John Adams had been working in 1786 on
A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America,
and he published the first volume of what would be a
very long work the first day of January 1787.
Here is the entire Preface excluding only Latin passages:
The arts and sciences, in general, during the three or four
last centuries, have had a regular course
of progressive improvement.
The inventions in mechanic arts, the discoveries
in natural philosophy, navigation, and commerce,
and the advancement of civilization and humanity,
have occasioned changes in the condition of the world,
and the human character, which would have astonished
the most refined nations of antiquity.
A continuation of similar exertions is every day rendering
Europe more and more like one community, or single family.
Even in the theory and practice of government,
in all the simple monarchies,
considerable improvements have been made.
The checks and balances of republican governments
have been in some degree adopted by the courts of princes.
By the erection of various tribunals, to register the laws,
and exercise the judicial power—by indulging the petitions
and remonstrances of subjects, until by habit
they are regarded as rights—a control has been established
over ministers of state, and the royal councils,
which approaches, in some degree, to the spirit of republics.
Property is generally secure,
and personal liberty seldom invaded.
The press has great influence, even where
it is not expressly tolerated; and the public opinion must be
respected by a minister, or his place becomes insecure.
Commerce begins to thrive: and if religious toleration were
established, and personal liberty a little more protected,
by giving an absolute right to demand a public trial
in a certain reasonable time—and the states invested
with a few more privileges, or rather restored to some
that have been taken away—these governments would
be brought to as great a degree of perfection,
they would approach as near to the character
of governments of laws and not of men,
as their nature will probably admit of.
In so general a refinement, or more properly reformation
of manners and improvement in knowledge,
is it not unaccountable that the knowledge of the principles
and construction of free governments,
in which the happiness of life, and even the further progress
of improvement in education and society,
in knowledge and virtue, are so deeply interested,
should have remained at a full stand
for two or three thousand years?—
According to a story in Herodotus, the nature of
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy,
and the advantages and inconveniences of each,
were as well understood at the time of the
neighing of the horse of Darius, as they are at this hour.
A variety of mixtures of these simple species were
conceived and attempted, with different success,
by the Greeks and Romans.
Representations, instead of collections, of the people—
a total separation of the executive from the
legislative power, and of the judicial from both—
and a balance in the legislature, by three independent,
equal branches—are perhaps the three only discoveries
in the constitution of a free government,
since the institution of Lycurgus.
Even these have been so unfortunate, that they have
never spread: the first has been given up by all the nations,
excepting one, who had once adopted it;
and the other two, reduced to practice, if not invented,
by the English nation, have never been imitated
by any other except their own descendants in America.
While it would be rash to say, that nothing further
can be done to bring a free government, in all its parts,
still nearer to perfection—the representations of the people
are most obviously susceptible of improvement.
The end to be aimed at, in the formation of a representative
assembly, seems to be the sense of the people, the public
voice: the perfection of the portrait consists in its likeness.
Numbers, or property, or both, should be the rule; and the
proportions of electors and members an affair of calculation.
The duration should not be so long that the deputy
should have time to forget the opinions of his constituents.
Corruption in elections is the great enemy of freedom.
Among the provisions to prevent it, more frequent elections,
and a more general privilege of voting,
are not all that might be devised.
Dividing the districts, diminishing the distance of travel,
and confining the choice to residents, would be
great advances towards the annihilation of corruption.
The modern aristocracies of Holland, Venice, Berne, &c.
have tempered themselves with innumerable multitudes
of checks, by which they have given a great degree
of stability to that form of government:
and though liberty and life can never be there enjoyed
so well as in a free republic,
none is perhaps more capable of profound sagacity.
We shall learn to prize the checks and balances
of a free government, and even those of the modern
aristocracies, if we recollect the miseries of Greece
which arose from their ignorance of them.
The only balance attempted against the ancient kings
was a body of nobles; and the consequences were
perpetual altercations of rebellion and tyranny,
and butcheries of thousands upon every revolution
from one to the other.
When the kings were abolished, the aristocracies tyrannized;
and then no balance was attempted
but between aristocracy and democracy.
This, in the nature of things, could be no balance at all,
and therefore the pendulum was forever on the swing.
It is impossible to read in Thucidydes, book 3, his account
of the factions and confusions throughout all Greece,
which were introduced by this want
of an equilibrium, without horror.
During the few days that Eurymedon, with his troops,
continued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended
the massacre to all whom they judged their enemies.
The crime alleged was,
their attempt to overturn the democracy.
Some perished merely through private enmity;
some, for the money they had lent,
by the hands of the borrower.
Every kind of death, every dreadful act, was perpetrated.
Fathers slew their children; some were dragged from altars,
some were butchered at them;
numbers, immersed in temples, were starved.
The contagion spread through the whole extent of Greece:
factions raged in every city;
the licentious many contending for the Athenians,
and the aspiring few for the Lacedaemonians.
The consequence was, seditions in cities,
with all their numerous and tragical incidents.
Such things ever will be, say Thucidydes,
so long as human nature continues the same.
But if this nervous historian had known a balance
of three powers, he would not have pronounced
the distemper so incurable, but would have added—
so long as parties in cities remain unbalanced.
He adds—Words lost their signification:
brutal rashness was fortitude; prudence, cowardice;
modesty, effeminacy; and being wise in everything,
to be good for nothing: the hot temper was manly valor;
calm deliberation, plausible knavery;
he who boiled with indignation, was trustworthy;
and he who presumed to contradict, was ever suspected.
Connection of blood was less regarded
than transient acquaintance:
associations were not formed for mutual advantage,
consistent with law, but for rapine against all law:
trust was only communication of guilt:
revenge was more valued,
than never to have suffered an injury:
perjuries were master-pieces of cunning;
the dupes only blushed,
the villains most impudently triumphed.
The source of all these evils is a thirst of power,
from rapacious or ambitious passions.
The men of large influence, some contending
for the just equality of the democratic,
and others for the fair decorum of aristocratic government,
by artful sounds, embarrassed those communities,
for their own private lucre, by the keenest spirit,
the most daring projects, and most dreadful machinations.
Revenge, not limited by justice or the public welfare,
was measured only by such retaliation as was judged
the sweetest—by capital condemnations,
by iniquitous sentences, and by glutting
the present rancor of their hearts with their own hands.
The pious and upright conduct was on both sides
disregarded: the moderate citizens fell victims to both.
Seditions introduced every species of outrageous
wickedness into the Grecian manners.
Sincerity was laughed out of countenance:
the whole order of human life was confounded:
the human temper, too apt to transgress in spite of laws,
now having gained the ascendant over law,
seemed to glory that it was too strong for justice,
and an enemy to all superiority.
Mr. Hume has collected, from Diodorus Siculus alone,
a few massacres which happened in only sixty
of the most polished years of Greece:
“From Sybaris, 500 nobles banished; of Chians, 600 citizens;
at Ephesus, 340 killed, 1000 banished; of Cyrenians,
500 nobles killed, all the rest banished;
the Corinthians killed 120, banished 500;
Phaebidas banished 300 Boeotians.
Upon the fall of the Lacedaemonians, democracies were
restored in many cities, and severe vengeance taken
of the nobles; the banished nobles returning,
butchered their adversaries at Phialae, in Corinth,
in Megara, in Phliasia, where they killed 300 of the people;
but these again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles,
and banished the rest.
In Arcadia, 1400 banished, besides many killed;
the banished retired to Sparta and Pallantium; the latter
were delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed.
Of the banished from Argos and Thebes,
there were 500 in the Spartan army.
The people, before the usurpation of Agathocles,
had banished 600 nobles; afterwards that tyrant,
in concurrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles,
and banished 6000; and killed 4000 people at Gela;
his brother banished 8000 from Syracuse.
The inhabitants of Aegesta, to the number of 40,000, were
killed, man, woman, and child, for the sake of their money:
all the relations of the Libyan army, fathers, brothers,
children, killed; 7000 exiles killed after capitulation.
These numbers, compared with the population
of those cities, are prodigious; yet Agathocles was a man
of character, and not to be suspected of wanton cruelty,
contrary to the maxims of his age: such were
the fashionable outrages of unbalanced parties.
In the name of human and divine benevolence,
is such a system as this to be recommended to Americans,
in this age of the world?
Human nature is as incapable now of going through
revolutions with temper and sobriety,
with patience and prudence, or without fury and madness,
as it was among the Greeks so long ago.
The latest revolution that we read of was conducted,
at least on one side, in the Grecian style,
with laconic energy; and with a little attic salt;
at least, without too much patience,
foresight, and prudence, on the other.—
Without three orders, and an effectual balance
between them, in every American constitution,
it must be destined to frequent unavoidable revolutions:
if they are delayed a few years, they must come, in time
The United States are large and populous nations,
in comparison of the Grecian commonwealths,
or even the Swiss cantons; and are growing every day
more disproportionate, and therefore less capable
of being held together by simple governments.
Countries that increase in population so rapidly
as the States of America did, even during such
an impoverishing and destructive war as the last was,
are not to be bound long with silken threads:
lions, young or old, will not be bound by cobwebs.—
It would be better for America, it is nevertheless agreed,
to ring all the changes with the whole set of bells,
and go through all the revolutions of the Grecian states,
rather than establish an absolute monarchy among them,
notwithstanding all the great improvements
made in that kind of government.
The objection to it is not because it is supported
by nobles, and a subordination of ranks;
for all governments, even the most democratic, are
supported by a subordination of offices, and of ranks too.
None ever existed without it but in a state of anarchy
and outrage, in a contempt of law and justice,
no better than no government.
But the nobles, in the European monarchies, support them
more by opposing than promoting their ordinary views.
The kings are supported by their armies;
the nobles support the crown,
as it is in full possession of the gift of all employments;
but they support it still more by checking its ministers,
and preventing them from running into abuses of power
and wanton despotism; otherwise the people
would be pushed to extremities and insurrections.
It is thus that the nobles reconcile the monarchical authority
to the obedience of the subjects; but take away
the standing armies, and leave the nobles to themselves,
and in a few years, they would overturn every monarchy
in Europe, and erect aristocracies.
It has become a kind of fashion among writers, to admit,
as a maxim, that if you could be always sure of a wise,
active, and virtuous prince,
monarchy would be the best of governments.
But this is so far from being admissible, that it will forever
remain true, that a free government
has a great advantage over a simple monarchy.
The best and wisest prince, by means of a freer
communication with his people, and the greater
opportunities to collect the best advice from the best
of his subjects, would have an immense advantage
in a free state over a monarchy.
A senate consisting of all that is most noble, wealthy,
and able in the nation, with a right to counsel the crown
at all times, is a check to ministers, and a security
against abuses, such as a body of nobles who never meet,
and have no such right, can never supply.
Another assembly, composed of representatives chosen
by the people in all parts, gives free access to
the whole nation, and communicates all its wants,
knowledge, projects, and wishes to government;
it excites emulation among all classes, removes complaints,
redresses grievances, affords opportunities of exertion
to genius, though in obscurity, and gives full scope to all the
faculties of man; it opens a passage for every speculation
to the legislature, to administration, and to the public:
it gives a universal energy to the human character,
in every part of the state, which
never can be obtained in a monarchy.
There is a third particular which deserves attention
both from governments and people.
In a simple monarchy, the ministers of state can never
know their friends from their enemies; secret cabals
undermine their influence, and blast their reputations.
This occasions a jealousy ever anxious and irritated,
which never thinks the government safe without
an encouragement of informers and spies,
throughout every part of the state, who interrupt
the tranquility of private life, destroy the confidence
of families in their own domestics and in one another,
and poison freedom in its sweetest retirements.
In a free government, on the contrary, the ministers
can have no enemies of consequence,
but among the members of the great or little council,
where every man is obliged to take his side,
and declare his opinion, upon every question.
This circumstance alone, to every manly mind,
would be sufficient to decide the preference
in favor of a free government.
Even secrecy, where the executive is entire in one hand,
is as easily and surely preserved in a free government,
as in a simple monarchy; and as to dispatch,
all the simple monarchies of the whole universe may be
defied to produce greater or more numerous examples
of it than are to be found in English history.
An Alexander, or a Frederic, possessed of the prerogatives
only of a king of England, and leading his own armies,
would never find himself embarrassed
or delayed in any honest enterprise.
He might be restrained, indeed, from running mad,
and from making conquests to the ruin of his nation,
merely for his own glory;
but this is no argument against a free government.
There can be no free government
without a democratic branch in the constitution.
Monarchies and aristocracies are in possession of the voice
and influence of every university and academy in Europe.
Democracy, simple democracy,
never had a patron among men of letters.
Democratic mixtures in government have lost almost all
the advocates they ever had out of England and America.
Men of letters must have a great deal of praise, and some
of the necessaries, conveniences, and ornaments of life.
Monarchies and aristocracies pay well and applaud liberally.
The people have almost always expected to be served
gratis, and to be paid for the honor of serving them;
and their applauses and adorations are bestowed too often
on artifices and tricks, on hypocrisy and superstition,
on flattery, bribes, and largesses.
It is no wonder then that democracies and democratic
mixtures are annihilated all over Europe,
except on a barren rock, a paltry fen,
an inaccessible mountain, or an impenetrable forest.
The people of England, to their immortal honor,
are hitherto an exception; but, to the humiliation of human
nature, they show very often that they are like other men.
The people in America have now the best opportunity
and the greatest trust in their hands, that Providence
ever committed to so small a number, since
the transgression of the first pair; if they betray their trust,
their guilt will merit even greater punishment than
other nations have suffered, and the indignation of Heaven.
If there is one certain truth to be collected from the history
of all ages, it is this; that the people’s rights and liberties,
and the democratic mixture in a constitution, can never be
preserved without a strong executive, or, in other words,
without separating the executive from the legislative power.
If the executive power, or any considerable part of it,
is left in the hands either of an aristocratic or
a democratic assembly, it will corrupt the legislature
as necessarily as rust corrupts iron,
or as arsenic poisons the human body; and when
the legislature is corrupted, the people are undone.
The rich, the well-born, and the able, acquire an influence
among the people that will soon be too much for simple
honesty and plain sense, in a house of representatives.
The most illustrious of them must, therefore, be separated
from the mass, and placed by themselves in a senate;
this is, to all honest and useful intents, an ostracism.
A member of a senate, of immense wealth,
the most respected birth, and transcendent abilities,
has no influence in the nation, in comparison of what
he would have in a single representative assembly.
When a senate exists, the most powerful man in the state
may be safely admitted into the house of representatives,
because the people have it in their power to remove him
into the senate as soon as his influence becomes dangerous.
The senate becomes the great object of ambition;
and the richest and the most sagacious wish to merit
an advancement to it by services to the public in the house.
When he has obtained the object of his wishes,
you may still hope for the benefits of his exertions,
without dreading his passions; for the executive power
being in other hands, he has lost much of his influence
with the people, and can govern very few votes
more than his own among the senators.
It was the general opinion of ancient nations,
that the Divinity alone was adequate
to the important office of giving laws to men.
The Greeks entertained this prejudice throughout
all their dispersions; the Romans cultivated the same
popular delusion; and modern nations, in the consecration
of kings, and in several superstitious chimeras
of divine right in princes and nobles,
are nearly unanimous in preserving remnants of it.
Even the venerable magistrates of Amersfort devoutly
believe themselves God’s vicegerents.
Is it that obedience to the laws can be obtained
from mankind in no other manner?
Are the jealousy of power and the envy of superiority
so strong in all men that no considerations of public
or private utility are sufficient to engage
their submission to rules for their own happiness?
Or is the disposition to imposture so prevalent in men
of experience that their private views of ambition
and avarice can be accomplished only by artifice?
It was a tradition in antiquity that the laws of Crete
were dictated to Minos by the inspiration of Jupiter.
This legislator and his brother Rhadamanthus
were both his sons; once in nine years they went
to converse with their father, to propose questions
concerning the wants of the people; and
his answers were recorded as laws for their government.
The laws of Lacedaemon were communicated by Apollo
to Lycurgus; and, lest the meaning of the deity should not
have been perfectly comprehended, or correctly expressed,
they were afterwards confirmed by his oracle at Delphos,
Among the Romans, Numa was indebted for those laws
which procured the prosperity of his country
to his conversations with Egeria.
The Greeks imported these mysteries from Egypt and
the East, whose despotisms, from the remotest antiquity
to this day, have been founded in the same solemn empiricism;
their emperors and nobles being all descended from their gods.
Woden and Thor were divinities too; and their posterity ruled
a thousand years in the north by the strength of a like credulity.
Manco Capac was the child of the sun, the visible deity
of the Peruvians; and transmitted his divinity, as well as
his earthly dignity and authority, through a line of Incas.
And the rudest tribes of savages in North America have
certain families from which their leaders are always chosen,
under the immediate protection of the god war.
There is nothing in which mankind have been more
unanimous; yet nothing can be inferred from it
more than this, that the multitude have always been
credulous, and the few are always artful.
The United States of America have exhibited, perhaps,
the first example of governments erected on the simple
principles of nature: and if men are now sufficiently
enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice,
imposture, hypocrisy, and superstition,
they will consider this even as an era in their history.
Although the detail of the formation of the American
governments is at present little known or regarded
either in Europe or America,
it may hereafter become an object of curiosity.
It will never be pretended that any persons employed
in that service had any interviews with the gods,
or were in any degree under the inspiration of heaven,
any more than those at work upon ships or houses,
or laboring in merchandise or agriculture:
it will forever be acknowledged that
these governments were contrived
merely by the use of reason and the senses.
As Copley painted Chatham; West, Wolf; and Trumbull,
Warren and Montgomery; as Dwight, Barlow, Trumbull,
and Humphries composed their verse,
and Belknap and Ramsay history;
as Godfrey invented his quadrant,
and Rittenhouse his planetarium;
as Boylston practiced inoculation, and Franklin electricity;
as Paine exposed the mistakes of Raynal,
and Jefferson those of Buffon, so unphilosophically
borrowed from the despicable dreams of De Paw—
neither the people, nor their conventions, committees,
or sub-committees, considered legislation in any other light
than as ordinary arts and sciences, only more important.
Called without expectation, and compelled without previous
inclination, though undoubtedly at the best period of time,
both for England and America, suddenly to erect
new systems of laws for their future government,
they adopted the method of a wise architect,
in erecting a new palace for the residence of his sovereign.
They determined to consult Vitruvius, Palladio,
and all other writers of reputation in the art;
to examine the most celebrated buildings,
whether they remain entire or in ruins;
to compare these with the principles of writers;
and to inquire how far both the theories and models
were founded in nature, or created by fancy;
and when this was done, so far as their circumstances
would allow, to adopt the advantages
and reject the inconveniences of all.
Unembarrassed by attachments to noble families,
hereditary lines and successions, or any considerations
of royal blood, even the pious mystery of holy oil
had no more influence than that other of holy water:
the people universally were too enlightened to be imposed
on by artifice; and their leaders, or more properly followers,
were men of too much honor to attempt it.
Thirteen governments thus founded on the natural authority
of the people alone, without a pretense of miracle
or mystery, which are destined to spread over
the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe,
are a great point in favor of the rights of mankind.
The experiment was made, and has completely succeeded:
it can no longer be called in question, whether authority
in magistrates, and obedience of citizens, can be grounded
on reason, morality, and the Christian religion, without
the monkery of priests, or the knavery of politicians.
As the writer was personally acquainted with most
of the gentlemen in each of the states,
who had the principal share in the first drafts,
the following letters were really written to lay
before the gentleman to whom they were addressed,
a specimen of that kind of reading and reasoning
which produced the American constitutions.
It is not a little surprising that all this kind of learning
should have been unknown to any illustrious philosopher
and statesman, especially one who really was,
what he had been often called, “a well of science.”
But if he could be acquainted with it,
or it could have escaped his memory, we may suppose
millions in America have occasion to be reminded of it.—
The writer has long seen with anxiety the facility with which
philosophers of greatest name have undertaken to write
of American affairs, without knowing anything of them,
and have echoed and re-echoed each other’s visions.
Having neither talents, leisure, nor inclination,
to meet such champions in the field of literary controversy,
he little thought of venturing
to propose to them any questions.
Circumstances, however, have lately occurred,
which seemed to require that
some notice should be taken of one of them.
If the publication of these papers should contribute anything
to turn the attention of the younger gentlemen of letters
in America to this kind of inquiry, it will produce
an effect of some importance to their country.
The subject is the most interesting that can engage
the understanding or the heart; for whether the end of man,
in this stage of his existence, be enjoyment or improvement,
or both, it can never be attained so well
in a bad government as a good one.
The practicability or the duration of a republic,
in which there is a governor, a senate, and
a house of representatives, is doubted by Tacitus,
though he admits the theory to be laudable….
Cicero asserts … in such peremptory terms the superiority
of such a government to all other forms, that the loss
of his book upon republics is much to be regretted.
From a few passages that have been preserved,
it is very probable he entered more largely into
an examination of the composition of monarchical republics
than any other ancient writer.
He was so far from apprehending “disputes” from a variety
of orders, that he affirms it to be the firmest bond of justice,
and the strongest anchor of safety to the community.
As the treble, the tenor, and the bass exist in nature,
they will be heard in the concert.
If they are arranged by Handel, in a skillful composition,
they produce rapture the most exquisite
that harmony can excite;
but if they are confused together, without order, they will“Rend with tremendous sound your ears asunder….”
As all the ages of the world have not produced
a greater statesman and philosopher united than Cicero,
his authority should have great weight.
His decided opinion in favor of three branches
is founded on a reason that is unchangeable;
the laws, which are the only possible rule, measure,
and security of justice, can be sure of protection,
for any course of time, in no other form of government;
and the very name of a republic implies, that
the property of the people should be represented
in the legislature, and decide the rule of justice….
According to this, a simple monarchy, if it could
in reality be what it pretends to be, a government
of laws, might be justly denominated a republic.
A limited monarchy, therefore, especially when limited
by two independent branches, an aristocratic
and a democratic power in the constitution,
may with strict propriety be called by that name.
If Cicero and Tacitus could revisit the earth,
and learn that the English nation had reduced the great idea
to practice, and brought it nearly to perfection, by giving
each division a power to defend itself by a negative;
had found it the most solid and durable government,
as well as the most free; had obtained by means of it
a prosperity among civilized nations, in an enlightened age,
like that of the Romans among barbarians;
and that the Americans, after having enjoyed the benefits
of such a constitution a century and a half, were advised
by some of the greatest philosophers and politicians
of the age to renounce it, and set up the governments
of ancient Goths and modern Indians, what would they say?
That the Americans would be more reprehensible
than the Cappadocians, if they should listen to such advice.
It would have been much to the purpose, to have inserted
a more accurate investigation of the form of government
of the ancient Germans and modern Indians;
in both, the existence of the three divisions of power is
marked with a precision that excludes all controversy.
The democratic branch, especially, is so determined, that
the real sovereignty resided in the body of the people,
and was exercised in the assembly
of king, nobles, and commons together.
These institutions really collected all authority
into one center of kings, nobles, and people.
But, small as their numbers and narrow as their territories
were, the consequence was confusion;
each part believed it governed the whole;
the chiefs thought they were sovereigns;
the nobles believed the power to be in their hands; and the
people flattered themselves that all depended upon them.
Their purposes were well enough answered,
without coming to an explanation, so long as
they were few in number, and had no property;
but when spread over large provinces of the Roman empire,
now the great kingdoms of Europe,
and grown populous and rich,
they found the inconvenience of each not knowing its place.
Kings, nobles, and people claimed the government in turn;
and after all the turbulence, wars, and revolutions,
which compose the history of Europe for so many ages,
we find simple monarchies established everywhere.
Whether the system will now become stationary,
and last forever, by means of a few further improvements
in monarchical government, we know not;
or whether still further revolutions are to come.
The most probable, or rather the only probable change,
is the introduction of democratic branches
into those governments.
If the people should ever aim at more,
they will defeat themselves; as they will, indeed,
if they aim at this by any other than gentle means
and by gradual advances, by improvements
in general education, and by informing the public mind.
The systems of legislators are experiments made
on human life and manners, society and government.
Zoroaster, Confucius, Mithras, Odin, Thor, Mahomet,
Lycurgus, Solon, Romulus, and a thousand others,
may be compared to philosophers
making experiments on the elements.
Unhappily, political experiments cannot be made
in a laboratory, nor determined in a few hours.
The operation once begun, runs over whole quarters
of the globe, and is not finished in many thousands of years.
The experiment of Lycurgus lasted seven hundred years,
but never spread beyond the limits of Laconia.
The process of Solon expired in one century;
that of Romulus lasted but two centuries and a half;
but the Teutonic institutions, described by Caesar
and Tacitus, are the most memorable experiment,
merely political, ever yet made in human affairs.
They have spread all over Europe,
and have lasted eighteen hundred years.
They afford the strongest argument that can be imagined
in support, of the position assumed in these volumes.
Nothing ought to have more weight with America,
to determine her judgment against mixing the authority
of the one, the few, and the many, confusedly
in one assembly, than the wide-spread miseries
and final slavery of almost all mankind, in consequence
of such an ignorant policy in the ancient Germans.
What is the ingredient which in England
has preserved the democratic authority?
The balance, and that only.
The English have, in reality, blended together
the feudal institutions with those of the Greeks and Romans,
and out of all have made that noble composition,
which avoids the inconveniences,
and retains the advantages of both.
The institutions now made in America
will not wholly wear out for thousands of years.
It is of the last importance, then,
that they should begin right.
If they set out wrong, they will never be able to return,
unless it be by accident, to the right path.
After having known the history of Europe,
and of England in particular, it would be the height of folly
to go back to the institutions of Woden and of Thor,
as the Americans are advised to do.
If they had been counseled to adopt a single monarchy
at once, it would have been less mysterious.
Robertson, Hume, and Gibbon have given such admirable
accounts of the feudal institutions and their consequences,
that it would have been, perhaps, more discreet
to have referred to them,
without saying anything more upon the subject.
To collect together the legislation of the Indians would
take up much room, but would be well worth the pains.
The sovereignty is in the nation, it is true,
but the three powers are strong in every tribe;
and their royal and aristocratic dignities are
much more generally hereditary, from the popular partiality
to particular families, and the superstitious opinion
that such are favorites of the God of War,
than late writers upon this subject have allowed.1
In his chapter on monarchical republics
Adams analyzed England, Poland, and Neuchatel.
In the “Recapitulation” he concluded with this paragraph on the United States:
After all, let us compare every constitution we have seen
with those of the United States of America,
and we shall have no reason to blush for our country.
On the contrary, we shall feel the strongest motives
to fall upon our knees, in gratitude to heaven for having
been graciously pleased to give us birth and education
in that country, and for having destined us
to live under her laws!
We shall have reason to exult, if we make our comparison
with England and the English constitution.
Our people are undoubtedly sovereign; all the landed
and other property is in the hands of the citizens;
not only their representatives, but their senators
and governors, are annually chosen;
there are no hereditary titles, honors, offices, or distinctions;
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are carefully
separated from each other; the powers of the one, the few,
and the many are nicely balanced in the legislatures;
trials by jury are preserved in all their glory,
and there is no standing army;
the habeas corpus is in full force;
the press is the most free in the world.
Where all these circumstances take place,
it is unnecessary to add that the laws alone can govern.2
Rev. Richard Price in England supported the American Revolution.
Adams in his section on Dr. Price wrote,
Our friend Dr. Price had distinguished very well,
concerning physical, moral, religious, and civil liberty;
and has defined the last to be “the power of a civil society
to govern itself, by its own direction,
or by laws of its own making, by the majority,
in a collective body, or by fair representation.
In every free state every man is his own legislator.
Legitimate government consists only in the dominion
of equal laws made with common consent, and
not in the dominion of any men over other men.”3
Adams quoted James Harrington who wrote The Commonwealth of Oceana
and explained how equality can be promoted by requiring
decisions from two different governmental bodies.
The senate, then, having divided, who shall choose?
Ask the girls, for, if she that divided must have chosen also,
it had been little worse for the other, in case she had not
divided at all, but kept the whole cake to herself;
in regard that, being to choose too, she divided accordingly.
Wherefore, if the senate have any further power
than to divide, the commonwealth can never be equal.
But, in a commonwealth consisting of a single council,
there is no other to choose than that which divided.
Whence it is, that such a council fails not to scramble, that
is, to be factious; there being no other dividing of the cake,
in that case, but among themselves; nor is there
any other remedy, but to have another council to choose.
The wisdom of the few may be the light of mankind;
but the interest of the few is not the profit of mankind,
nor of a commonwealth.
Wherefore, seeing we have granted interest to be reason,
they must not choose, lest it put out their light.
But as the council dividing consists of the wisdom
of the commonwealth, so the assembly or council choosing
should consist of the interest of the commonwealth;
as the wisdom of the commonwealth is in the aristocracy,
so the interest of the commonwealth
is in the whole body of the people.
And whereas this, in case the commonwealth consist of
a whole nation, is too unwieldy a body to be assembled,
this council is to consist of such a representative as may
be equal, and so constituted as it can never contract
any other interest than that of the whole people.
But, in the present case, the six dividing,
and the fourteen choosing, must of necessity
take in the whole interest of the twenty.
Dividing and choosing, in the language of the
commonwealth, is debating and resolving;
and whatsoever, upon debate of the senate, is proposed
to the people, and resolved by them, is enacted
by the authority of the fathers, and by the power
of the people … which concurring make a law.4
Adams at the beginning of his section on Harrington wrote,
In searching for the principles of government,
we may divide them into two kinds;
the principles of authority and the principles of power.
The first are virtues of the mind and heart, such as wisdom,
prudence, courage, patience, temperance, justice, &c.
The second are the goods of fortune, such as
riches, extraction, knowledge, and reputation.
I rank knowledge among the goods of fortune,
because it is the effect of education, study, and travel,
which are either accidents, or usual effects of riches or birth,
and is by no means necessarily connected with wisdom
or virtue; but, as it is universally admired and respected
by the people, it is clearly a principle of power.
The same may be said of reputation, which,
abstracted from all consideration whether it is merited
or not, well, or ill-founded, is another source of power.5
Adams in his section on Machiavelli quoted this from his
Discourses upon the First Decade of Livy,
According to some authors, there are but three sorts
of government, namely,—monarchy or principality,
aristocracy, and democracy; and that those
who intend to erect a new state, must have recourse
to some one of these which they like best.
Others, and, as many think, with more judgment, say
there are six sorts; three of which are very bad,
and the other three good in themselves, but liable
to be so corrupted that they may become the worst.
The three good sorts have been just now mentioned.
The other three proceed from these; and every one of them
bears such a resemblance to that on which it respectively
depends, that the transition from one to the other is short
and easy; for monarchy often degenerates into tyranny,
aristocracy into oligarchy,
and democracy into licentious anarchy and confusion.
So that, whoever sets up any one of the former three sorts
of government, may assure himself it will not be
any long duration; for no precaution will be sufficient
to prevent its falling into the other that is analogous to it,
on account of the affinity which there seems to be
in this case betwixt perfection and imperfection.6
On 25 January 1787 John Adams signed a peace and friendship treaty
with leaders of Morocco that included tribute payments
to Morocco to provide protection against pirates.
Early in 1787 Adams asked the United States Congress
to replace him as the minister in London.
John Adams published the second volume on July 18 and the completed
three volumes of A Defense of the Constitutions of Government
of the United States of America in early 1788.
On 26 December 1787 in Letter VII he concluded:
All nations, from the beginning,
have been agitated by the same passions.
The principles developed in these Letters will go
a great way in explaining every phenomenon
that occurs in the history of government.
The vegetable and animal kingdoms,
and those heavenly bodies whose existence and movements
we are as yet only permitted faintly to perceive,
do not appear to be governed by laws more uniform
or certain than those which
regulate the moral and political world.
Nations move by unalterable rules, and education,
discipline, and laws, make the greatest difference
in their accomplishments, happiness, and perfection.
It is the master artist alone who finishes
his building, his picture, or his clock.
The present actors on the stage have been too little
prepared by their early views, and too much occupied
with turbulent scenes, to do more than they have done:
impartial justice will confess, that it is astonishing
they have been able to do so much.
It is for you, and your youthful companions,
to make yourselves masters of what
your predecessors have been able to
comprehend and accomplish but imperfectly.
A prospect into futurity in America, is like contemplating
the heavens through the telescopes of Herschell:
objects, stupendous in their magnitudes and motions,
strike us from all quarters, and fill us with amazement!
When we recollect, that the wisdom or the folly,
the virtue or the vice, the liberty or servitude,
of those millions now beheld by us,
only as Columbus saw these times in vision,
are certainly to be influenced, perhaps decided,
by the manners, examples, principles, and political
institutions of the present generation,
that mind must be hardened into stone
that is not melted into reverence and awe.
With such affecting scenes before his eyes, is there,
can there be, a young American indolent and incurious;
surrendered up to dissipation and frivolity;
vain of imitating the loosest manners of countries,
which can never be made much better or much worse?
A profligate American youth must be profligate indeed,
and richly merits the scorn of all mankind.
The world has been too long abused with notions,
that climate and soil decide the characters
and political institutions of nations.
The laws of Solon, and the despotism of Mahomet,
have at different times prevailed at Athens;
consuls, emperors, and pontiffs, have ruled at Rome.
Can there be desired a stronger proof,
that policy and education are able to triumph
over every disadvantage of climate?
Mankind have been still more injured by insinuations,
that a certain celestial virtue, more than human,
has been necessary to preserve liberty.
Happiness, whether in despotism or democracy, whether
in slavery or liberty, can never be found without virtue.
The best republics will be virtuous, and have been so;
but we may hazard a conjecture that the virtues
have been the effect of the well-ordered constitution,
rather than the cause: and perhaps it would be impossible
to prove, that a republic cannot exist,
even among highwaymen, by setting one rogue
to watch another; and the knaves themselves may,
in time, be made honest men by the struggle.
It is now in our power to bring this work
to a conclusion with unexpected dignity.
In the course of the last summer, two authorities have
appeared, greater than any that have been before quoted,
in which the principles we have attempted to defend
have been acknowledged.
The first is, an Ordinance of Congress, of the
13th of July 1787, for the Government of the Territory
of the United States North-west of the River Ohio;
the second is, the Report of the Convention
at Philadelphia, of the 17th of September 1787.
The former confederation of the United States was formed
upon the model and example of all the confederacies,
ancient and modern, in which the federal council
was only a diplomatic body: even the Lycian,
which is thought to have been the best, was no more.
The magnitude of territory, the population,
the wealth and commerce, and especially
the rapid growth of the United States, have shown
such a government to be inadequate to their wants;
and the new system, which seems admirably calculated
to unite their interests and affections, and bring them
to a uniformity of principles and sentiments, is equally well
combined to unite their wills and forces as a single nation.
A result of accommodation cannot be supposed to reach
the ideas of perfection of anyone;
but the conception of such an idea, and the deliberate union
of so great and various a people in such a plan, is,
without all partiality or prejudice, if not the greatest exertion
of human understanding, the greatest single effort
of national deliberation that the world has ever seen.
That it may be improved is not to be doubted,
and provision is made for that purpose in the Report itself.
A people who could conceive, and can adopt it,
we need not fear will be able to amend it,
when, by experience, its inconveniences
and imperfections shall be seen and felt.7
In his last chapter “Conclusion” he wrote,
By the authorities and examples already recited,
you will be convinced that three branches of power
have an unalterable foundation in nature;
that they exist in every society natural and artificial;
and that if all of them are not acknowledged
in any constitution of government, it will be found to be
imperfect, unstable, and soon enslaved;
that the legislative and executive authorities
are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws
depend entirely on a separation of them in the frame
of government; that the legislative power is naturally
and necessarily sovereign and supreme over the executive;
and, therefore, that the latter must be made an essential
branch of the former, even with a negative,
or it will not be able to defend itself,
but will be soon invaded, undermined, attacked,
or in some way or other totally ruined
and annihilated by the former.
This is applicable to every state in America,
in its individual capacity; but is it equally applicable
to the United States in their federal capacity?
The people of America and their delegates in congress
were of opinion, that a single assembly was every way
adequate to the management of all their federal concerns;
and with very good reason, because congress is not a
legislative assembly, nor a representative assembly
but only a diplomatic assembly.
A single council has been found to answer
the purposes of confederacies very well.
But in all such cases the deputies are responsible
to the states; their authority is clearly ascertained;
and the states, in their separate capacities, are the checks.
These are able to form an effectual balance,
and at all times to control their delegates.
The security against the dangers of this kind of government
will depend upon the accuracy and decision with which
the governments of the separate states
have their own orders arranged and balanced.
The necessity we are under of submitting to
a federal government, is an additional and a very powerful
argument for three branches, and a balance by
an equal negative, in all the separate governments.
Congress will always be composed of members from the
natural and artificial aristocratical body in every state, even
in the northern, as well as in the middle and southern states.
Their natural dispositions, then, in general will be,
(whether they shall be sensible of it or not, and whatever
integrity or abilities they may be possessed of,)
to diminish the prerogatives of the governors
and the privileges of the people,
and to augment the influence of the aristocratic parties.
There have been causes enough to prevent the appearance
of this inclination hitherto; but a calm course of prosperity
would very soon bring it forth,
if effectual provision against it be not made in season.
It will be found absolutely necessary, therefore,
to give negatives to the governors, to defend the executive
against the influence of this body, as well as
the senate and representatives in their several states.
The necessity of a negative in the house of representatives
will be called in question by nobody.
Dr. Price and the Abbé de Mably are zealous
for additional powers to congress.
Full power in all foreign affairs and over foreign commerce,
and, perhaps, some authority over the commerce
of the states with one another, may be necessary;
and it is hard to say that
more authority in other things is not wanted.
Yet the subject is of such extreme delicacy and difficulty,
that the people are much to be applauded for their caution.
To collect together the ancient and modern leagues,—
the Amphictyonic, the Olynthian, the Argive, the Arcadian,
and the Achaean confederacies, among the Greeks;
the general diet of the Swiss cantons,
and the states-general of the United Netherlands;
the union of the Hause-towns, &c., which have been found
to answer the purposes both of government and liberty;
to compare them all with the circumstances, the situation,
the geography, the commerce, the population,
and the forms of government, as well as the climate,
the soil, and manners of the people, and
consider what further federal powers are wanted,
and may be safely given, would be a useful work.
According to M. Turgot’s idea of a perfect commonwealth,
a single assembly is to be possessed of all authority,
legislative, executive, and judicial.
It will be a proper conclusion of all our speculations
upon this, the most interesting subject which can employ
the thoughts of men, to consider in what manner such an
assembly will conduct its deliberations and exert its power.
The executive power is properly the government;
the laws are a dead letter until an administration
begins to carry them into execution.
Let us begin, then, with this.
If there is an army to raise,
this single assembly is to appoint all its officers.
The man of the most ample fortune, the most honorable
descent, the greatest abilities, especially if there is anyone
among them who has had experience, rendered important
services, and acquired fame in war, will be chosen general.
This event is a great point gained by the aristocracy;
and a great advance towards the selection of one,
in case of convulsions and confusions, for monarchy.
The general has vast influence, of course,
with the whole nation, and especially with the officers
of his army; whose articles of war, and whose habits,
both of obedience and command, establish a system
of subordination of which he is the center,
and produce an attachment that never wears out.
The general, even without being sensible of it,
will naturally fall in with the views of the aristocratic body,
in promoting men of family, property, and abilities;
and indeed, in general, it will be his duty to do this, as such
are, undoubtedly, in general, the fittest for the service.
His whole corps of officers will grow habitually to respect
such only, or at least chiefly, and, it must be added,
because experience proves it, and the truth requires it
to be mentioned, to entertain some degree of contempt
for the rest of the people, as “rank and file.”
The general’s recommendation will have great weight in the
assembly, and will in time be given chiefly, if not wholly,
to men who are either of the aristocratic body themselves,
or at least recommended by such as are so.
All the other officers of the army are to be appointed by this
assembly; and we must suppose that all the general officers
and field officers will be of patrician families, because each
candidate will be unknown to nine tenths of the assembly.
He comes from a part of the state which a vast majority
of the members of the assembly do not particularly
represent and are unacquainted with; they must, therefore,
take his character upon trust from his patron in the house,
some member who is his neighbor, and who, perhaps,
owes his election to him or his particular friends.
Here is an endless source of debate and delay.
When there are two or more candidates for a commission,
and there will generally be several, how shall an assembly
of five hundred or one hundred men, collected from all
the most distant parts of a large state, become informed
of the merits and pretensions of each candidate?
It can only be done in public or in private.
If in public, it exposes the characters of the candidates
to a public discussion, which few men can bear;
it consumes time without end; and it will frequently happen
that the time of the whole assembly shall be wasted,
and all the public affairs delayed, for days and weeks,
in deliberating and debating, affirming and denying,
contradicting and proving, in the appointment
of a single officer; and, after all, he who has friends of the
most influence in the house, who will be generally
of the aristocratic complexion, will be preferred.
It is moderate to say, that the loss of time and delay
of business will be a greater burthen to the state
than the whole support of a governor and council.
If there is a navy, the same process must be gone
through respecting admirals, captains, and all other officers.
All the officers of revenue, police, justice,
must be appointed in the same way.
Ambassadors, consuls, agents to foreign countries,
must be appointed, too, by vote of assembly.
This branch of business alone would fill up the whole year,
and be more than could be done.
An assembly must be informed before it can act.
The understanding and conscience of every member
should be clearly satisfied before he can vote.
Information is to be had only by debate
and examination of evidence.
Any man may see that this must be attended with difficulty;
but no man who has not seen the inside of such
an assembly, can conceive the confusion, uncertainty,
and procrastination of such proceedings.
The American provincial congresses had experience enough
of this; and gentlemen were more convinced,
by what they there saw, heard, and felt,
of the necessity of three branches than
they would have been by reasoning or reading;
it was generally agreed that the appointment of officers
by lot would have been a more rational method.
But this is not all.
The army, the navy, revenue, excise, customs, police,
justice, and all foreign ministers, must be gentlemen,
that is to say, friends and connections of the rich,
well-born and well-educated members of the house; or,
if they are not, the community will be filled with slander,
suspicion, and ridicule against them, as ill-bred, ignorant,
and in all respects unqualified for their trusts;
and the plebeians themselves will be as ready as any
to join in the cry, and run down their characters.
In the second place, there never was yet a people who
must not have somebody or something to represent
the dignity of the state, the majesty of the people,
call it what you will,—a doge, an avoyer,
an archon, a president, a consul, a syndic;
this becomes at once an object of ambition and dispute,
and, in time, of division, faction, sedition, and rebellion.
The next inquiry is,
concerning the administration of justice.
Shall every criminal be brought
before this assembly and tried?
shall he be there accused before five hundred men?
witnesses introduced, counsel heard?
This again would take up more than the whole year;
and no man, after all, would consider his life,
liberty, or property, safe in such a tribunal.
These all depend upon the disquisitions of the counsel,
the knowledge of the law in the judges, the confrontation
of parties and witnesses, the forms of proceedings by which
the facts and the law are fairly stated before the jury
for their decision, the rules of evidence, by which
the attention of the jury is confined to proper points,
and the artifices of parties and counsel avoided.
An assembly of five hundred men are totally
incapable of this order, as well as knowledge;
for, as the vote of the majority must determine,
every member must be capable, or all is uncertain.
Besides, it is the unanimity of the jury
that preserves the rights of mankind.
Must the whole five hundred be unanimous?
Will it be said that the assembly
shall appoint committees to try causes?
But who are to make these appointments?
Will not a few haughty palatines in the assembly
have influence enough to determine the election
in favor of their friends?
and will not this make the judges the tools of a party?
If the leaders are divided into parties, will not one prevail
at one year, and another the next?
and will not this introduce the most wretched of servitudes,
an uncertain jurisprudence?
Will it be said that the assembly shall appoint committees
for the nomination of officers?
The same intrigues and greater struggles would be
introduced for the place of a committee-man;
and there would be frequent appeals
from those committees to the body that appointed them.
Shall the assembly appoint a governor or president,
and give him all the executive power?
Why should not the people at large appoint him?
Giving this power to the assembly will open a wider door
to intrigue for the place; and the aristocratic families will be
sure, nine times in ten, to carry their choice in this way;
and, what is much worse, the first magistrate will be
considered as dependent on every obscure member
of the house, but in reality he will be dependent only on a
dozen or a score, perhaps on two or three, of the whole.
He will be liable to daily motions,
debates, and votes of censure.
Instead of thinking of his duty to the people at large,
he will confine his attention chiefly to the assembly,
and believe, that if he can satisfy them,
or a majority of them, he has done his duty.
After all, any of these devices are only changing words;
they are, in reality, erecting different orders of men,
and aiming at balances, as much as the system
which so much displeases M. Turgot;
they are introducing, in effect, all the inequalities and
disputes that he so greatly apprehends, without any of that
security to the laws, which ought to be the principal object;
they render the executive power, which is in truth
the government, the instrument of a few grandees.
If these are capable of a combination with each other,
they will seldom disagree in their opinion,
which is the richest man and of the first family;
and, as these will be all their inquiries,
they will generally carry their election.
If they are divided, in constant wrangles with each other,
and perpetual attacks upon the president about the
discharge of his functions, they will keep the nation
anxious and irritated, with controversies
which can never be decided nor ended.
If they agree, and the plebeians still carry the vote
against them, the choice will nevertheless probably fall upon
one of their number, who will be disposed to favor them
too much; but if it falls upon a plebeian,
there commences at once a series of contests
between the rich and the poor, which will never end
but in the ruin of the popular power and the national liberty;
or at least in a revolution and a new constitution.
As the executive power, the essence of government,
is ever odious to popular envy and jealousy, it will ever be
in the power of a few illustrious and wealthy citizens
to excite clamors and uneasiness,
if not commotions and seditions, against it.
Although it is the natural friend of the people,
and the only defense which they or their representatives
can have against the avarice and ambition of the rich
and distinguished citizens, yet, such is their thoughtless
simplicity, they are ever ready to believe that the evils
they feel are brought upon them by the executive power.
How easy is it, then, for a few artful men among the
aristocratic body to make a president, thus appointed
and supported, unpopular, though he conducts himself
with all the integrity and ability which his office requires?
But we have not yet considered how the legislative power
is to be exercised in this single assembly.
Is there to be a constitution?
Who are to compose it?
The assembly itself, or a convention called for that purpose?
In either case, whatever rules are agreed on for the
preservation of the lives, liberties, properties, and
characters of the citizens, what is to hinder this assembly
from transgressing the bounds which they have prescribed
to themselves, or which the convention
has ordained for them?
The convention has published its code and is no more.
Shall a new convention be called, to determine
Every question which arises concerning
a violation of the constitution?
This would require that the convention should sit whenever
the assembly sits, and consider and determine
every question which is agitated in it.
This is the very thing we contend for, namely,—
that there may be two assemblies;
one to divide, and the other to choose.
Grant me this, and I am satisfied; provided you will confine
both the convention and assembly to legislation,
and give the whole executive power to another body.
I had almost ventured to propose a third assembly
for the executive power; but the unity, the secrecy,
the dispatch of one man has no equal;
and the executive power should be watched by all men;
the attention of the whole nation should be fixed
upon one point, and the blame and censure, as well as the
impeachments and vengeance for abuses of this power,
should be directed solely to the ministers of one man.
But to pursue our single assembly.
The first year, or the first seven years,
they may be moderate; especially in dangerous times, and
while an exiled royal family, or exiled patricians or nobles,
are living, and may return; or while the people’s passions
are alive, and their attention awake,
from the fresh remembrance of danger and distress.
But when these transitory causes pass away,
as there is an affection and confidence
between the people and their representatives,
suppose the latter begin to make distinctions,
by making exceptions of themselves in the laws.
They may frank letters; they are exempted from arrests;
they can privilege servants; one little distinction
after another, in time makes up a large sum.
Some few of the people will complain; but the majority,
loving their representatives, will acquiesce.
Presently they are exempted from taxes.
Then their duration is too short; from annual they become
biennial, triennial, septennial, for life; and at length,
instead of applying to constituents to fill up vacancies,
the assembly takes it upon itself,
or gives it to their president.
In the meantime, wars are conducted by heroes to triumph
and conquest, negotiations are carried on with success,
commerce flourishes, the nation is prosperous; the citizens
are flattered, vain, proud of their felicity, envied by others.
It would be the basest, the most odious ingratitude, at least
it would be so represented, to find fault with their rulers.
In a word, as long as half a score of capital characters
agree, they will gradually form the house and the nation
into a system of subordination and dependence
to themselves, and govern all at their discretion—
a simple aristocracy or oligarchy in effect,
though a simple democracy in name.
But, as every one of these is emulous of others,
and more than one of them is constantly tormented
with a desire to be the first, they will soon disagree;
and then the house and the nation gradually divides itself
into four parties, one of which, at least, will wish
for monarchy, another for aristocracy,
a third for democracy, and a fourth for various mixtures of
them; and these parties can never come to a decision
but by a struggle, or by the sword.
There is no remedy for this, but in a convention of deputies
from all parts of the state; but an equal convention can
hardly be obtained, except in times like those we have lately
seen, when the danger could only be warded off
by the aid and exertions of the whole body of the people.
When no such danger from without shall press,
those who are proud of their wealth, blood, or wit,
will never give way to fair and equal establishments.
All parties will be afraid of calling a convention;
but if it must be agreed to, the aristocratical party
will push their influence, and obtain elections even
into the conventions, for themselves and their friends,
so as to carry points there which perhaps
they could not have carried in the assembly.
But shall the people at large elect a governor and council
annually to manage the executive power,
and a single assembly to have the whole legislative?
In this case, the executive power, instead of being
independent, will be the instrument of a few leading
members of the house; because the executive power,
being an object of jealousy and envy to the people,
and the legislative an object of their confidence and
affection, the latter will always be able to render
the former unpopular, and undermine its influence.
But if the people for a time support an executive
disagreeable to the leaders in the legislative,
the constitution will be disregarded, and the nation will be
divided between the two bodies,
and each must at last have an army to decide the question.
A constitution consisting of an executive in one single
assembly, and a legislative in another, is already composed
of two armies in battle array; and nothing is wanting
but the word of command to begin the combat.
In the present state of society and manners in America,
with a people living chiefly by agriculture, in small numbers,
sprinkled over large tracts of land, they are not subject
to those panics and transports, those contagions of madness
and folly, which are seen in countries where large numbers
live in small places, in daily fear of perishing for want.
We know, therefore, that the people can live and increase
under almost any kind of government,
or without any government at all.
But it is of great importance to begin well;
misarrangements now made, will have great,
extensive, and distant consequences;
and we are now employed, how little soever we may think
of it, in making establishments which will affect
the happiness of a hundred millions of inhabitants
at a time, in a period not very distant.
All nations, under all governments, must have parties;
the great secret is to control them.
There are but two ways, either by a monarchy
and standing army, or by a balance in the constitution.
Where the people have a voice, and there is no balance,
there will be everlasting fluctuations, revolutions, and
horrors, until a standing army, with a general at its head,
commands the peace, or the necessity of an equilibrium
is made to appear to all, and is adopted by all.8
Many Americans wanted a bill of rights to be
added to the new Constitution as amendments.
John Adams in October 1779 had written a Declaration of Rights
for the Constitution of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
that listed 31 rights and principles that provided more than what would be included
in the Bill of Rights as the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution.
These can be read in chapter 4 on pages 176-181.
The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia that began in May 1787
produced a new Constitution that they approved on September 17.
As ambassadors John Adams was in England and the Netherlands
while Thomas Jefferson was in France.
Congress in October informed Adams that his resignation was accepted.
On November 13 Thomas Jefferson from Paris in a
letter to John Adams wrote this about the new Constitution:
How do you like our new constitution?
I confess there are things in it which stagger all my
dispositions to subscribe to what
such an assembly has proposed.
The house of federal representatives will not be adequate
to the management of affairs either foreign or federal.
Their President seems a bad edition of a Polish king.
He may be reelected from 4 years to 4 years for life.
Reason and experience prove to us that a chief magistrate,
so continuable, is an officer for life.
When one or two generations shall have proved that
this is an office for life, it becomes on every succession
worthy of intrigue, of bribery, of force,
and even of foreign interference.
It will be of great consequence to France and England
to have America governed by a Galloman or Angloman.
Once in office, and possessing the military force
of the union, without either the aid or check of a council,
he would not be easily dethroned, even if the people
could be induced to withdraw their votes from him.
I wish that at the end of the 4 years they had
made him for ever ineligible a second time.
Indeed I think all the good of this new constitution might
have been couched in three or four new articles to be added
to the good, old, and venerable fabric, which should
have been preserved even as a religious relique.9
On December 6 John Adams sent this letter to
Jefferson giving his views on the new document.
The Project of a new Constitution, has Objections
against it, to which I find it difficult to reconcile myself,
but I am so unfortunate as to differ somewhat from you
in the Articles, according to your last kind Letter.
You are afraid of the one—I, of the few.
We agree perfectly that the many should have a full,
fair and perfect Representation.—
You are Apprehensive of Monarchy; I, of Aristocracy.
I would therefore have given more Power
to the President and less to the Senate.
The Nomination and Appointment to all offices I would have
given to the President, assisted only by a Privy Council
of his own Creation, but not a Vote or Voice would I
have given to the Senate or any Senator,
unless he were of the Privy Council.
Faction and Distraction are the sure and certain
Consequence of giving to a Senate
a vote in the distribution of offices.
You are apprehensive the President when once chosen,
will be chosen again and again as long as he lives.
So much the better as it appears to me.—
You are apprehensive of foreign Interference, Intrigue,
Influence.
So am I.—
But, as often as Elections happen,
the danger of foreign Influence recurs.
The less frequently they happen the less danger.—
And if the Same Man may be chosen again, it is probable
he will be, and the danger of foreign Influence will be less.
Foreigners, seeing little Prospect
will have less Courage for Enterprise.
Elections, my dear sir, Elections to offices
which are great objects of Ambition, I look at with terror.
Experiments of this kind have been so often tried,
and so universally found productive of Horrors,
that there is great Reason to dread them.10
John Adams on 12 February 1788 in a letter to Cotton Tufts wrote,
Every Question you ask about the new Constitution
shows that you understand the subject as well as
I can pretend to do, and that you are well aware
of the reasonable Difficulties and objections.
But is there not danger that a new Convention at this time,
would increase the Difficulties and reasonable Exceptions
rather than remove any of them?
(A Declaration of Rights I wish to see with all my Heart:
though I am sensible of the Difficulty of framing one,
in which all the States can agree.—
a more complete Separation of the Executive
from the Legislative too, would be more Safe for all.
The Press, Conscience & Juries I wish better Secured.—
But is it not better to accept this Plan
and amend it hereafter?
After ten years Absence from his Country
a Man should be modest, but as at present instructed
I think I should vote for it, as it is, and promote
a Convention after some time, to amend it.)11
On 5 April 1788 John Adams wrote in a letter to Thomas Brand Hillis,
Yet my countrymen have so much more need of
arguments against errors in government, than in religion,
that I am again comforted and encouraged.
At this moment there is a greater fermentation throughout
all Europe upon the subject of government,
than was perhaps ever known, at any former period.
France, Holland, and Flanders are alive to it.
Is government a science or not?
Are there any principles on which it is founded?
What are its ends?
If indeed there is no rule; no standard;
all must be accident and chance.
If there is a standard, what is it?—
It is easier to make a people discontented with
a bad government, than to teach them
how to establish and maintain a good one.
Liberty can never be created and preserved
without a people: and by a people, I mean
a common people, in contradistinction from the gentlemen;
and a people can never be created and preserved
without an executive authority in one hand,
separated entirely from the body of the gentlemen.
The two ladies Aristocratia and Democratia will
eternally pull caps, till one or other is mistress.
If the first is the conqueress, she never fails to depress
and debase her rival into the most deplorable servitude.
If the last conquers, she eternally surrenders herself
into the arms of a ravisher.
Kings, therefore, are the natural allies of the
common people, and the prejudices against them
are by no means favorable to liberty.
Kings and the common people have both a common enemy
in the gentlemen, and they must unite in some degree
or other against them, or both will be destroyed;
the one dethroned and the other enslaved.
The common people too are unable to defend themselves
against their own ally, the king,
without another ally in the gentlemen.
It is, therefore, indispensably necessary, that the gentlemen
in a body, or by representatives, should be an independent
and essential branch of the constitution.
By a king, I mean a single person
possessed of the whole executive power.
You have often said to me, that it is difficult
to preserve the balance.
This is true.
It is difficult to preserve liberty.
But there can be no liberty without some balance;
and it is certainly easier to preserve a balance
of three branches than of two.—
If the people cannot preserve a balance of three branches,
how is it possible for them to preserve one of two only?
If the people of England find it difficult to preserve
their balance at present, how would they do, if they had
the election of a king, and a house of lords to make,
once a year, or once in seven years,
as well as of a house of commons?
It seems evident at first blush, that periodical elections
of the king and peers in England, in addition
to the commons, would produce agitations that
must destroy all order and safety as well as liberty.
The gentlemen too, can never defend themselves
against a brave and united common people,
but by an alliance with a king, nor against a king,
without an alliance with the common people.
It is the insatiability of human passions,
that is the foundation of all government.
Men are not only ambitious, but their ambition
is unbounded: they are not only avaricious,
but their avarice is insatiable.
The desires of kings, gentlemen and common people,—
all increase, instead of being satisfied by indulgence.
This fact being allowed, it will follow that
it is necessary to place checks upon them all.12
Adams traveled to the Netherlands in March, and he had negotiated a fourth
Dutch loan that would help the United States make payments on previous loans.
On June 17 he and his wife Abigail arrived in Boston.
On September 13 the United States Congress approved an election that
established the dates to elect a president and a vice president by choosing electors.
John Adams was elected to the House of Representatives in the first Federal Congress.
He did not serve because he was elected Vice President of the United States.
Adams on December 3 wrote another letter to Thomas Brand Hillis:
What shall I say to you of our public Affairs?
The increase of population is wonderful.
The Plenty of Provisions of all kinds, amazing;
and cheap in proportion to their abundance,
and the scarcity of money which is certainly very great.
The Agriculture, Fisheries, Manufactures and Commerce
of the Country are very well,
much better than I expected to find them.
I cannot say so much of our Politics.
The Constancy of the People in a course of annual Elections
has discarded from their Confidence almost all the old
staunch firm Patriots who conducted the Revolution
in all the civil departments, and has called to the Helm
Pilots much more selfish and much less skillful—
I cannot however lay all the Blame of this upon the People.
Many of my brother Patriots have flattered the People,
by telling them they had Virtue; Wisdom and Talents,
which the People themselves have found out by Experience,
they had not: and this has disgusted them
with their Flatterers.—
The Elections for the new Government, have been
determined very well, hitherto, in general—
You may have the Curiosity to ask what share,
your Friend is to have?
I really am at a loss to guess.
The probability at present seems to be that
I shall have no Lot in it.
I am in the habit of balancing every Thing.
In one scale is Vanity; in the other Comfort;
can you doubt which will preponderate?
In public Life, I have found nothing but the former;
in private Life I have enjoyed much of the latter.
I regret the Loss of the Bookshops and the Society
of the few Men of Letters that I knew in London:
in all other respects
I am much better accommodated here.13
Notes
1. John Adams Writings from the New Nation 1784-1826
ed. Gordon S. Wood, p. 64-79.
2. Ibid., p. 87-88.
3. The Works of John Adams: Second President of the United States,
Volume 4 by Charles Francis Adams, p. 401.
4. Ibid., p. 412-413.
5. Ibid., p. 427.
6. Ibid., p. 416.
7. John Adams Writings from the New Nation 1784-1826, p. 158-160.
8. The Works of John Adams: Second President of the United States,
Volume 4, p. 579-588.
9. Thomas Jefferson Writings, p. 913-914.
10. John Adams Writings from the New Nation 1784-1826, p. 63.
11. Ibid., p. 163.
12. Ibid., p. 164-165.
13. Ibid., p. 166-167.
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