
success or perhaps without being suspected of a greedy
ambition than the island of New Orleans and the two
Floridas it being little doubted that the latter was or would
be comprehended in the cession from Spain to France.
To the acquisition of New Orleans and the Floridas
the provision was therefore accommodated.
Nor was it to be supposed that in case the French
government should be willing to part with more than the
territory on our side of the Mississippi an arrangement with
Spain for restoring to her the territory on the other side
would not be preferred to a sale of it to the United States.
It might be added that the ample views of the subject
carried with him by Mr. Monroe, and the confidence
felt that your judicious management would make
the most of favorable occurrences, lessened the
necessity of multiplying provisions for every turn
which your negotiations might possibly take.
The effect of such considerations was diminished
by no information or just presumptions whatever.
The note of Mr. Livingston in particular, stating to the
French Government the idea of ceding the western country
above the Arkansas and communicated to this Department
in his letter of the 24th of January, was not received
here till April 5th more than a month after the
instructions and Commission had been forwarded.
And besides that this project not only left with France
the possession and jurisdiction of one bank of the
Mississippi from its mouth to the Arkansas but a part
of West Florida the whole of East Florida and the
harbors for ships of war in the gulf of Mexico, the
letter enclosing the note intimated that it had been
treated by the French government with a decided neglect.
In truth the communications in general between
Mr. Livingston and the French government both
of prior and subsequent date manifested a repugnance
to our views of purchase which left no expectation
of any arrangement with France by which an
extensive acquisition was to be made unless in
a favorable crisis of which advantage should be taken.
Such was thought to be the crisis which gave birth to
the extraordinary Commission in which you are joined.
It consisted of the state of things produced by the breach
of our Deposit at New Orleans, the situation of the French
Islands, particularly the important Island of St. Domingo,
the distress of the French finances, the unsettled posture
of Europe, the increasing jealousy between Great Britain
and France, and the known aversion of the former to
see the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of the latter.
These considerations it was hoped might so far open
the eyes of France to her real interest and her ears
to the monitory truths which were conveyed to her
through different channels, as to reconcile her to the
establishment of the Mississippi as a natural boundary
with the United States; or at least to some concessions
which would justify our patiently waiting for a fuller
accomplishment of our wishes under auspicious events.
The crisis relied on has derived peculiar force from
the rapidity with which the complaints and questions
between France and Great Britain ripened towards a rupture;
and it is just ground for mutual and general felicitation,
that it has issued under your zealous exertions, in the
extensive acquisition beyond the Mississippi.
With respect to the terms on which the acquisition
is made there can be no doubt that the bargain will
be regarded as on the whole highly advantageous.
The pecuniary stipulations would have been more
satisfactory if they had departed less from the plan
prescribed and particularly if the two millions of dollars
in cash intended to reduce the price or hasten the
delivery of possession had been so applied and
the assumed payments to American claimants
placed on the footing specified in the instructions.
The unexpected weight of the draught now to be made
on the treasury will be sensibly felt by it and may possibly
be inconvenient in relation to other important objects.
The President has issued his proclamation convening
Congress on the 17th of October in order that the exchange
of ratifications may be made within the time limited.
It is obvious that the exchange to be within the time
must be made here and not at Paris; and we infer
from your letter of 3 that the ratifications of the Chief
Consul are to be transmitted hither with that view.23
Madison wrote to James Monroe on 30 July 1803.
(Italicized words were put into a secret code.)
The purchase of Louisiana in its full extent,
though not contemplated is received with
warm & in a manner universal approbation.
The uses to which it may be turned,
render it a truly noble acquisition.
Under prudent management it may be made to
do much good as well as to prevent much evil.
By lessening the military establishment otherwise
requisite or countenanced, it will answer the
double purpose of saving expense & favoring liberty.
This is a point of view in which the Treaty
will be particularly grateful to a most
respectable description of our Citizens.
It will be of great importance also to take the
regulation & settlement of that territory out of other
hands into those of the U. S. who will be able to
manage both for the general interest & convenience.
By securing also the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Mississippi to the mouth a source of
much perplexity & collision is effectually cut off.
The communications of your colleague hither have
fully betrayed the feelings excited by your mission and
that he was precipitating the business even after your
arrival without respect to the measure of the government
to yourself or to the advantage to be expected from the
presence and cooperation of the more immediate
depository of the objects and sensibilities of his country.
It is highly probable that if the appeal to the French
government had been less hackneyed by the ordinary
minister and been made under the solemnity of a
joint and extraordinary embassy the impression
would have been greater and the bargain better.
What course will be taken by his
friends here remains to be seen.
You will find in the gazettes a letter from Paris understood
to be from Swan enclosing a copy of his memorial
representing it as the primary cause of the cession praising
the patriotism which undertook so great a service without
authority and throwing your agency out of any real merit
while by good fortune it snatched the ostensible merit.
This letter with the memorial has been published in all
our papers, some of them making comments favorable
to Mr. Livingston, others doing justice to you, others
ascribing the result wholly to the impending rupture.
Another letter from Paris has been published
which makes him the magnus Apollo.
The publication of the memorial is so improper
and in reference to the writer invites such strictures
that a sanction from him is not to be presumed.
The passages against England have not escaped the lash.
It would not be very wonderful if they were to be noticed
formally or informally by the British legation here.
My public letter will show the light in which the purchase
of all Louisiana is viewed, and the manner in which it was
thought proper to touch the policy of Mr. Livingston in
complaining that the commission did not authorize the
measure notwithstanding the information given that he was
negotiating for more than the east side of the Mississippi.
The pecuniary arrangements are much
disrelished particularly by Mr. Gallatin.
The irredeemability of the stock which gives it a value
above par the preference of the creditors to the true
object in the cash payment and the barring of a
priority among them are the errors most regarded.
The origin of the two last is easily understood.
The claims of the different creditors
rest on principles clearly different.24
President Jefferson was concerned that buying a large territory from
a nation to bring it into the United States may violate the Constitution.
Madison did not agree with that interpretation, and he drafted an amendment
to the Constitution that would authorize the Congress to annex a territory.
When the United States Senate met in October, they ratified the treaty
for the cession of the territory within a few days.
Both nations ratified the treaty before the deadline on October 30.
The next day Jefferson signed the bill that authorized him to appoint
William C. C. Claiborne the territorial governor of Louisiana.
Also that month the Congress confirmed the 12th Amendment
to the US Constitution that separated the voting for
President and Vice President in the Electoral College.
On December 20 the Louisiana Territory was peacefully turned over
to the
United States, and the news reached New Orleans on 15 January 1804.
Notes
1. James Madison: Secretary of State 1800-1809 by Irving Brant, p. 40.
2. James Madison: A Biography by Ralph Ketcham, p. 411.
3. James Madison: Secretary of State 1800-1809 by Irving Brant, p. 64.
4. From James Madison to Rufus King, 15 June 1801 (Online).
5. From James Madison to Rufus King, 24 July 1801 (Online).
6. To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 28 August 1801 (Online).
7. From James Madison to Rufus King, 7 April 1802 (Online).
8. From Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, 18 April 1802 (Online).
9. From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 26 April 1802 (Online).
10. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, 1 May 1802 (Online).
11. From James Madison to Charles Pinckney, 11 May 1802 (Online).
12. To Thomas Jefferson from James Madison, 14 August 1802 (Online).
13. To James Madison from Robert R. Livingston, 1 September 1802 (Online).
14. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, 15 October 1802 (Online).
15. From James Madison to John Adams, 22 November 1802 (Online).
16. From James Madison to Charles Pinckney, 27 November 1802 (Online).
17. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, [17] December 1802 (Online).
18. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe,
2 March 1803 (Online).
19. From James Madison to Robert R. Livingston, 18 January 1803 (Online).
20. From James Madison to James Monroe, 1 May 1803 (Online).
21. James Madison: Secretary of State 1800-1809, p. 125-126.
22. To James Madison from Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe,
13 May 1803 (Online).
23. Writings by James Madison, p. 671-673.
24. From James Madison to James Monroe, 30 July 1803 (Online).