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Characters:
Socrates
Glaucon
Adeimantus
Polemarchus
Other listeners
Scene: Inside the house of Polemarchus. SOCRATES, GLAUCON, ADEIMANTUS, POLEMARCHUS and others are sitting in a circle for a discussion.
GLAUCON
In our last discussion, Socrates,
we attempted to discover what justice is
by examining it in the larger picture of the state,
and we looked at how justice and injustice
originate in different types of states.
Now I would like to know
how the just state may be brought about.
SOCRATES
That is no easy question, Glaucon.
If you knew how difficult this is to answer,
you would be more ready to admit
that there is reason to hesitate and worry about
how to consider such a paradoxical discussion.
GLAUCON
The more excuses you make, the less likely
will you be released by us from telling
how this government can be attained.
SOCRATES
Then the first thing to remember is how
searching for justice and injustice brought us here.
GLAUCON
It did; but what of it?
SOCRATES
Oh nothing;
but if we discover what justice is,
shall we expect that the just person
shouldn't differ from it at all,
but be absolutely just,
or shall we be happy
if someone can come near it
and share in it more than others?
GLAUCON
That would content us.
SOCRATES
Then for the sake of a model
were we searching for what justice is,
and for the character of the perfectly just person
and also for that of the unjust,
so that whatever we found in them
of happiness and the opposite,
we must admit concerning ourselves,
that whoever was most like them
would have a similar destiny;
but it was not for the sake of showing
how these things could be attained.
GLAUCON
That's true.
SOCRATES
So do you think one would be any less of an artist
who painted a model of the most beautiful person
and put in everything satisfactorily,
if one wasn't able to prove such a person exists?
GLAUCON
By God, not I.
SOCRATES
So weren't we claiming to make
a model in logic of a good state?
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
So do you think we are any less logical,
if we have not proved that
this state can be managed as it was described?
GLAUCON
Of course not.
SOCRATES
So that's true; but if to please you,
it's shown how it could be realized,
again would you concede to me the same point?
GLAUCON
What?
SOCRATES
Can anything be realized in practice as told,
or is it the nature of practice
that it attains less truth than description,
even if it doesn't seem like it?
Do you concede this or not?
GLAUCON
I concede it.
SOCRATES
Then you shouldn't compel me to show in action
everything we went through with logic;
but if we could discover how a state
could be managed most nearly to our description,
apparently we would have discovered
the possibility of realizing what you demanded.
Wouldn't you be content with that?
For I know I would.
GLAUCON
I would too.
SOCRATES
After this probably we should try to find out
what is now done badly in states,
because of which they're not managed so,
and what is the smallest change
which would bring a state
to this type of government,
preferably one thing or two
or as few as possible.
GLAUCON
Absolutely.
SOCRATES
Then it seems to me there is one change
which would bring about reform,
though it's not small nor easy,
but it's possible.
GLAUCON
What?
SOCRATES
There is one thing for this greatest of difficulties;
but I'll say it, even if it stimulates laughter.
Consider what I'm about to say.
GLAUCON
Say it.
SOCRATES
Unless either philosophers lead in states
or those who are said to lead now
are able to pursue wisdom truly and sufficiently,
and political and philosophical ability coincide,
while those many natures
who now follow one without the other
are excluded out of necessity,
there is no rest in states from evils, dear Glaucon,
nor I think for the human race,
unless this government
which we just described in words
grows into power and sees the light of the sun.
This is what I hesitated to say,
seeing that it would be a very paradoxical statement;
for it's hard to see that there is no other happiness
neither in private nor in public.
GLAUCON
Socrates, having made
such a statement and argument,
certainly many who are not poor would now strip
and taking weapons would rush at you
prepared to do surprising works;
and unless you defend yourself with logic and escape,
being jeered you'll pay the penalty.
SOCRATES
Then aren't you the cause of this?
GLAUCON
That's right I am;
however, I won't give you up,
but I'll defend you as best I can;
I can encourage you with good will,
and perhaps I may answer you
with more care than another.
So having such help try to prove to the disbelievers
that it's as you say.
SOCRATES
I must try, since you offer so great an alliance.
So it seems necessary to me,
if we're to escape from those you mentioned,
to define for them what is meant by philosophers
whom we dare to claim should lead,
so that when it's made clear
one can defend oneself by showing that it's fitting
that those with the nature of philosophers
are meant to lead in the state,
while the others are meant to follow the leaders.
GLAUCON
Look to the definition.
SOCRATES
Come then, follow me,
if we may somehow or other
explain it sufficiently.
GLAUCON
Go on.
SOCRATES
Should I remind you, or do you remember that
when we claim someone loves something,
it should be apparent, if it's meant correctly,
that one likes not just a part of it, but all of it?
GLAUCON
Probably I should be reminded,
for I certainly don't understand.
SOCRATES
What you say, Glaucon, is fitting for another,
but not for a lover of youths,
for you find a reason to be attracted
to any who are in the bloom of their prime.
GLAUCON
If you wish to use me
as an example of such lovers,
I'll admit it for the sake of the argument.
SOCRATES
But don't you observe
lovers of wine doing this too?
Aren't they glad for every excuse to drink?
GLAUCON
Very much.
SOCRATES
And you've seen lovers of honor, I believe,
who if they can't be generals, are local leaders;
if they're not honored by the great and prominent,
they're content to be honored by the small and poor,
because in short they desire being honored.
GLAUCON
Exactly.
SOCRATES
Then when we say someone desires something,
shall we claim they desire all things of that kind,
or some and not the rest?
GLAUCON
All.
SOCRATES
Then shall we not claim that a philosopher
is desiring not a part of wisdom, but all of it?
GLAUCON
True.
SOCRATES
Then those who are annoyed at their studies,
especially when they're young
and don't know what's useful and what isn't,
we'll claim aren't lovers of learning
nor philosophers,
just as we claim those annoyed by food
aren't hungry and don't desire food,
and aren't fond of eating,
but have a bad appetite.
Or what do you think?
GLAUCON
We'd be correct in claiming that.
SOCRATES
But those who have a taste
for willingly yielding to every study
and gladly going into learning
and are never satisfied,
we'll rightly claim are philosophers.
GLAUCON
Then there will be many unusual ones,
for it seems to me all the lovers of spectacles
delight in learning such things,
and it would be most unusual
to put the curious with the philosophers,
who would not be willing to listen to a discussion,
as though they had hired their ears out,
going around to every Dionysian festival
in the cities and towns without missing any.
So shall we claim that all these
and other learners of minor arts are philosophers?
SOCRATES
Not at all, but they are like philosophers.
GLAUCON
Who do you say are the true ones?
SOCRATES
Those who love seeing the truth.
GLAUCON
That's correct;
but how do you mean it?
SOCRATES
It's not at all easily explained to another;
but I think you would agree with me on this.
GLAUCON
What?
SOCRATES
Since the beautiful is opposite to the ugly,
they are two.
GLAUCON
Why not?
SOCRATES
Then since they're two, is each of them one?
GLAUCON
Yes.
SOCRATES
And concerning the just and unjust, good and bad,
and all ideas the argument is the same,
that each of these is one,
but in combination with actions and bodies
and with one another
each appears everywhere in many appearances.
GLAUCON
You're right.
SOCRATES
Then I'll distinguish these
whom you just said were lovers
of spectacles and arts and the practical
separately from those of the argument
who alone should be correctly called philosophers.
GLAUCON
What do you mean?
SOCRATES
The lovers of sights and sounds are attracted
to beautiful tones and colors and shapes
and everything artificially made out of these,
but their understanding is incapable of seeing
and appreciating the nature of the beautiful itself.
GLAUCON
That's so.
SOCRATES
Wouldn't those who could go to beauty itself
and see it by itself be rare?
GLAUCON
Definitely.
SOCRATES
So those accustomed to beautiful things,
but not accustomed to beauty itself
nor able to follow
when led to the knowledge of it,
do you think they're dreaming or awake in life?
Consider.
Isn't it dreaming,
whether they're asleep or awake,
to believe the like is the unlike,
and the same a resemblance?
GLAUCON
At least I'd claim that was dreaming.
SOCRATES
What about the opposite,
of those thinking something is beauty itself
and can distinguish this
and the things sharing in it,
and thinking the things sharing in it are not it
nor it the things sharing;
do you think they're awake or dreaming in life?
GLAUCON
Definitely awake.
SOCRATES
Then couldn't we correctly claim that
the understanding of the knowledgeable is knowing,
and that of the believing is opinion?
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
So what if those we claim believe but don't know
get angry at us and doubt what we said as not true,
is there any way we could console them
and persuade them gently in secret,
that they're not healthy?
GLAUCON
There should be.
SOCRATES
Come consider what we should say to them.
Or would you question them in this way,
as if no one is jealous of them,
but we'd be glad to see them knowing something,
yet tell us this:
Do those knowing know something or nothing?
So you answer for them.
GLAUCON
I'd answer that they know something.
SOCRATES
Something that is or is not?
GLAUCON
That is; how could what is not be known?
SOCRATES
So do we have this sufficiently,
even if we should consider it
from every perspective,
that what completely is
may be completely known,
and what in no way is
in every way is unknown?
GLAUCON
Most sufficiently.
SOCRATES
Well; if something is thus,
so as to be and not be,
wouldn't it lie in between
what absolutely is and what in no way is?
GLAUCON
Yes, in between.
SOCRATES
Then since knowledge relates to what is,
and ignorance of necessity to what is not,
for what is in between
should one search for something
in between ignorance and knowledge,
if such a thing happens to exist?
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
Then is there something we call opinion?
GLAUCON
Why not?
SOCRATES
Is it another ability than knowledge or the same?
GLAUCON
Another.
SOCRATES
Then opinion has been appointed to one thing
and knowledge to another,
each according to its ability.
GLAUCON
That's so.
SOCRATES
Then isn't knowing naturally related to what is,
to know how what is is?
But now it seems necessary to me
to distinguish here.
GLAUCON
What?
SOCRATES
We'll claim abilities are a kind of being,
which enable us and everything else
to be able to do whatever can be done.
For example,
I mean sight and hearing are abilities,
if you understand the kind of thing I mean.
GLAUCON
I understand.
SOCRATES
Listen then to what is apparent to me about them:
for in an ability
I don't see color, shape or anything,
which when looking at many other things
I distinguish for myself some from others;
but with an ability I look only at
what is related to it and what it affects,
and I call each of them an ability,
and what is related to the same thing
and affects the same thing I call the same,
and another what relates to another
and affects another.
What about you?
How do you do it?
GLAUCON
That way.
SOCRATES
Here again, good sir,
would you claim knowledge is an ability,
or in what class would you put it?
GLAUCON
In that, the most vigorous of all abilities.
SOCRATES
What about opinion?
Do you think it's an ability
or in another category?
GLAUCON
Not at all, for we have the ability to believe,
which is nothing else but an opinion.
SOCRATES
But a while ago you agreed that
knowledge and opinion are not the same.
GLAUCON
How could anyone having intelligence
identify the unerring with what is not unerring?
SOCRATES
Right, and clearly it was admitted by us
that opinion is different from knowledge.
GLAUCON
Yes, different.
SOCRATES
Then naturally each different ability
relates to something different.
GLAUCON
They must.
SOCRATES
Does knowledge relate to what is
to know how it is?
GLAUCON
Yes.
SOCRATES
And do we claim opinion is to believe?
GLAUCON
Yes.
SOCRATES
Is it the same as knowledge knows,
and is the known and the believed the same?
Or is that impossible?
GLAUCON
It's impossible from what was admitted,
if another ability naturally relates to another,
and both opinion and knowledge are abilities,
and each different, as we claim,
the known and believed
aren't allowed to be the same.
SOCRATES
Then if what is is known,
something else is believed,
or would it be what is?
GLAUCON
No, something else.
SOCRATES
Then does one believe what is not?
Or is it impossible to believe what is not?
Doesn't one believing bring an opinion to something?
Or for example, is to believe to believe nothing?
GLAUCON
Impossible.
SOCRATES
But does the one believing believe something?
GLAUCON
Yes.
SOCRATES
But what is not isn't something,
but should most correctly be called nothing.
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
To what is not we of necessity assigned ignorance,
and to what is, knowing.
GLAUCON
Correct.
SOCRATES
Then one believes neither what is nor what is not.
GLAUCON
No.
SOCRATES
Then opinion would be
neither ignorance nor knowing.
GLAUCON
Probably not.
SOCRATES
Then is it outside of these going beyond
either knowing in clarity
or ignorance in obscurity?
GLAUCON
It's neither.
SOCRATES
Does it appear to you
opinion is darker than knowing
and more apparent than ignorance?
GLAUCON
Yes, and much.
SOCRATES
Then would opinion lie between the two?
GLAUCON
Yes.
SOCRATES
Didn't we claim before, that if anything
should appear to be and not be at the same time,
that it lies in between
what purely is and what wholly is not,
it would be neither knowledge nor ignorance,
but appears to be in between them.
GLAUCON
That's correct.
SOCRATES
Now what is called opinion
has appeared between them.
GLAUCON
It has.
SOCRATES
So what about those who believe
there is no beauty itself
nor any idea of beauty always staying the same
but who think many things are beautiful,
lovers of spectacles who can't stand anyone claiming
beauty is one and the just is one and so on?
For sometimes won't beautiful things appear ugly,
the just unjust, and the holy unholy?
GLAUCON
They must.
SOCRATES
Won't even double things
be half of something else?
GLAUCON
Of course.
SOCRATES
And may large and small things,
light and heavy things
be described by their opposites also?
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
Then since equivocation is possible with these things,
which are between what is and what isn't,
don't we find that such conventions are opinions?
GLAUCON
We do.
SOCRATES
Then those who see many beautiful things
but don't perceive beauty itself
and are unable to be led to it,
and who see many just things but not justice itself,
and so on with all the rest,
shall we claim that they believe things
but know nothing about what they believe?
GLAUCON
That must be.
SOCRATES
But what about those who see the things themselves
always the same and never changing?
Do they know and not believe?
GLAUCON
That also must be.
SOCRATES
Shall we claim that those who like tones and colors,
but can't stand the reality of beauty itself,
are lovers of opinion,
and will they get angry at us for saying this?
GLAUCON
No, for it's not right to get angry at the truth.
SOCRATES
And may those who love knowledge
and welcome reality
be called lovers of wisdom or philosophers?
GLAUCON
By all means.
SOCRATES
Since the philosophers are capable
of understanding the eternal and unchanging,
shouldn't they be leaders in the state?
GLAUCON
That would be appropriate.
SOCRATES
For surely we wouldn't want to appoint those
who are blind to the beautiful and just and good.
GLAUCON
No, by God.
SOCRATES
We should agree on the qualities of the philosophers.
GLAUCON
What other qualities should the philosophers have
in order to be good leaders of the state?
SOCRATES
Not lying and never being willing to accept falsehood,
but hating it and loving the truth.
GLAUCON
That's likely.
SOCRATES
Not only likely, my friend,
but it's completely necessary
that anyone who loves something
should naturally cherish all of it.
GLAUCON
That's correct.
SOCRATES
So could you find anything
more related to wisdom than truth?
GLAUCON
How could I?
SOCRATES
Then the lover of wisdom must from youth
reach for all kinds of truth.
GLAUCON
Absolutely.
SOCRATES
Surely we realize that desires flowing in one direction
are weakened for other things.
GLAUCON
Of course.
SOCRATES
So the philosopher's desires will flow to learning
and the pleasures of the soul rather than the body.
GLAUCON
That definitely must be so.
SOCRATES
Such will be prudent
and not money-lovers nor illiberal,
which are contrary to the soul which always seeks
divine and human wholeness and integrity.
GLAUCON
Most true.
SOCRATES
Then will they think death is terrible?
GLAUCON
Least of all.
SOCRATES
For the cowardly and illiberal don't share
the nature of the true philosopher.
GLAUCON
I don't think so.
SOCRATES
In addition to being courageous
won't the philosopher be just and gentle
rather than unsocial and rude?
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
They'll be quick learners and have good memories,
or else forgetting they'd lose interest in wisdom;
and they'll have harmony, proportion and grace
in order to be guided to the ideal realities.
GLAUCON
Blame itself could not fault these qualities.
SOCRATES
Then if such were perfected
by education and maturity,
wouldn't you entrust the state to them?
ADEIMANTUS
Socrates,
no one could contradict these arguments,
but those who listen to them
think because of their inexperience in answering
that a little at a time they're led astray
to a conclusion opposite
to what they declared at first,
like a checkers player who eventually can't move.
I say this,
since most who study philosophy beyond youth
become cranks, if not complete rascals,
and those thought the best
are made useless to society
by the pursuits which you praise.
SOCRATES
That's apparently true.
ADEIMANTUS
So how can it be right
that states won't stop evils
until philosophers,
whom we admit are useless, lead?
SOCRATES
Your question requires
an answer through a parable.
For so hard is the experience
of the best in the state
that there is nothing else like it.
Imagine this happening on many ships or one:
A shipmaster is taller and stronger
than all on board;
but he's slightly deaf and also has impaired vision,
and his knowledge of navigation is similar.
Sailors fight with each other
for control of the helm,
each thinking he should steer,
though they never learned the skill
nor did they ever study it nor were they taught.
Furthermore they claim it can't be taught,
and they're ready to put down
anyone who says it can.
They gather around the shipmaster,
asking for the helm to be turned over to them.
Sometimes not convincing him,
others are preferred,
whom they either kill or throw off the ship,
and after binding and drugging
the noble shipmaster,
they take over the ship, use the supplies,
and sail on in a similar way.
Whoever is most clever at convincing or forcing
the shipmaster to let them lead,
is praised and called a navigator;
and whoever doesn't, they blame as useless,
not realizing that the true pilot
must take care of the time of year,
the seasons, the sky, winds, stars,
and everything related to that skill,
if one is to be a leader on the ship;
but as for piloting,
if some wish it and some don't,
neither this skill nor caring what is thought
can be done at the same time as navigation.
On such a ship wouldn't a true pilot
be called a stargazer, an idle talker, and useless
by those who had taken over the ship in this way?
ADEIMANTUS
Definitely.
SOCRATES
I think you understand how this relates
to the true philosopher in the state.
ADEIMANTUS
I do.
SOCRATES
Then teach this parable to those
who are surprised
that philosophers aren't honored in our states,
and try to convince them that
it would be much more surprising
if they were honored.
ADEIMANTUS
I will.
SOCRATES
So it's true the best philosophers are useless,
yet don't blame them
but those who don't use them.
A pilot shouldn't have to beg sailors
to be led by him,
nor should the wise go to the doors of the rich.
But the sick, whether rich or poor,
should go to the door of the physician,
and everyone wanting to be led
should go to those who can lead.
Our present political leaders
are like those sailors,
and those whom we call
useless, idealistic stargazers
are like the true pilots.
ADEIMANTUS
That's correct.
SOCRATES
Among these the best pursuit
is not well thought of
by those whose pursuits are opposite,
but the greatest and strongest slander of philosophy
is what you said about most being cranks and rascals,
which I agreed with you is true.
Haven't we explained the reason for the uselessness?
ADEIMANTUS
Definitely.
SOCRATES
Next shall I explain why philosophy
is not the cause of the majority's corruption?
ADEIMANTUS
Certainly.
SOCRATES
Didn't we say a philosopher
must seek truth above all?
ADEIMANTUS
We did.
SOCRATES
Lovers of learning won't be distracted by details
and the many opinions about them,
but love will lead on to the nature of each reality,
which may be grasped by the soul,
producing intelligence and truth,
in order to truly know how to live and grow;
and not till then will their travail be relieved.
ADEIMANTUS
That is most fair.
SOCRATES
Then when truth leads,
I think we could claim that it's followed by
courage, generosity, learning, and memory.
Now we're contemplating why
the nature of most philosophers becomes corrupted,
and only a few escape
to be called not bad but useless.
ADEIMANTUS
What corruptions do you mean?
SOCRATES
I'll try to explain them for you.
First I think everyone agrees that
a philosophic nature is rare;
or don't you think so?
ADEIMANTUS
Most definitely.
SOCRATES
Consider how many things corrupt them.
Most surprising of all is how natural gifts
such as courage, prudence and all the rest
can be diverted and corrupt the soul,
as do all things said to be good,
such as beauty, wealth, bodily strength, and status.
ADEIMANTUS
I'd like to know how.
SOCRATES
Every seed needs the right food, seasons, and place;
so it's natural that the best natures do worse
in a bad environment than the mediocre;
for weak natures don't cause anything great,
neither good nor bad.
ADEIMANTUS
That's so.
SOCRATES
Thus the philosophic nature nurtured well
will grow into complete excellence,
but in the wrong environment will be the opposite,
unless some god happens to help.
Some believe sophists corrupt the young,
but the majority with their applause and criticism
may sweep away the young to do their bidding;
then sophists inculcate those opinions,
as if by acquiring knowledge of the beast's desires
it may be tamed or made fierce,
believing whatever pleases the beast is good
and whatever doesn't is bad.
Before God, wouldn't they be strange educators?
ADEIMANTUS
I think so.
SOCRATES
Could the majority ever tolerate and believe in
beauty itself instead of many beautiful things?
ADEIMANTUS
Not at all.
SOCRATES
Then philosophy is impossible for the crowd.
ADEIMANTUS
Impossible.
SOCRATES
Then won't the natural born philosopher
likely be tempted, flattered and led astray
by petitions and honors of those
who want to sway that ability?
ADEIMANTUS
That's likely.
SOCRATES
Won't ambitious hopes
make him proud and foolish?
ADEIMANTUS
Definitely.
SOCRATES
If such a person is told the truth
that he needs intelligence
and must work hard for it,
do you think he'll listen
when surrounded by evils?
ADEIMANTUS
Hardly.
SOCRATES
So even if someone due to a good nature
and an affinity for logic understands somehow
and is drawn toward philosophy,
won't those afraid of losing influence
act to keep him from being persuaded,
and won't they disable anyone who tries,
either by private intrigue or public prosecution?
ADEIMANTUS
It's inevitable.
SOCRATES
So could such a person be a philosopher?
ADEIMANTUS
Certainly not.
SOCRATES
So usually talented people do the greatest harm,
or when well directed they do the greatest good;
but those with little talent never do anything great.
ADEIMANTUS
True.
SOCRATES
But if the unfit and vulgar try to be philosophers
don't they produce sophisms and other nonsense?
ADEIMANTUS
I'm afraid so.
SOCRATES
A very few worthy to join with philosophy
may somehow escape corruption
in exile or a small town,
as Theages was held back from politics by illness,
and I by my divine sign,
which rarely occurred before.
These few taste its pleasures and blessings,
and seeing the madness of the majority enough
realize that present politics is not healthy
and no one's help could save justice,
but it would be like falling among wild beasts,
nor could one hold out against all the cruelty;
and aware one couldn't benefit the state or friends,
but would be throwing away one's life,
these all remain quiet and mind their own business;
seeing others filled with lawlessness,
content to keep free of injustice and unholy deeds,
they live life here and depart with fair hope.
ADEIMANTUS
Those are no small accomplishments.
SOCRATES
Not the greatest though, which can only be done
if one is in an appropriate state
where one may save oneself and the common good.
Yet thus far a perfectly virtuous person
leading a similar state has never been seen.
Or do you think it ever has happened?
ADEIMANTUS
Never.
SOCRATES
Neither do people listen
to fine and free discussions
whose whole effort is
to seek the truth and knowledge.
I'm afraid we must say then
that no person nor state will ever be perfect
until the philosophers who now are called useless
take care of the state,
whether they wish to or not,
or until sovereigns and those in power
are divinely inspired by the love of true philosophy.
Though we admit this is difficult,
it's not impossible.
ADEIMANTUS
I think so too.
SOCRATES
But will you say the majority doesn't think so?
ADEIMANTUS
Perhaps.
SOCRATES
But my friend, don't condemn all the people.
They'll change their minds, if not in strife
they're encouraged gently not to dislike learning,
and if you show them
what you mean by philosophers,
so they won't think
you mean the rascals and cranks.
I think most are not so ungentle and harsh,
but their anger toward philosophy
comes from those who are abusive
and criticize people instead of things.
ADEIMANTUS
I agree.
SOCRATES
For the one whose mind is truly on what is
has no time to look down on human business
nor to be filled with envy in struggling with them
but looks at the eternal realities of the cosmos,
seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged,
but all live in harmony according to reason;
these one should imitate as best one can.
Thus the philosopher relating to the divine order
becomes as divine and orderly as a human can.
Then will many be angry at such a philosopher,
and would they deny that a state
could be drawn in life from a heavenly model?
ADEIMANTUS
They would not be angry if they perceived it.
But in what way would they draw that?
SOCRATES
First wiping the slate clean,
wouldn't they sketch the constitution?
ADEIMANTUS
Of course.
SOCRATES
Looking to the nature of justice,
beauty and prudence,
they would create these among humans,
making them as friendly to God as they can.
ADEIMANTUS
That would be the most beautiful painting.
SOCRATES
Can we persuade them
such a political artist exists,
and will they become gentler
when they hear this?
ADEIMANTUS
Much gentler, if they are prudent.
SOCRATES
Will they deny philosophers love the truth,
or that their nature is the best?
ADEIMANTUS
That would be absurd.
SOCRATES
So persuaded and made gentle,
will they agree?
ADEIMANTUS
Certainly.
SOCRATES
Now for perfection
the philosopher must study the greatest thing of all.
ADEIMANTUS
Is anything greater than justice,
wisdom, courage, and prudence?
SOCRATES
Yes, greater, and it must be drawn most perfectly;
for it's the idea of the good by which justice
and the others become useful and beneficial.
Now you realize we don't know it adequately.
Unless we know what is good,
we don't know if we have anything of value.
Or do you think there is any profit
in acquiring everything except the good?
or in understanding all things
without understanding the good?
ADEIMANTUS
No, by God.
SOCRATES
You know many think pleasure is the good,
but can pleasure be the good
when some pleasures are bad?
ADEIMANTUS
Of course not.
SOCRATES
The orderly think knowledge is the good,
but in the end they must admit
it's knowledge of the good which is best.
ADEIMANTUS
True.
SOCRATES
Is anyone satisfied
with the appearance of the good?
Surely everyone wants the reality.
ADEIMANTUS
Definitely.
SOCRATES
Do you think it's right to talk as if knowing
when one doesn't know?
ADEIMANTUS
Not as knowing, but as one thinks.
SOCRATES
But haven't you observed that
opinion without knowledge is shameful?
Even the best opinions are blind;
or do you think opinion without truth
is different than traveling the road blindly?
ADEIMANTUS
No, I don't.
GLAUCON
Before God, Socrates,
as you're near the goal,
explain the good
as you have justice and prudence.
SOCRATES
My friend, I'm afraid I'm not equal to it,
for I don't think I could fly that high today;
but I'm willing to discuss
the offspring of the good
and what it's most like, if you wish.
GLAUCON
Do that, and describe the father later.
SOCRATES
I wish I could make you a payment
and not just the interest,
but accept the interest
and the offspring of the good;
and be careful I don't render a false account.
GLAUCON
We'll be careful; only go on.
SOCRATES
Let's remind ourselves that we've often claimed
that there are many beautiful and good things,
and there is also beauty itself and the good itself
which we've put forward as single ideas of what is.
GLAUCON
That's so.
SOCRATES
We claim the many may be seen but not thought,
while the ideas are thought but not seen.
GLAUCON
Absolutely.
SOCRATES
So what do we see visible things with?
GLAUCON
With sight.
SOCRATES
Don't we hear things with hearing
and perceive all other things with the other senses?
GLAUCON
Of course.
SOCRATES
Have you ever noticed that
seeing requires something
besides the things seen and sight?
GLAUCON
No.
SOCRATES
Color can't be seen without what you call light.
GLAUCON
That's true.
SOCRATES
Then what joins together the visible
and the ability to see is more valuable,
unless light is without value.
GLAUCON
But it's far from being without value.
SOCRATES
Which of the gods in heaven
is the lord causing this,
whose light makes our sight
see visible things best?
GLAUCON
It's clear your question refers to the sun.
SOCRATES
Then the sun is not sight,
but as the cause of sight, is it seen by it?
GLAUCON
That's so.
SOCRATES
Now by the offspring of the good I mean that
as the good is in the intelligible world
to the mind and mental things,
so is the sun in the visible world to the things seen.
GLAUCON
How? Explain it to me.
SOCRATES
You know that when the eyes turn to objects
on whose colors the light of day no longer shines,
at night they are dim and almost blind,
but when directed to objects illuminated by the sun,
they see clearly and apparently have vision.
GLAUCON
Of course.
SOCRATES
Now apply this to the soul:
when it rests on what truth and reality shine on
it understands them
and apparently has intelligence;
but when it's been mixed in the dark
with what becomes and passes away,
it has opinions and is dulled;
and it changes its opinions up and down
as though it had no intelligence.
GLAUCON
It does.
SOCRATES
Now this which provides truth to what is known
and ability to the knower
you must claim is the idea of the good
and the real cause of knowledge and truth
as they're known by the mind.
As beautiful as knowing and truth are,
you'll correctly think of this as more beautiful.
Just as it's correct to think of light and sight
as like the sun,
but not to think they are the sun,
so here it's correct
to consider knowledge and truth
as like the good,
but not to think they are the good;
but the good is of still greater value.
GLAUCON
You mean an extraordinary beauty,
if it's the source of knowledge and truth,
and yet goes beyond them in beauty.
SOCRATES
As the sun is considered
the origin of visible things,
so things known are not only provided by the good
with their being known,
but their reality itself is provided by the good;
yet it transcends that reality in dignity and power.
GLAUCON
Spirit may transcend no farther!
SOCRATES
You're the cause for compelling me
to talk about this.
GLAUCON
Don't stop,
but explain what the sun is most similar to,
if anything is left.
SOCRATES
I am leaving much out.
GLAUCON
Don't even omit a little.
SOCRATES
I think there is much,
but as far as it's presently possible
I won't willingly leave out anything.
GLAUCON
Don't.
SOCRATES
Observe then, as we were saying,
there are these two,
one is sovereign over the intelligible
and the other over the visible.
Now take a line divided into two unequal sections,
again cut each section into the same ratio,
both the visible and the intelligible,
and in clearness and unclearness to each other
one section of the visible will be images.
By images I mean first shadows,
then reflections in water and smooth surfaces
and all such things, if you understand.
GLAUCON
I do.
SOCRATES
Then assume the other is what this is like,
the animals around us and all the plants
and the whole category of artificial things.
GLAUCON
I assume it.
SOCRATES
Would you be willing to claim it's divided
into truth and what is not,
as opinion is to knowing,
so the similar is to what it's similar to?
GLAUCON
I would.
SOCRATES
Consider then how the intelligible section is cut.
GLAUCON
How?
SOCRATES
Then one section is cut
so that the soul is compelled
to search by using likeness from hypotheses,
not to a principle but to a conclusion,
but in the other it advances from hypothesis
above hypothesis to a principle without those images
but does it through the system of ideas themselves.
GLAUCON
I don't adequately understand what you mean.
SOCRATES
You'll understand more easily from geometry.
I think you know they postulate
lines, angles, and figures as hypotheses,
taking it for granted they're obvious to everyone;
starting from these
the rest is explained and concluded.
GLAUCON
Certainly; I know that.
SOCRATES
Though they talk about visible forms,
such as a square or diagonal, which have images,
they draw them not as things and images
but to represent those ideas themselves,
which can only be seen by the mind.
GLAUCON
True.
SOCRATES
Now by these I mean the intelligible section
where the soul must use hypotheses in searching,
not principles, since it can't rise above hypotheses,
and using as images the physical things
which are clearer than their visible reflections.
GLAUCON
I understand how geometry and related arts do this.
SOCRATES
Now by the other section of the intelligible
understand that I mean the reason itself
attaining the ability to discuss,
not using hypotheses as principles but as hypotheses
in order to rise above them to the principle of all,
attaining that, and again what that has,
going down to the conclusion,
using none of the senses,
but going from ideas themselves through ideas
and in the end to an idea.
GLAUCON
I understand, not adequately,
for it's much work;
yet you wish to distinguish clearer being
by the discussion of real knowledge
and the intelligible contemplated
from the so-called arts
which must begin with hypotheses and thought,
but the ones contemplating them don't perceive
because they don't go back
to consider the principle,
but from hypotheses
they don't seem to you to understand intelligence,
although being intelligent with a principle.
You seem to call the thought of geometers thought
as being in between opinion and intelligence.
SOCRATES
I approve your understanding as most adequate.
For these four sections
accept four experiences occurring in the soul:
intelligence the highest, thought second,
third assign belief, and finally images;
and arrange them in order as it's believed
they share in truth and their objects in clearness.
GLAUCON
I understand, concur, and arrange them as you say.
SOCRATES
Next compare the nature of our experience
concerning education and lack of education.
For look,
humans dwell in a kind of underground cave
open to the light all along the cave;
in it from childhood
their legs and necks are in chains
so that they stay seeing only in front,
and they're unable to turn their heads around;
the light of a fire above and distant from them
is burning behind them,
and between the fire and the chained is a road
along which a low wall has been built,
like screens are set before wonder-workers
in front of people,
above which they show the wonders.
GLAUCON
I see.
SOCRATES
Now see people along this wall
carrying all kinds of artifacts above the wall
and human statues and stone and wooden animals;
some carrying them speak, and others are silent.
GLAUCON
You tell of unusual images and prisoners.
SOCRATES
Similar to us, for first do you think
they would see anything
of themselves and each other
except the shadows from the fire
on the cave wall in front of them?
GLAUCON
How could they,
if they're forced to keep their heads
unmoved throughout their life?
SOCRATES
So if they could converse with each other,
don't you think they would believe
they're naming the things present as seen?
GLAUCON
They must.
SOCRATES
If their prison had an echo
from the opposite wall,
when a passer-by spoke,
do you think they would believe
the passing shadow was the speaker?
GLAUCON
By God, I do.
SOCRATES
Then in every way they would consider the truth
nothing but the shadows of the artifacts.
GLAUCON
It's quite necessary.
SOCRATES
Now consider what would naturally happen
if some of them were released
and healed from the chains and thoughtlessness:
When they're released
and suddenly compelled to stand up
and turn around and slowly go
and look up at the light,
feeling pain while doing all this,
and due to the glare being unable to look upon
those objects whose shadows they had seen,
what do you think they would say,
if someone said that things seen then were illusions,
but that now nearer to reality
turning to the more real
they would be looking more correctly?
And being shown each passing thing
if they were compelled to answer what it is,
don't you think they would be in doubt
and believe that what was seen before is more true
than what is shown now?
GLAUCON
Much more.
SOCRATES
If they were compelled to look at the light itself,
wouldn't their eyes be in pain
and turning away escape to those things
which they can look upon and are accustomed to
as more clear than the things shown?
GLAUCON
That's so.
SOCRATES
If someone dragged them from there by force
up the steep ascent and didn't let go
until they were drawn out into the sun's light,
wouldn't they suffer pain and struggle,
and when they came to the light,
their eyes being full of sunbeams
wouldn't they be unable to see
even one of the things now called true?
GLAUCON
At least not suddenly.
SOCRATES
I think they'd need
to get used to seeing things above:
first the shadows would be easy to look upon,
after this images in water,
and last the things themselves;
from these at night they would go on
to view things in heaven and heaven itself,
looking at the light of the stars and moon more easily
than by day the sun and its light.
GLAUCON
Why not?
SOCRATES
Finally they'd be able
to look upon and view the sun,
not in water nor phantoms of it in other settings,
but itself by itself in its own place.
GLAUCON
That's necessary.
SOCRATES
After this they'd conclude about it
that this is what provides the seasons and years
and presides over all things in the visible region
and somehow is the cause of all those things
which they had seen.
GLAUCON
It's clear they would come to that next.
SOCRATES
So remembering their first dwelling
and what passed for wisdom there with the prisoners,
don't you think they'd be happy with the change
and pity them?
GLAUCON
Definitely.
SOCRATES
And if some were honored
and praised by each other then
and given prizes for seeing those passing by sharpest,
and for remembering their habitual moving sequences,
and for being most able to predict their future return,
do you think they would want to have these
and would envy those honored and successful,
or with Homer would they definitely prefer being
a serf to another landless man and endure anything
rather than believe those and live in that way?
GLAUCON
I think they'd accept anything rather than that.
SOCRATES
Notice this too.
If they went down again
and sat on their old seat,
wouldn't their eyes be full of darkness,
suddenly coming out of the sunlight?
GLAUCON
Very much.
SOCRATES
If they had to compete
in discerning those shadows again
with those perpetual prisoners while dim-sighted,
before the eyes adjusted,
the habit's time certainly not being short,
then wouldn't they provoke laughter,
and wouldn't those say about them,
that having gone up
they returned with eyes ruined,
and that it's not worth even trying to go up?
And if those could lay their hands on them
and kill them
for attempting to release and lead up any,
would they kill them?
GLAUCON
Definitely.
SOCRATES
Now this image, dear Glaucon,
applies to everything said before,
comparing the setting revealed through sight
to living in the prison,
and the light of the fire in it to the sun's power;
and if you assume the ascent and the view above
is the soul's way up to the intelligible region
you'll not mistake my hope,
since you want to hear this;
but God knows if it happens to be true.
So the phenomena appear thus to me:
in the known the idea of the good is the ultimate
and is seen with difficulty,
and having been seen the conclusion is that
it's the cause of all things correct and beautiful,
generating light and lord of this in the visible;
in the intelligible it's the lord
providing truth and intelligence,
and those intending to act sensibly
either in private or public should see this.
GLAUCON
I'm following as best I can.
SOCRATES
Come then and follow here
and don't be surprised
that the ones coming to this
are not willing to act in human affairs,
but their souls always urge them
to spend time above;
for this is likely if the comparison holds.
GLAUCON
It's likely.
SOCRATES
Do you think it's surprising
if someone returning from the divine view
to evil human affairs is put to shame
and appears quite ridiculous while dim-sighted
and before becoming adequately adjusted
to the dark environment
is compelled to contend in courtrooms or elsewhere
about the shadows of the just or of the statues,
and to debate about this when these undertaking them
have never seen justice itself?
GLAUCON
It wouldn't be surprising.
SOCRATES
Then if this is true, we should consider that
education is not really what some claim it is;
for they claim they can put knowledge into the soul
that doesn't have it, like sight into the blind.
GLAUCON
So they claim.
SOCRATES
But now logic indicates this ability is in each soul,
and the instrument by which each understands
is like an eye
which can't turn from light to darkness
unless it turns the whole body,
so with the whole soul it's to be turned around
from becoming until it can endure
viewing the brightest of the real;
and this we claim is the good, or don't we?
GLAUCON
Yes.
SOCRATES
Now wouldn't there be
an art of turning it around
in the easiest and most effective way,
not of creating sight,
but as one already has it of bringing about
what was turned and looking incorrectly.
GLAUCON
Probably.
SOCRATES
While other virtues are near the body
and are created by habit and practice,
that of thought is more divine
and never loses its ability,
and by its direction
becomes useful and beneficial
or useless and harmful.
Or haven't you noticed how
those said to be bad are smart
and focus their little soul on its interests,
not with poor sight,
but it's forced to serve evil,
so that the sharper the vision
the more evil it does?
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
Yet if such a nature
from childhood may be cut loose
of the lead weights of pleasures and greed
which turn the sight of the soul down,
and be converted to truth,
it would be sharpest on this
as now it is on those.
GLAUCON
Probably.
SOCRATES
Isn't it probable and necessary from what was said,
that the uneducated and inexperienced in truth
could not preside adequately over a state
nor would those allowed to be educated to the end;
the first because they don't have one purpose in life
to which all private and public actions should be aimed,
and the others because they're not willing to act,
believing they're already living with the blessed?
GLAUCON
True.
SOCRATES
So our work is to encourage the best natures
to learn what we claim is the greatest,
to see the good and ascend to that;
when they've ascended
we shouldn't let them stay there,
but we should encourage them to go down
among the prisoners
to share their labors and honors.
GLAUCON
Should we wrong them
and make them live a worse life
when they can do better?
SOCRATES
Have you forgot that we care about the whole state
and harmonizing all the citizens by persuasion
so that each can benefit the others
in whatever they can give the community?
GLAUCON
That's true; I forgot.
SOCRATES
Consider, Glaucon,
that we're not wronging philosophers
if we ask them to serve the state
in exchange for the education they have received.
Those with more education
are more capable of sharing;
they should go down
to live with those viewing shadows;
for once accustomed to them
they'll know them best,
having seen the truth
of the beautiful, just, and good.
So our state will live awake,
not in a dream like most now
where they fight in shadows to lead,
as if that were a great good;
but the truth is that the state
in which those lead who least want to lead
is the most undisturbed.
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
When those lead who are wealthy, not in money,
but in the happiness of a good and thoughtful life,
a well-governed state becomes possible.
But when offices become prizes of contention,
such warfare destroys both them and the state.
GLAUCON
True.
SOCRATES
Does any other life look down on political leaders
except that of the true philosophers?
GLAUCON
No, by God.
SOCRATES
Then must not a philosopher
be able to define with logic
and abstract from all other things
the idea of the good,
as though in battle being tested,
and endeavor to examine everything
according to reality and not opinion?
For whoever lacks this ability
doesn't know the good itself
nor any particular good.
GLAUCON
By God, I agree with you.
SOCRATES
Also a philosopher must be diligent in learning,
and loving truth
will hate even involuntary falsehood,
and will be prudent, courageous, generous and just.
For you know the soul has three parts,
each with its corresponding pleasures and virtues.
GLAUCON
What are they?
SOCRATES
First the appetites for food, drink, sex and desires
are also related to money-loving,
since money is used to gratify these desires;
this pleasure we could call
the love of gain or profit.
Can you name the corresponding virtue?
GLAUCON
Certainly; it's prudence or self-control.
SOCRATES
Next the emotional part
seeks victory and reputation
and can be called ambitious or honor-loving.
What virtue is associated with that?
GLAUCON
Clearly courage.
SOCRATES
Finally the intelligence seeks learning and knowledge
and can be said to love truth and wisdom.
GLAUCON
And wisdom would be the ideal virtue sought.
SOCRATES
Precisely.
Now don't the money-lovers
and the lovers of honor and the philosophers
disagree as to which pleasures are best?
GLAUCON
They certainly do,
for money-lovers care nothing
for honor or knowledge if they bring no gain,
and the ambitious look down
on wealth and education,
while a lover of wisdom
rises above gain and honor.
SOCRATES
But which of these can judge
which pleasure is best?
Do the lovers of wealth and honor
ever experience the pleasures of knowledge?
GLAUCON
Not really.
SOCRATES
For only a philosopher
understands both gain and honor
and yet has entered the reality of being and truth,
and thus using the ability of intelligence
can best judge between the three different values.
GLAUCON
That's true.
SOCRATES
For the appetites relate to the body,
which we found is far from reality
but always changing,
and the emotions are dependent on opinions,
which also are below the realm of knowledge;
but intelligence is able to know true being,
and so the whole soul
is best guided by its wisdom,
while courage and prudence govern the rest.
GLAUCON
Precisely.
SOCRATES
To use a metaphor we might say that
the appetites are like a many-headed beast,
emotion like a lion,
and intelligence like a human.
If the desires take over, then the beast rages;
if the ambitious lion takes charge, conflict results;
but if human reason has dominion,
then we'll have harmony inside and justice outside.
For the human will use the courage of the lion
to restrain the many lusts of the beast;
providing what is needed all will be friendly,
and every part of the soul and everyone in society
will grow and prosper as is proper to their natures.
Thus it's better for everyone
to be led by divine intelligence.
Therefore we have laws
and constitutional government,
and children are guided
by those responsible for them
until they develop this leadership inside themselves
and learn how to be responsible
for their own freedom.
GLAUCON
That's clear.
SOCRATES
But the unjust and inharmonious
become worse people,
and those who get away with wrong still worse;
while those who are caught may be corrected,
and by discipline the brutish part can be tamed
so that the gentle part is liberated,
and the whole soul may return to its best nature
in prudence and justice and thoughtfulness,
just as the body gains strength when it's healthy.
Now as the soul is greater than the body,
the intelligent will care more about virtue
and less about bodily pleasures and even health
except insofar as the body is attuned to harmony
for the sake of the balance in the soul.
GLAUCON
Absolutely, if one intends to be a true musician.
SOCRATES
So one will relate to wealth and offices
only as these are for the highest good of the whole,
and the individual, like the ideal state,
will be led by a higher principle, the good.
GLAUCON
I think that state doesn't exist on earth.
SOCRATES
But perhaps there is a model of it in heaven,
and those seeing it may live in it nonetheless.
GLAUCON
That's likely.
SOCRATES
We haven't described the greatest rewards of virtue.
GLAUCON
You must mean something inconceivably great,
if it's greater than what was already said.
SOCRATES
What could be great in a short time
compared to all of eternity?
GLAUCON
Nothing.
SOCRATES
Haven't you perceived that
our souls are immortal
and never are destroyed?
GLAUCON
By God, not I.
Do you mean you hold this?
SOCRATES
I do and you should too, for it's not hard.
GLAUCON
I'd like to hear about that.
SOCRATES
Listen.
Don't you call things good and bad?
GLAUCON
I do.
SOCRATES
Does the bad corrupt and destroy,
while the good preserves and benefits?
GLAUCON
Certainly.
SOCRATES
Now if disease corrupts and destroys the body,
as mildew does wood and rust iron,
then what about the evils of the soul,
do you know them?
GLAUCON
They're opposite to the virtues
we already discussed:
injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance.
SOCRATES
These may corrupt,
but do any destroy the soul?
Does wrong make a soul die,
like disease does a body?
GLAUCON
Never,
but does disease in the body kill the soul too?
SOCRATES
No, disease in the body may cause the body to die,
but vice in the soul may corrupt but doesn't kill;
just like bad food won't kill the body
unless it first causes disease in the body;
but disease in the body
doesn't necessarily cause vice,
and vice surely doesn't cause death to that person,
even though a vicious person
might murder another.
GLAUCON
You're right.
SOCRATES
Thus neither a fever nor a knife to the throat
nor even chopping up the body into bits
can cause the soul to be destroyed.
So if the soul is not destroyed by itself or another,
it's clear it always exists and must be immortal.
GLAUCON
It must be.
SOCRATES
To view the soul in truth,
we must observe her
not when joined to the body and its evils,
but see her with reason in her original purity;
and you'll find she is far more beautiful
and will better distinguish justice and injustice
and everything we've discussed.
GLAUCON
Absolutely.
SOCRATES
Now we must restore the rewards to the just,
for certainly the character of the just and unjust
does not escape the notice of the gods?
GLAUCON
Let's do so.
SOCRATES
For even if the just person falls into poverty
or disease or any other supposed evil,
for that person these will in the end
prove good in life and in death;
for such a person
will never be neglected by the gods.
Even in human relations don't people tend to
treat the just well and offer them offices,
while the unjust even if they escape when young
in the end are caught and punished somehow?
GLAUCON
Certainly what you say is just.
SOCRATES
But the rewards and blessings in life are nothing
in comparison to those awaiting the just after death.
GLAUCON
I'd like to know more about that.
SOCRATES
Then let me tell you a story
about a warrior named Er.
Having died in a war,
on the tenth day the decayed corpses were taken up;
but his was healthy,
and on the twelfth day
laying on the funeral pyre he revived;
and coming back to life he told what he saw there.
He said when the soul went out
it traveled with many
and came to a mysterious place
with two openings in the earth
and two in heaven above;
between these sat judges
who after judgment ordered
the just to move to the right and up to heaven
with the signs of their judgment attached,
and the unjust to the left and down into the earth
wearing the signs of what they'd done on their backs.
Himself approaching he was told that
he should be a messenger to people from there,
and they directed him to listen
and observe everything in the place.
He saw souls departing after judgment,
while from the earth came dusty souls
and down from heaven clean and bright ones;
they went to a meadow
and discussed their experiences,
some lamenting how dreadful things
were under the earth,
and others telling of indescribable heavenly visions.
To relate it all would take too long,
but for every wrong they had done to anyone
they had to pay a penalty ten times for each;
and if they had done acts of kindness
and had been holy and just
they received a reward in the same measure.
He saw some dictators and great criminals coming up,
but they were thrown back down into Tartarus again.
After seven days in the meadow they traveled on
and in four days came to where a pillar of light
extended from above all through heaven and earth,
like a rainbow, only brighter and purer.
They came to this after another day's journey
and saw in the middle of the light
the connections stretched from heaven,
for this light binds together all the orbits of heaven.
From the heights stretched the spindle of Necessity
surrounded by the orbits
of the planets, sun and moon,
each sounding a note and all seven in harmony.
Sitting around the throne were the three Fates,
the daughters of Necessity, dressed in white
singing together the music of the Sirens:
Lachesis what was, Clotho what is,
and Atropos what is to be.
So when they arrived they went to Lachesis.
A prophet taking lots and life plans from Lachesis
went up on a high platform to say:
"Souls of a day, death-bringing birth
is the beginning of another mortal cycle.
Your spirit will not be by lot,
but you will choose your spirits.
Let the first by lot choose a life,
which you will live with from necessity.
Virtue having no master,
as you honor or dishonor her
each will have more or less of her.
The chooser is responsible, not God."
Saying this the lots were thrown among them all,
and each picked one up,
except Er wasn't allowed to.
After this the life plans were laid out before them,
many more than those present and of all kinds:
lives of all animals and various human lives:
tyrannies ending in early death, poverty, and exile;
there were lives of men famous
for their forms, beauty, strength, and noble birth,
and others infamous for the same things,
and in the same way for women.
But the quality of soul was not determined,
because a different choice
produced a different life;
and mixed together were wealth and poverty,
sickness and health,
and intermediate conditions too.
That probably, dear Glaucon,
is the entire human risk,
and this is why each of us should be careful,
neglecting other studies for this one,
if one can learn and find someone
who will create the ability and knowledge
to distinguish a useful life from a poor one,
and always choose the best possible,
taking into account everything we've discussed,
to know how combining or separating these
will affect the virtue of the life:
either beauty with poverty
or how wealth affects good and bad
with what kinds of souls,
high and low birth and private life
and leadership and strength and weakness
and aptitude and dullness
and all such natural and acquired gifts of the soul,
so that one can choose looking at the soul's nature
between the worse and the better life,
the worse producing injustice and the better justice,
disregarding everything else;
for we have seen this is the best choice
both in living and dying.
One should go into Hades
having this adamantine faith,
so that not falling into tyrannies and such
one won't do bad works and suffer greatly,
but will know how
to choose the moderate life always
and avoid either extreme in this life and the next,
for this produces the happiest human.
So then the messenger from there reported
the prophet spoke thus:
"Even for the one coming last,
with an intelligent choice, living diligently
there is a lovable life that's not bad.
Let not the beginning chooser be careless
nor the last be discouraged."
Having said this, the first by lot
immediately came and chose the greatest tyranny,
and in thoughtlessness and greed
didn't examine the choice adequately, not noticing
it involved eating his children and other evils;
considering it at leisure he regretted the choice,
not heeding the warning by the prophet;
for he didn't blame himself,
but luck and spirits and everything but himself.
He had come down from heaven,
having lived in an orderly state in his previous life,
accustomed to virtue by habit without philosophy.
Not a few were so caught coming from heaven,
as unexercised in pain;
but most from the earth
had suffered and seen others,
and they didn't make their choice suddenly.
Yet always if at each return to this life
one was a sound philosopher
and didn't have the last choice,
from what was reported from there
not only are they happy here
but the journey there
wouldn't be underground and rough
but smooth and in heaven.
For he said the sight was worth seeing
how each chose their lives;
for it was pitiful and ridiculous and surprising;
for most chose
according to the previous life's habits.
But when all the souls had chosen their lives
they went to Lachesis who sent with each
the life's guardian spirit and the choice's completer,
who first led them to Clotho to ratify the destiny,
and then to Atropos to make it irreversible;
from there they went under the throne of Necessity
and traveled to the plain of Oblivion
through stifling and terrible heat;
for no trees or plants were growing,
and they camped along the Careless river.
They were all compelled
to drink a measure of water;
and as they drank they forgot everything.
When they had slept, in the middle of the night,
there was thunder and an earthquake;
and from there
they suddenly were taken up to birth,
like shooting stars.
But Er was prevented from drinking the water;
yet how he returned to his body he didn't know;
but suddenly looking up at dawn
he saw himself laying on the pyre.
And so, Glaucon,
the story was preserved and not lost,
and it will save us if we believe it,
and we'll cross Oblivion
and keep our souls undefiled.
But if we're convinced by me,
believing the soul is immortal
and can endure all evils and all goods,
we'll always follow the upward course
and pursue justice in every thoughtful way
so that we may be friends
to ourselves and the gods,
both staying here
and when we receive our reward
in the journey which was described;
then we shall do well.
-end-
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